Mr. Speaker, I want to note the heckling from the other side about “hug-a-thug” and that kind of nonsense. It is pretty depressing to be here and to hear that kind of talk, when it is very clear that the hecklers on the other side have not actually read this legislation and do not really know what it is about. This is a serious issue in front of us. This is a decision from the Supreme Court of Canada, which has instructed Parliament to change the Criminal Code of Canada.
Let us do a legal analysis of the bill. We will start with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, let us start with section 8, which provides that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. There are very few words, but there is a lot packed into that section.
The courts have held that a search without a warrant is unreasonable. The standard for determining whether a search is reasonable is to have it brought before a judge. There must be a neutral and impartial party, such as a judge, who can determine if a search is unreasonable. However, the courts have noted, in particular Justice Dickson in Hunter v. Southam that:
[I]t may not be reasonable in every instance to insist on prior authorization in order to validate governmental intrusions upon individuals' expectations of privacy. Nevertheless, where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, I would hold that such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure.
However, there is also a long line of case law that states that judicial authorization can actually be waived if there is potential for serious and immediate harm or exigent circumstances. I use those words purposely: serious and immediate harm. For example, when a person calls 911, the police are actually permitted to enter the home without a warrant. Why? It is because it has been held that the police duty to protect life warrants and justifies a forced entry into the home in order to figure out if the person is safe. Section 184 of the code says that violations of privacy are against the law, but then we say that this can be violated or waived with judicial authority. However, judicial authority can be waived if there is potential for serious and immediate harm. That is the chain of thinking.
Bill C-55 is an attempt to update the wiretapping provisions in section 184.4 of the Criminal Code. Why? The government is making an attempt to update the code after the Supreme Court of Canada's decision R. v. Tse struck down the wiretapping provisions in the Criminal Code because they violated section 8 of the charter, which I described, which is the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.
It is worth noting that the court gave us the deadline of April 13, 2013 to correct the decision, but here we are in February 2013 debating this legislation.
I will move on to the analysis. Before we can analyze Bill C-55 and the government's proposal, we need to take a close look at what the Supreme Court said about section 184.4. We need to understand the problems with section 184.4 and why it was struck down if we are going to be able to understand whether this attempt by the government actually fixes those problems or whether we are going to have the same constitutional problems.
The court stated that:
[I]n principle, it would seem that Parliament may craft a narrow emergency wiretap authority for exigent circumstances to prevent serious harm if judicial authorization is not available through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
These are lots of words, but let us unpack them.
When section 184.4 made its way through Parliament in 1993, there was testimony at committee about the need for this kind of emergency power for situations such as hostage takings, bomb threats and armed standoffs. These are pretty serious situations. There was also testimony that this was necessary for very short periods of time during which it might be possible to actually stop that threat and prevent harm from occurring.
I will return later to the phrase “peace officers” in the wording of section 184.4.
Peace officers may only use the power to wiretap without judicial authority if they believe, on reasonable grounds, that the urgency of the situation is such that authorization could not, with reasonable diligence, be obtained under any other provision in the part, so there are four key concepts there.
What happened? The Supreme Court of Canada found that section 184.4 does not meet accountability standards because it does not provide any accountability measures. If we think about it, wiretapping is not at all like a 911 emergency call.
I want to quote something important from the decision.
The Supreme Court of Canada quoted Justice Davies who, I believe, wrote the court of appeal decision:
The interception of private communications in exigent circumstances is not like situations of hot pursuit, entry into a dwelling place to respond to a 9-1-1 call, or searches incidental to arrest when public safety is engaged. In those circumstances, the person who has been the subject of a search will immediately be aware of both the circumstances and consequences of police action. The invasion of privacy by interception of private communications will, however, be undetectable, unknown and undiscoverable by those targeted unless the state seeks to rely on the results of its intentionally secretive activities in a subsequent prosecution.
In other words, it would actually come out in court. In this case, however, a person could actually be wiretapped and never know it. There is no accountability here.
Another piece that the Supreme Court quoted was the intervener, the Criminal Lawyers Association, and I think this is really interesting:
...notice is neither irrelevant to section 8 protection, nor is it a “weak” way of protecting section 8 rights, simply because it occurs after the invasion of privacy. A requirement of after-the-fact notice casts a constitutionally important light back on the statutorily authorised intrusion. The right to privacy implies not just freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, but also the ability to identify and challenge such invasions, and to seek a meaningful remedy. Notice would enhance all these interests. In the case of a secret warrantless wiretap, notice to intercepted person stands almost alone as an external safeguard.
As we can see, it is not at all like a 911 call, and we need to have notice. As was pointed out, notice after the fact is still notice. There needs to be an accountability provision, and the Supreme Court of Canada found that Parliament actually failed to provide adequate safeguards to address the issue of accountability in relation to unwarranted wiretaps and went on to outline why this charter breach was not saved by section 1 of the charter.
Parliament was tasked with drafting a constitutionally compliant provision. How has the government attempted to deal with these accountability provisions?
It did introduce a new provision that the authorization should be reported back to Parliament by the Minister of Public Safety.
Like any law student, I took criminal law, but I am far from a criminal law expert. However, it strikes me that this might actually be a creative way of addressing this issue, the issue of accountability.
Offhand, I cannot think of any similar accountability provisions whereby the accountability problem is solved through annual reports to Parliament. In a way it reminds me a bit of a sunset clause, when legislation is debated and is brought back to the House for debate again, but at the same time, it is really quite different. Through this way of dealing with the report, quite a number of details would be introduced in section 195 of the Criminal Code.
It is interesting, it is potentially very creative, and I am curious about how it would work. My first instinct is to think that it just might work, but then I remember where I am. I am in the House of Commons in the 41st Parliament, with a Conservative government that refuses to accept amendments to legislation, that invokes closure or time allocation to stifle debate, that buries important legislative policies and changes in omnibus legislation.
I would like to see the bill go to committee not just to find out if this is a creative and interesting accountability solution that might work but also to find out if it would work in the context of a government that has such disdain for parliamentary oversight.
I cannot say I have the answer to those questions right now, but I really do think Canadians have good reason to be concerned about the legislation, because the government's record on privacy is not very encouraging.
I very much look forward to the testimony at committee.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
