Peter Milliken

[Points of Order, March 1st, 2007]

I will not make a definitive ruling today, but for the benefit of the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc, the member for Windsor—Tecumseh and all other hon. members who are interested in this point, the Chair has in hand a ruling given by Mr. Speaker Fraser on March 20, 1990, on this very point. Perhaps I could quote just a little bit of the ruling. I do not want to bore hon. members. It states:

Committees sitting at the same time as bells are sounded to call members into the House for a recorded division continues to be a problem in the eyes of some hon. members. On January 25 and again on January 30, first the hon. member for Ottawa Vanier and later the hon. member for Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca raised this matter.

This is not the first time this matter has been brought forward. Last May 31, for example, the hon. member for Hamilton East complained that the Standing Committee on the Environment was sitting at the same time as division bells were ringing in the House to call the members in for a vote.

Mr. Speaker Fraser went on. He referred to previous incidents from rulings from the Chair in 1971, 1976, 1978 and 1981. Clearly the Speaker had done a significant review of the situation. He concluded:

I am concerned about the matter raised by hon. members but, in my view, it is neither a point of order nor a question of privilege. It is rather a grievance but a serious one and in light of the many instances where the matter has been raised on the floor, it is one that merits some attention by the House. Perhaps the Standing Committee on Elections and Privileges might consider the situation to decide whether or not to recommend changes to our rules.

Evidently if the committee did consider the matter, changes were not made in the rules. The committee on procedure and House affairs, which has replaced that committee and did so many years ago, could consider this matter and come back with suggested changes to our rules that might deal with the grievance that is raised by the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc.

It appears, and I say appears because I am only hearing this now and have not done any more research than to dig out this particular ruling, that the issue raised by the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc is, as Mr. Speaker Fraser called it, a grievance and not a point of order or a question of privilege, and it may be that there is nothing I can do that will clarify the matter for the benefit of the hon. member or for the benefit of the House.

But certainly it is a grievance. In my view, the House ought to be the place where members should be able to come for a vote. When the bells summon members, they should come here. Indeed, in the old days committees had to have permission from the House to sit when the House was sitting, as is still the case in the other place down the hall.

If members want to consider such a change in the rules of our House so that committees cannot sit when the House is sitting, without permission, or if they must adjourn or suspend their sitting when bells are ringing to summon members here for a vote in the House, that is a question that could be considered by the committee on procedure and House affairs. The committee could make a report to the House that would result in either a directive or a change in our rules that would require committee chairs to act in accordance with that directive or those rules.

I will look at the matter. If the rules have changed any since the decision in 1990, I can assure the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc that he will be on firmer ground than the members who were arguing the case then, and I will come back with a decision. But if it appears that things have not changed since then, I think he has a good idea of what I am going to say when I do get back to the House on this point. I will look forward to that, as I am sure he will.

[Points of Order, February 27th, 2007]

On February 26, 2007, a point of order was raised by the Leader of the Government in the House to the effect that amendments adopted by the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities in its consideration of C-257, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (replacement workers) and reported to the House on February 21, 2007, are inadmissible.

The hon. members for Davenport, Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean, Scarborough—Rouge River and Windsor—Tecumseh have also now presented their arguments on the matter.

As the House knows, the Speaker does not intervene on matters upon which committees are competent to take decisions. However, in cases where a committee has exceeded its authority, particularly in relation to bills, the Speaker has been called upon to deal with such matters after a report has been presented to the House.

In terms of amendments adopted by committees on bills, if they were judged to be inadmissible by the Speaker, those amendments would be struck from the bill as amended because the committee did not have the authority to adopt such provisions. As the hon. Member for Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean reminded us, this is succinctly explained in a ruling of Mr. Speaker Fraser on April 28, 1992 at page 9801 of the Debates:

When a bill is referred to a standing or legislative committee of the House, that committee is only empowered to adopt, amend or negative the clauses found in that piece of legislation and to report the bill to the House with or without amendments. The committee is restricted in its examination in a number of ways. It cannot infringe on the financial initiative of the Crown, it cannot go beyond the scope of the bill as passed at second reading, and it cannot reach back to the parent act to make further amendments not contemplated in the bill no matter how tempting that may be.

This is precisely the kind of case that I am being asked to adjudicate today.

Before getting into the substance of that case, I want to comment briefly on a precedent cited earlier today where the admissibility of an amendment adopted in committee was challenged, though on rather different grounds than the case before us now.

The hon. Member for Roberval—Lac St-Jean referred to the ruling handed down by the Speaker on October 26, 2006 with respect to Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act (adoption). Although the Member for Roberval—Lac St-Jean is right in citing that decision as an example, he gives it his own interpretation. In that particular case, the Speaker carefully examined, one by one, the amendments adopted by the committee and concluded that, as regards strict compliance with procedural rules, the committee had not exceeded its powers in adopting the amendments challenged by the government.

The case before us is rather different. Given the very narrow scope of Bill C-257, any amendment to the bill must stay within the very limited parameters set by the provisions of the Canada Labour Code that are amended by the bill.

I have reviewed with great care the text of Bill C-257 as adopted at second reading, the text of the amendments adopted in committee, the relevant sections of the parent act, the Canada Labour Code and, of course, the arguments presented by the hon. members who intervened on this matter. I am now ready to rule.

In relation to the first amendment, the government House leader contends that an amendment proposed in committee by the hon. member for Davenport to clause 2, subparagraph 2.1, is inadmissible because it attempts to make the bill “subject to section 87.4” of the Canada Labour Code. As the hon. member for Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean noted, the first reading version of the bill already contained this exact phrase within subparagraph 2.1(c); the amendment simply repositioned it within the same subparagraph.

Therefore, the Chair is of the view that this amendment can be characterized as a reference to section 87.4, rather than as an amendment to the Canada Labour Code dealing with the maintenance of services. As such, this amendment to subparagraph 2.1 does not import matters which are beyond the scope of the bill and is therefore admissible.

The admissibility of two other amendments to clause 2, both proposed by the hon. member for Davenport, is also in dispute. The first is to subparagraph 2.3 and introduces the concept of “essential services”. After hearing ample discussion in committee on the admissibility of this amendment, the committee chair found the amendment to be beyond the scope of the bill and ruled it inadmissible. That ruling was challenged and overturned, and the amendment was subsequently adopted. The second disputed amendment, this one to subparagraph 2.4 and also dealing with “essential services” enjoyed the same fate.

The hon. members for Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean and Windsor—Tecumseh have maintained in their arguments that these two amendments serve to clarify the intent of the main provisions of Bill C-257. They argue that these amendments are admissible for they only make clearer the bill's provisions with respect to replacement workers as these relate to the continuation of essential services.

I fully appreciate the arguments that my hon. colleagues are making. However, I fear that their views are precisely what Mr. Speaker Fraser meant in the 1992 ruling cited earlier when he warned members against being led into the temptation of amendments not contemplated in the original bill.

Hon. Members will know that Bill C-257 is limited in its scope. As the summary of the bill adopted at second reading explains:

The purpose of this enactment is to prohibit employees under the Canada Labour Code from hiring replacement workers to perform the duties of employees who are on strike or locked out.

Bill C-257 amends three sections of the Canada Labour Code: section 87.6 dealing with the reinstatement of employees after a strike or lockout, section 94 dealing with prohibitions relating to replacement workers, and section 100 dealing with offences and punishment.

Clause 2, where the two remaining disputed amendments lie, addresses section 94 dealing with prohibitions relating to replacement workers. Clause 2 in the original bill does not touch section 87.4 which is the operative provision of the Canada Labour Code dealing with essential services.

Indeed, it is worth noting that the very phrase “essential services”, although one with which we are all familiar, is not a phrase found in the Labour Code. The Labour Code does not use the term, but refers to “maintenance or continuation of activities to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public”.

The first amendment imports the new concept of essential services into a clause originally addressing employers' right to protection of their property. As for the second amendment, while it does not actually directly seek to amend section 87.4, it nevertheless does reach back to the parent act and import into Bill C-257 the terms of reviews of orders made by the board under subsection 87.4(7), concepts not found within the bill as adopted at second reading.

Therefore, on strictly procedural grounds, the Chair must conclude that the ruling of the chair of the committee was correct: these last two amendments do go beyond the scope of the bill as adopted at second reading and are therefore inadmissible.

Pursuant to this decision, I must order that the two inadmissible amendments to clause 2, subparagraph 2.3 and 2.4 adopted by the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities be declared null and void, and no longer form part of the bill as reported to the House.

In addition, I am ordering that a reprint of Bill C-257 be published with all possible haste for use by the House at report stage to replace the reprint ordered by the committee.

Since report stage on this bill is to be taken up tomorrow, I have advised the Table officers to take appropriate action to ensure that any report stage motions of amendments submitted this evening are in proper form. As hon. members know, they must be submitted by 6 p.m. tonight.

I therefore wish to thank the House for giving me the opportunity of addressing this complicated and somewhat unusual situation.

[Points of Order, February 23rd, 2007]

On January 30, 2007, just prior to debate on Bill C-327, An Act to amend the Broadcasting Act (reduction of violence in television broadcasts), a point of order was raised by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons to the effect that this bill required a royal recommendation.

The sponsor of the bill, the hon. member for Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, and the hon. member for Mississauga South also made interventions arguing that this bill did not infringe on the financial initiative of the Crown.

The Chair thanks the hon. members for having addressed this matter at an early opportunity so that a ruling could be delivered before the question is put at second reading.

In his submission, the Parliamentary Secretary argued that clauses 1 and 2 of the bill were adding a new purpose to the Broadcasting Act.

These provisions would give new powers to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission to regulate violence on television, verify broadcasters’ compliance, issue annual reports, and undertake a five-year review including the holding of public consultations. These activities, it was argued, were new responsibilities that would clearly require spending.

Citing rulings delivered on February 8, 2005, May 9, 2005, and September 19, 2006, the parliamentary secretary stated that these precedents express the principle that a royal recommendation is required when a bill proposes significant change in the mandate of a public body that entails spending.

In short, the parliamentary secretary made the point that a royal recommendation is required when legislative action seeks an authorization for new spending for a distinct purpose.

In the case of Bill C-327, the question is whether the power to make regulations respecting the broadcasting of violent scenes constitutes spending by the CRTC for a new and distinct purpose.

First, I would like to point out that, as a rule, a power to make regulations given to the government in an act of Parliament is not an authorization either for new spending or for an appropriation. It is simply a statutory power to make regulations.

On the issue of determining if there is a new and distinct purpose contained in Bill C-327, the Chair notes that section 5 of the Broadcasting Act provides that the CRTC

--shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1)....

Subsection 3(1) of the act specifies that

(d) the Canadian broadcasting system should

(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada, [and]

(ii) encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity....

It seems to the Chair that the provisions being contemplated in C-327 would not authorize spending for a new and distinct purpose. As the Broadcasting Act indicates, the CRTC presently has the authority to regulate programming to safeguard social values, a part of the CRTC mandate into which new regulations to reduce violence in the programming offered to the public would appear to fall. The Chair is of the view that as a whole, Bill C-327 proposes activities which are already being performed by the CRTC within its existing mandate, that is to say: the making of regulations, the conducting of reviews, the holding of public consultations and the reporting to Parliament on the broadcasting industry.

Bill C-327 may or may not result in a greater workload for the CRTC, but the activities being proposed are within its mandate. If additional staff or resources are required to perform these activities then they would be brought forward in a separate appropriation bill for Parliament’s consideration.

In summary, Bill C-327 in its current form can continue through the legislative process without a royal recommendation.

[Railway Operations Legislation, February 23rd, 2007]

The Chair has heard the very able arguments put forward by the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh in respect of this motion and I must say that I greet his arguments with some skepticism.

I am concerned about his reference to the fact that a majority of the parties in the House have not agreed to something and therefore that something may not be in order. The House decides matters, not by party but by votes, by the number of members supporting or rejecting a motion. In my view, that is the way the House operates and will continue to operate.

I point out that this motion, which has been moved today and which is now the subject of debate, if acceptable, is one that will be voted on by the members of the House. Members are free to vote for or against the motion as they see fit and the decision of the House will be taken by the majority of the members voting either for or against. If the majority vote against, the motion is defeated and we will not proceed in this way. If the majority favour proceeding in this way, then that is exactly what will happen.

I would refer the hon. member to a ruling made by Mr. Speaker Fraser on December 15, 1988, when a motion for certain changes to the Standing Orders was moved in the House. Mr. Speaker Fraser, quoting an earlier ruling of his which he had made in June 1988, said:

The most fundamental privilege of the House as a whole is to establish rules of procedure for itself and to enforce them. A few rules are laid down in the British North America Act, but the vast majority are resolutions of the House which may be added to, amended, or repealed at the discretion of the House. It follows, therefore, that the House may dispense with the application of any of these rules by unanimous consent on any occasion, or, by motion, may suspend their operation for a specified length of time.

He went on to say:

Standing Orders may be suspended for a particular case without prejudice to their continued validity, for the House possesses the inherent power to destroy the self-imposed barriers and fetters of its own regulations. It may even pass an order prescribing a course of procedure inconsistent with the Standing Orders.

He continues to say:

Furthermore, there are several precedents for such occurrences in the Canadian House found in the Journals for March 16, 1883, June 1, 1898, April 8, 1948, April 24, 1961, and May 14, 1964. Clearly then both the authorities and our practices allow for our Standing Orders to be suspended or amended by motion on notice.

I note that there has been notice given of this motion. It has been moved in accordance with the Standing Orders and will propose to suspend certain operations of those Standing Orders.

Finally:

Standing Orders are not safeguarded by any special procedure against amendment, repeal or suspension, whether explicitly or by Order contrary to their purport. Ordinary notice only is requisite for the necessary motion: and some Standing Orders have included arrangements for the suspension of their own provisions by a bare vote, without amendment or debate.

In the circumstances, having regard to the motion that has been proposed by the government House leader, I must say that it appears to me to suspend the operation of the Standing Orders in relation to a bill that is to be introduced at some future time with a specific title, and that when that bill is introduced, this special order will kick in, in relation to that bill.

It seems to me that it is a matter for the House to decide if it wishes to proceed in this way.

I think that the motion is receivable in its present form and is consistent with the authorities I have cited. It is up to the House and not me to decide if the motion is acceptable or not.

In my view, the motion is receivable right now and the House can decide after the debate if it wants to adopt it or not. We will now hear the hon. Minister of Labour for the beginning of the debate.

[Points of Order, February 19th, 2007]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader on February 16, 2007, concerning amendments reported by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on February 1, 2007 to Bill C-293, An Act respecting the provision of development assistance abroad.

The parliamentary secretary referred to my previous ruling of September 19, 2006, where I addressed the need for a royal recommendation for this bill. At that time, I identified several clauses in the bill which contained the provisions for the authorization of new spending for a distinct purpose.

To quote from the ruling:

The Chair has reviewed this matter carefully and agrees that the establishment of the advisory committee for international development cooperation provided for in clause 6 clearly would require the expenditure of public funds in a manner and for a purpose not currently authorized.

Similarly, the provisions in clauses 7 to 10, which describe the functions of the advisory committee with regard to the process of petitioning and reporting, are also functions which would require the authorization of spending for a new and distinct purpose.

As such, clause 6 and clauses 7 to 10 cause the bill as a whole in its current form to require a royal recommendation. Accordingly, I will decline to put the question on third reading of this bill unless a royal recommendation is received.

In his intervention, the Parliamentary Secretary asked for an assessment of the effect of committee amendments on the clauses identified by the Chair. He also raised questions concerning the operation of clauses 3 and 4 which he contends affect the terms and conditions attached to the original legislation.

The Parliamentary Secretary cited previous rulings which underlined the need to adhere to the terms and conditions of the royal recommendation and not only to the amount of spending.

Finally, he referred to the fact that the Chair did not consider clauses 3 and 4 in its ruling of September 19, 2006.

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development adopted a number of amendments to the bill following my ruling on September 19, 2006. Notably and most importantly the committee deleted clause 6 which created the advisory committee. The committee also deleted clauses 7, 8 and 10 which dealt with the functions of the advisory committee, and amended clauses 3 and 9 so as to remove references to the advisory committee.

Therefore, the provisions which were earlier identified by the Chair as requiring a royal recommendation because they were related to or were dependent upon the establishment of the advisory committee were removed from Bill C-293.

I will now turn to the issues involving clauses 3 and 4 of the bill as addressed by the parliamentary secretary.

Clause 3 is known as the interpretation clause and contains definitions for the terms used in this piece of legislation. The parliamentary secretary notes that the committee introduced a definition for “official development assistance” which reads as follows:

“official development assistance” means international assistance

(a) that is administered with the principal objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries, that is concessional in character, that conveys a grant element of at least 25%, and that meets the requirements set out in section 4; and/or

(b) that is provided for the purpose of alleviating the effects of a natural or artificial disaster or other emergency occurring outside Canada.

He argued that this definition and similar provisions in clause 4 alter the terms and conditions of the original legislative authority and consequently cause the bill to require a royal recommendation. The parliamentary secretary raised some important points that the Chair wishes to address, the first being that provisions in subclause 4.(2) oblige the minister to consult.

The Chair is of the view that this sort of provision does not create new spending for a distinct purpose. Consultations like this fall within the ongoing mandate of the minister. The Chair, however, does have serious concerns about the claim that provisions in the definition add new conditions and criteria to official development assistance that is, “concessional in character, [and] that conveys a grant element of at least 25%”.

The parliamentary secretary argued that these provisions alter the conditions and qualifications originally attached to assistance for developing countries as found in subsection 10.(3) of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act which reads as follows:

The Minister may develop and carry out programs related to the Minister’s powers, duties and functions for the promotion of Canada’s interests abroad including:

(b) the provision of assistance for developing countries.

As this is a fairly broad statutory provision, the Chair conducted some further research, to better understand how existing official development assistance, as presently authorized by acts of Parliament, was currently being provided.

The Chair turned to the departmental performance report for the Canadian International Development Agency for the year ending March 31, 2006. On page 8 it states:

In 2005-2006, CIDA's authorized budget was $3.3 billion and its actual spending was $3.1 billion, disbursed mainly through grants and contributions...CIDA's budget is part of the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), a jointly-managed envelope which funds official development assistance (ODA), as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee.

I will not give all the letters for those but I am going to refer to them now.

And in footnote 4, it says:

ODA is defined by the OECD-DAC as funding transferred “to development countries and multilateral institutions provided by official government agencies which meets the following tests: (a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and (b) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25%”.

The Chair notes that the criteria presently used for the disbursement of grants and contributions for official development assistance, as explained by the government in the departmental performance report, is identical to the criteria found in clause 3 of Bill C-293.

Bill C-293 at first reading only contained a reference to the OECD-DAC in clause 3. Amendments adopted in committee simply inserted in the interpretation clause the full text of the existing criteria used by the government. The Chair therefore must conclude that the conditions and qualifications, which were attached to the original authorization for spending, have not been altered in any manner. If anything, the bill reinforces the criteria presently employed by the government itself. Consequently, in the unique context this bill presents, and despite an impressive demonstration of scholarly research by the parliamentary secretary who quoted from previous rulings of mine and of Mr. Speaker Fraser, I must conclude that these provisions in Bill C-293, as amended, do not cause the bill to require a royal recommendation.

The Chair has examined carefully all other amendments adopted by the standing committee and can confirm that none of these additional modifications would require a royal recommendation.

To summarize then, the deletions made by the committee eliminated the problematic issue set out in my earlier ruling last September. Consequently, debate on this bill may proceed and the Chair will put the question on third reading of the bill in its present form, which requires no royal recommendation.

I thank all hon. members for their patience in listening to this rather lengthy explanation and ruling.

[Points of Order, February 14th, 2007]

Last night, just before debate on private members’ business began, the hon. government House leader raised a point of order relating to Bill C-288, the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, standing in the name of the hon. member for Honoré-Mercier.

The House will recall that on Friday, February 9, 2007, debate on Bill C-288 was completed and divisions on the report stage of the bill deferred to February 14, 2007. Because of this, I felt obliged to point out to the hon. government House leader that his intervention came very late although I proceeded to listen to his argument in case he had new light to shed on the bill.

After his intervention, the hon. members for Wascana, Scarborough—Rouge River and Honoré-Mercier offered their views.

I have now carefully reviewed the comments made by the hon. government House leader and I confess that I find them somewhat troubling, for the hon. minister presents no new arguments, but instead comes perilously close to an appeal of the Chair's decisions, an appeal specifically prohibited by Standing Order 10.

Despite two rulings from the Chair to the contrary, the crux of the argument presented by the hon. government House leader is that Bill C-288 does require a royal recommendation because the course of action it puts forward would require the expenditure of government funds.

This is substantially the same argument so ably presented by the minister's predecessor on June 16, 2006. It was not persuasive then and is no more persuasive now.

With respect, I would refer the hon. government House leader to Debates for September 27, 2006, at pages 3314 and 3315 where I ruled on the original point of order raised on June 16. Since this latest intervention provided no new insights, let me simply quote from that decision. Referring back to an earlier decision on a similar case, I said:

the Chair--in the case of Bill C-292, an act to implement the Kelowna Accord--made a distinction between a bill asking the House to approve certain objectives and a bill asking the House to approve the measures to achieve certain objectives. So too in the case before us--[Bill C-288]--the adoption of a bill calling on the government to implement the Kyoto protocol might place an obligation on the government to take measures necessary to meet the goals set out in the protocol but the Chair cannot speculate on what those measures may be. If spending is required, as the government House leader contends, then a specific request for public moneys would need to be brought forward by means of an appropriation bill or through another legislative initiative containing an authorization for the spending of public money for a specific purpose.

As it stands, Bill C-288 does not contain provisions which specifically authorize any spending for a distinct purpose relating to the Kyoto protocol. Rather, the bill seeks the approval of Parliament for the government to implement the protocol. If such approval is given, then the government would decide on the measures it wished to take. This might involve an appropriation bill or another bill proposing specific spending, either of which would require a royal recommendation.

As Bill C-288 stands however, the Chair must conclude that the bill does not require a royal recommendation and may proceed.

This first ruling on the bill seems quite clear. The House will also recall that on February 2, 2007, a point of order was raised by the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader to the effect that amendments to this bill reported by the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development on December 8, 2006 required a royal recommendation and some hon. members commented on his intervention. That exchange is captured at pages 6341 and 6342 of the Debates. It too concludes that the bill does not require a royal recommendation and I would commend it to the attention of all hon. members. In short, the Chair has not been presented with any precedents that would reverse the views it expressed earlier.

I can appreciate that the hon. government House leader is frustrated by the prospect of what he calls a bad law being enacted and by the constitutional difficulties that he foresees, but these are not matters within the Speaker's purview. The Chair's powers are limited to interpreting matters of parliamentary procedure, not matters of law, nor matters of public policy.

Bill C-288 seeks to ensure Canada meets its global climate change obligations under the Kyoto protocol ratified by Canada on December 17, 2002, but the bill contains no provisions authorizing spending to that end. Therefore, there is simply no procedural impediment to the bill proceeding further or to the House pronouncing itself on report stage and third reading.

Let me just say in conclusion that, as your Speaker, I take very seriously indeed the responsibility to interpret the procedures and practices of this House in specific cases, particularly where the prerogatives of the Crown may be at issue and particularly in controversial cases such as this one where parties are deeply divided as to the right course of action.

The House's new rules on private members' business bring out in full relief the Chair's role and responsibility in these matters. I believe that a careful reading of my rulings on such cases, including the two rulings already rendered on Bill C-288, reveals them to lie squarely within the traditions of this place. I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Point of order, February 8th, 2007]

On February 2, 2007, prior to debate on report stage of Bill C-288, An Act to ensure that Canada meets its global climate change obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, a point of order was raised by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader and Minister for Democratic Reform .

He said that amendments to this bill reported by the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development on December 8, 2006 required a royal recommendation. Interventions were also made by the hon. members for Don Valley West, Wascana, Honoré-Mercier, Cambridge and Mississauga South.

The Chair thanks all the hon. members for having addressed this matter.

In his submission, the parliamentary secretary referred to my ruling of September 27, 2006 where I concluded that Bill C-288, as it was introduced in the House, did not require a royal recommendation. He did not dispute this decision, but argued that two amendments adopted by the standing committee created a new and distinct purpose which involved new spending, and that comments by the sponsor of the bill in a CBC interview confirmed the fact that significant new spending would result from the adoption of the bill.

The Chair has examined the two amendments reported by the committee. The first one modifies clause 5 of the bill. That clause requires the minister to prepare a climate change plan and lists measures to be taken to ensure that Canada meets its Kyoto obligations. The amendment adopted by the committee adds a provision to the list of measures regarding transitions for affected workers. It results in an additional element that the minister must address in the climate change plan.

As I mentioned in my September 27, 2006 ruling, the measures which this bill obliges the minister to bring forward may or may not entail spending. The Chair cannot speculate on what those measures may be, for they are not contained in this bill. Therefore, the amendment does not require a royal recommendation because it does not contain any authorization for spending; it merely directs the minister as to what should be addressed in the plan.

The second amendment modifies clause 10. That clause deals with the review of the Minister’s Climate Change Plan. The amendment gives the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy the responsibility of analyzing the plan and advising the minister. The Parliamentary Secretary argues that this is a new and distinct purpose for the National Round Table which will involve new spending.

In examining the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy Act, the Chair notes that section 4 establishes its mandate as follows:

… to play the role of catalyst in identifying, explaining and promoting, in all sectors of Canadian society and in all regions of Canada, principles and practices of sustainable development by

(a) undertaking research and gathering information and analysis on critical issues of sustainable development;

(b) advising governments on ways of integrating environmental and economic considerations into their decision-making processes and on global issues of sustainable development….

In determining whether a royal recommendation is needed for a new and distinct purpose, the Chair considers whether some entirely new activity or function is being proposed which radically diverges from the activities already authorized in existing legislation.

In the present case, section 4 of the act calls on the national round table to perform activities relating to an analysis of sustainable development issues and to advising the minister on environmental and economic considerations.

The terms of the amendment to Bill C-288 appear to me to fall precisely within its ongoing mandate: that is, to analyze the climate change plan and to advise the minister. Now it might be argued that this would increase the workload of the national round table, but even if this were so, an increase to its budget would be sought through existing appropriation arrangements.

In summary, then, on the arguments related to the text of the bill, as amended, I must conclude that the amendments to Bill C-288, adopted in the standing committee, do not constitute new spending for a new and distinct purpose, and the bill, as amended, does not require a royal recommendation.

Let me now deal with various ancillary points raised during interventions on Bill C-288.

The Parliamentary Secretary referred to the transcript of a CBC interview where the member for Honoré-Mercier alleged to have confirmed the fact that Bill C-288 would result in significant public expenditures. The hon. member for Honoré-Mercier disputes this interpretation.

The Chair is of the view that this is a matter of debate and not germane to the point of order itself.

Another matter was raised by the hon. member for Mississauga South. He asked how the House is formally informed that a bill, amended and reported from committee, requires a royal recommendation. The Chair would strongly encourage any member who has doubts in this regard to raise a point of order shortly after a committee has reported amendments to the House. In this manner, the Chair would be able to return with a decision in time for the appropriate action to be taken at report stage.

Once again, I thank the House for its assistance on these matters and its patience in permitting me to deal with this particular complex question.

[Points of Order, February 1st, 2007]

Order, please. The hon. member may want to put all kinds of facts on the record, but points of order are not opportunities for debate.

The member has raised a point of order. He has said the minister used words that were incorrect in her answer by suggesting that the hon. member had misled the House. Now he is putting another set of facts here, which could go on for some time. I respect the fact that he may be interested in doing that, but there are ways he can do it. He can arrange for a late show, for example, in respect to the question he asked today, and have a much more extended debate on the subject then. In terms of the facts, that is exactly what he should do.

With respect to the statement the minister made that the hon. member misled the House, I point out to him that the Chair has never ruled, that I am aware of, that stating that a member has misled the House is out of order. “Deliberately”, yes, but members mislead the House for various reasons. Members may make a statement that is perfectly correct, but the person hearing it is perhaps not thinking straight, gets things mixed up, is misled, and therefore thinks the House has been misled because the person thinks everyone thinks like that member. Misleading the House has never been unparliamentary that I am aware of.

While I respect the hon. member's objection, I do not believe he has a valid point of order in that the minister, and I listened very carefully, did not say that he deliberately misled the House, which of course would have invoked all kinds of censure from the Chair. I respect the hon. member's view, but in the circumstances I do not believe he has a valid point of order.

We have another point of order, this one from the hon. member for Ottawa—Vanier.

[Privilege, January 30th, 2007]

I thank both hon. members for their interventions on this point.

I point out to the hon. member for Scarborough—Agincourt page 876 of Marleau and Montpetit, and I will read the paragraph:

The scope of a committee's examination of Order-in-Council appointees or nominees is strictly limited to the qualifications and competence to perform the duties of the post. Questioning by members of the committee may be interrupted by the Chair, if it attempts to deal with matters considered irrelevant to the committee's inquiry. Among the areas usually considered to be outside the scope of the committee's study are the political affiliation of the appointee or nominee, contributions to political parties and the nature of the nomination process itself. Any question may be permitted if it can be shown that it relates directly to the appointee's or nominee's ability to do the job.

It seems to me that the debate seems to centre around whether the questions had to do with the candidate's political affiliation. In any event, I understand, as pointed out by the parliamentary secretary, that the committee had an appeal from the hon. member of the chairman's ruling which was upheld by the committee, so in my view this is not a question of privilege. This is a matter of procedure in the committee.

Committees are masters of their own proceedings and there is not an appeal from a decision of a committee chair to the Speaker on matters that are within the jurisdiction of the committee.

In my view, this was within the jurisdiction of the committee. The committee has made a decision and I have no intention of interfering with the chair's decision in that committee which was upheld by the committee. Therefore, I feel the hon. member for Scarborough—Agincourt does not have a valid question of privilege in the House on this point today.

[Privilege, December 7th, 2006]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the hon. member for Malpeque on November 28, 2006, concerning the alleged intimidation of witnesses before the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food.

I would like to thank the hon. member for Malpeque for raising this important issue, as well as the hon. Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food and the hon. member for Wascana for their comments.

In raising this question of privilege, the member for Malpeque alleged that the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food intended to intimidate witnesses scheduled to appear before the agriculture and agri-food committee. He argued that the intimidation of witnesses constitutes a contempt of the House.

The minister, in his reply, indicated that while the government had made clear its views on how the Canadian Wheat Board should conduct itself, he had no intention of interfering with the rights of Wheat Board directors to express themselves before the committee or anywhere else. In response to a concern raised by the member for Wascana, the minister indicated that this position applied to officials employed by the Wheat Board as well.

I indicated at that time that I was unsure that sufficient grounds existed for the finding of a prima facie breach of privilege, but undertook to look into the matter.

Having now done so, I first wish to point out that the issue of intimidating witnesses who appear or are to appear before a committee of this House is a very serious matter, and members, particularly the hon. member for Malpeque, are to be commended for exercising vigilance in this regard.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, at page 862, states:

Witnesses appearing before committees enjoy the same freedom of speech and protection from arrest and molestation as do Members of Parliament.

It continues on page 863:

Tampering with a witness or in any way attempting to deter a witness from giving evidence at a committee meeting may constitute a breach of privilege.

In light of this, I have carefully reviewed the exchanges on this matter. In his answers during oral questions and in his responses when the present question of privilege was raised, the minister has consistently denied interfering with the potential witnesses in any way. As Speaker, I accept that. In the present case, it is clear that the member for Malpeque and the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food disagree about the significance of the answers provided by the minister during oral questions. In the circumstances, in the view of the Chair, that is a topic properly dealt with as a matter of debate or during exchanges during oral questions.

With regard to concerns about the actual appearance of the witnesses before the agriculture and agri-food committee, it will be up to the committee to examine such concerns in due course and take the action it judges appropriate. At the present time, based on the arguments presented, the Chair hesitates to intervene in the matter.

As the House of Commons Procedure and Practice indicates on page 128, and I quote:

Speakers have consistently ruled that, except in the most extreme situations, they will only hear questions of privilege arising from committee proceedings upon presentation of a report from the committee which directly deals with the matter and not as a question of privilege raised by an individual member.

For the reasons stated above, I must rule that the issue raised by the member for Malpeque does not constitute a question of privilege.

I thank the hon. members for their comments on the matter.