Kirsty Duncan

[Health, April 30th, 2009]

Mr. Speaker, health officials missed the opportunity to act in Mexico, where there are 2,500 suspected cases of flu. CDC and WHO officials say that the flu may turn out to be more similar in both Mexico and the United States; that is, more mild cases may be uncovered in Mexico and more severe ones found in the U.S.

What is the minister doing to ensure that no opportunity to intervene appropriately is missed here in Canada?

[Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, April 30th, 2009]

Madam Speaker, bioterrorism is a real threat. I will give a recent example. In October 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to American news media offices and to senators. The letters killed five people and infected twenty others. Broad public health measures were implemented to treat thousands who were potentially exposed and the decontamination of buildings and post offices took years. The total cost to the United States was more than $1 billion.

We certainly need to be vigilant about bioterrorism. Diseases we would be concerned about, for example, are anthrax and plague, to name two.

[Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, April 30th, 2009]

Madam Speaker, these were certainly questions that were raised in committee. It is our understanding that we received a letter from the Privacy Commissioner and that conversations are ongoing with the government to address those concerns.

[Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, April 30th, 2009]

Madam Speaker, we are currently facing a very serious threat in Canada with influenza A(H1N1) that started in Mexico. It is a new virus. It has segments from avian, swine and human flu. We started with clusters in Mexico which then spread to the United States and Canada.

The pandemic alert level has been raised from a phase 3 to a phase 4 and now phase 5. This means that in Canada we are looking at rolling out our pandemic plan. Organizations throughout Canada that have developed a plan over the last several years will also be working on rolling out their plan.

Pandemics can be very serious. In the last century, we had 1918, 1957 and 1968. The latter two pandemics killed three million people. In stark contrast, the pandemic in 1918 killed 50 million people worldwide.

[Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, April 30th, 2009]

Madam Speaker, we learned through our committee work that probably several thousand labs need this legislation. We currently do not know which labs, for example, hold pathogens below level four. It is important that the government knows this information because if there is a problem it needs to respond.

The legislation is important because it will protect laboratory workers and the communities.

[Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, April 30th, 2009]

Madam Speaker, today I rise to speak to Bill C-11, the human pathogens and toxins act, adopted by the Standing Committee on Health on March 31 and presented to the House on April 2, 2009. The bill is important and significant because infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.

Today, new infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, SARS and now swine influenza A(H1N1) are emerging. Old infectious diseases such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat. Research to combat infectious diseases has resulted in over 5,000 laboratory-associated infections and almost 200 deaths over the last 70 years. Most recently, in 2008, the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.

Fortunately, Canada has not experienced a large intentional or unintentional release of a dangerous agent. However, we have had some close calls. In April 2005 a facility in Canada imported a live virus sample under a risk group 2 permit. However, laboratory analysis showed that the material was contaminated with a risk group 3 pathogen: namely, influenza A(H2N2). Once the contamination was confirmed, the Public Health Agency of Canada's importation office, in consultation with the World Health Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the provincial health ministers contacted the supplier of the material and all facilities in Canada that had been issued a permit for the same panel and advised them of corrective action.

It was only because the material was imported that the federal government was able to track who had the affected materials. Should this situation happen today in Canada, with a domestically produced product, there would be no authority or ability to track materials and advise affected parties of corrective action. This could result in a biosafety and biosecurity risk as Canadians would likely have no immunity to the influenza A(H2N2) virus, possibly creating the conditions for the next influenza pandemic. This is why the legislation is so important.

Currently, PHAC has knowledge of laboratory-acquired infections, but has no national reporting mechanism to capture them. Our laboratories must have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment to protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratories. We must ensure the safety of all Canadians.

Therefore, we must be diligent in creating a legislative base that balances biosafety without impeding scientific advancement. We must also provide assurances to the Canadian public and our international partners that Canada takes biosafety and biosecurity seriously.

Bill C-11 will only succeed in making Canadians more secure if the scientists it regulates are consulted thoroughly and if the bill is implemented in close partnership with them. Canadian economic and social prosperity depend on scientific study. We must be wary of a regulatory regime that would interrupt discovery, as happened in the United States following publication of similar legislation. Many laboratories simply stopped working with listed pathogens rather than face the costs and hassles of complying with the legislation.

I believe Bill C-11 strikes the necessary balance between mitigation of risk and scientific freedom, which must then be maintained in the regulations. This balance will require, in the words of one witness, “constant attention and rebalancing that can be done only through ongoing dialogue with the scientific community”.

Witnesses from PHAC assured the committee that consultations will help determine what the regulations regime will look like. Witnesses were optimistic that they could move forward together with partners and that they would continue to take action to address their concerns.

The committee recommended the creation of an external advisory group, perhaps consisting of representatives from private industry, provincial public health agencies, universities and others to ensure that the regulations and the subsequent implementation of the bill proceed with the input and the support of the scientists.

The proposed external advisory group could also be instrumental in categorizing pathogens, as there was discussion regarding, for example, whether or not certain risk group 2 pathogens should be removed from the schedule. Removing risk group 2 from the legislative framework would take away the ability to know who has those pathogens, which are the majority of pathogens in Canada, the ability to assess whether they are handled in an appropriate manner and the ability to measure laboratory-acquired infections and their impacts.

There was general agreement that risk group 2 should be handled in a safe manner, which is not necessarily happening now, but less stringently than risk group 3.

Witnesses from PHAC also addressed stakeholder concerns regarding financial expenditures. It was pointed out that these costs must be balanced against the cost of taking no action, mainly loss of credibility, dollars and human life, which are significant in this case.

Other stakeholder concerns included duplicate laboratory licensing regimes, security checks, licences and privacy issues. The potential for duplicate regulatory licensing and inspection regimes is significant, as is the possible impacts on workload and scheduling which could drastically affect the operation of clinical, public health and research laboratories.

Witnesses from PHAC agreed that opportunities for harmonizing licensing with existing regimes must be considered. Witnesses from PHAC also agreed to clarify the requirements for security clearances for different categories of workers.

Security checks were thought to be burdensome by stakeholders due to significant impacts on students and training, as well as the lab's ability to hire additional staff during an outbreak. Stakeholders would like PHAC to clarify who the inspectors will be, how they will be trained and how they will carry out their tasks.

Partners would also like PHAC to address the important issues regarding licensing. For example, to whom a licence should be awarded, the institution, the group or the individual? What conditions will be required for awarding licences? Will there be an appeals process? Will custodial staff have access to labs? Will they require security clearances?

The last concern I will address is that of privacy, as clause 38 of the bill identifies extremely broad powers for the minister to order an applicant to disclose personal information. It is the committee's understanding that conversations have taken place with the Privacy Commissioner to satisfy stakeholder unease.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention, because bioterrorism remains a very real threat.

In 2004, The National Academies committee issued a report entitled, “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism”. The report identified experiments of concern, such as rendering vaccines ineffective or turning non-pathogens, which are not found anywhere in the bill's schedules, into pathogens.

We need to ensure that granting agencies and medical journals are sensitive to these matters and have processes for addressing them. The same National Academies committee recommended creating, through legislation, an independent science and technology advisory group to the intelligence community. Does such a group exist in Canada to monitor and study the next generation of threats in a comprehensive, systematic way, as is being undertaken in the United States?

Finally, the bill is only part of the web of protection needed to make Canada more secure and prepared for bioterrorism. What is being done to promote a common culture of awareness, a shared sense of responsibility to prevent misuse within the scientific community?

We need more than legislation. We need a code of ethics, role modelling and teaching with a particular focus on the biosecurity agenda in Canada.

We have had multiple wake-up calls. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety and biosecurity, which is why this legislation is important. The committee did work hard together to make necessary modifications to the bill.

[Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, April 29th, 2009]

Mr. Speaker, I absolutely agree. As I mentioned, children spend their lives virtually on the floor. They put everything in their mouths and their body systems are still developing. We have to know what is going into the products they use.

I point out that the Canadian Cancer Society reports that healthy lifestyle choices could prevent about 50% of cancers. Each of us has pollutants in our blood and urine: heavy metals, pesticides and other toxic chemicals such as mercury, lead and PCBs. The government currently requires big polluters to report how much is coming out of smokestacks, but it does not require them to report what is going into the products they are making.

[Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, April 29th, 2009]

Mr. Speaker, that is a very important issue and we would like to hear about that in committee.

[Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, April 29th, 2009]

Mr. Speaker, U.S. companies must label their ingredients in consumer products under the fair packaging and labeling act. In California, products that contain chemicals known or suspected by the state to cause cancer or disrupt normal reproductive functions must have a warning label.

The European Union has an eco-label system. Products such as cleaners, indoor paints and varnishes have to meet certain environmental criteria. Products cannot carry the eco-label flower if they contain cancer-causing substances. It is really important to understand that cosmetics in the European Union are highly regulated. Cosmetic manufacturers must provide safety information on all their ingredients and substances known or suspected to cause cancer are not allowed in European cosmetics.

[Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, April 29th, 2009]

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in the House to support Bill C-6, An Act respecting the safety of consumer products.

Albert Schweitzer, doctor, philosopher and Nobel Prize winner, warned that “Man has lost the capacity to foresee and forestall. He will end by destroying the earth”.

I would like to give the House a lesson in history regarding a product and a devastating disease.

Animal slaughterhouse wastes have been recycled into animal feed since the beginning of the 20th century. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. department of agriculture decided that carcasses of sheep afflicted with the disease scrapie should not be used in animal or human foods. Tragically, the U.K. government decided that its industry should be left to decide how its equipment should be operated. It was not until 1996 that processing standards were introduced.

In the United States, government oversight and relatively inexpensive restrictions may have prevented the mad cow epidemic. In the United Kingdom, industry self-policing provided ideal conditions for the development of the progressive, fatal disease that affects the brain.

Reducing risks to health has been a preoccupation of people, physicians, and politicians for the last 5,000 years.

Virtually every major advance in public health has involved the reduction or the elimination of risk, with the result being that the world is a safer place today. It is safer from accidents, deadly or incurable diseases and safer from hazardous consumer goods.

Therefore, it is the government's duty to do all it reasonably can to accurately assess and reduce risks, such as making sure that food, medicines and other products are safe.

Although government can rarely hope to reduce risks to zero, it can aim to lower them to a more acceptable level and should openly and transparently communicate risk and risk reduction strategies to the public.

The Canadian government introduced Bill C-6 on January 26, 2009, to ensure, through regulation, that risk is reduced and that Canadians have access to safer consumer products.

The bill is important because it would fill many regulatory gaps and give government the power to issue recalls and raise fines. Companies and their directors, officers and employees may be held criminally liable for contravention and penalized up to $5 million.

The bill would prohibit the manufacture, importation, advertising and sale of a consumer product that is a danger to human health or safety, is the subject of a recall or does not meet the regulatory requirements that apply to the product.

The bill would require that all persons who manufacture, import or sell a consumer product for commercial purposes maintain documents identifying from whom they obtained the product and to whom they sold it, and provide regulators with all related information within two days of becoming aware of an incident. These mechanisms will help ensure that products can easily be removed from store shelves when a recall is made.

Bill C-6 would also give regulators the power to order manufacturers and importers to conduct tests on a product, to provide documents related to those studies and to compile any information required to confirm compliance.

The bill also would give inspectors new wide-ranging powers, including the power to order a recall if they believe, on reasonable grounds, that a consumer product is a danger to human health or safety. These powers may be invoked even when there is a lack of full scientific certainty.

This is a strength of the bill, as scientific standards for demonstrating cause and effect are extremely rigorous and often time-consuming, substantial damage to humans may result during long testing. For example, many experts strongly suspected that smoking caused lung cancer long before overwhelming proof became available. Unfortunately, hundreds of thousands of smokers died waiting for a definitive answer. Thousands of others, however, quit smoking because they suspected, as there were 7,000 articles by 1964, that tobacco probably caused lung cancer.

When a product raises threats of harm to human health, precautionary methods should be taken, even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

Perhaps the following questions might be asked at committee. Why does the bill not phase out or ban known carcinogens and other toxic chemicals in consumer products? Why does the bill not create a mandatory testing and labelling scheme? Does the bill go far enough to protect the health of Canadians from toxic imports? Will the government dedicate the necessary resources to enforce the bill?

The United Steelworkers remind us that, “recalls and fines all happen after the fact. Canada needs a strategy that repairs...trade deals that have led to toxic imports crossing our border in the first place”, such as in 2007, when millions of Chinese made toys were recalled by both the EU and the U.S. The European Commission subsequently identified over 1,600 products that were considered risky.

We live in an increasingly chemical society. Toxic chemicals are found in everyday consumer products, including art supplies, kitchenware, personal products, pet food, toys, water bottles and many products intended for babies.

When researchers test the air in our homes, the average readings for volatile organic compounds increase in areas where cleaners are stored. CBC's Marketplace showed Pledge registered 273 parts per billion, Clorox wipes more than 1,000 parts per billion. Anything over 500 parts per billion could be a problem for people with sensitivities. Lysol's disinfecting spray, however, recorded 1,200 parts per million, or 1,000 times higher than the Clorox.

Experts do not know how dangerous these chemicals might be, but they are starting to worry. Dr. Gideon Koren, a pediatrician at the Hospital for Sick Children, asks, “How can we, as one of the most advanced countries in the world, allow these to enter our household for small children, without the appropriate testing to see that it's safe?”

Young children are especially vulnerable because they virtually live on the floor. Everything goes into their mouths, and their basic body systems are still developing.

We cannot continue to repeat the key mistake of the past, namely, responding late to early warnings as we did with benzene and PCBs.

Ever since anemia was diagnosed among young women engaged in the manufacture of bicycle tires in 1897, benzene was known to be a powerful bone marrow poison. Recommendations made in the U.K. and the U.S. in the 1920s for substitution of benzene with less toxic solvents went unheeded. Benzene-related diseases of the bone marrow continued to increase dramatically through the first half of the 20th century. Benzene was not withdrawn from consumer products in the U.S. until 1978, and this was done by manufacturers on a voluntary basis.

A chief medical inspector of factories wrote in 1934, “Looking back in the light of present knowledge, it is impossible not to feel that opportunities for discovery and prevention of disease were badly missed”.

As we continue to debate the bill, let us ensure that in 2034, future generations do not lament missed opportunities.

I would like to share my time, Mr. Speaker, with the member for St. Paul's.