Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to the opposition motion. The motion is to denounce the government for not appointing a royal commission to inquire into the "illegal activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service".
The hon. member is putting the cart before the horse. Why would the government wish to mount a royal commission when there has been no evidence of illegal activities? It is true there have been allegations of wrongdoing but they are just that, allegations.
Yet on the strength of unproven allegations the member wishes the government to mount a royal commission which would cost the taxpayers of the country hundreds of thousands of dollars. The hon. member may be prepared to take such liberties with the public purse, but the government has made it clear that it is committed to a program of fiscal responsibility.
Fiscal considerations aside, there is a more serious concern raised by the hon. member's motion. Implicit in the wording of the motion is the idea that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is an organization that is not subject to the authority of Parliament or to any type oversight mechanism. This motion, by suggesting such an idea, does a grave disservice to the reputation of CSIS and to the House which in 1984 put in place an extensive array of legislative safeguards and oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability, control and review of CSIS activities. Operating within this legislative framework, CSIS has proven itself to be a responsible security intelligence agency on a professional par with those of other western democracies.
Central to the control and direction of CSIS are the principles of ministerial control and accountability which are also central to Canadian parliamentary democracy. The CSIS act ensured that the minister would have full knowledge and power of direction over the policies, operations and management of CSIS. Subsection 6(1) of the CSIS act is unequivocal in its message that the minister provides direction to the director of the service.
The CSIS act also supplied the minister with the means to control and guide the service. Ministerial control is to be distinguished from ministerial accountability. Though they are sometimes used interchangeably, the terms have distinct meanings. Control refers to the minister's power of approval, the minister's ability to set policy and give direction and the means at the minister's disposal to ensure that decisions are implemented.
Accountability refers to the minister's obligation to answer before Parliament and the duty of officials to answer to the minister. A principal means by which the minister exercises control over CSIS is through the power of approval. By the normal rules of government, a minister must be consulted on all important matters related to the minister's portfolio.
In addition, the CSIS act and ministerial directions issued to the service require the minister to personally approve a wide variety of operational activities, particularly sensitive operations. The CSIS act stipulates that the minister must personally approve all applications for judicial warrants, all CSIS arrangements with other federal agencies and departments, provincial authorities and foreign governments, and the service's assistance in the coalition of foreign intelligence in Canada.
The minister also exercises control over the service through statutory power to establish the policy guidelines for the service. This is achieved through the issuance of ministerial directions.
An act of Parliament can construct a legislative framework but legislation alone cannot provide detailed guidance covering every aspect of operational activity.
For this there needs to be a policy framework to assist interpretation and implementation. Legislation governing the creation of a security intelligence agency has a special need for such a policy framework if there is to be public confidence in how the agency operates.
Policy frameworks in support of legislation are normally achieved in two ways; through the formulation of regulations and the development of operation guidelines. Neither mechanism however is entirely satisfactory in the security intelligence context.
Regulations as public instruments are obviously unsuited for conveying detailed instructions on how secret operations are to be conducted. Internal agency rules on the other hand would not provide a sufficient level of confidence.
A third device was therefore embodied in the legislation in the form of ministerial direction issued pursuant to subsection 6(2) of the act. Ministerial direction helps to ensure that the Solicitor General is the linchpin of the legal and policy framework.
In practice the minister issues all instructions of consequence in written form regardless of subject. Through the experience of working with the CSIS act the government now defines direction pursuant to subsection 6(2) as "written instructions of a continuing nature issued at the prerogative of the minister that relates to policy standards or procedures".
The strategic work for ministerial direction is clear. Over the last 10 years a set of ministerial directions has been developed setting out the Solicitor General's governing principles for the service and its activities. The directions may be grouped into seven major categories relating to; arrangements to assist the director's accountability to the minister; the government's annual priorities for intelligence on threats to Canada's security, known as the "national requirements"; guidance on the service's statutory duties and functions; guidance on investigative
methods and techniques; instructions dealing with the service's corporate management practices; standards for negotiating co-operative arrangements with domestic and foreign organizations and, policy and file mismanagement issues, particularly the service's retention of files inherited from the RCMP security service.
Currently some 50 ministerial directions are in effect. Directions are converted by the service into operational procedures for use directly by CSIS staff. This logical progression from statute to ministerial direction to operational procedure provides a manageable and auditable means of ensuring that the service is fulfilling its duties and functions in an appropriate manner. I remind all members that SIRC is copied on all these directives.
There is also great provision in the act for accountability. A general direction also exists to ensure the director's accountability to the minister. It describes the roles and responsibilities of the Solicitor General, the Deputy Solicitor General and the director and outlines formal reporting requirements such as the director's obligation to prepare an annual report. The minister has also established guidelines for the scope and content of the director's annual report.
Direction on service operational policy in respect of the service's security intelligence mandate is particularly important to ministerial control. It ensures that the service's collection, analysis and reporting activities respond to the government's annual national requirements for security intelligence and provides practical guidance in interpreting important terminology of the CSIS act.
The operational methods also are clearly laid out. A general direction on the conduct of investigations serves as an umbrella for other more specific directions providing guidance on operational methods. It implicitly endorses the five fundamental principles for controlling investigations espoused by the McDonald commission. The rule of law must be observed at all times.
The investigative means used must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed and the probability of its occurrence. The need to use various investigative techniques must be weighed against possible damage to civil liberties or the valuable social institutions.
The more intrusive the technique, the higher the authority required to approve its use. Except in emergency circumstances, the least intrusive techniques of information collection must be used before more intrusive techniques are applied.
A direction on joint operations recognizes that in certain circumstances Canadian security interests may demand the active presence in Canada of investigators from foreign security and intelligence organizations. The principles that are to guide the service's activities in this field are that Canadian sovereignty and law are to be fully respected and protected; the objective and potential product of the co-operation must be of benefit to Canada and serve Canadian national interests; and CSIS must exercise effective control of the co-operative activity.
A direction on foreign investigation provides guidelines governing the service's foreign investigative activity in relation to threats to the security of Canada. It stipulates that the approval of the Solicitor General is required before CSIS may undertake operational activity abroad.
The direction applies to human source travel, foreign security intelligence investigations by CSIS officials and service operational assistance abroad to foreign security and intelligence organizations.
A direction on domestic liaison provides guidance on the establishment of arrangements between-