Preston Manning

[National Unity, November 8th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the constitutional proposals in Reform's new confederation package have been under discussion with the Canadian public for five years. It came from the bottom up, not the bottom down.

The fact remains that the only government response to the Quebec referendum thus far has been to start down the same rocky road that led to the failures of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords by establishing a top down, closed door committee of cabinet to develop unity proposals without the involvement of Canadian people. This is the process that doomed Meech, doomed Charlottetown and will doom this post-referendum strategy unless the public is involved.

What specifically does the government intend to do to bring the Canadian people, the ones who pulled the no vote out of the fire, into the development of its post-referendum strategy?

[National Unity, November 8th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, for months before the Quebec referendum the government went to sleep on the national unity issue, failing to provide a strong federalist vision of strategy to counter the separatist dreams and strategy. Then the government got the mother of all wake up calls on October 30 and the Prime Minister belatedly decided to act on the demand for change inside and outside Quebec.

Now, a week later, we find the government going back to sleep. Instead of offering leadership it falls back on a tired, old precedent of appointing a top down, closed door committee to come up with some post-referendum strategy.

My question is for the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. What on earth happened to the sense of urgency that the Prime Minister expressed on October 30? By what date will this cabinet committee have something intelligent to report to the House?

[National Unity, November 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the biggest mistake the federal politicians made with respect to Charlottetown and Meech was that they tried to draft unity proposals themselves behind closed doors, by ministerial committees and by ministerial conferences. The Canadian people were shut out of the building process.

If we have learned anything from this referendum campaign it is that the federal government does not have a monopoly on brains or on patriotism. The Canadian people saved the referendum campaign and their voices should be heard in this post-referendum strategy.

Instead of following the traditional closed door approach to developing unity proposals, what is the government doing to bring the Canadian people into the development of its post referendum strategy?

[National Unity, November 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, despite the polls and the lessons of Meech and Charlottetown the government is still favouring a distinct society clause and constitutional veto for Quebec. Both of these concepts are the products of a top down, legalistic approach to national unity which has not worked for 30 years.

Recognizing distinctiveness in Canada is not the problem; it is how to do it. The alternative bottom up approach would be to give each province the practical tools to protect and nurture its own distinctiveness, and real control over resources, social services, language and culture.

Is the national unity committee of cabinet giving serious consideration to this alternative approach to achieve provincial distinctiveness? If so, who is the spokesperson on that committee for that alternative approach?

[National Unity, November 7th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, there are competing visions in the country of where Canada should be headed after the Quebec referendum.

One side represented by the government wants to go back to elements of the failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords. The other side represented by Reform and some provincial governments wants to move forward to decentralize certain key social functions of the federal government while strengthening the economic union at the same time.

Now a special committee of cabinet has been set up to design a post-referendum strategy. My question to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs is: What is the national unity committee of cabinet doing to ensure this alternative federalist vision is being considered, and what minister in the cabinet represents that position?

[National Unity, November 3rd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the government can try to ignore 30 per cent of the yes people who thought they were voting for something else. I suggest that is keeping the government's head in the sand. That is not going to win the battle with the separatists the next time around.

Quebecers must know the Canadian position on terms and conditions of separation. Quebecers have to know the Canadian position on debt division, the Canadian position on boundaries, the Canadian position on protecting Atlantic Canada and the Canadian position on terms and conditions of trade.

Since over 30 per cent of yes voters thought they could keep all the benefits of Canadianism and vote for separation, will the government begin to spell out the Canadian position on terms and conditions of separation in order to make the negative consequences of separation clear to every Quebecer?

[National Unity, November 3rd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, it may be that some of the economic arguments on the dangers of secession were presented.

The sad fact is that on October 30 over 30 per cent of the people who voted yes thought they were voting for a new and better economic union with Canada rather than for a separate Quebec. The federal government and the no campaign failed utterly to get through to those voters on the negative implications of a yes vote. That simply cannot be allowed to ever happen again.

To prevent that from happening again, will the government begin to clearly and openly answer from a Canadian perspective all the what if questions which are raised by a Quebec secession and which I presented to the Prime Minister on June 8, 1994 prior to the last campaign?

[National Unity, November 3rd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, Canadian federalists must never get into any future contest with Quebec separatists-and regrettably there will be one more contest-as ill prepared and ill equipped as they entered the last referendum campaign.

If we are to keep this great country together, we have to fight the separatist dream with a federalist vision, not the status quo. We have to fight separatist deceptions not with panic or propaganda, but with the naked truth about what separation really means. The time to prepare the ground is before, not during some future campaign.

I ask the intergovernmental affairs minister, in this period prior to the next real confrontation with the separatists, what is the government going to do to make the real consequences of secession crystal clear to every Quebecer?

[The Referendum, November 2nd, 1995]

If there is no question, sit down.

[National Unity, November 1st, 1995]

Let me put the question and let the Prime Minister listen, because it is really simple.

Is the Prime Minister really serious in saying that he is willing to give the separatist Government of Quebec a veto over the Constitution of Canada?