Pierre Paul-Hus

[National Security Act, 2017, June 7th, 2019]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague opposite for his question.

He asked me if it was appropriate to quote a terrorist organization. I believe it is. That is why it is also important to record the names of terrorist organizations in the Criminal Code. We have to state the facts and use the right words.

With respect to the definition of committing a terrorist act, the main objective should always be to be effective and ensure that we arrest those seeking to commit terrorist acts.

[National Security Act, 2017, June 7th, 2019]

Madam Speaker, I will continue my speech on this very serious matter.

This week the Liberals moved a motion declaring that they would accept just two of the four amendments proposed by the Senate and that they were rejecting the important amendment on terrorism. The two amendments they retained were administrative ones.

Also, we did not support this bill because it makes it harder for law enforcement and security agencies to prevent attacks on Canadian soil, since they no longer have any threat disruption powers. Furthermore, the bill creates information silos among our agencies, which creates problems. I have said this before and I will say it again: information sharing is fundamental.

The Senate's first amendment is to part 2 of the bill, which deals with the intelligence commissioner. The amendment adds a new clause under the “Foreign Intelligence Authorization” heading. This new clause would allow the intelligence commissioner to refer a matter back to the minister with a description of the condition that would have to be added to the authorization in order to make the conclusions reasonable. This amendment would affect the Communications Security Establishment in particular and was recommended by the commissioner.

We support this amendment because it improves the bill by increasing communication and feedback between the information commissioner and the minister, thus reducing administrative formalities. We also proposed this amendment at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Unfortunately, the government rejected it.

The second amendment pertains to counselling the commission of a terrorism offence—I keep bringing it up and we will talk about it again and again—under the “Criminal Code” heading. Those few words make a world of difference in these 260 pages. This amendment broadens the scope of the wording slightly, given that some of our witnesses felt that the term “counselling” was too narrow. We support that amendment because it significantly improves the wording, ensuring greater certainty regarding how counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence should be interpreted. For an offence to have been committed, there is no requirement that:

(c) the accused knows the identity of the person whom the accused counsels to carry out the terrorist activity; or

(d) the person whom the accused counsels to carry out the terrorist activity knows that it is a terrorist activity.

This amendment addresses concerns specific to online terrorist propaganda. We do not understand why the government rejected this amendment proposed by the Senate, which is dominated by independent Liberals.

Despite two positive amendments, this legislation is still flawed. Aside from our unconditional support of part 6, we cannot support Bill C-59.

I will close by mentioning a few examples of serious flaws.

Part 4 amends threat reduction powers by limiting guaranteed powers to seven types of actions, one of which raises the question of whether non-invasive actions require a warrant. That action is described as interfering with the movement of any person. That means a CSIS agent on the ground would need a warrant to give false information to someone who could help the agent meet conspirators. It would also prevent a CSIS agent from warning the parents of a child who is being radicalized unless the agent has a warrant. These changes place an additional administrative burden on our agencies, which, without additional funding, will have to take agents out of the field so they can take care of paperwork.

Information silos are another problem. Part 5 was created in response to privacy protection groups that were unhappy with the fact that government institutions may share information, of their own accord or at the request of another institution, about activities that pose a threat to Canada's security. This creates a silo effect, which national security experts decried.

When ordinary Canadians look at the government, it seems complicated to them. There are many different public servants and many different departments. They often say that people do not talk to each other. Part 5 further complicates the exchange of information that is crucial to protecting national security. People have to be able to communicate. Information silos hinder communication. Leading national security advisors expressed concerns, but the government did not want to change its approach.

The third important element is threat disruption. Part 7 raises the threshold for recognizance orders and peace bonds, making it more difficult for law enforcement to monitor problematic individuals and disrupt threats before they occur.

This clause replaces the following words from the Criminal Code, “suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or the arrest of a person, is likely to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity” with “suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or the arrest of a person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity”.

It all comes down to two words: “likely” is replaced by “necessary”.

Instead of having serious concerns or information about a likely terrorist activity, we now have to be sure that the arrest is necessary. This complicates things. If there is any doubt, we have to back off. Terrorist activities tend to develop quite quickly. People who plot attacks might take months to think about and plan them, but others might quickly decide that they feel like doing something on Sunday, for example. When we get information quickly we have to be able to react quickly. Bill C-59 encumbers the process.

The powers provided for in Conservative Bill C-51 were aligned with those of our allies, including Norway and Finland. We modelled our bill on other democracies that believe freedom and security go hand in hand.

In summary, Bill C-59 is a heavy bureaucratic tool that will not ensure public safety, but will undo what the Conservative government put in place to safeguard the security of Canadians.

I move:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:

“the order for the consideration of the amendments made by the Senate to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, be discharged and the Bill withdrawn”

[National Security Act, 2017, June 7th, 2019]

Madam Speaker, I rise this morning to speak to Bill C-59, an omnibus bill that is over 260 pages long and has nine major parts. I listened to the minister's speech, which addressed the Senate amendments, but I would first like to focus on Bill C-59 itself.

As I have been saying from the outset, the problem is that most parts of Bill C-59 are administrative in nature. They make changes to the various intelligence and communications agencies. That is fine, but the main goal of Bill C-59 was to respond to Bill C-51, which was implemented by the Conservatives following the attacks that took place here in Ottawa. Bill C-51 was specifically designed to counter terrorism and ensure that anyone seeking to commit terrorist acts in Canada was stopped to avert disaster.

Overall, the omnibus bill has some parts that are fine. They contain the sort of changes that need to be made from time to time. However, other parts are very administratively heavy and will be very costly for the public purse. Essentially, this is a bill on national security. The public expects the government to protect people properly and ensure that the offenders and would-be terrorists of this world are stopped.

Despite what the minister says, we believe that Bill C-59 limits CSIS's ability to reduce terrorist threats. It also limits the departments' ability to share information in order to protect national security. It removes the offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general and raises the threshold for obtaining terrorism peace bonds and recognizance with conditions.

At the end of the day, Bill C-59 is going to make life difficult for CSIS agents and telecommunications services people. The bill makes it harder to exchange information. It will once again clog up a system that is already burdensome. People working on the ground every day to ensure Canada's security and safety will be under even more restrictions, which will prevent them from doing their jobs.

Here is a snapshot of the nine parts. Part 1 establishes the national security and intelligence review agency.

Part 2 enacts the intelligence commissioner act. It deals with everything pertaining to the commissioner and the various tasks he or she will have, but abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment and provides for that commissioner to become the intelligence commissioner. It transfers the employees of the former commissioner to the office of the new commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other acts. In other words, it shuffles things around.

Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment act. CSE's new mandate includes the ability to conduct preventive attacks against threats in addition to its role in signals intelligence and cyber defence. We really do not have a problem with that, provided it remains effective. That is an important point.

Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. It changes the threat reduction powers by limiting them to seven types of measures, one of which gives rise to the issue of whether non-invasive actions require a warrant. The measure in question is described as interfering with the movement of any person. This could mean that a CSIS officer requires a warrant to give misleading information to someone on the way to meeting with co-conspirators.

During operations, officers will sometimes provide individuals with false information to be passed on to those organizing terrorist or other plots. That is one of the work methods used in the field. Henceforth, warrants will have to be obtained, making the work more complicated. The officers will have to spend more time in the office doing paperwork and submitting applications instead of participating in operations.

Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which was enacted by the Conservative government's Bill C-51. Individuals and privacy groups were unhappy that government institutions could, on their own initiative or at the request of another institution, share information on activities that undermine the security of Canada. Bill C-51 was criticized for permitting the sharing of citizens' personal information.

Although Bill C-59 maintains part of the departments' ability to share information, it is much more restrictive. This means that the departments operate in silos, which was harshly criticized by the national security experts who testified.

Part 6 is the most positive part, and we fully support it. This part deals with the Secure Air Travel Act and the problems with the no-fly list. When travellers have the same name as a terrorist, they encounter major problems, especially when it happens to children and they are not allowed to travel. This part will help fix this problem, and we fully support it.

Part 7 amends the Criminal Code by changing the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years.

I will read the next part, which does not pose any problems:

Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.

Finally, here is the last part:

Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the sixth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force.

These are additional administrative measures.

In short, of the nine parts of Bill C-59, we fully support part 6 on the no-fly list. The other parts contain a lot administrative provisions that will make the system more cumbersome. Part 7 is the most problematic.

We believe that the Prime Minister and the minister are weakening Canada's national security agencies and their ability to keep Canadians safe. This legislative measure will make it more difficult for law enforcement and security agencies to prevent attacks on Canadian soil because it takes away their authority to counter threats. The information silos this bill will create within our federal agencies are dangerous and foolish. Rather than countering radicalization, the Liberals are creating loopholes that could be exploited by those who want to radicalize our young people.

The Conservatives take the safety of Canadians very seriously. That is why the previous government brought Canada's national security laws into the 21st century and aligned them with those of our allies. While all of the Five Eyes allies are taking measures to strengthen national security, this government is bringing in legislation that will eliminate our intelligence service's ability to reduce terrorist threats. The Liberals' irresponsible approach will put Canadians' safety at risk.

I was pleased with the four amendments proposed by the senators, who also took the time to work on Bill C-59 and hear witnesses. We know that the independent Liberals have a majority in the the Senate, so we would not normally expect to see amendments that reflect the Conservatives' views. This time, however, we think all four amendments are excellent and deserve our support. We waited for the government's response.

Two of the amendments had been proposed by me and my Conservative colleagues on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, but the Liberals had rejected them. One of them sought to clarify the definition of the phrase “counselling commission of terrorism offence”. This short phrase really embodies the problem we have with Bill C-59. For the benefit of our viewers, I would like to quote the specific wording.

The bill would amend the Criminal Code by changing the following existing definition:

Every person who knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to carry out a terrorist activity is guilty....

The bill would change it to the following:

Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence...is guilty....

What is the Liberals' real goal here, if not to just strike out the Conservative government's Bill C-51 so they can say they made a change?

Did they make this change with the intention of improving the legislation? No. Even the senators advised the government to preserve the essence of the definition set out in the Conservatives' Bill C-51.

The minister says that in 2015, when Bill C-51 was introduced by the Conservative government, no charges were ever laid. Is it not possible that no charges were laid because people got scared and decided not to run any risks, in light of the legislation and resources that were in place, as well as the enforcement capability?

Maybe that was why nothing happened. Does watering down and changing this—

[National Security Act, 2017, June 7th, 2019]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the minister for his explanation.

However, I am still skeptical about part 7. I listened carefully when the minister explained the part about the commission of a terrorism offence. In the broader conversation, people are comparing Bill C-59 to Bill C-51.

Bill C-59 is 260 pages long. Many parts of it are very administrative and relate to structural changes. I will talk about that later.

Everyone agrees that the government's approach here is wrong. National security experts say so. Conservatives sent the same message with our amendments. Even the Senate's amendment confirmed that the government's approach is wrong. Despite all that, the minister insists that he has the right solution.

Is the government butting heads with everyone just because it wants to keep its election promise to change Bill C-51 at any cost?

[National Security Act, 2017, June 7th, 2019]

Minister, I thank you for your explanations.

[Auditor General of Canada, June 6th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, the Auditor General asked for additional funding to fulfill his mandate, but the Prime Minister refused his request.

The Auditor General was therefore forced to abandon his audit of the government's performance on cybercrime and Arctic sovereignty. Once again, this Prime Minister does not care about anything that relates to security.

Can the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness call his boss to order and bring him to his senses?

[75th Anniversary of D-Day, June 6th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, 75 years ago on June 6, 1944, D-Day, the Régiment de la Chaudière, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Mathieu, landed on Juno Beach to fight the Nazi forces that had invaded France and Europe.

The Régiment de la Chaudière helped liberate the beaches of Normandy, the city of Caen, the Carpiquet airport and many other areas where heavy fighting claimed many victims from our regiment.

Dozens of men from the Régiment de la Chaudière died in the Normandy campaign and many others were wounded. However, one fact remains: these men are heroes. They are the heroes of the Régiment de la Chaudière.

Today marks the 75th anniversary of a major military operation, the largest in history. In memory of all those Quebeckers who gave their lives in battle to protect our freedom, let us all be eternally grateful to those men and say, “Never again”.

Aere Perennius.

[Public Safety, June 5th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the minister for his answer. We know that people were intercepted. The issue now is whether 400 Mexican cartel members are actually operating here in Canada.

I have another question for the minister. Can he confirm that Mexican cartels are currently selling drugs in Canada and that they are very active, yes or no?

[Public Safety, June 5th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness did not listen carefully to my question. I hope he does today.

We know that the Canada Border Services Agency intercepted 238 individuals, that 27 of them were inadmissible and that three were members of Mexican cartels. That is what we know.

The problem is that there are 400 other individuals, Mexicans or foreigners travelling on Mexican passports, with ties to organized crime, who have come to Canada and are now operating in our communities.

My question is simple. Is the minister taking steps to arrest and deport them?

[Criminal Records Act, June 4th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his excellent question.

One amendment the government agreed to covered situations where an individual who wants to apply does not have information about the arrest, such as the name of the city and the province. The documents relating to the criminal record exist only on paper, so the information might be in a drawer at some police station or courthouse. Sometimes the individual in question is somewhere else in Canada and does not have access to the documents or may not even remember where the arrest took place.

To simplify things, our amendment suggested that applicants could submit a sworn statement attesting to the details of the arrest and the individual's inability to obtain the documents. We were prepared to accept a sworn statement in order to process applications without proper documentation because accessing documents is very complicated. The Liberal committee members agreed to the amendment, but the government rejected it, and we have no idea why.

Now people have to fill out forms. Those 10,000 people with criminal records I was talking about earlier are marginalized and do not really have much in the way of resources. That makes it hard for them to know where to go to get the forms. Accessing the forms online is easier, so we suggested that systems should be digitized to improve the situation. The government rejected that idea too. If the government had agreed to that amendment, it would have made things easier.

Our requests were practical.