Peter Milliken

[Points of Order, February 1st, 2008]

I am now prepared to rule on a point of order raised by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons concerning the need for Bill C-219, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act (deduction for volunteer emergency service), standing in the name of the hon. member for Malpeque, to be preceded by the adoption of a ways and means motion.

I wish to thank the hon. parliamentary secretary, as well as the hon. member for Malpeque and the hon. member for Mississauga South for their submissions on this matter.

On January 31, 2008, the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons rose to argue that the provisions of Bill C-219 to allow volunteer emergency workers to deduct certain amounts from their taxable income needed to be preceded by the adoption of a ways and means motion because they would have the effect of replacing several tax relief measures enacted by Parliament following the adoption of the Budget Implementation Act, 2006. He contended that removing such alleviations of taxes would result in an increased tax burden on taxpayers.

In his response, the hon. member for Malpeque argued that on the contrary, Bill C-219 would reduce taxes, not increase them. He pointed out that a very similar bill in the last Parliament, Bill C-273, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act (deduction for volunteer emergency service) had been accepted as being properly before the House and that there was no reason to judge it to be otherwise in the current session.

The Chair has carefully reviewed the provisions of Bill C-219. As has been pointed out, the bill provides for volunteer emergency workers to deduct certain amounts from their taxable income. It would thus reduce the amount of taxes payable. It does so by adding to, not replacing, parts of sections 60 and 60.02 of the Income Tax Act. Let me explain.

It is true that these same sections of the Income Tax Act were amended by the Budget Implementation Act, 2006, but those amendments dealt with very different issues than Bill C-219. Specifically, they provide tax relief in relation to the universal child care benefit, the Canada Disability Savings Act and income splitting for seniors.

On reflection, I believe that the House will conclude with the Chair in the first place that the sponsor of the bill could not have intended to amend provisions which did not even exist at the time of the introduction of his bill, Bill C-219.

Furthermore, Bill C-219 does not explicitly repeal provisions of the Income Tax Act, nor does it concern in any way the issues addressed in the subsequent amendments brought by the Budget Implementation Act, 2006. Instead, the bill deals with deductions for volunteer emergency workers.

In light of this, the Chair simply cannot accept the arguments put forward by the hon. parliamentary secretary. If and when the bill is referred to committee, the Chair has no doubt that any clause numbering inconsistencies will be corrected.

Accordingly, I find that Bill C-219 is properly before the House and that debate on the motion for second reading may commence as planned.

[Privilege, January 31st, 2008]

The Chair is now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on Monday, January 28, 2008 by the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam concerning replies on the issue of Afghan detainees given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during oral questions on November 15, 2007.

I would like to thank the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam for raising this matter and for providing the Chair with additional documentation. The Chair also appreciates the contributions on this matter from the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and the hon. member for Saint-Jean.

In presenting her case, the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam charged that the Minister of Foreign Affairs deliberately misled the House in responding to her questions regarding the government’s detainee policy in Afghanistan because he had not, in her opinion, provided all the information that was available to him at that time.

In particular, she stated that on November 15, 2007, the minister had not offered any information concerning the halt in the transfer of Afghan detainees to the Afghan authorities that had occurred 12 days earlier. The hon. member for Saint-Jean also noted that he found the minister's silence on this point particularly troubling. In his response, the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons contended that the government made no misleading statement on this issue and insisted that no change in policy had occurred.

At the outset, I wish to remind hon. members that a minister may decide how or if he or she wishes to respond to an oral question. As indicated on page 433 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice:

Members may not insist on an answer nor may a Member insist that a specific Minister respond to his or her question. A Minister's refusal to answer a question may not be questioned or treated as the subject of a point of order or question of privilege.

Furthermore, the role of the Speaker with respect to oral questions is very limited. I refer the House again to Marleau—Montpetit which clearly states on the same page:

The Speaker ensures that replies adhere to the dictates of order, decorum and parliamentary language. The Speaker, however, is not responsible for the quality or content of replies to questions. In most instances, when a point of order or a question of privilege has been raised in regard to a response to an oral question, the Speaker has ruled that the matter is a disagreement among Members over the facts surrounding the issue. As such, these matters are more a question of debate and do not constitute a breach of the rules or of privilege.

With those principles in mind, the Chair has carefully read the two questions posed by the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam, as well as the answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as found in the Debates of November 15, 2007. Let me say, first, that my reading reveals that the hon. member for New Westminster--Coquitlam ran out of time before completing either of her questions that day and so these questions appear to be incomplete. Second, the Chair is unable to find in either question a precise request of the minister to provide the information the member is now alleging was not given.

Furthermore, the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons has now made a categorical assertion that there has been “absolutely no change” in the policy of the government. This is an assertion the Chair is bound to accept, just as it would be bound to accept the word of any hon. member.

It appears to me that we are dealing with a matter of debate. I realize full well, not only from the content of statements but also from their tone, that there are strikingly different views on this subject held by hon. members in this House as to whether the current handling of detainees represents a change in government policy or not. There is also strong disagreement over whether the minister ought to have communicated to the House certain facts about the halting of prisoner transfers in Afghanistan.

However, as I stated earlier in this ruling and as I have mentioned before on various occasions in this House, any dispute regarding the accuracy or appropriateness of a minister’s response to an oral question is a matter of debate; it is not a matter for the Speaker to judge. The same holds true with respect to the breadth of a minister’s answer to a question in the House: this is not for the Speaker to determine.

As hon. members know, before finding a prima facie breach of privilege in situations such as these, the Speaker must be convinced that deliberately misleading statements were made to the House. The current case is a dispute about the lack of information in the minister's responses to questions on November 15, 2007.

The Chair acknowledges that there are strong differences about the issue of prisoner transfers as well as strong disagreements about what information on prisoner transfers has been or ought to have been provided. However, it is not for the Speaker to address or resolve these differences nor are they sufficient to convince the Chair that the House was deliberately misled.

Accordingly, the Chair cannot find that there is a prima facie question of privilege in this case.

I thank the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam for bringing this matter to the attention of the House.

[Points of Order, January 29th, 2008]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on December 13, 2007 by the hon. member for Joliette concerning a proposed report-stage amendment to C-3, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act.

I thank the member for Joliette and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons for their interventions. I am aware of the particulars of this case, since the hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin was courteous enough to inform me of them in a letter that he wrote to me earlier, in December.

Let us review the events that have brought us to this point today. The hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin proposed the amendment in question during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill in committee.

The amendment was ruled inadmissible by the committee chair on the grounds that it was beyond the scope of the bill. It was contended that on the contrary his amendment was within the scope of the bill because it simply expanded the appeal provision already contained in the bill.

The hon. member therefore appealed the ruling which was however sustained by a majority of the committee members.

As the hon. members know, at report stage, the decision with respect to the admissibility of motions rests with the Speaker of the House. Therefore, when the hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin submitted the same amendment to Bill C-3 at report stage, I too had to consider the matter of admissibility. With regret, I had to inform the member that, in my opinion, the amendment was indeed inadmissible on the same grounds, namely that it was beyond the scope of the bill.

I would like to take a moment to explain the reasons that led me to that conclusion. In essence, what we are dealing with is the distinction between the principle of the bill and its scope. The principle refers to the purpose or objective of a bill, while the scope refers to its legislative scheme or the mechanisms that will give effect to the principle, purpose or objective of a bill. In the case of Bill C-3, the principle with which we are concerned is the right to appeal. The scope of this right to appeal is set out in clause 4 of the bill, more specifically in lines 35 to 39 of page 3, where we read the following:

An appeal from the determination may be made to the Federal Court of Appeal only if the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance is involved and states the question.

Admittedly, the hon. member’s amendment deals with this same principle, namely the right to appeal, but where it goes beyond the scope of the bill is in relation to the conditions under which the appeal may be made. More specifically, the amendment would allow the appeal to be based on a question of law, a question of fact, or both. In my opinion, this goes beyond “a serious question of general importance”. I would point out that the hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin himself has stated that the effect of his amendment is to expand the principle of the right to appeal. Consequently, even if the principle remains the same, its scope is clearly expanded.

Last, I refer the hon. member to page 654 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice which states:

An amendment to a bill that was referred to a committee after second reading is out of order if it is beyond the scope and principle of the bill.

I appreciate that this is a matter of some importance to the hon. member, but for the reasons just given, I am not able to accede to the hon. member's request.

I believe the hon. member for Scarborough—Rouge River has a submission to make on a question of privilege that was before the House earlier today.

[United Nations Conference on Climate Change, December 13th, 2007]

Order, please.

Pursuant to order made this morning, the House will adjourn this afternoon for the Christmas holidays.

I wish to advise hon. members that, as is the custom, I will be hosting a reception following private members' hour, whenever that might occur, in Room 216, to which all hon. members are invited.

[Private Members' Business, November 28th, 2007]

Before we proceed to orders of the day, I wish to give a ruling on a matter before the House.

Members will recall that on October 16, 2007, the Chair made a statement reminding members that our Standing Orders provide for the continuance of private members' business from session to session within a Parliament.

In discharging its usual responsibilities regarding the orderly conduct of private members' business, the Chair reviewed all private members' business items eligible to continue from the first session into this new one. I need to bring to the attention of the House an issue that was noted with regard to Bill C-418, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act (deductibility of remuneration), standing in the name of the hon. member for Hamilton Mountain.

Bill C-418 proposes to amend the Income Tax Act to provide that a corporation may not deduct as a business expense more than $1 million per year in respect of remuneration paid to an employee or officer of the corporation in that year. If adopted, this measure would therefore have the effect of increasing the tax payable by certain corporations. In essence, this constitutes a reduction of an alleviation of taxation. In other words, the bill deals with an issue of ways and means.

As indicated at page 748 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, there are two types of Ways and Means proceedings. The budgetary policy of the government is the first of these. The second type refers to “the consideration of legislation (bills based on Ways and Means motions already approved by the House) which imposes a tax or other charge on the taxpayer”.

Furthermore, at page 896 of Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice, 23rd edition, it states that “the repeal or reduction of existing alleviations of taxation” must be preceded by a Ways and Means motion.

In my view, Bill C-418 imposes a charge on the taxpayer, but it was not preceded by a ways and means motion, which, as hon. members know, can only be proposed by a minister of the crown. I realize that this is a difficulty that ought to have been noticed earlier. In fact, it should have been noted when the member for Hamilton Mountain introduced the bill.

Accordingly, I have asked legislative drafters and procedural staff, working together, to provide early advice to members on their legislative initiatives so that members have ample opportunity to make the necessary adjustments to ensure their draft legislation does not offend House rules.

In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, proceedings on the bill to date, namely, introduction and first reading, have not respected the provisions of our Standing Orders and are therefore null and void. Accordingly, the Chair must now direct that the order for second reading of the bill be discharged and the bill withdrawn from the order paper.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Presence in Gallery, November 22nd, 2007]

Perhaps I could, while I am on my feet and before the Thursday question, deal with a matter that arose following question period yesterday.

A number of members raised a point of order concerning the reference by the Minister of the Environment to the presence of certain persons in the gallery and offered advice to the Speaker on ways that I might deal with this problem.

I very much appreciate the suggestions of certain hon. members, particularly the hon. member for York West.

In any event, I do recall that when members were suspended for 30 days from asking questions, if they showed proper repentance, they were allowed back on the list if they indicated they realized their error in having made these references to people in the gallery.

I have looked at cases where members did make this kind of statement in the House.

Yesterday, the Minister of the Environment was truly repentant following his error. He stood up and said he was sorry, and claimed that the reason for his failure to comply completely with the rules was because of the fact that he was a new member. I know he was first elected to this House in 2006, having spent 13 long years watching the proceedings of this place from another spot.

I also have to say that I received various offers of assistance. Even the Minister of Justice offered to take the punishment for the Minister of the Environment and not answer questions in the House for 30 days.

Notwithstanding these generous offers and the suggestions that hon. members have made to me, I feel that the Minister of the Environment has indicated that he will not repeat this performance, and I therefore consider the matter closed.

It being Thursday, the hon. opposition House leader has a question.

[Points of Order, November 13th, 2007]

Order, please. The Chair obviously was aware this argument might take place, because correspondence had been sent outlining the arguments of the two parties that have made submissions and of others. I have had an opportunity to read that correspondence. I would like to thank the members who intervened in the matter and thank those who sent the letters. I am quite prepared to make a ruling now on the apportionment of the remaining allotted days for the supply period ending on December 10, 2007.

The number of supply days and how they are distributed throughout the year are set out in Standing Order 81(10)(a), which states:

In any calendar year, seven sitting days shall be allotted to the Business of Supply for the period ending not later than December 10; seven additional days shall be allotted to the Business of Supply in the period ending not later than March 26; and eight additional days shall be allotted to the Business of Supply in the period ending not later than June 23; provided that the number of sitting days so allotted may be altered pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c) of this section. These twenty-two days are to be designated as allotted days. In any calendar year, no more than one fifth of all the allotted days shall fall on a Wednesday and no more than one fifth thereof shall fall on a Friday.

As is the practice at the beginning of each Parliament, an agreement was reached among the opposition parties concerning the apportionment of the 22 allotted days for the calendar year. However, in 2007, prorogation intervened, so some three weeks of sittings otherwise projected by the House of Commons calendar were not held. As a result, given that the House did not begin sitting until October 16, pursuant to Standing Order 81(10)(b) the number of supply days for the supply period ending December 10 was reduced from seven to five.

As the House has heard this morning, this reduction in the number of allotted days has resulted in the parties in opposition to the government being unable to reach an agreement concerning how those days should be apportioned in this supply period. Specifically, there is disagreement about whose motion should be debated today.

The Speaker’s role in the apportionment of supply days is addressed directly in Standing Order 81(14)(b), which states:

When notice has been given of two or more motions by Members in opposition to the government for consideration on an allotted day, the Speaker shall have power to select which of the proposed motions shall have precedence in that sitting.

Furthermore, as has been mentioned in the arguments made today, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, p. 725, states:

Generally, in making their decision, Speakers will take into consideration the following: representation of the parties in the House; the distribution of sponsorship to date; fair play towards small parties; the date of notice; the sponsor of the motion; the subject matter; whether or not the motion is votable; and what has happened, by agreement among the parties, in the immediate past Supply periods.

In the vast majority of cases, of course, the opposition parties are able to reach an agreement as to which party will bring forward the motion to be debated in the House on a particular supply day. The number of cases in which the parties have not been able to agree is so small it is only rarely that the Speaker has been called upon to adjudicate such a dispute, fulfilling the obligation set out in the Standing Orders.

Past Speakers have noted that little guidance is provided concerning how the Speaker should exercise his discretion in carrying out those responsibilities. Even though factors to be taken into consideration are listed in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, the resolution of any particular case will depend, as it usually does in most procedural difficulties that the House encounters, on the particular circumstances which confront the House.

By way of example, let us consider the factor of votability cited in Marleau and Montpetit. It might be argued that votability ceases to have much significance when the Speaker adjudicates a dispute, given that 2005 amendments to the Standing Orders made all opposition motions automatically votable.

However, in any dispute, one factor always plays a major role. As Speaker Francis stated in a ruling given on May 31, 1984, at p. 4223 of Debates:

The Chair’s selection must be based on the representations of the Parties in the House…

At the time of that ruling, there were only two parties in opposition; today there are three. However, the representation of the various opposition parties remains the primary consideration in ensuring procedural fairness to all opposition parties, large and small.

As we have already reviewed, the Standing Orders explicitly set out the number of allotted days and their distribution among the three supply periods on the basis of the calendar year. In this Parliament, as in the past, the agreement among the parties on apportionment of those days was based on the proportional representation of each opposition party and calculated using the traditional numerical rounding conventions. Translated into practical terms, this meant that of the 22 supply days, the official opposition got 12, the Bloc Québécois six, and the NDP four. However, prorogation saw the total number of supply days for this calendar year go from 22 to 20.

Any intervention by the Chair at this stage must, of course, take into account the apportionment that has already occurred during the two preceding Supply periods.

An examination of the Journals of the House for the first two Supply periods—ending in March and June respectively—shows that the Official Opposition has so far received eight allotted days, the Bloc Québécois four and the New Democratic Party three.

It seems only reasonable, then, that in the situation before us the Chair make its decision on the number of supply days to be allocated to each party in these new circumstances on the same basis as that used in reaching the original agreement among the parties. The number of days allotted to each party should reflect that party's representation in the House. By using the same method of calculation the parties used to arrive at their original agreement, the Chair has determined that the apportionment for the revised total of 20 days works out as follows: 11 for the official opposition, six for the Bloc Québécois, and three for the NDP.

While the Chair recognizes that this distribution is only approximate with respect to the relative numbers of each opposition party, it provides the closest approximation possible to their representation. Furthermore, let me stress again that this conclusion is based on the very same calculation used by the parties in reaching their original agreement.

I suppose it might be argued that had it been known at the beginning of the year that there would only be 20 allotted days, the parties, among themselves, might have reached a different agreement concerning the apportionment of allotted days for the 2007 calendar year, or for one or more of the supply periods in it, but for the Speaker that remains speculation. The Chair must address the specific situation in which the House finds itself today and must, of course, take into account what has occurred so far this year.

In this current and last Supply period, the Official Opposition has so far had two allotted days, for a total of ten this year; the Bloc Québécois has had one allotted day, for a total of five in 2007.

It is therefore my ruling that today, November 13, 2007, the fourth day in the current period, shall be allotted to the Bloc Québécois. The fifth day, when it is designated, shall be allotted to the Official Opposition.

I remind the House that the guidance provided by the Standing Orders and our practice is of limited assistance to the Speaker in adjudicating this kind of dispute. The application of a mathematical formula may seem to be a crude method for a Speaker to use, one that does not take sufficient account of more subtle aspects of the problem. I believe that the Speaker's discretion in these matters is limited, especially given that the House itself has never seen fit to elaborate on the grounds on which the Chair might exercise such discretion. I do no more than repeat the request of my predecessors when I say that the Chair would welcome any recommendations from the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs that might clarify these issues for the future.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, October 30th, 2007]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 18, 2007 by the hon. member for Skeena-Bulkley Valley concerning the alleged obstruction of his ability to carry out his duties as a member of Parliament.

I would like to thank the hon. member for raising this issue, which is of importance to all members. I would also like to thank the hon. member for Cariboo—Prince George, the hon. House leader of the official opposition, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, the hon. member for Mississauga South and the hon. whip of the Bloc Québécois for their comments.

In bringing this matter to the attention of the House, the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley stated that in a press release issued on August 21, 2007, by the member for Cariboo—Prince George, Ms. Sharon Smith was identified as the person his constituents should contact if they required assistance in dealing with the government or with members on the government side of the House. He alleged that this was an attempt to usurp his role as member for the riding of Skeena—Bulkley Valley and that in so doing it obstructed him in carrying out his proper functions. He also claimed that the effect of the press release and of subsequent statements made by the member for Cariboo—Prince George was to confuse his constituents concerning the fact that he was their duly elected member of Parliament.

In replying to these charges, the member for Cariboo-Prince George stated that his only objective had been to see to it that people in the riding of Skeena-Bulkley Valley received adequate service. He rejected the suggestion that there was any other motive behind his actions and asserted that he had no intent to interfere with his colleague’s ability to do his job. The importance of this issue was underlined by the opposition House leader.

In his remarks, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons drew the Speaker's attention back to what he took to be the crux of the matter, that is, whether the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley had successfully made the case that he had been obstructed in his work as a parliamentarian.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, p. 71, states:

The rights, privileges and immunities of individual Members of the House are finite, that is to say, they can be enumerated but not extended except by statute or, in some cases, by constitutional amendment...Moreover, privilege does not exist “at large” but applies only in context, which usually means within the confines of the parliamentary precinct and a “proceeding in Parliament”.

In a ruling on May 3, 2006, Debates, page 845, I reminded the House that previous speakers had consistently upheld the right of the House to the services of its members free from “intimidation, obstruction and interference”, but that for that protection of parliamentary privilege to be successfully invoked, the member's activity must be linked to a proceeding in Parliament. This point is clearly set out at page 93 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, which states:

Every Member has duties as a representative of the electorate. A Member may only claim the protection of privilege relating to his or her parliamentary duties—

As I indicated in my remarks when this question was first raised, what is said outside the House is beyond the Speaker's purview.

However, there does exist an important exception to this general principle, one which was cited by the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley. For the benefit of members, I will repeat the citation, which is found at page 87 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice and is taken from Mr. Speaker Fraser's ruling of May 6, 1985.

It should go without saying that a Member of Parliament needs to perform his functions effectively and that anything tending to cause confusion as to a Member’s identity creates the possibility of an impediment to the fulfilment of that Member’s functions. Any action that impedes or tends to impede a Member in the discharge of his duties is a breach of privilege. There are ample citations and precedents to bear this out.

Footnote 173 on the same page provides an example of such a case, namely a ruling delivered on May 30, 1985, where an advertisement identifying an unelected individual as a member was found to constitute a breach of privilege.

I have examined with great care the press release and the transcripts provided to me by the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley. I have also taken into consideration the remarks made by the member for Cariboo—Prince George. I am satisfied that there was no intent to mislead the constituents of Skeena—Bulkley Valley concerning the identity of their MP and that the texts I have examined do not do so. I point out, as an example, that the press release explicitly refers to the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley as “an MP from the fourth party in the House”.

Accordingly, while I will concede that the hon. member may well have a grievance, I have to conclude that he was not obstructed in the performance of his parliamentary duties. I cannot therefore find that a prima facie breach of privilege has occurred in this case.

Although that disposes of the procedural point which was raised, I think it is proper to underline to the House that the member for Skeena-Bulkley Valley and other members who intervened have raised important issues concerning the ability of members to advocate for their constituents that may concern members on all sides of the House. The House will recall, specifically, that the member for Mississauga South alleged that he was encountering other difficulties in dealing with the public service and ministers’ offices on behalf of his constituents, and the whip of the Bloc Québécois further alleged that there was at least one further example of misleading information being disseminated to the public concerning who their elected representative is. These allegations may not meet the recognized criteria of matters of privilege but they are not concerns to be dismissed lightly.

Should the procedure and House affairs committee, within whose mandate such matters fall, think it appropriate, it might choose to examine any or all of these issues more closely.

Once again, I would like to thank the hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley and others who made interventions on this important issue for raising a matter which I believe is of concern to all hon. members.

[Resumption of Debate on Address in Reply, October 24th, 2007]

I declare the motion carried.

[Privilege, October 23rd, 2007]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the hon. House leader for the official opposition on October 16, 2007, concerning disclosure to the media of details of the Speech from the Throne prior to its reading by Her Excellency the Governor General to both Houses of Parliament.

I would like to thank the House Leader for the Official Opposition for bringing this matter to the attention of the House, as well as the hon. government House leader for his contribution on this question.

The House leader for the official opposition, in raising the matter, pointed out that copies of the Speech from the Throne were made available to the media before Her Excellency read the speech in the Senate chamber. The government House leader also expressed his concern about this situation, which he described as troubling.

I, too, view such matters seriously, as I know all honourable members do. The premature release of important documents, such as the Speech from the Throne or the Budget, runs contrary to our practices.

In this particular situation, however, there seems to be some disagreement about the responsibility for this leak. I must add, too, that even if undisputed facts were provided in this specific case, the Chair can find no procedural authority for the claim that the premature disclosure of the Speech from the Throne constitutes a breach of the privileges of the members of this House.

In reference to the secrecy of the budget, House of Commons Procedure and Practice states at page 753: “Speakers of the Canadian House have maintained that secrecy is a matter of parliamentary convention, rather than one of privilege”.

I would suggest to the House that the same is true with regard to throne speeches. I therefore must rule that no breach of privilege has occurred in the present case.

Once again, I would like to thank the hon. opposition House leader for going to the trouble of raising this matter.