Pierre Paquette

[Supply, May 1st, 2001]

Madam Speaker, that gives me another chance to speak. In the NDP motion, there is reference to a chapter 11-style investor-state clause as in NAFTA.

I was very clear on this. We do not want to see any possibility under the FTAA of companies being able to take direct proceedings against governments.

That said, as with the WTO and the European Union, I have no problem with the states having the responsibility to protect foreign investments and being answerable to other states within a multilateral treaty.

When the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade examined it, when the MAI was studied—and we in the House were extremely critical of that—it must be realized that the MAI was a more general application of dispute resolution mechanisms already contained in NAFTA's chapter 11, along with certain additional provisions of course.

In this context, I would say that not all of NAFTA and Chapter 11 needs to be rejected. I will not say “scrapped” because that is not a proper French word.

For me, and for the Bloc Quebecois, one thing is certain. The dispute resolution mechanism needs to be corrected so that states can deal with it.

Second, the concept of expropriation must be tightened up so as to ensure that what is protected is direct and not indirect expropriation.

That said, these are things that are accessible for the three governments, in my opinion. Moreover, the Minister for International Trade has told us that he was working along these lines with the U.S. and Mexican governments in order to tighten up these definitions.

As far as negotiation of the FTAA is concerned, therefore, it seems to me that this is not the basis on which negotiation ought to begin.

[Supply, May 1st, 2001]

Madam Speaker, since May 1 is International Workers Day, I want to begin by saluting workers from Quebec and the whole world.

I also want to congratulate the New Democratic Party for its initiative, which is entirely in keeping with the work that the Bloc Quebecois has been doing for the past number of weeks in this House to ensure a true public debate on the ongoing negotiations on the free trade area of the Americas.

Chapter 11, and particularly the issue of dispute settlement, is at the very core of the lessons that we should learn from the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

I remind the House that the Bloc Quebecois supports free trade. This being said, we are, based on the experience gained with the two agreements that we signed with the United States, and with the United States and Mexico, in a position to draw some conclusions as to what has worked well and what has not worked so well.

The motion proposed by the New Democratic Party allows us to debate an aspect of the North American Free Trade Agreement that is very problematic, even in the eyes of the government. Indeed, both the Minister for International Trade and the Prime Minister have alluded to a number of issues concerning, among others, chapter 11.

The forum of parliamentarians we helped organize during the people's summit in Quebec City was attended by representatives from every country in the Americas, particularly Latin America. These parliamentarians told us “In Canada, in Quebec, in the United States and in Mexico you know what a free trade agreement is all about. We would like to share that experience with you”. But for us to do that, we ourselves must take the time to digest the positive and sometimes less positive results of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

From this angle, it appears that today's debate is extremely useful, not just for the House, but also for all parliamentarians in the Americas. I undertake to share the results of today's debate with the parliamentarians present at the people's summit forum of parliamentarians.

When the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed, no one had assessed the full impact of chapter 11, particularly as regards the dispute settlement mechanism. I have here a quotation from the June 23, 1999 La Presse . Howard Mann, who was a member of Canada's negotiating team and who drafted the environmental portion of the trade agreement, said, and his comments were reported in La Presse , as I mentioned:

This is a situation that nobody anticipated. It was only in 1996, with Ethyl Corp.'s lawsuit, that we realized how far companies wanted to take certain provisions of the agreement.

So, it was not the intention of those who negotiated this chapter for Canada, for the United States and for Mexico, that it would be used as it has been for the past few years.

Between 1996 and 1999, seven lawsuits, for a total of $1.5 billion, were filed under chapter 11. All seven of these lawsuits, which represented half of all those filed, had to do with environmental legislation. All of them challenged environmental standards which these companies felt were discriminatory or amounted to the introduction of protectionist measures.

Last week, in the House, the Prime Minister seemed to feel that Canada's chapter 11 record was good. I wonder how he, of all people, can think such a thing, with his recent boasting about his political longevity; if his concern for a good record in the case of chapter 11 matched his concern for his own personal record, I do not think he would still be sitting in the House.

The record shows that we struck out twice. The case involving Ethyl Corporation was settled out of court, but Canada admitted its guilt by paying the company compensation. In the S.D. Myers case, we lost. There was one victory, but it was an obvious one in my opinion, that of Pope & Talbot's challenge of the provisions of the Canada-US agreement on softwood lumber, under chapter 11, on the grounds that they were contrary to NAFTA. There is still one case pending, UPS against the federal government in connection with unfair competition by Canada Post for delivery services. Sun Belt Water is still involved with the Government of British Columbia as well.

I think it is, therefore, very early to be saying that Canada has had good results relating to chapter 11. On the contrary, it seems to me that what the Minister for International Trade said—version one, that is, since there seems to have been a rather rapid change in his thinking since then—constituted an appropriate beginning of a position when he stated before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade as follows:

What I have been seeking, for some time, as we discussed at this committee the last time I was here, is clarification about some elements of chapter 11 that I believe have been given extension beyond the real intention of the drafters. Some are about expropriation, for instance. You use some clauses on expropriation in a way that is, in my view, excessive and not useful.

That was last March, when the Minister for International Trade was before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

He went on to state:

We want more transparency as well. I think chapter 11, in that clarification, which would be binding on the three NAFTA countries, would need to adopt more transparent ways of dealing with the investment, and particularly the investor-state, aspects.

So even the Minister for International Trade was, only a few weeks ago, questioning the dispute settlement mechanism.

It was totally in keeping with his April 5, 2000 statement about chapter 11, reported in the motion by the NDP, when he replied:

On chapter 11—and we had a discussion a few weeks ago, and I understand where you're coming from—I can assure you that we are not seeking an investor-state provision in the WTO or anywhere else in other agreements.

A member of the NDP asked “On the FTAA?” The minister responded “No, not on the FTAA, either”.

These are the words of the Minister for International Trade, who said a month ago, and a year ago, that the government did not intend to include a dispute resolution mechanism in the FTAA and the WTO accord equivalent to that found in NAFTA.

If it were the intention of the minister and if it were the intention of the government, there must be a problem with the mechanism. So, let us look at the problem and resolve the causes of the problem.

As I mentioned earlier, this was the position of the Minister for International Trade in the first draft. Then, in the conclusions of the summit of the Americas in Quebec City, the Prime Minister of Canada intervened. He felt reasonably satisfied with chapter 11. Afterward, here in the House the Minister for International Trade changed his position, and on April 24, we heard him say here “Mr. Speaker, the government believes strongly that chapter 11 is working reasonably well”.

It was a bit troubling to see such a quick change in the Minister for International Trade's thinking, when, for a year, he considered and stated that there were problems with the application of chapter 11, specifically the dispute regulation mechanism.

In the summary of Canada's position on the matter of investments with respect to the FTAA—because we are still waiting to hear Canada's position on investments—I quote what appears on the government's website, which we have been advised to consult regularly:

Canada is not advocating the replication of NAFTA investor-state rules in the FTAA and has not supported the proposals made so far by other FTAA countries to include such a type of dispute settlement mechanism.

The issue is one of consistency, I think. The other parties in this House may think that anything on international trade that comes from the New Democratic Party or the Bloc Quebecois lacks credibility, but the NDP motion presents the position of the Canadian government itself, as stated on its website. I would find it hard to see how the government party could vote against its own position.

This being said, it is true that this is the summary of the position on investments. We still do not know the government's final position on investments and dispute settlement in the context of the negotiations on the free trade area.

I am asking the government to state that position as soon as possible, because it is one of two elements that generate a great deal of distrust toward the whole process, the other one being the fact that last week the party in office defeated an amendment brought forward by the hon. member for Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot to the effect that any final agreement be voted on by this House before being ratified by the government.

It is perfectly legitimate to debate and question the validity of the dispute settlement mechanism, which is found in chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and which is, for some countries, perhaps the United States and perhaps Canada, an acceptable basis for negotiation.

It is neither the position of the Bloc Quebecois nor that of the institutions committee of the Quebec National Assembly.

The following is a passage from page 68 of the report entitled “Le Québec et la Zone de libre-échange des Amériques: Effets politiques et socioéconomiques”:

—a number of stakeholders are concerned that states no longer seem to be allowed to set their national development policies without having to constantly consult investors. In addition, the dispute settlement mechanism is a worry because it seems to circumvent governments and traditional justice and concentrate this power in the hands of trade tribunals.

As can be seen, not only is our concern shared, but it is shared by parliamentarians.

It must be realized that the mechanism provided for in chapter 11, which allows investors to sue states directly for contravention of this chapter, is almost unique in the world. In other words, Canada, Mexico and the United States have saddled themselves with an obligation that does not exist in any of the international trade agreements, whether they involve the World Trade Organization or are between European countries which, when there are international disputes, resolve them between states.

That is one of the reasons that has screwed up—the right word for it, in my opinion—all the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, because of the belief, by the premier of France in particular, that state sovereignty could be shared between states but could not be handed over to private enterprise. Such is the case, unfortunately, with chapter 11.

That is not, however, the only problem with the dispute resolution mechanisms contained in chapter 11 of NAFTA. I will touch on some of the criticisms that can be made.

First, the interpretation of certain provisions is unclear, because every time a dispute panel is formed by virtue of chapter 11, it is not bound by previous decisions. There is therefore no precedent, each case being judged, I would say, on its merits by adjudicators who are different every time. This creates uncertainty for government administration. Will what was valid for one case also be valid for another? There has been no jurisprudence created for administration of this chapter.

Second, there is a lack of transparency in the whole process. The decisions rendered by the dispute panels are not made public. This applies even to the number of court cases under way. I have referred to 15, while others speak of 18. Obviously, these are against the governments of Canada or the provinces, or those of the United States or Mexico.

Third, there is the whole matter of the mandate and the impact of decisions by international adjudicators relating to chapter 11 disputes. These arbitrators are perhaps experts in trade, but they do not see all of the ins and outs leading up to the decision by one or other of the governments. In this regard, public interest may have to take a back seat to a very sectorial private interest, which can be very damaging for certain segments of the population.

A fourth element I want to introduce is the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism benefits foreign investors over local ones. Obviously, we are talking about national treatment, and I think everyone will agree that all investors must be treated the same way. But here, with chapter 11 of NAFTA, as concerns dispute settlement, foreign investors are being given an advantage, which local investors are not. To me this seems to contradict the very spirit of these trade agreements.

More basically, I would say that the question of the dispute settlement mechanism is whether the arbitrators appointed under chapter 11 can legitimately make decisions dictating certain behaviour to governments, be it the federal government, a provincial government or a municipal one, all of which are democratically elected.

For all these reasons, it seems to us that the dispute settlement mechanism in NAFTA causes a problem and cannot serve as the basis for proper negotiations on the protection of investments—which we agree with—in the free trade agreement of the Americas.

As I mentioned, in the NDP initiative, what is interesting is that it is possible to speak as I did on one aspect of chapter 11, the settlement of disputes but I think other problems must be addressed as well. I will name two of them. There are others, but I will run out of time, I guess.

There is the definition of “investment”, which is found in Article 1139. That definition has broadened in a significant way, the definition of “investment” used in the free trade agreement with the United States.

In the free trade agreement with the United States, “investment” was defined as “an American majority interest in Canada” and conversely for Canadian interests in the United States.

In NAFTA, that definition also includes minority interests, including in portfolios. This also includes loans, real estate and majority or controlling interests by investors from signatory states.

This definition creates an extravagant situation whereby, in theory, a bank that would have loaned money to an American business in Canada could potentially feel prejudiced by a decision of the Canadian government, even though the American company located in Canada might not itself feel prejudiced. This definition of the term “investment” is much too broad. It should be restricted.

Another problem with chapter 11, and the Minister for International Trade himself alluded to it, is the notion of expropriation. As members know, in international law, the concept of expropriation traditionally included two elements: there must be an act by a state and that act must lead to a transfer of property.

This is how Article 1110 defines “expropriation” and it is extremely important to read it, because is it is the root cause of a major problem in that chapter of NAFTA:

No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment.

As can be seen, this definition of indirect expropriation of a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation opens up a whole series of possibilities, with the result that some companies have extended the notion of expropriation to activities that they might have engaged in and to profits that they might have made. In the case of Pope & Talbot, for example, the company's reason for suing the federal government was that it felt that if it had located in the Atlantic provinces rather than British Columbia, its sales would have been higher, its net worth would have been greater and its profits would have been higher.

The damages sought by this company had to do with this notion of indirect expropriation. In a case such as Pope & Talbot, I would say that a Canadian company would not have had recourse against the federal government. Fortunately, in this case, as with the lottery, we won. Unfortunately, we do not know what the arbitration tribunal will decide the next time around.

As I mentioned, the Bloc Quebecois is for genuine protection of foreign investments. This requires regulation. The state must assume its responsibility of protecting national and international investors but, in so doing, it must balance public and private interests. Investors must have both rights and obligations.

In the case of NAFTA's chapter 11, which we do not want to see form the basis of negotiations for a free trade zone of the Americas, investors have rights, but governments have obligations. This seems completely unbalanced to us. The Bloc Quebecois will therefore be voting in favour of the New Democratic Party motion and the amendment.

[Resource Industries, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Chairman, if the truth be known, the provinces affected by the Canada-Unites States deal have been hard hit.

Producers in British Columbia, as in Quebec, have lost some of their share of the U.S. market to other countries but also sadly to other Canadian provinces who had free access to the American market.

Members will remember that when we had free trade with the Unites States, which lasted only a few months in 1995 and 1996, prices in Canada and in the States were the same, but with the quota system, prices in the U.S. ended up being $140 higher than in Canada.

We can all imagine how provinces like Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario were unable to fully benefit from the feverish activity in the U.S. market but had to sell a huge part of their products at a price $140 lower than in the United States.

The quota system really hurt us. It is true for Quebec, but I must say that it is also true for British Columbia, which along with the crisis in southeast Asia, had to deal with a decline in its lumber exports without the benefit of any new outlets.

[Resource Industries, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Chairman, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Témiscamingue.

I am extremely pleased to take part in this debate on the state of the natural resources of Canada and Quebec. I am going to use a topical example to address this question: softwood lumber.

We are going through some extremely difficult times in connection with this. We know the American commission has decided to look into Canadian trade practices, in what I would term a highly impertinent manner.

We will have a pretty tough row to hoe, and I feel it is important to have a clear picture of the situation, as it pertains to Quebec in particular, as far as the importance of wood as a resource and of the lumber industry.

We have had occasion to discuss this matter in the House several times, so hon. members will know that it accounts for 130,000 jobs in Canada, which are directly connected with the industry. The figure for Quebec is 40,000 jobs. Quebec is the second highest producer, ranking after British Columbia, which is responsible for close to 25% of lumber production. It means that 7 billion board feet are produced annually, which represents a total value of $4 billion Canadian. About half a billion dollars are directly invested in the sawmill industry each year and some $65 million in the forest industry.

As far as Quebec and the regions of Quebec are concerned and I am looking at my colleagues and all of us are being affected by this crisis some 250 municipalities have sprung up around wood processing. In 135 towns and villages, all of the jobs are related to this industry. Except for our major urban sectors, all our rural, semi-rural and semi-urban regions are affected.

My riding is located in the Lanaudière area, which produces lumber. The ridings of my colleagues from Témiscamingue and Saguenay—Lac-Saint-Jean are also affected. In the Mauricie area that I had the opportunity to visit during a tour concerning the summit of the Americas, producers asked me a lot of questions about what we had done in the House. The same is true for the Lower St. Lawrence, the North Shore, the Eastern Townships, the Laurentians and many more areas.

This all goes to show how crucial the sawmill industry is for the regions of Quebec. This crisis in our trade relations with Canada is extremely serious, and we are following the situation very closely.

All in all, 51.4% of Quebec exports go to the United States, while the rest, or 47.6%, goes to Canada. As we can see, the U.S. market is a major outlet.

Quebec exports to the United States represent about $2 billion a year while Canadian exports as a whole represent about $10 billion or $11 billion a year.

It is a very important industry, an industry for which the free trade provided for under NAFTA must be maintained. It is widely known that for the last twenty years now, the American industry, and I should even say part of the American lumber industry, has been harassing the Canadian and Quebec industry as soon as our market reaches 30% of the American market.

The real reason of all that fuss is that the Canadian and Quebec industries have been successful over the years, thanks to the investments they made in their equipment and to their revamping of their production methods.

The lumber industry is closely related to the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. Accordingly, a great deal was done over the years with regard to the environment, work organization and investment in new technologies.

The problem is not that Canada and Quebec are subsidizing their industries by requiring very low stumpage fees. We all know that the investigations made in 1991-92 have shown that as far as the Canadian industry was concerned, especially in Quebec, there was no subsidy. Actually they really had to look hard to find a 0.01% subsidy. Therefore, the problem is not there.

I believe people need to be reminded that since 1992 stumpage fees have been raised substantially in Quebec and in all of Canada's provinces. For example, in 1992, when the most recent inquiry on the alleged subsidies took place, stumpage fees were $5.42 a thousand board feet. In December, they were $9.26. So they have just about doubled, and reached $11.61 in December 1997.

Since 1992, our stumpage fees have increased in objective terms. This is true for Quebec and for the other provinces—making our case even better.

This is why we are disappointed to see that the American secretariat has nevertheless initiated inquiries under anti-dumping procedures and countervailing duties, despite the facts.

The paradox, and I think it is important to point it out, is that the American interests established in Quebec and Canada are complaining, in terms of their production in Canada and Quebec, that stumpage fees are too high. Often these same American interests criticize Canada and Quebec for having stumpage fees that are too low, when it comes to their American production.

This is a sort of schizophrenia, which demonstrates the extent of ill will in the whole matter in part of the American industry. As I mentioned, we find it completely unacceptable that the U.S. department of commerce has begun investigations when there is absolutely nothing to justify them. I read the Minister for International Trade's press release and we share his point of view completely—

One interesting thing is that, contrary to 1995-96, it seems that the Canadian and Quebec industry, and I can guarantee this for the Quebec industry, is united. After five years of the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber agreement with quotas and countervail duties, we came to the conclusion that it was not a question of negotiating any agreement at all and that we had to return, in fact, there was a short period of free trade, to the rules of free trade, as set out in NAFTA, for all goods, including energy. This is in a context where there are new rules of the game compared to 1995-96.

One thing Canada did was file a complaint with the World Trade Organization, which agreed to set up a panel of experts to look into the legality of American practices with respect to countervailing duties, which we are now subject to. Let us hope that we have their response soon.

Our regions in Canada and Quebec deserve to see members of the House stand together against harassment from the American industry and, I would say, a certain lax attitude on the part of the U.S. government.

I am pleased to recall that on March 20 of this year the House almost unanimously passed a motion which I moved on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois to support the Canadian government's wish to go back to free trade, that is free and equitable circulation of all softwood lumber. Following this motion, our subcommittee on disputes and investments took the initiative of sending a letter signed by a large number of parliamentarians from all parties to the American secretary of state for commerce, Mr. Zoellick, to inform him that we were in disagreement with the situation and that we wanted to go back to free trade.

I said, and I think we all agree, that this is not a subsidy issue. As I mentioned earlier, our stumpage fees are not low. I will read a short excerpt of a letter sent to the minister for International Trade by Gilles Baril, the Quebec minister of state responsible for regional development and minister of industry and commerce, and Jacques Brassard, the Quebec minister of natural resources. They remind the federal minister that:

Under the Quebec forestry development plan, timber royalties are based on the market value of timber from private forests. That timber and the timber from the United States account for 31% of all the lumber provided to the Quebec industry.

However, the situation is still critical. There is the structural problem to which I referred, in that the American industry did not invest enough money. It cannot compete with the Canadian and Quebec industries and its production costs are indeed higher than those of our industries. There is also a problem with economic conditions in that lumber prices in Canada and in Quebec are currently going down.

There are three reasons, which I will review briefly. American consumption has slowed down because of the economic downturn in the United States, which means that there is less demand for softwood lumber. Supply has increased substantially, not because the provinces, those provinces affected by the agreement between Canada and the United States, have increased their exports, but because other countries have taken advantage of the agreement.

During the time that the agreement was in place, Canada increased its exports to the United States by 7.9%, while other countries increased theirs by 187.7%. This means that certain countries took advantage of the fact that the Canadian industry could not do more.

Another important aspect that is specific to Canada is the issue of quotas, which forced several provinces, including Quebec and British Columbia, to sell to Canadian markets.

This led to such a drop in prices that, and I will conclude with this, at this very moment, stumpage fees in Quebec are $9.26 and the price is $10, which means that our industry could not survive countervailing duties.

I remind members that the Bloc Quebecois wants this situation settled rapidly, without compromising the principle of free trade. We want all of Canada's regions to work together through these difficult times, from which I am sure we will emerge as winners.

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I have a few very specific questions for the hon. member. I would like him to tell me why there were no Liberal members of parliament at the people's summit and at the parliamentary conference of the Americas.

Second, does he not find inappropriate that the final declaration of the 34 heads of state mentions only the inter-parliamentary forum of the Americas, the FIPA, which has been in existence for hardly a month, while there is no mention whatsoever of COPA, which has been highly respected since 1997 and whose membership is much larger and pluralistic?

What does he think about the relations between FIPA and COPA during these negotiations?

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I really appreciated my colleague's speech. At the end of his presentation, he referred to the positions taken by the CEGEP de Rivière-du-Loup mobilization committee.

I have had the opportunity in a debate to share with him the ideas put forward by these students and I was very impressed to see they did not object to market openness nor to free trade, but they suggested a number of conditions. They have learned from the past as we should also do.

I would like my colleague to give us more details on something he has already talked about, which is the general approach used by these young people to mobilize the students of Collège de Rivière-du-Loup in Quebec.

[Trade, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, we agree with free trade but, as the Minister for International Trade said, there is a problem with chapter 11. He admitted it himself. The Prime Minister says the opposite.

What is the government's position? In the face of such an important threat, should the Prime Minister not clarify his position and tell us whether chapter 11 poses a problem for Canadians and Quebecers in the context of NAFTA today?

[Trade, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the lawsuits now under way and those that might yet be brought under chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement could exceed $2 billion. Clearly, this is no small affair.

How can the Prime Minister and his government be so irresponsible as not to have a clear position on something as basic, both for NAFTA and for the FTAA, as chapter 11, when what is at stake is the very ability of governments to legislate for the common good?

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to tell the Minister for International Trade that I am pleased we are able to start debating this whole matter today. We are always focussing just on the process and I am anxious to see us touch on substantive issues.

That said, the opposition has not waited for government permission to call for the texts to be made public, as hon. members will recall. I believe the Minister for International Trade was surprised by his colleagues' response, the proof being that the French translation of the texts was not available. If the federal government had really thought the response would be positive, it would have started getting its texts translated before receiving the response.

I have been interested in the debates on the free trade area of the Americas for 15 years now. I have seen that the process has in fact become increasingly transparent as the result of social pressure, pressures from parliaments and parliamentarians. As far as the free trade agreement with the United States was concerned, and that was a relatively non-transparent negotiation, there was no desire to address trade issues.

When NAFTA was negotiated, there was a little more openness, but not a lot. It was the American government, at the urging of President Clinton, that finally forced Canada and Mexico to have two parallel agreements on the environment and on labour.

Now we are at another stage, the free trade area of the Americas. I willingly admit that there has been some progress as far as transparency is concerned, but not enough. It seems to me that we have reached the stage where parliamentarians need to be involved on an ongoing basis, and to have the opportunity to give their approval of any potential free trade area of the Americas agreement before government ratification of it.

It could very easily work this way: the government signs an agreement, submits it to the House, which holds a debate on it, the House approves it and then the executive ratifies it. That is the way it is done in Great Britain and in Australia, and how it will also be done in the Quebec national assembly. The premier of Quebec has in fact announced that the national assembly would vote on the agreement before the government signs it.

I believe we have got to this stage and I would have liked to have seen the government party support the amendment, which seems to me to be the stage we have reached at this time, as far as transparency and democracy in Canada and in Quebec are concerned.

[Supply, April 24th, 2001]

Madam Speaker, a quick answer is that the goal of this proposal is to create a democratic forum for all our discussions. This is quite acceptable.

To be frank, the NPD position seems to be overly simplistic to me. It is the very opposite of the position held by those who think free trade will solve all our problems. Not all the problems we have in our society are caused by the opening up of markets, something that is happening anyway.

Let me conclude by asking a question of the NPD leader. Did she not also conclude from the COPA meeting that parliamentarians, while extremely critical of the current process, should co-operate with governments in order to influence the choices that will be made? Does she agree with such a co-operative approach, even if she is extremely critical of the current process?