Mr. Speaker, I stand before you today somewhat disappointed, but not beaten. On Tuesday, June 14, this House adopted the report of the Transport Committee, despite the amendments proposed, warnings given and negative vote entered by the Official Opposition and the third party. Yet the amendments we presented would, we hoped, have enlightened our colleagues on the compensation which the government intends to give to the former directors of Pearson Airport, namely the Pearson Development Corporation.
I was very disappointed to see and hear the Chairman of the Transport Committee tell this House yesterday that he did not intend to spend a million dollars to call witnesses who, in one way or another, would repeat what we already know. He also mentioned that even if witnesses were called, the result would be minimal because the process is too cumbersome and it simply would not be worthwhile. He informed us that the last time witnesses were subpoenaed was in 1913, when the matter had to be taken to the House and the Sergeant-at-Arms was sent to get the witness. The outcome was that the person wound up in jail. This is not what we are requesting. What we are asking for is the application of quite recent precedents, one of which was set on Tuesday, August 20, 1991, before the finance committee, where the following motion was introduced. I will read it in the language of Shakespeare so that everyone can understand:
On a motion by René Soetens, it was ordered, that-Diane Woodruff, from Price Waterhouse, Frank Kolhatkar and James Goodfellow, from Deloitte & Touche, be summoned and required to appear before the Committee.
Another precedent was set on Monday, October 21, 1991, when the hon. member for Windsor, the current Government House Leader, who was in opposition at the time moved:
That Anwar Khan be summoned to appear before the Committee.
After debate, the question being put on the motion it was by a show of hands, agreed to: YEAS: 3; NAYS: 2.
The motion was agreed to. More recently, on Tuesday, December 8, 1992, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs agreed to summon the Minister of National Defence to appear before the committee on February 2 to discuss the Auditor General's 1992 annual report.
I wanted to set the record straight and I can tell you that both the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport and the chairman of the transport committee were aware of these facts yesterday because I had made the same presentation in committee. The chairman of the transport committee and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport refuse to spend $1 million to make the truth known to Canadians.
At the same time, their party is considering paying as much as $250 million perhaps to friends of the two older parties -the Liberal and the Conservative Party- although we do not even know yet if we should pay a single penny in compensation or if Pearson Development Corporation should not be reimbursing the government instead.
Also, my colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport in this Liberal government, has no qualms paying the bills Pearson Development Corporation may submit, because, as he indicated: "The Auditor General has a job to do and he will report any irregularity in the bills paid by the government." Let us not forget that, as is always the case with reports from the Auditor General, observations are made after the fact.
That is why we in the Official Opposition, wanting to prevent such occurrences and ensure that the taxes of Canadians and Quebecers are used wisely, have reacted. We proposed that a commission of enquiry be established to uncover the truth. That is not serious.
I trust the Auditor General and his recommendations but I am not confident that the current government will take them into account and recover the amounts actually spent, even if it was recommended by the Auditor General. If this government is really serious, it should read the Auditor General's latest report and make the requested corrections immediately. We may then believe that it is possible to act first and then to make the recommended corrections.
Yet some members of the transport committee such as my colleague from the Reform Party asked only for incremental measures, a certain openness and a transparency that the Canadian people want to see right away. Liberal members do not seem interested in seeing again Tory ghosts like Otto Jelinek, as my colleague, the hon. member for Hamilton West, stated in response to my speech on June 13.
I am not interested either in seeing these ghosts again. In any case, we only have to look at how often the current leader of the Progressive Conservative Party and hon. member for Sherbrooke sits in this House to be convinced that if we saw him, we would have the impression of seeing a ghost. That is true, but I would like to compel them to come before the transport committee to shed light on the previous government's actions in awarding the Pearson Airport privatization contract.
We are now at third reading and I am trying one last time to inform my colleagues properly on the history of the Pearson Airport privatization. Together let us look at some important dates.
On April 8, 1987, the government published its policy on airport management in Canada and recommended that airports be operated by local authorities. On June 22, 1987, the Government of Canada designated Airport Development Corporation, Claridge, to build and operate terminal 3 at Pearson.
In September 1989, Paxport presented a proposal to privatize terminals 1 and 2 which was rejected by the government. On October 17, 1990, the government invited the private sector to help modernize terminals 1 and 2. No details were provided at that time.
On February 21, 1991, terminal 3 began operations under Claridge Holdings Incorporated. On March 11, 1992, the government officially called for proposals to privatize terminals 1 and 2 at Pearson. A single sentence, no prequalification.
Early June 1992, bidding closed. Two bids were received: one from Paxport, the other from Claridge.
On December 7, 1992, Paxport's proposal was selected; it had until February 15 to show that its proposal was financially viable. This condition was not met.
On February 1, 1993, Paxport and Claridge merged in the T1T2 Limited Partnership. From February to May 1993, the financial viability of the project and Air Canada's lease were discussed.
In May 1993, official negotiations began and Claridge took control of the T1T2 Limited Partnership. On June 18, 1993, a memorandum of agreement was signed on the privatization of terminals 1 and 2. On August 30, 1993, the Minister of Transport announced a general agreement between the two parties and promised a final agreement would be signed in the fall.
On September 8, 1993, the Government of Canada called an election. On October 7, 1993, the legal agreement on privatizing terminals 1 and 2 was signed. On October 25, 1993, the federal election was held. On November 29, 1993, the Nixon report was published, and on December 3, 1993, the Prime Minister announced the cancellation of the agreement to privatize the airport.
Before the final signature, the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and present Prime Minister warned the parties that he would not hesitate to cancel this agreement. Following that statement, the chief negotiator asked for written instructions to proceed to the signing of the contract. The then-Prime Minister requested specifically that the transaction be completed that same day. Mr. Nixon found in his report that the lobbyists' role in this matter went beyond the usual normal bounds. In fact, lobbyists were directly responsible for the reassignment of several senior public servants and the request from some others to be replaced.
The 90-day call for tenders was surprisingly short, and it was impossible for groups other than those already involved in the administration of the airport, such as Claridge and Paxport, to submit a valid bid. This explains why only two bids were received. Paxport had previously submitted a privatization plan in 1989, and Claridge was already operating terminal 3.
It is surprising that no prior financial analysis was required in this proposal. It is not usual democratic practice to sign a transaction of this magnitude during an election campaign, thereby binding the soon-to-be-elected government to a policy established by the previous government.
From a financial standpoint, as previously mentioned, Pearson is the only profitable airport in Canada. The agreement prohibits Transport Canada from making investments that might have a detrimental effect on Pearson's traffic in any airport within a 75-kilometre radius of the Pearson Airport; this clause gives preference to Pearson over other airports in the region.
My purpose in reviewing the events of 1987 to 1993 in this matter, first of all, is to make sure that my colleagues in the House are aware of the importance of the decision we will be called upon to make-a decision that will make people aware of the kind of democracy in which they live.
Parliament has all the instruments it needs to find out the truth and decide accordingly. But we must be prepared to forget partisan considerations and to probe some apparently disturbing facts. We have four instruments: the House of Commons, the committees, royal commissions of inquiry and finally, the justice system.
In this particular case, the Prime Minister quickly cancelled the privatization contract because he thought there might be misappropriation of funds. However, since he made that decision, what did we find out? Not much, but it was not because the opposition lacked the political will. Here in the House we asked for a royal commission of inquiry. Our request was turned down. In committee, we invited witnesses. What happened? They did not appear.
Mr. Speaker, with your leave, I will go through the list of 17 witnesses I tabled in the transport committee. We invited Ray Hession, who agreed to appear. We invited Robert Nixon, but our Liberal colleagues said that his detailed report was clear enough. Ramsay Withers refused. Herb Metcalfe refused. Fred Doucet refused. William Rowat refused. Huguette Labelle refused. Former minister Jean Corbeil refused. In the case of Robert Wright, our Liberal colleagues made the point that since Mr. Wright was responsible for negotiations between the parties, it was perhaps irrelevant to invite him to appear before the
committee. We agreed. Jodi White, the former prime minister's chief of staff. Doug Young, the Minister, who agreed. Robert Bandeen refused. Peter Coughlin refused. Don Matthews agreed. Former minister Otto Jelinek refused. Representatives for Air Canada agreed to appear, and finally, Liberal Senator Leo Kolber refused.
That was the list of 17 witnesses I invited to appear before the committee.
When we look at the connections of these people, I understand why my Liberal colleagues refused to let people testify before the committee, when we are talking about certain representatives or lobbyists who are close to the Conservatives. I disagree in the case of people with very close connections with the Liberal Party. For instance, Otto Jelinek, a former Conservative minister who is now president of the Asian branch of the Matthews group, and Ray Hession, a former Deputy Minister of Industry and senior executive at Supply and Services under the Trudeau governments.
We could add Herb Metcalfe, a lobbyist with the Capital Hill group, a former representative for Claridge Properties and a former organizer for Jean Chrétien. We could mention Ramsay Withers, a Liberal lobbyist with very close connections to Jean Chrétien and a former Deputy of Transport.
