Mr. Speaker, I will note, as well, that none of us will be silenced in speaking out against what happened under the direction of the previous Liberal government. The sponsorship scandal was created by the Liberals for the Liberals. Today we see a very prominent participant in that Liberal scandal come forward and confess his guilt.
Today I would like to further clarify the legislated intent behind the accounting officer provisions as set out in the Federal Accountability Act's amendment to the Financial Administration Act.
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts has been considering the meaning of this new designation, and we appreciate its careful consideration of these provisions in ensuring good management in the Government of Canada. However, we must insist on defending the principles of ministerial responsibility and the political neutrality of the public service, two key principles undermined by the Liberal Party during the sponsorship scandal and during other corrupt episodes in the history of that government.
The Liberals interpretation of the role of the accounting officer differs from what the government codified in legislation. Some have compared our differences as akin to the epic struggle between Parliament and the executive back in the misty beginnings of British history.
I do not really know that much about the Magna Carta, but I do know one thing about Canada. Ministers have always been responsible for the conduct and decisions they have made. It has never been the duty of the deputy minister to rise in the House and explain the behaviour of the minister.
What the public accounts committee is attempting to do is to transfer the responsibility of minister, the politician, and put it on the backs of the public servant. We do not believe this is healthy evolution in the history of our democracy.
I know that ministerial responsibility and political neutrality of the public service are cornerstones of Canadian constitutional law, Canadian values and the Canadian system of democracy. I ask the hon. members to forget King John and to look at the facts of our history, after all we are Canadians. The accounting officer protocol adopted by the committee runs counter to the Federal Accountability Act and chips away at the underpinning principle of our democratic system of government.
According to the act, approved by the House, deputy ministers and deputy heads are designated as accounting officers for their organizations within the framework of ministerial accountability and accountability to Parliament. The accounting officer is legally obligated to appear before committees, but the legislation does not make him or her accountable in political arenas for management in the specific areas set out for in the act.
Ministers are still politically accountable to Parliament for the actions of the executive, including management. This is where we differ. Recently we had Anne McLellan, the previous public security minister before the public accounts committee. We asked her, as a former minister, why she publicly exonerated the commissioner of the RCMP before a criminal investigation was allowed to go ahead into the scandal unfolding at the highest levels of that organization.
I note the public accounts chair became very emotional and he shut down questions against the minister because he did not believe that she should be held accountable for her own behaviour. Therein lies the difference between our vision and the Liberal vision. We believe ministers ought to be held to account. The Liberals believe in transferring responsibility and blame onto the bureaucrats.
This does not mean that accounting officers have no accountability for management. They do. They are accountable to their minister, who in turn is accountable to Parliament.
The Federal Accountability Act has clarified accountabilities and recognizes that officers may have more information on the day to day management of the department than their ministers. Therefore, the accounting officer appears before committees in support of the minister's overall accountability.
What we have not done through the act is to undermine the long-standing principles of ministerial responsibility and the core relationship between ministers and their deputies. For example, we have not altered the obligation of the public servant to protect confidential information. Nor does the act contemplate parliamentary committees subjecting accounting officers to censure, engaging them in policy discussions or asking them to disclose personal opinions or advice to ministers.
These accounting officers are non-partisan public servants. It is not their role to take a position on political issues. It is not their duty to explain the political rationale behind the behaviour of the minister. That is the minister's job. That is why we have question period. That is why we have confidence votes in Houses of Commons across the world. The ministers, and therefore the government, are responsible here before the House of Commons rather than the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats are accountable through those ministers.
Parliamentary committees do not have the authority to direct public servants. It does not matter if the chair of the public accounts committee wants to beat his chest and pronounce that he now wants new authorities on how the government operates. He cannot take that authority away from the executive branch of government. Try though he might, he does not have the authority. That might bother him. He might not be satisfied with his role in the democratic process. Perhaps he wants to augment his powers. However, he cannot do so because our system forbids him from accumulating power that was not handed to him in an election.
In short, the accounting officer model underlines the critical importance of sound departmental management. At the same time, it underlines the role played by deputy ministers in achieving and supporting their ministers' accountability for it.
To help deputy ministers understand their new responsibilities as accounting officers, the government has developed a new document entitled “Accounting Officers: Guidance on Roles, Responsibilities and Appearances Before Parliamentary Committees”. It provides guidance on such matters as preparing for committee appearances and the principles governing conduct during appearances. In places, it refers to certain recognized principles of conduct during the appearances of public servants. It endorses professionalism and mutual respect.
However, the document does not purport to govern parliamentarians. Parliamentarians can behave as they wish before parliamentary committees. Our government will never put out a document demanding that they behave in one way or another. That comportment is governed by the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and we do not propose to intervene in it.
We propose, rather, to define the roles of accounting officers. Accounting officers work for the government. They are hired by the government. They are fired by the government. They are remunerated by the government. They are not paid directly by Parliament. Their authority flows through the ministers to Parliament and not directly. That will not change, thump his chest though the public accounts chair might.
This document is intended as guidance for officials. It is not direction to committees.
We understand the importance of Parliament having access to non-confidential information about the operations of government and we want Parliament to have the information it needs to hold the government to account for management issues.
However, it is equally important that public servants not be drawn into the political and partisan arenas by replacing the rightful roles of elected officials. That is why we must never compromise political neutrality of the public service.
We want to work with the public accounts committee to ensure that the accounting officer functions effectively. I know we share a common goal in wanting to ensure good government management for Canadians, but there are areas of disagreement between oppositions. These areas are limited, but they are important and they need to be resolved.
In particular, the government does not agree that accounting officers have a personal accountability relationship with Parliament and committees. This seems to reflect the idea that the accounting officer appears in defence of his or her performance, but in fact the accounting officer appears before the committee to support the minister's accountability and ultimately the government's accountability for the way departments, agencies and other government organizations are managed.
Ministers and not public servants are accountable directly to Parliament. Closely related to this point, committees' protocol could be interpreted to support the earlier mentioned principle.
It speaks, for example, of accounting officers being held accountable before the committee and also of the deterrent force of bad publicity. We disagree with shifting political blame to bureaucrats. This would undermine the principle, once again, of ministerial responsibility and public service neutrality.
That is to say, if a government fails to manage its operations effectively, we will not transfer blame from where it should be to where it cannot be. We will accept responsibility, something to which the previous Liberal government had a violent allergy. We, in this government, believe in ministerial responsibility and that is what distinguishes us from the members across.
The protocol also calls for the disclosure of certain decisions of the Treasury Board, which is a committee of cabinet, under the mechanism for resolving disagreements between accounting officers and their ministers. The legislation, however, does not contemplate disclosure of cabinet decisions. It never has. No government in the country's history has ever believed that cabinet confidences should be made public before parliamentary committees.
Frankly, the Liberals were in power for 13 years. If they wanted to put an end to cabinet confidences, make all cabinet activity public, they could have done so. Strangely enough, they did not do it and they have not done it, and no government has done it in the past 130 years in our country. We do not believe that cabinets can function properly if they cannot operate in carrying out their duties and carrying out their work in that way.
It now turns on to us to recognize that decisions will be shared with the office of the Auditor General as confidants of the Queen's privy council, which is consistent with the general treatment of Treasury Board decisions. Cabinet decisions will be available to the Auditor General, who is independent from the government and who can scrutinize those decisions.
We look forward to meeting with the committee to discuss the effectiveness of this accounting officer model in helping Parliament to hold government to account, but in the Canadian tradition of evolution, not revolution, our goal is to implement a model that balances accountability with the important constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility.
The Federal Accountability Act is our made in Canada solution. The protocol should be returned to the public accounts committee for proper review and consideration.
I hope that next time the chair of the public accounts committee will recognize his duty to allow debate before the public accounts committee, that he will stop shutting down questioning of former Liberal ministers and that he will learn to curtail his outbursts in defending previous Liberal corruption and incompetence. I will join with him and I will be happy to offer him my help as he makes that transformation in his conduct.
Mr. Speaker, I thank you very much for this opportunity. I thank you for allowing the government to stand before the Canadian people and uphold the principles of accountability upon which we were elected and for which we are deeply proud.