Matthew Dubé

[Public Safety, December 1st, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the member's compliments, but we are talking about the minister appearing for one hour on a 138 page bill, which, by the government's own admission, is the biggest overhaul of pieces of legislation in 30 years. If the Liberals think that is sufficient, then they do not understand what they are doing. It just does not work.

This is in a context where we are hearing more and more about some of CSIS's questionable spying practices, with the use of things like stingray technologies. There are still many questions about a too low threshold for information sharing in the current legislation. There are issues around new powers for CSE, a whole slew of questions that we have not even had a chance to ask.

In its new legislation, when will the government finally take Canadians—

[Public Safety, December 1st, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, this would have been a lot less complicated if we had adopted the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley's motion for a real appointment process for officers.

On another topic, yesterday, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security met with the Minister of Public Safety only for one hour on a 138-page omnibus bill, Bill C-59.

We cannot fast-track issues relating to our national security, rights and freedoms, and the privacy of Canadians. Spending one hour with the minister and two hours with heads of agencies is simply not enough.

Can the minister commit to come before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and once again answer members' questions on this omnibus bill?

[Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No. 2, December 1st, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for his speech.

When debating a budget, or in this case, a budget implementation bill, we often talk about the measures set out in that budget. However, it is also important to talk about what is missing. I want to talk about a commitment that the NDP and the Liberals made regarding the tax loophole on CEO stock options.

I am raising this issue because it is disappointing to see that the Liberals have not closed this loophole after two years in office. What is more, they are eliminating the public transit tax credit and other tax credits. I want to ask my colleague to explain the rationale behind eliminating the public transit tax credit while keeping a tax credit for CEOs who are buying stocks in their own companies.

[Prevention of Radicalization through Foreign Funding Act, November 29th, 2017]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka for introducing this bill. I also liked his anecdote. Indeed, cabinet members do not get to introduce private member's bills. That is something we tend to forget.

Unfortunately, I am opposed to this bill for a number of reasons. The first was aptly explained by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety . The objectives sought by the member in this bill are already enshrined in legislation. They were even improved on by the Magnitsky act, which was passed unanimously by the House. In Canada, it is already illegal to receive funds from a criminal or terrorist organization.

Another one of my concerns stems from the Senate report that my colleague was talking about, one of whose recommendations led to the creation of this bill. The Senate's study, if I am not mistaken, focused entirely on the Muslim community. I find that deeply concerning because I fear that these measures target specific groups and countries. With all due respect, if we look at the stakeholders my colleague mentioned as supporters of this bill, a dangerous theme emerges.

My colleague quoted Mr. Richard Fadden, the former head of CSIS and a national security adviser to former Prime Minister Harper. I want to read what came after that quote in the same testimony before the Senate.

Mr. Richard Fadden said, “In fact, in my previous job, I actually raised with representatives from some of the countries who might be involved in this and suggested to them this was not helpful.” He is of course talking about funding of terrorist activities. He continued with “The difficulty in most cases is that the monies are not coming from governments. They're coming from fairly wealthy institutions or individuals within some of these countries.” That is fair enough. The member has included those measures in his bill to deal with people who are associated with the government of the country that would be on this black list. However, he went on to say, ”It makes it doubly difficult to track. It doesn't mean you're not right in raising it. I just don't have an easy solution.”

When I read that, it caused me great concern that the head of CSIS and a national security adviser to a prime minister felt there was no easy solution and that it was difficult to get to the root of the cause. I have a difficult time imagining a list such as this, which could potentially become arbitrary, being managed by the Minister of Public Safety in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

That brings me to my other concern, and that is Canada's track record on public safety related lists. Take, for example, the no-fly list, the list of terrorist entities, or even the list of criminal organizations proposed by my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord. He proposed a bill in that regard in this Parliament. We know the risks associated with those sorts of lists.

First, there is a risk for the court system, since these lists could result in countless charter challenges. Second, there is a risk that these lists may be arbitrary, since they are established by the government of the day. Of course, the member sponsoring the bill may say that there are oversight mechanisms and criteria to prevent that from happening, but the problem is that depending on how we view certain acts, trying to interpret the definition of torture or cruel treatment of citizens is a slippery slope.

The United States prison in Guantanamo is a good example, since cruel and inhuman acts have been committed there that should be considered torture. Are we going to put the United States on the list?

We cannot, because the United States is excluded under the provisions of that same bill. That example may seem a bit extreme, but I am using it to illustrate one of the shortcomings of the bill.

The other issue is on what we want to tackle here, and that is radicalization leading to violence and ensuring public safety. As the member who sponsored the bill rightly pointed out, it certainly is not a partisan issue, even when we may have disagreements on how to obtain that objective. For that reason, I want to raise the following points.

First, more and more studies are showing, even anecdotal evidence of what we see in the news and also hear more and more from expert testimony, that the methods being employed by certain groups conducting terrorist activities are cheaper. We are not talking about sophisticated organizations that are being funded. The member would probably want me to raise the distinction between the act being committed and the money being used to radicalize. However, it is becoming clearer and clearer that it is less about money and more about the issues of which we need to tackle the root causes, and I will get to in a moment. The parliamentary secretary has also raised this.

Second, I read a study out of Great Britain. It says that 40% of the money being used to finance terrorist acts committed in Europe, and certainly the example can apply to us as well, comes from what we could call petty crime. We are talking about money laundering, robberies, drug trafficking. These things remind us of the importance of not looking to legislative change, as we have so often on these issues, but ensuring the men and women who ensure our safety have the proper resources. That is consistent with what the New Democrats have always stood for. It is exactly what we said during the debate, for example, on Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. Why look to a legislative change to do something that can be done by providing proper resources?

Another point to consider is whether this is the right way to fight radicalization. I do not think that money is the root of this particular problem.

To go back to what the parliamentary secretary said earlier, there is a government initiative receiving some funding. I hope that the government continues to step up its efforts and maintains this funding. If we want to fight radicalization and violence properly, it will take a community effort like the one the centre in Montreal is making, for example. It will also take federal involvement in other initiatives, to encourage all orders of government, stakeholders, and community organizations to contribute to these efforts. It is very important to add that these efforts must not focus on any one group in particular.

Hon. members will recall last week's awful far-right rallies in Quebec City. Some of the groups involved either were American or had been infiltrated by or were affiliated with American far-right groups. In that context, we need to look at the whole range of factors weighing on youth, youth who often struggle with addiction or mental health issues that we have a responsibility to address.

By properly addressing those factors and making sure that a young individual in the process of being radicalized does not take the bait, not only do we help someone who really needs it, but we also ensure public safety. By making the right kind of efforts, we will be able to ensure that this individual never goes on commit the kinds of atrocities we see all too often on the news.

For these reasons, unfortunately, I will be opposing the bill. I am always open to working with my colleague on public safety initiatives, but I do not feel that this bill serves the intended objectives, and unfortunately it could end up targeting a specific community, which I think is totally inappropriate.

[Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, November 29th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, on Christmas Eve 2016, Nicolas Faubert of Mont-Saint-Hilaire died in a tragic accident. He was sponsoring his spouse, Sophie Thewys, and her son for permanent residence.

The application was approved, but because of his tragic death, Sophie was sent back to square one. This appalling lack of compassion is preventing a single mother from grieving properly.

I have written authorization, so the government cannot hide behind privacy excuses.

Will the government right this injustice and give Sophie permanent resident status?

[Public Safety, November 23rd, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, the legislation falls under the responsibility of the current government and the House of Commons, and that is what we are asking the minister to review and modernize.

I appreciate the government's good intentions, but fine words are not the same as real action. Whether we are talking about Equifax, Uber, or even the Canada Revenue Agency, Canadians' personal information is often being put at risk. We needs laws that require transparency and provide for fines. We are lagging far behind in this area.

Will the minister commit today to reviewing the legislation and finally modernizing the legislative framework in order to protect Canadians' privacy?

[Public Safety, November 23rd, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, as I just experienced myself, having participated in a planned hacking of my cellphone as part of a CBC/Radio-Canada report, Canada's networks are vulnerable. Phone conversations can be listened to and movements tracked. Every Canadian could be a potential target, from elected officials to business people.

While telecom companies have the capacity to beef up their security, what we need is leadership and legislation from the federal government.

Will the minister finally take Canadians' privacy seriously and modernize our laws?

[Points of Order, November 20th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to ask that you consider Standing Order 69.1 and divide certain parts of Bill C-59 before us today into separate pieces. As mentioned during today's debate, I believe that Bill C-59 is an omnibus bill as described in that standing order.

Standing Order 69.1 now says, in part:

(1) In the case where a government bill seeks to repeal, amend or enact more than one act, and where there is not a common element connecting the various provisions or where unrelated matters are linked, the Speaker shall have the power to divide the questions, for the purposes of voting.

I submit that Bill C-59 fits that description.

We are thinking of this analysis at this time, because in your ruling of November 7 on Standing Order 69.1, you said:

Where members believe that the Standing Order should apply, I would encourage them to raise their arguments as early as possible in the process, especially given that the length of debate at a particular stage can be unpredictable.

That is what we believe we are doing today.

Here is how I see the various parts of the bill and why, I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, we believe they should be divided into different parts to be voted on separately.

Let us take a look at part 1 and part 2. Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, and part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act. These two parts enact two new acts and amend up to 12 existing acts.

These parts obviously create watchdogs to oversee the national security agencies.

The activities of the new agencies created under this bill would affect up to 14 federal departments. Since these parts create new agencies and enact two brand-new acts with a very specific mandate, we believe they should be voted on separately.

We believe that part 3 should be separated because it makes a significant change. It too would enact a new act, the Communications Security Establishment Act, yet another act that will amend existing acts.

That proposed act would also amend the National Defence Act. We know that the minister responsible for CSE is the Minister of National Defence. Again, we feel that puts certain optics around this debate, given that the Minister of Public Safety is tabling this bill, and the purpose for changing that particular piece.

Still on part 3, I do want to mention that many of these components are being painted as dealing with specific aspects of national security, more specifically terrorism, but if we look the part dealing with CSE, we see that a large part of the mandate goes beyond just terrorism. It could be individuals and, to use the colloquial term, hackers or even states that would be engaging in certain forms of cyber-activity. The proposed act would give CSE the ability to interfere and even counter certain things that might be done, which is very separate from reforming elements of the previous Bill C-51.

Parts 4 and 5 deal with metadata collection and the threat disruption powers being given to CSIS. In the case of the metadata collection, that of course is something new. In the case of threat disruption, we are obviously looking at what the specific intent of the bill was, which is to repeal and amend, in this case to amend certain things brought in under Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We are also looking at changes to SCISA, the information-sharing regime brought in by former Bill C-51. That again leads us to argue that parts 4 and 5, given their nature and the connection they have with previous legislation that is being changed, should be looked at together.

Part 6 has to do with the Secure Air Travel Act and the no-fly list. We definitely think this needs to be separated. There are a number of important elements to consider, not to mention the issue of funding and the different work that will be done by the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Transport in co-operation with airlines.

Part 7 deals with specific changes to the Criminal Code, certain offences that were brought in under Bill C-51, and other aspects that needed to be cleaned up based on the reforms the government wishes to propose to the Criminal Code, specifically to what the previous government did in that respect. We are looking here specifically at how terrorism charges are laid and prosecuted in Canada, which is fair to argue is very distinct from dealing with cybersecurity threats or even the no-fly list. We are looking here at the way the justice system is treating these matters.

Part 8 is in the same vein because it proposes changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act. It looks at those offences, but from the perspective of young offenders and, more specifically, at how to deal with those particular cases.

Parts 9 and 10 are the more procedural elements, dealing with statutory review and coming into force provisions. We believe that we can group together parts 7, 8, 9, and 10.

As you obviously know, the Standing Order currently gives you the power to divide a bill, but is limited to “the motion for second reading and reference to a committee and the motion for third reading and passage of the bill.” I am sure that could be read to mean that you do not have the power to divide the bill for a vote on a motion like the one before us to immediately refer a bill to a committee forthwith.

The government, by presenting this motion in a way that, on the surface, is well intentioned and indicates its wish to significantly amend the bill and hear experts at committee, I submit is actually attempting to circumvent Standing Order 69.1, knowing full well that this is omnibus legislation. It is trying to do so by sending this bill to committee before second reading, and therefore preventing us from going forward with the way the Standing Order is now drafted, which would mean second reading and then referral to committee. That is not how the process would take place given the motion that is before the House today.

This bill has so many components and, as the government has said, is perhaps one of the most significant changes to the various components of national security, whether oversight, CSE, or CSIS. It includes some significant changes to how national security cases are charged and prosecuted in the judicial system. It is telling that the government seems to recognize the omnibus nature of the bill in debate here today. It seems the only procedural way to hide the omnibus nature of the bill is for the government to present the motion today to provide it with a legislative pathway that would allow it to circumvent its own new rules in the Standing Orders on omnibus provisions.

We are concerned that the Liberal government is hiding the omnibus nature of this bill from the public. From a communications point of view, we know it sounds nice to only talk about the oversight elements when experts have agreed there are very significant concerns over how cyber-weapons, as described in part 3 of the bill, would operate. We have even heard experts say it is not possible for them to fully analyze all of the elements or the entire scope of the bill, even with their own expertise. To me, that is very telling of the omnibus nature of the bill and the difficulties of undertaking a legislative process in the way proposed by the government.

While wanting to give the benefit of the doubt to the government and its good intentions to have a robust study, the feeling we get from our reading of the Standing Order seems to be that this is an attempt to do through the back door what it is forbidden from doing through the front door, thereby preventing you and the powers conferred on you in this place to separate the different aspects of the bill.

I assert that under Standing Order 69.1, the role of the Speaker is to apply the rules of the House to deal with different concepts and themes in a bill with a different vote, which is obviously what I am raising today, so that MPs can represent their constituents' views differently on each part of a bill if they believe they should and are able to vote appropriately based on the different complexities and nature of different points. As my colleague from Victoria just pointed out in his speech, the fact that we might agree with the government on going forward with certain elements of oversight is distinct from a debate on cybersecurity or one on the no-fly list, which are very different matters. Pardon my choice of words, but I believe comparing oversight to cybersecurity, the Criminal Code, and the no-fly list seems a little ludicrous, and makes it very challenging as members of Parliament to properly vote and express ourselves.

By having the bill go through before second reading, the government is arguing that it should be treated as one whole question. It is all about security. However, anything can essentially be qualified as national security. That is obviously not enough of a common element.

When we look at what these different parts would do, the new acts that would be created and the acts that would be amended, forcing MPs to vote on the creation of two new acts and the amendments of dozens of other acts, such significant acts as the National Defence Act, the CSIS Act, and others, it certainly causes problems for members of Parliament who wish to vote on these different distinct components. I also submit that it circumvents these very same omnibus rules that have been put in place by a government that said this would no longer be a practice, as we saw under the previous government.

Mr. Speaker, you stated in your November 8 ruling about the uses of Standing Order 69.1, “In my view, the spirit of the Standing Order was to provide for a separate vote when new or unrelated matters were introduced in the budget implementation bill.” I agree with the logic you expressed at the time and believe that in this case, the same logic could apply. We are, of course, dealing with new and unrelated matters that were not part of the debate leading up to the tabling of the legislation and the arguments the government made for the need to reform certain elements of legislation tabled in the previous Parliament. I hope you will agree with our assessment and arrive at the same finding here today.

Finally, I submit that Standing Order 69.1 should apply at all stages of the process, including sending the bill to committee before second reading. Again, the motion is before us today. This way, a bill that contains very different ideas would be divided in such a way at every stage that members could continue to express their views, the views of their constituents and the views of Canadians more broadly in dealing with these very distinct and complicated matters when it comes to these important reforms and not simply having to say yes or no to these sweeping reforms and then be accused of being on one side or the other when clearly there are some very distinct components.

I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. New Democrats fundamentally believe that these important and unique changes to such cornerstones of our democracy as national security and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms and privacy deserve to be separated in order for members to express Canadians' concerns and views through a vote. That is why I thought it was extremely important to bring all of this to the attention of the House.

[National Security Act, 2017, November 20th, 2017]

Madam Speaker, certainly those elements that I touched on are what I support in this bill. I cannot give much more for the member because there are so many things that we find wrong with the approach that is being taken here.

To get to the question of information sharing, to my knowledge there is no evidence that the information-sharing regime has prevented any attempted terrorist attack from taking place. I will say again what we said in the last Parliament when we opposed Bill C-51. We certainly take the safety of Canadians very seriously. That is why, for example, one of the ways to tackle these issues is to provide proper resources to the RCMP. The RCMP members have long said that they do not have the resources to do their work. Let law enforcement services have the resources to be able to apprehend the people whom they have sufficient evidence against to be able to stop them from committing these kinds of atrocities.

The other thing that is not in the bill and that is fundamental to tackling this issue is a counter-radicalization strategy, something that is grassroots, something that deals with all forms of radicalization leading to violence. I have heard the minister talk at length about it and about different proposals that the Liberals have, but it seems to have stalled and we have not seen very much about that. If they really want a solution to protect Canadian safety, those are the solutions, not legislative solutions that threaten Canadians' rights.

[National Security Act, 2017, November 20th, 2017]

Madam Speaker, instead of citing people out of context and using glowing words like “endorsement”, the member could perhaps do more reading and listen to what those same academics said. Mr. Forcese also said that it would require more study because there is a lot in there. He specifically said he has not had time to study the magnitude of some of the important changes being brought to, for example, the National Defence Act with regard to cyber–weapons. I do not understand what that has to do with fixing the no-fly list, but I will let the member justify that.

I want to go back to the fact that the member was in the last Parliament voting with the Conservatives for a bill that threatened Canadians' rights, for a bill that threatened their privacy. We were proud to stand up with his constituents and people in his city who protested that very same bill. The member asked how it was possible that we can complain about it being omnibus but that there is not enough. There is not enough in this bill because it would not repeal the dangerous elements brought in by Bill C-51, the bill from the previous Conservative government that the member voted in favour of. Until we see those things in this kind of legislation, we cannot support it.