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Crucial Fact

  • Her favourite word was businesses.

Last in Parliament April 2025, as Liberal MP for Markham—Thornhill (Ontario)

Won her last election, in 2021, with 62% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023 October 23rd, 2023

Mr. Speaker, the CPTPP is an excellent agreement and many Canadian firms and exporters have benefited. It is not just a good agreement because of its commercial success, but it also has some of those very high-quality provisions for the environment, for inclusiveness.

As my hon. colleague will know, CPTPP colleagues around the table, who party to that agreement, make those decisions about accession together. We are very pleased that the first accession candidate is the United Kingdom, another of Canada's trading partners. We have just finished that very important work.

No doubt we will continue to work, along with our partners, with all the other applicants for accession.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023 October 23rd, 2023

Mr. Speaker, one of the things that I am really proud about in this agreement are the highest standards in environmental protections of any trade agreement that we have on record today. We would agree that is really important, particularly in the trade agreements that we negotiate today, in which we can indeed support an economy and protect the environment at the same time.

What is also remarkable about this agreement, which members heard me say in my opening remarks, is the speed at which we were able to reach an agreement with Ukraine and how much the Ukrainians participated in this, despite the fact that they have been and continue to be in a war effort.

I am encouraged by the work that we always do in ensuring good debate on something like this, which we all agree with, and is continuing to support Ukraine.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023 October 23rd, 2023

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague and all members in the House. At a time when Canada chose to unequivocally support Ukraine, there was a tariff-free ability for them to export into Canada, including the supply-managed sector. I know what a commitment that took for Canadians to permit that to take place, and that really did show the support that Canadians have and that my hon. colleague had, for Ukraine. Of course, in this agreement, it is clear, just like in our other trade agreements, that the supply-managed sectors are not, and are excluded from this agreement, just as they have been with others.

I believe that this is a very important and progressive agreement and a good agreement. It has provisions for investment protections. There is a chapter that deals with binding dispute settlements. Therefore, this is very much the modern agreement that we have negotiated with Ukraine, and it would facilitate what Canadians want to do, which is to participate in that reconstruction in due course.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023 October 23rd, 2023

Mr. Speaker, that is a very important question from my hon. colleague, the critic on the trade file.

We see in this agreement an effort to establish a framework that would not only enable Canadian businesses to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, but also, indeed, include the highest environmental protections of any trade agreement on record. It would very much allow Canadians to participate and allow Ukrainian businesses and investors to rapidly pursue that transition to a greener economy.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023 October 23rd, 2023

moved that Bill C-57, An Act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in the House today in support of Bill C-57, an act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine. This is not the first time I have stood in this House to introduce a new trade agreement, but this trade agreement is special. I rise today to enter into the record the story behind this agreement, because all members in the House, all Canadians and, especially, the 1.3 million members of the Ukrainian Canadian community, should know how it came about.

The story of this agreement begins with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's first visit to Canada back in 2019. During that visit, President Zelenskyy and the Prime Minister announced a mutual intention to modernize the existing Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. Following that announcement, public servants in both countries went about doing their respective homework to prepare for renewed negotiations.

That homework often takes many months. It is just part of the routine for our respective civil servants and trade negotiators. However, there was nothing routine about the way these negotiations unfolded.

First came the pandemic, which stalled progress for over a year. Then, when we were finally ready to launch negotiations, Russian troops were massing along the Ukrainian border.

On January 27, 2022, I held a virtual event with Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine's deputy prime minister and minister of economy, to announce the start of negotiations on this agreement. Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine at that time, but it was already clear that the situation was reaching a precipice. The world was seeing that an invasion was imminent, and there was a lot of uncertainty.

A short time before that announcement, I asked my Ukrainian counterpart if she and her government were still willing and able to move forward with negotiations. Her answer was candid and unequivocal: She told me that her government was determined to move ahead, and she told me how much it mattered that Canada was showing confidence in Ukraine at a time when many were beginning to question its resolve.

Ukraine knew then which path it wanted to take for its future. Ukraine had chosen the values of democracy, openness and transparency, as well as a rules-based international order. A sovereign Ukraine was seeking to modernize its infrastructure, its economy and its laws. A comprehensive and progressive free trade agreement would be an important step toward modernization for Ukraine, and Canada would be its gateway.

One month after that announcement, on February 24, 2022, Russia moved in with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it invaded for all the reasons I just listed: Ukrainian territorial and economic sovereignty, values of openness and democracy, and a rules-based international order. Vladimir Putin despises all these things, and he could not stand to see Ukraine embrace them, uphold them and blossom into a great modern nation. That is why he invaded Ukraine.

On that day, I knew, the Prime Minister knew and the government knew what we had to do. As long as the government of Ukraine stood, we would stand with it. Since the war began, Canada has committed $9 billion in military, humanitarian, financial and development assistance to Ukraine. We also understood that standing with Ukraine meant that we would see these trade negotiations through to the end.

At the outset, it was not easy. The war made travel dangerous and even routine calls impossible for our Ukrainian counterparts. Negotiations had barely begun; suddenly, they came to a standstill. They stayed at a standstill for four months, until I travelled for meetings at the OECD in Paris. That is where I met Ukraine's chief negotiator, Taras Kachka.

It is important to understand that we did not plan a formal meeting that day. He and I, along with Canada's chief negotiator, simply sat in the cafeteria of the OECD building and talked. Mr. Kachka recounted the first 120 days of the war and the challenges he had to overcome just to make that one trip to the OECD. I again asked if Ukraine was able and willing to begin negotiations. Mr. Kachka said yes and I said yes, and negotiations began in earnest.

A few weeks later, at the G7 summit in Germany, I finally met Deputy Prime Minister Svyrydenko face to face. We revisited our earlier conversations and talked of how our earlier hope of avoiding the conflict had been so savagely dispelled. We reiterated our mutual intention to reach an agreement, and then we hugged.

The private conversations I had with my Ukrainian counterparts moved me in ways that are hard to describe. If they had told me that they were not yet ready to begin trade talks, of course we would have waited. Canada would have given Ukraine as much time as it needed.

Ukraine's quiet resolve to move forward was unmistakable and unbreakable. These negotiations were driven by the very values of openness and self-determination that Ukrainian soldiers were and are fighting and dying for. I can tell the House today that, even in the midst of an all-consuming war effort, Ukraine's commitment to those values never wavered and neither did Canada's.

I am proud to say that this agreement was achieved in record time, a mere 12 months from start to finish. That shows the resolve that Canada and Ukraine share on this crucial matter. This process reached its conclusion just a few weeks ago, when our Prime Minister and President Zelenskyy signed this agreement as part of President Zelenskyy's second visit to Canada. It is my true honour to speak to it in this House.

It is not just that we reached a deal in 12 months; it is that we reached an exceptional deal. In trade circles, it is known as a “high-quality agreement”. It includes provisions for trade in services and investments, a binding dispute settlement mechanism to ensure fair treatment, and labour protections. It recognizes the importance of small- and medium-sized businesses, women-owned businesses and indigenous-owned businesses, and it includes environmental protections that are the strongest of those in any of Canada's trade agreements currently on record.

In terms of its contents, it is on par with best practice agreements such as CUSMA, the CPTPP and CETA. With this agreement, Canada becomes the first country to sign a comprehensive trade agreement with Ukraine.

Ukraine has told us that this trade deal would serve as a model for further agreements with other prospective partners. That is one of the reasons I said this agreement is special.

Above all, this agreement is special because Canadians support Ukraine's fight against Putin's barbaric invasion. They demonstrate their support through their government with military, humanitarian and financial aid. However, support for Ukraine is not limited to government alone. Here in Canada, many individuals and organizations are helping by welcoming Ukrainian families fleeing the war. Many more Canadian organizations and businesses want to join that effort, both here at home and in the Ukrainian heartland.

This agreement opens up new avenues for Canadians to support Ukraine. It establishes the rules by which Canadian companies could invest in Ukraine's reconstruction, modernize its infrastructure and create jobs in Ukraine, as well as here in Canada. There are Canadian companies already active in Ukraine, and more are joining as we speak. The Canadian construction firm of Aecon is now forming partnerships in Ukraine under a memorandum of collaboration for the construction of a hydro power plant in Ukraine.

The presence of Canadian companies will help Ukraine persevere amid the strife of war. Thanks to this agreement, more can and will join them. Through all these activities, Canada and a victorious Ukraine will strengthen our shared values in our pursuit of peace, mutual success and prosperity. At the end of the day, trade is not just about business; it is about shared values.

Ukrainians and Canadians both want a free, modern and democratic Ukraine. This trade agreement is a manifestation of those shared values. I am truly proud to have been a part of it.

Today, I urge the House to reaffirm its commitment to those values and its support for Ukraine by ensuring the swiftest possible passage of this bill. Slava Ukraini.

International Trade October 17th, 2023

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 32(2) and consistent with the policy on the tabling of treaties in Parliament, I have the honour to table, in both official languages, the treaty entitled “Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement”, done at Ottawa on September 22, 2023.

Questions on the Order Paper September 18th, 2023

Mr. Speaker, with regard to (a), funds like CASEIF IV submit drawdown requests to all the Limited Partners specifying the application of funds including details on the portfolio companies that will be supported with the funding request. Application of funds are allocated based on the drawdown request. CASEIF IV and other similar financial intermediaries provide quarterly and annual reporting that includes portfolio updates, Financial Statements and a Capital Account Statement with the value attributable to each Limited Partner.

With regard to (b), CASEIF IV and other similar financial intermediaries provide quarterly and annual reporting that includes portfolio updates, Financial Statements and a Capital Account Statement with the value attributable to each Limited Partner.

With regard to (c), CASEIF IV is a generalist growth equity fund for small and medium sized enterprises in Central America, Panama, Dominican Republic and Colombia. CASEIF IV supports companies within key target sectors, namely the agribusiness value chain, renewable energy (up to 25MW generation), food and beverages processing, manufacturing, education and IT, that promote development and fight poverty by enhancing sustainable growth in alignment with FinDev Canada’s development impact goals. As of today, the CASEIF IV investment portfolio consists of two entities, a loan to a retail company and an equity investment in a food and beverage processing company.

With regard to (d), in accordance with FinDev Canada’s Development Impact Framework, eligible transactions are assessed for their current and potential development impact on women’s economic empowerment, climate action and local market development. Contributions from FinDev Canada and other Limited Partners towards investments administered by CASEIF IV are governed by a Limited Partners Agreement (LPA) that includes an Investment Policy with each of the Limited Partners participating pro rata in each of the underlying investments unless a predefined opt out criteria is communicated upfront.

Compliance with the LPA and other Fund Documents are monitored via the quarterly and annual reporting and compliance undertakings provided with each drawdown request. The Limited Partners Advisory Committee meets at least annually or more frequent when required for decisions that required Advisory Committee approval. Deviations from the Investment Policy requires Advisory Committee approval. As a limited liability partner, FinDev Canada does not participate in the management of the Fund.

With regard to (e), FinDev follows up to ensure that its requests are respected through review of quarterly and annual reporting, quarterly valuation review, monitoring reports, request for additional information if required.

With regard to (f), CASEIF IV is in good standing with all requirements having been respected to date.

Questions on the Order Paper September 18th, 2023

Mr. Speaker, the following reflects a consolidated response approved on behalf of Global Affairs Canada ministers.

With regard to part (a), based on available records, Canada has not facilitated any such meetings between Canadian and Chinese companies involved in development projects.

With regard to part (b), Global Affairs Canada does not disaggregate the geographic scope of international assistance projects beyond the country level. Therefore, data specific to development projects in the Tibetan Autonomous Region or the other Tibetan areas referenced are not available. Canada’s bilateral aid program to China expired in 2013.

With regard to part (c), Canada’s responsible business conduct expectations, including Canada’s Responsible Business Conduct Strategy, applies to all Canadian companies active abroad, regardless of the region in which they operate.

With regard to part (d), the Government of Canada provides two non-judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms: Canada’s National Contact Point, or NCP, for Responsible Business Conduct and the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, or CORE. Canada’s NCP has a mandate to facilitate dialogue/mediation to help resolves issues raised about the observance of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, or the Guidelines, by multinational enterprises operating in or from Canada, in any economic sectors. The NCP can receive complaints related to any of the areas covered in the eleven chapters of the Guidelines, including those dealing with human rights, employment and industrial relations, and the environment. Outcomes of the NCP process can include agreement on remedy, changes to company policy, as well as relationship-building between companies and communities where they operate.

The CORE has a mandate to review allegations of human rights abuses arising from the operations of Canadian companies abroad in the mining, oil and gas, and garment sectors. The CORE can undertake a review on its own initiative or in response to a complaint received, offer informal mediation services, and issue recommendations at the end of a review. The CORE is required to report publicly throughout the process. The office of the CORE began accepting complaints on March 15, 2021. The Government of Canada expects Canadian companies involved in a dispute-resolution process to participate in good faith. If a Canadian company fails to act in good faith during a review or follow-up process, recommendations can be made to implement trade measures such as the withdrawal of Trade Commissioner Service support, and recommending that Export Development Canada and the Canadian Commercial Corporation withdraw future support.

With regard to part (e), Canada’s NCP has closed 25 cases since 2000. The NCP publishes a Final Statement at the conclusion of each case. These Final Statements, as well as other information on past NCP cases, can be found on the NCP’s website. The CORE publishes a quarterly report on complaints received and is required to publish reports on its reviews. CORE publications are available on the CORE’s website.

Questions on the Order Paper September 18th, 2023

Mr. Speaker, the following reflects a consolidated response approved on behalf of Global Affairs Canada ministers.

With regard to (a), Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service, TCS, helps Canadian businesses grow with confidence by connecting them with our funding and support programs, international opportunities, and our network of trade commissioners in over 160 cities worldwide, including with our network in greater China, including Canada’s embassy in Beijing, its consulates in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing and its trade offices across 10 secondary markets. The TCS helps companies find key local players that have the knowledge needed for clients to refine and carry out their international strategy. This may include connecting Canadian companies with potential local Chinese business partners.

With regard to (b), the Government of Canada expects Canadian companies active abroad to abide by all relevant laws, to respect human rights in their operations and to adopt best practices and internationally respected guidelines on responsible business conduct, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In support of these objectives, Canada’s responsible business conduct, or RBC, strategy – “Responsible Business Conduct Abroad: Canada’s Strategy for the Future”-- was launched in 2022. This five-year strategy, 2022-2027, sets out priorities for the Government of Canada, through the TCS and partners, to provide guidance and tools in order to support Canadian companies to uphold Canada’s RBC expectations. The TCS provides advice to Canadian companies to identify and mitigate risks and to strengthen their responsible business conduct practices. If there is a legitimate concern and there is credible information of a Canadian company’s misconduct or wrongdoing abroad, the TCS can withhold all services and support from the company.

With regard to (c), available records show no such interest or inquiries to Canada’s trade offices.

With regard to (d), there are no plans for Canada to open a trade office in Lhasa in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, TAR. Canada makes plans to open trade offices in a given location based on market potential for Canadian clients and based on broader international commercial strategies. The 10 trade offices currently operating in China were established when two separate Canadian strategies were executed. The first six offices were established under Canada’s global commerce strategy in 2007, while the final four were added as part of the Global markets action plan in 2013.

With regard to (e), Canada’s trade offices in China have not promoted trade in the TAR. The current trade offices do not deal with any matters related to the TAR.

With regard to (f), Canada did not attend the event.

Small Business June 20th, 2023

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague for his advocacy, and thank all members for their advocacy in the House for small businesses across the country.

It was really heartening to see that almost a million small businesses got through the pandemic with the CEBA loan. We have, of course, been in touch with many of the businesses, some of which we know are still having a tough time throughout this period. I want to thank the Canadian small businesses for their resiliency, and we will continue to keep working on this very issue.