Peter Milliken

[Privilege, November 1st, 2006]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the hon. member forMississauga South on October 19, 2006, concerning the premature disclosure of Bill C-30, An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, the Energy Efficiency Act and the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act (Canada's Clean Air Act).

I would like to thank the hon. member for Mississauga South for having raised this important matter as well as the hon. Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform for his comments on October 23, 2006.

In raising this question of privilege, the hon. member for Mississauga South claimed that a breach of the privileges of the House had occurred as a result of the premature disclosure of Bill C-30, Canada's clean air act. He stated that copies of the bill had been distributed at a press conference held on October 13, 2006 by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups. The bill itself was not introduced in the House until October 19, 2006.

In response to this question of privilege, the hon. government House leader contended by Bill C-30 had a much broader scope than the document tabled by the hon. member for Mississauga South. He noted that the bill proposed amendments to three statutes rather than only to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999. He went on to indicate that, even with respect to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, Bill C-30 proposed amendments not identical to those in the document referred to by the hon. member for Mississauga South.

In response to this intervention, the member for Mississauga South stated that the basis of his complaint was not that the two texts were identical, but that they contained, “substantively, the same critical provisions”.

This is not the first time a question of privilege has been raised about the premature disclosure of a government bill. In cases where prima facie cases of privilege have been found, there has been divulgation of the actual bill prior to members having been made privy to its contents. Members may wish to consult the ruling delivered by Mr. Speaker Parent on February 21, 2000, at pages 3766 and 3767, of the Debates where such an issue is discussed.

When looking carefully at the document provided by the hon. member for Mississauga South, it is evident to me that it is not a copy of the bill which the government placed on notice. In addition to the differences pointed out by the hon. government House leader, an examination of the two documents shows numerous other differences. These include not only differences in the organization and numbering of its parts, but more extensive textual differences as well, since there are various provisions in the bill not found in the document provided by the hon. member for Mississauga South.

I have also looked at the press release issued by the Sierra Club in conjunction with the October 13 press conference. The press release clearly indicates that the Sierra Club's comments relate to, “...an August version of the proposed amendments...”. The Sierra Club further notes in the press release that its comments on the legislative proposal will remain valid, and again I quote, “...(a)ssuming that this draft is what is introduced into Parliament...”.

The fact that the document distributed by the Sierra Club contains blacked-out passages also indicates that the document as circulated by the government was a consultation document and not an advance copy of Bill C-30.

As has been noted in previous Speaker's rulings, the government is free to consult whomever it wishes in preparing legislation for submission to the House. It is not for the Chair to determine what form these consultations may take or what documents the government may circulate for comment.

The key procedural point, as I indicated in a ruling delivered on March 19, 2001, at pages 1839 and 1840 of the Debates and to which the government House leader made reference, is that once a bill has been placed on notice, it must remain confidential until introduced in the House. In the present case, I can find no evidence that there has been any premature disclosure of a confidential document to which the House has priority. I, therefore, must rule that no breach of privilege has occurred.

I would again like to thank the hon. member for Mississauga South for his vigilance in drawing this matter to the attention of the House.

[Privilege, October 30th, 2006]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on Wednesday, October 25, 2006 by the hon. member for Wascana concerning comments allegedly made by the hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs last Thursday, October 19, 2006.

I would like to thank the hon. member for raising this matter as well as the hon. Government House Leader for his response for it gives me the opportunity to clarify the very limited role that the Speaker can play in situations of this sort.

First, let us review the events to date. On October 19, the hon. member for Bourassa rose on a point of order to object to remarks he alleged were made by the hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was supported by the hon. member for Ajax—Pickering. Since I had not heard the remarks complained of, I undertook, as I would usually do in such cases, to review the record and return to the House if necessary.

On October 20, the hon. member for Newmarket—Aurora rose on a point of order and, quoting Standing Order 18, sought an apology for offensive and disrespectful remarks allegedly made by the Minister of Foreign Affaire the previous day. The Chair responded as follows:

--the news of these statements is something that is new to me because I did not hear the comments or see any of the gestures that are alleged to have taken place.

My staff have carefully reviewed the audio tapes of question period and the written transcript of Hansard, which I myself have seen, and of course there is no reference to these words in either. So I am unable to confirm any of the suggestions that have been made. I know several members say that they heard these remarks.

However, in the circumstances, there is nothing further I can do at this time.

Now the House leader of the official opposition has risen on a question of privilege on this same matter and has provided the Chair with affidavits signed by several hon. members stating that they heard the offending remarks.

In the meantime, of course, as the House knows, audio clips of the October 19 proceedings have been aired in the media. Indeed, a transcript of one such report has been sent to me by the hon. member for Newmarket—Aurora.

However, last Wednesday, when asked by the hon. House leader of the official opposition to apologize, the hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs replied:

I made no such gesture. I made no derogatory or discriminatory remarks toward any member of the House.

The hon. member for Mississauga South argues that the Chair might refer this matter to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs so that the Committee can get at the truth in these competing claims. Even if I were so inclined, it is not for the Chair to refer matters to a committee but for the House to take that decision.

Historically, when a member has made a remark considered unparliamentary or inappropriate, the Speaker has asked the member to withdraw or rephrase the comment. Standing Order 18 prohibits disrespectful or offensive language against a member of the House and, as Marleau and Montpetit states at page 522:

A member will be requested to withdraw offensive remarks...directed toward another member.

But such action by the Chair—that is, requesting an apology or a withdrawal—is predicated on a common agreement about what actually took place, either because the exchange appears in the official record or because both parties acknowledge that the exchange took place.

In this case, the official record is not helpful and the Speaker is faced with a dispute, indeed a contradiction, about what actually happened. Some hon. members insist that they heard the offensive remarks; the hon. minister denies making them.

In examining the precedents, I find guidance in a ruling delivered on December 12, 1991 by Mr. Speaker Fraser. At pages 6218 and 6219 of the Debates, he stated:

The Chair is faced with a dispute and is unable to resolve it. When the official records are not supportive of the allegations, I am convinced that it is not the duty of the Chair to try and resolve it. As far as I am concerned from a procedural point of view and in keeping with our conventions the matter is closed.

In the circumstances, I have listened very carefully to the arguments presented, notably by the hon. member for Wascana who contended:

The privileges of members of this House are thus being infringed: first, by the lingering untruth; and, second, by the inability of the minister, apparently, to be believed.

While I may agree with the hon. member that the circumstances surrounding this situation are most regrettable, it is not clear to me how they prevent hon. members from accomplishing their work. Since I fail to see how the privileges of the House have been breached by this unfortunate situation, I cannot conclude that a prima facie breach of privilege has occurred.

This conclusion is consistent with Speakers Lamoureux and Jerome who, in rulings delivered on June 8, 1970, Journals page 966, and on June 4, 1975, Journals page 600 respectively, both quote citation 113 of Beauchesne's fourth edition, which states that:

--a dispute arising between two members, as to allegations of facts, does not fulfill the conditions of parliamentary privilege.

Mr. Speaker Jerome, again on June 4, 1975, Journals page 601, further concluded that serious dispute and disagreement about facts and their implications or significance are “ingredients for debate and not ingredients for a question of privilege”.

In the case before the House now, the remarks may or may not have been said. However, it is not for the Speaker to decide where the truth lies.

I regret that the Chair can offer no remedy to the House, particularly as it seems apparent that the situation does nothing to enhance the reputation of the House of Commons and its members. Members on all sides of the House have commented on the erosion of mutual respect in the House. As was stated by the chief government whip on October 20, it is incumbent upon all of us to work harder toward maintaining decorum in this chamber.

I believe we would do well to recall the words of Mr. Speaker Fraser on December 11, 1991 when he said:

Few things can more embitter the mood of the House than a series of personal attacks, for in their wake they leave a residue of animosity and unease.

I appeal, therefore, to all hon. members to be judicious in their language and avoid personal attacks on other members, so that they do not bring themselves and this House into disrepute.

As for this particular case, in keeping with the rulings of my predecessors, Messrs. Lamoureux, Jerome and Fraser, I must now consider the matter closed.

[Points of Order, October 26th, 2006]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on October 6 concerning the admissibility of an amendment to Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act (adoption), adopted by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.

I would like to thank the Parliamentary Secretary for having raised this issue as well as the hon. members for Burnaby—Douglas and Vaudreuil-Soulanges for having made submissions on this matter.

In his presentation, the parliamentary secretary asserted that an amendment to Bill C-14 adopted by the standing committee was inadmissible for three reasons: it was contrary to the principle of the bill, it was incomplete and it infringed on the financial initiative of the Crown. The hon. member for Burnaby—Douglas presented arguments to the contrary.

To summarize the situation briefly, at its meeting of June 21, 2006, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration adopted an amendment which reads as follows:

Any decision of the Minister under this section may be appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board.

That amendment was ruled admissible by the chair of the committee after a point of order was raised by the parliamentary secretary in committee. The ruling was then appealed and sustained. Following further consideration of the bill, the committee reported it to the House on October 2, 2006.

As all hon. members know, the Chair has always been extremely reluctant to be drawn into procedural arguments over committee proceedings since to do so would reopen matters which are properly left to committees themselves to resolve. Perhaps more significantly, such a practice would also undoubtedly tie up the time of the House in reviews of committee decisions defeating the very purpose of committees.

The one exception to this practice is, however, the one cited by the parliamentary secretary in relation to legislation before the House. As he has indicated, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, at pages 661 and 662, indicates that the Chair will become involved if the question at issue is whether a committee has exceeded its powers in its clause by clause review of a bill.

As Speaker Fraser indicated in a ruling found at page 9801 of the Debates for April 28, 1992:

When a bill is referred to a standing or legislative committee of the House, that committee is only empowered to adopt, amend or negative the clauses found in that piece of legislation and to report the bill to the House with or without amendments. The committee is restricted in its examination in a number of ways. It cannot infringe on the financial initiative of the Crown, it cannot go beyond the scope of the bill as passed at second reading, and it cannot reach back to the parent act to make further amendments not contemplated in the bill no matter how tempting this may be.

The first issue raised by the parliamentary secretary in his presentation to the House relates to the amendment being contrary to the principle of the bill. As the parliamentary secretary himself stated at page 3769 of the Debates:

The principle of Bill C-14, as adopted by the House, was to allow for a grant of citizenship to foreign adopted children without first requiring them to be permanent residents.

Having reviewed the bill as reported to the House, I cannot conclude that an amendment which provides for an appeal of a decision by the minister is contrary to the principle of the bill. As I see it, such an amendment places a condition on how decisions of the minister are exercised, but the principle of the bill remains intact. In the view of the Chair then, the amendment is admissible in that respect.

The next issue relates to the amendment being incomplete. As House of Commons Procedure and Practice explains at page 656:

—an amendment is out of order if it refers to, or is not intelligible without, subsequent amendments or schedules of which notice has not been given, or if it is incomplete.

Here again, in reviewing the bill, as reported to the House, I have not found any difficulty. As I read it, the amendment is intelligible, grammatical and complete as to the course of action that it is proposing. I cannot concur with the parliamentary secretary.

In his third and final argument, the parliamentary secretary claims that the amendment creates a new and distinct purpose for the Immigration and Refugee Board beyond its existing legal mandate under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and that this infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown. The member for Burnaby—Douglas disputes this conclusion, arguing that no expansion of the mandate is contemplated.

The Chair has noted that Bill C-14 proposes no amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Nor does the disputed amendment propose modifications to that act. As I read it, the amendment only provides that decisions arrived at under the terms of Bill C-14 may be appealed to the IRB's Immigration Appeal Division. Although immigration and citizenship issues are inextricably inclined, Bill C-14 deals solely with the issue of foreign adopted children and not with the mandate of the Immigration and Refugee Appeal Board. In effect, the Chair must limit itself to the bill currently before the House and cannot delve into the provisions of acts not addressed in the bill. The same principles apply to the amendment.

The Chair has concluded that the amendment adopted by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration has respected the rules of admissibility. It may be that the amendment to the bill will require other legislative actions in order to be fully implemented, but that is a legal question and not a procedural one. The Chair is limited to the narrow confines of Bill C-14 and must conclude that, standing alone, the amendment does not create a new and distinct purpose. Nor does it authorize the expenditure of public funds for a new or distinct purpose.

In summary, then, I find that the bill, as reported to the House, is procedurally in order. Of course, the House may choose to revisit the particular amendment that gave rise to the point of order raised by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, using the appropriate mechanisms provided for under the report stage rules.

The Chair wishes to thank the House for its patience in dealing with this rather unusual situation.

[Privilege, October 25th, 2006]

I first of all want to make perfectly clear what has happened in this case.

On Thursday last, the hon. member for Bourassa rose after question period and alleged that certain statements had been made. There was no explicit contradiction of that. The member did not rise on a question of privilege or point of order. He rose to demand an apology from the minister. One was not forthcoming at that time.

The next day, the member for Newmarket—Aurora rose on a point of order and asked for an apology. She said that she felt she was entitled to one because she felt that the rules of the House had been breached.

The ruling I made at that time was only to say that I had no information before me, aside from the statements from the hon. member for Bourassa and, I believe, the hon. member for Ottawa South that they had heard these comments in the House, and that I had checked the record and could find nothing on the record which indicated that to me.

I had not listened at that point to the tapes. I had merely looked at Hansard and I had heard from staff that they had listened to the tapes and could not pick out these words.

I have subsequently listened to a tape and I cannot tell that the words have been said from the tape I heard, which was the official transcript, the video-play of the House proceedings during the time that the alleged offence took place. So we are left with an inability to prove it on the record of the House.

The hon. member for Mississauga South says there are affidavits. I have seen no such thing.

The dispute is clearly there. The members on one side are saying one thing. The minister is saying another. There is a dispute. I will examine the matter again with a view to it being a question of privilege.

I must say that hearing it as a question of privilege is new. This is the first we have heard that it is alleged to be a question of privilege and I must say I have some reservations on that score, but I will look at the matter.

I will look at the arguments that the hon. member for Wascana and the hon. member for Mississauga South have advanced on this point. I will look at the statements that have been made by the government House leader in this regard. If I find there is a question of privilege, I will be back to the House in due course.

[Witness Protection Program Act--Bill C-286, October 20th, 2006]

Before we launch into orders of the day, I have a short ruling to make.

As hon. members know, the Chair has undertaken to ensure that pertinent procedural questions are resolved before the second reading debate on a private member's bill is concluded.

Therefore, before the debate begins on Bill C-286, An Act to amend the Witness Protection Program Act (protection of spouses whose life is in danger) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, I must advise the House of a procedural difficulty which the bill poses for the Chair.

Hon. members may recall that I first raised this issue in the statement I made in the House on May 31st last concerning private members' business.

Careful examination of Bill C-286 indicates that clause 4 replaces sections 3 and 4 of the existing Witness Protection Program Act. It extends the application of the program to persons whose life is in danger because of acts committed against them by their spouse, a protection that does not currently exist under the witness protection program. In doing so, the bill proposes to carry out an entirely new function.

As a new function, such an activity is not covered by the terms of any existing appropriation. As the House knows, funds are approved by Parliament only for purposes covered by the accompanying royal recommendation, as explicitly stated in Standing Order 79(1). New functions or activities must be accompanied by a new royal recommendation.

Thus, the Chair has concluded that those provisions in clause 4 of the bill which relate to the expansion of the witness protection program require a royal recommendation.

I will therefore decline to put the question on third reading of this bill in its present form unless a royal recommendation has been received.

Today, however, the debate is on the motion for second and this motion shall be put to a vote at the close of the second reading debate.

[Privilege, October 19th, 2006]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 3, 2006, by the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh concerning funding cuts to the Law Commission of Canada.

I wish to thank the hon. member for raising this issue. I also wish to thank the hon. member for London West, the hon. government House leader and the hon. member for Vancouver East for their interventions.

In his question of privilege, the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh expressed concern about the government's announcement on September 25 that it would be eliminating funding to the Law Commission of Canada, thus effectively dissolving the organization. He questioned the authority of the government to do so without parliamentary approval, contending that the House of Commons first had to pass legislation to repeal the Law Commission of Canada Act. In support of this argument, he referred to a 1993 precedent when Bill C-63, an act to Dissolve or Terminate Certain Corporations, was passed. In conclusion, he asserted that the actions of the government breached the collective privileges of the House.

The hon. member for London West contributed arguments in support of the question of privilege. She gave a brief summary of the history and mandate of the Law Commission of Canada, citing several sections from the Law Commission of Canada Act. The hon. member for Vancouver East also spoke in support of the question of privilege.

For his part, the hon. government House leader contended that this was not a question of privilege. He stated:

...the President of the Treasury Board and the Government of Canada are not obligated to continue to spend money in areas which the government has decided it does not want to spend....

The matter raised by the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh is complex. The question on which I have been asked to rule is twofold. First, is the government's actions in conformity with existing legislative provisions respecting the Law Commission of Canada? Second, do the government's actions in eliminating the funding for the Law Commission breach the privileges of the House?

With respect to the first point, as my predecessors and I have pointed out in many rulings, where legal interpretation is an issue, it is not within the Speaker's authority to rule or decide points of law. Mr. Speaker Lamoureux's ruling, found at page 7740 of the Debates for September 13, 1971, deals with this question as follows:

Whether the government has an obligation under the terms of the existing law to make certain payments is not a question for the Chair to decide...This is a matter of judicial interpretation and is far beyond the jurisdiction and certainly far beyond the competence of the Chair.

Accordingly, if there is a legal problem, then the solution is to be found in the courts.

Now let me address the procedural issues that do lie within the Speaker's purview. The hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh argues that the collective privileges of the House have been breached.

Generally speaking, the collective privileges of the House are categorized as the power to discipline; the regulation of its own internal affairs; the authority to maintain the attendance and service of its members; the right to institute inquiries, call witnesses and demand papers; the right to administer oaths to witnesses; and the right to publish papers containing defamatory material. In this particular instance, it is evident that none of these collective rights have been breached.

That being said, House of Commons Procedure and Practice states, at page 52:

Any conduct which offends the authority or dignity of the House, even though no breach of a specific privilege may have been committed, is referred to as a contempt of the House. Contempt may be an act or an omission; it does not have to actually obstruct or impede the House or a Member, it merely has to have the tendency to produce such results.

In short, the Chair is being asked to judge whether this action by the government has challenged the perceived authority and dignity of Parliament. Let me review briefly the parameters of that authority as they relate to this case.

Through the estimates and ways and means processes, Parliament authorizes the amounts and destinations of all public expenditures. Once Parliament has allocated the moneys, it is the prerogative of the government to manage these funds. On page 697 of the House of Commons Procedure and Practice it states:

As the Executive power, the Crown is responsible for managing all the revenue of the state, including all payments for the public service.

Although responsibility for financial management belongs to the government, the House retains an important oversight role. Members, through the standing committee system, have an opportunity to examine how the government has managed these funds through their review of the estimates, the annual departmental performance reports, the Public Accounts of Canada and the reports of the Auditor General.

At this time ministers may be invited to appear before standing committees to defend these expenditures and the committees may report back to the House. In addition, as part of its responsibility for oversight of government activities, a committee may invite a minister to appear at any time to discuss administrative decisions.

Following such inquiries, committees are empowered to report to the House concerning any comments or recommendations they may wish to make. The House then has the authority to take up the matter and deal with it as it sees fit.

Thus, the duty of oversight goes to the very reason for the existence of Parliament and this range of activities represents the normal operations of this place. In this way, members who disagree with the course taken by the government on any particular issue can pursue such questions in a variety of ways. Since the avenues remain open to the hon. member, the Chair cannot conclude that the government's action on the Law Commission is flouting the authority of the House.

While members may have deep concerns about the decision to no longer fund the Law Commission of Canada, this decision does not constitute a breach of privilege. While the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh may feel he has a grievance, I cannot find a prima facie case of privilege in this case.

I thank the hon. member, however, for bringing this important matter to the attention of the Chair.

[Privilege, October 19th, 2006]

The hon. member for Mississauga South raised a question of privilege. I note that the other day the member for Nepean—Carleton made a statement that included some kind of apology to the hon. member for Mississauga South. The hon. member for Mississauga South accepted the apology. He said:

I listened to the member carefully. I will take his points to heart and I accept his apology. Thank you.

The Chair really considered the matter closed at that point. He has now raised additional issues that arose out of the apology. It really is a dispute as to the statement that the hon. member for Nepean—Carleton made in the course of that apology.

I know that the hon. member for Mississauga South is offended. He has clearly indicated what he believes to be the correct statement of facts on the record and has cited various facts about his points of order and so on that he has raised in the House in this Parliament and in the previous Parliament. In my view that completes the matter.

I do not believe that a misstatement of what other members have done necessarily constitutes a breach of privilege. I am sure the hon. member felt insulted by what was said. He has made that clear. He has corrected the record and I believe that the matter can then end at that point.

I do not believe it is necessary for the Chair to intervene further to deal with the question of privilege on those issues which really in my view are disagreements as to the facts.

It is a substantial disagreement. I grant the hon. member that. However, he has set the record straight and hearing nothing further on this matter from the hon. member for Nepean—Carleton, I am going to suggest that the matter now has been resolved. I do not believe that there has been a breach of the hon. member for Mississauga South's privileges that the Chair could rule on at this time. I think that matter is now closed.

[Privilege, October 19th, 2006]

I thank all hon. members who have made contributions to this matter. I will take it under advisement.

I must say that it appears to me that the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh is correct in saying there has been a breach of the privileges of the House in terms of a leaking of information that was in a confidential report which has not been tabled. He cited ample precedents to support that point of view. I agree with him in that contention.

What I am going to do is review the comments of the hon. member for Leeds—Grenville in the circumstances, and of course the comments of the hon. the parliamentary secretary, but I will note that the parliamentary secretary seems to think I have disciplinary powers in this regard. I like to think of myself as a strict disciplinarian, but unfortunately in this case the best I can do is allow a motion to refer the matter to committee for further study. If the committee recommends discipline, I may be the one who has to administer it, but only after the House adopts the committee report, so the member for Leeds—Grenville need not quail at the prospect of what I may say in my ruling on this matter in the next few days.

I will take a look at the statements that were made and see if they are sufficient to require a referral to a committee for what I believe has been a breach of privilege. It is simply a matter of whether the statements that were made are sufficient to make it unnecessary for committee to do a study. I am quite prepared to look at that from the point of view of the Chair and get back to the House in due course. If I agree that a motion can be moved to refer it to committee, the House will then make its own decision whether to refer the matter, but as I say, I will review the statements first. I will come back to the House in due course on this one.

The hon. member for Mississauga South also has a question of privilege.

[Points of Order, October 18th, 2006]

I am now ready to rule on the point of order raised on September 20, 2006 by the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform with respect to Question No. 90 on the order paper.

I wish to thank the hon. Parliamentary Secretary for raising the matter. I also want to acknowledge the contributions made by the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh and by the hon. Government House Leader on September 22.

Let me first summarize the essence of Question No. 90. On September 19, 2006, the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam submitted to the Journals Branch a question containing 47 subsections. In general terms, the question has to do with the presence of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and each subsection poses a separate question on the government's defence and foreign policies with respect to the Afghanistan mission.

After consideration by the Journals Branch staff in the usual manner, the question was placed on the notice paper. After the usual two day notice period, Question No. 90 was transferred to the order paper, where it now stands as the only written question in the name of the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam.

In his intervention, the hon. parliamentary secretary expressed concern about the length of Question No. 90. In addition, he contended that some of the subsections to the question were not within the administrative responsibility of the government. He concluded by asking the Chair to rule Question No. 90 out of order.

In response to this point of order, the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh asserted that current practice permitted the placing of lengthy questions on the order paper. In support of this argument, he referred to Questions Nos. 5 and 7 from the previous Parliament, which he claimed were lengthier than Question No. 90 but which were nonetheless answered by the government. The hon. government House leader countered that the length of Question No. 90 was unreasonable and that it violated the spirit of Standing Order 39 by asking 47 questions under the guise of one question.

As all hon. members are aware, the purpose of placing questions on the Order Paper is to allow members to seek detailed or technical information on matters of public affairs from one or more government departments or agencies so as to enable members to carry out their parliamentary functions.

In order for a written question to be placed on the order paper, it must first meet certain requirements as to form and content. Standing Order 39(1) requires that no argumentative material or unnecessary fact or opinion be included in a question. In addition, the subject matter of the question must pertain to public affairs, which is another way of saying matters within the administrative responsibility of the government. A written question is also judged acceptable if it satisfies the general guidelines for oral questions. House of Commons Procedure and Practice on page 441 states:

Given that the purpose of a written question is to seek and receive a precise, detailed answer, it is incumbent on a Member submitting a question for the Notice Paper “to ensure that it is formulated carefully enough to elicit the precise information sought”.

The modern rules respecting questions on the order paper can be traced back to the 1985 third report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, commonly known as the McGrath committee. The committee recommended that members be limited to having four questions on the order paper at any one time as a means of resolving the decades long problem of hundreds, at times thousands, of written questions remaining unanswered on the order paper.

At the same time, the committee anticipated that members might try to circumvent the limit of four written questions by submitting questions containing numerous subquestions. The McGrath committee proposed that the Clerk should have authority to reject outright or to split into separate and distinct questions those questions that contain unrelated subquestions. What is today known as Standing Order 39(2) was subsequently adopted. It states:

The Clerk of the House, acting for the Speaker, shall have full authority to ensure that coherent and concise questions are placed on the Notice Paper in accordance with the practices of the House, and may, on behalf of the Speaker, order certain questions to be posed separately.

Hon. members who were here during the 36th Parliament may recall a ruling delivered by Mr. Speaker Parent on the division of a written question on February 8, 1999. The ruling was in response to a point of order raised by the hon. member for Delta—South Richmond, now the hon. member for Delta—Richmond East, and it can be found on pages 11531 to 11533 of the Debates for the First Session of the 36th Parliament.

The hon. member raised a number of issues in his point of order, including the matter of the division of his question by the Clerk’s staff. The hon. member claimed that the question had been divided by the Clerk’s staff because of its length. Mr. Speaker Parent found that the Clerk’s staff had followed the proper procedures and had made the decision to divide the question in accordance with Standing Order 39(2) not because the question was lengthy, but because the sub-questions were not related. The Speaker stated, and I quote:

The issue was not the length of the question but rather the fact that it contained unrelated subquestions. The subquestions may be linked from the member’s point of view but are in reality separate and distinct questions.

This ruling underscored that in order for a question with multiple subquestions to be found admissible, there must be a common element connecting the various parts.

As the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh correctly pointed out in his intervention, there have been numerous lengthy questions containing multiple subquestions and even some with subsections within subquestions, placed on the order paper in the past. These would include, for example, in the 36th Parliament, Questions Nos. 28, 56, 91, 103, 132, 138 and 190, which were judged acceptable and placed on the order paper.

Similarly, in the 37th Parliament, Questions Nos. 17, 60, 225 and 240 were also found to be acceptable. In the last Parliament, Questions Nos. 5, 7 and 151 were placed on the order paper and, finally, in the current Parliament, Questions Nos. 13 and 33 were placed on the order paper.

I do not recall that any objections were raised at the time these questions were placed on the order paper and, indeed, the government provided answers to all these questions, albeit perhaps not always within the 45 day timeframe set down in Standing Order 39(5)(a).

It is apparent to me from the examples cited above that the interpretation of the term concise in Standing Order 39(2) has evolved since this rule was first adopted. It is no longer interpreted to mean short or brief but rather comprehensible. Undoubtedly, this practice has evolved as a means of getting around the limit of four questions per member.

Leaving aside the issue of length, I want to turn now to the substance of the questions, specifically to the Standing Order requirement that questions must be “coherent and concise”. As hon. members will know, the Clerk and her staff routinely edit written questions as to form and, from time to time, have divided questions to make them conform to the requirements of the Standing Order. In questionable cases, their practice has been to give the member submitting the question the benefit of the doubt and to allow the question to be placed on the order paper. The Speaker has only become involved in rare cases such as this one where objections have been raised.

With this in mind, I reviewed all 47 parts of Question No. 90 carefully. Keeping in mind the need for coherence in the question, I must admit that I found that, as currently constructed, some parts of the question are rather tenuously knitted together. Accordingly, I have determined that the need for greater coherence necessitates that the question be divided. For this reason I must rule that Question No. 90, as currently formulated, is inadmissible.

To remedy the situation without unduly penalizing the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam, I have instructed the Clerk to divide Question No. 90 into three separate questions. The first question concerns the government's objectives, strategy, vision, results and capabilities with respect to the Afghanistan mission and includes 33 subquestions. The second deals specifically with Canadian Forces casualties in Afghanistan. It contains five subsections. Seven subquestions related to financial matters are grouped together in a third question.

In reviewing the question, I have also examined it to determine whether it respects the Standing Order requirement by seeking information that pertains to matters within the administrative responsibility of the government. In this case I have found that two of the original subquestions dealing with allied forces and non-governmental organizations are outside the administrative responsibility of the government. Accordingly, I have asked that they be deleted. Another subquestion was amended to remove references to agencies and multilateral organizations for the same reason.

Copies of the three questions are available at the table and will also be found on tomorrow's order paper listed as Questions Nos. 106, 107 and 108.

Finally, in view of the fact that the information sought remains essentially unchanged, the 45 day period for the government to respond to the questions will be retroactive to the original date when notice was first given of Question No. 90, that is September 19, 2006. I believe these steps taken together provide a remedy to the objections raised with respect to Question No. 90 while respecting rights of the hon. member for New Westminster—Coquitlam in seeking information by way of written questions that meet the requirements of our Standing Orders.

I wish to thank hon. members for allowing me the opportunity to clarify our practices with respect to written questions and if hon. members are still concerned about the rules and practices, they are of course free to take the matter up with the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Since 20 years have passed since the current Standing Order went into effect, it may be opportune to examine whether the rule has worked out in the way in which it was intended.

In the meantime, I am confident that, to avoid difficulties, members may be well-served should they seek guidance from the Clerk and her staff when drafting questions for the order paper. I apologize that this ruling was not more concise as is required in respect of the questions.

[Request for Emergency Debate, October 16th, 2006]

The Chair does not normally hear interventions on points except for the member who has asked for the emergency debate in these cases, interesting though it might be to hear the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food on the matter, and I know he is rising.

I have considered the matter. The hon. member for Malpeque has of course given the proper notice to the Chair in respect of this request.

My understanding of the order in council of which he is complaining, and which he says is the basis for the emergency, directs the Wheat Board not to “expend funds, directly or indirectly”, and I will quote from the document:

--on advocating the retention of its monopoly powers, including the expenditure of funds for advertising, publishing or market research: and

It shall not provide funds to any other person or entity to enable them to advocate the retention of the monopoly powers of the Canadian Wheat Board....

So it does not appear to affect the powers of the Wheat Board in respect of its principal mandate, that is, the selling of grain. It simply prevents it from being in the advocacy position in respect of this matter.

In the circumstances, I am not sure I am convinced that the hon. member has raised something that is an emergency in that sense. He may feel it is an important issue, but that does not necessarily make it an emergency.

I feel more comfortable in my ruling when I look at the fact that last June the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food presented its second report to the House, which dealt with the very issue of the Canadian Wheat Board and its mandate, and I note that the hon. member for Malpeque has notice of motions for a motion for concurrence in that report standing on the order paper, which would in my view enable a lively debate on the subject should he choose to move that motion during motions at some future opportunity, not that I would necessarily encourage that, but it is an available route for him. In my view it would allow for a vigorous debate on this point and might satisfy his urge to have a debate on the subject, which in my view does not meet the contingencies of the standing order in respect of emergency debates at this time.