House of Commons photoWon his last election, in 2000, with 65% of the vote.
National Unity November 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, rather than comment on the non-answer, let me go on to the most unbelievable aspect of the federal strategy, this makeshift strategy for unity.
The government seems to be seriously considering giving a constitutional veto to the Government of Quebec, a separatist government committed to breaking up the country. Perhaps the Prime Minister intends this as a parting gift to the Leader of the Opposition if he goes to Quebec City.
National Unity November 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister.
It seems that the Prime Minister is preparing to offer Quebec a special deal that consists of the old traditional federal chestnuts of a distinct society and a constitutional veto. For 20 years the separatists have been saying that because Quebec is a distinct society and people it should therefore become a sovereign state.
Why does the Prime Minister think that by conceding the first part of that proposition he can prevent the second? I think the Prime Minister would like me to repeat that question.
Quebec Referendum November 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, to compound the errors of the no side campaign, we now have the crowning miscalculation. Apparently the federal government is responding to the demands for change in Quebec by falling back on the tired old cliches of distinct society and a constitutional veto for Quebec, asking Canadians to wallow once again in the stagnant waters of Meech Lake.
This Liberal-Tory approach to national unity with its top down process, constitutional mumbo-jumbo and hollow symbolism has not worked for 30 years, and Canadians know it. They ask the Prime Minister, who in their right mind is responsible for this
misguided strategy? Is it the same people who devised the no strategy? Is it his new constitutional adviser from Sherbrooke, or is it the Prime Minister himself?
Quebec Referendum November 1st, 1995
The Prime Minister did not wake up to Quebec's profound demands for change until the last week of the campaign. For months and months in the House and outside the House, he insisted the status quo was good enough, plus a little administrative tinkering. It was not until the last days of the campaign that he belatedly recognized the need for change and began to talk about it.
I ask the Prime Minister, given the obvious desire in the country for change, who was the genius who decided that status quo plus administrative tinkering was good enough? Was it the Prime Minister's advisers? Was it some fossilized senators, or was it the Prime Minister himself?
Quebec Referendum November 1st, 1995
Nothing will change the fact that it was his lame brain strategy that brought the country-
Quebec Referendum November 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister can question the loyalty of millions of Canadians who disagree with his-
Quebec Referendum November 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, almost two days have passed since the Quebec referendum and as yet no one has accepted responsibility for the mismanagement of the federalist strategy which brought the country to the very brink of disaster, mismanagement which simply cannot be repeated in the future.
Seventeen months ago the Prime Minister was strongly urged to clearly define the costs of separation by answering 20 questions on the negative meaning of a yes vote. The Prime Minister dismissed those questions as hypothetical and did nothing. As a result he almost lost the country to Quebec voters who thought they could vote yes and still be Canadian.
Canadians want to know who is responsible for those miscalculations in that campaign. Was it the Prime Minister's advisers, was it the no side strategists, or was it the Prime Minister himself?
Canadian Unity October 31st, 1995
Shameful. Mr. Speaker, if I wanted to score cheap political points, I would know where to go.
A real agenda for change that would address the demands of Quebec and other provinces has to have two characteristics: it must be within the federal government's ability to implement without constitutional wrangling, and it must be capable of commanding support among all the provinces, including Quebec. Reform has a list of 20 such changes. We call them the new confederation proposals.
My question will appeal to the ethics of the government. If we were to put these new confederation proposals into a brown envelope and leave them outside the office of the Deputy Prime Minister, would the government be willing to steal them so that Canadians could at least have some plan to address the demand for change in this country?
Canadian Unity October 31st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, I do not think the Prime Minister learned a thing from last night.
Quebecers last night registered a massive demand for change. While Quebecers said no to separation by the narrowest of margins, both sides were giving a massive no to the status quo. Yet in his speech last night and in his remarks today, all the Prime Minister has to offer are the same old meaningless clichés about change that almost put this country over the edge.
Will the Prime Minister say today what changes he is going to make in the federal system to make it work for all Canadians? Will he be fresh, clear, and specific instead of tiresome, vague, and meaningless?
Canadian Unity October 31st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, last night this country came within a hair's breadth of breaking apart. Fortunately the no side scraped through, but it was thanks to the last-minute efforts of the Canadian public, not to the strategy of the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister and the no side strategists woefully underestimated Quebec's deep desire for change, and up until 10 days ago were still trying to sell the status quo with a little administrative tinkering. These gross miscalculations almost cost us the country.
My question is to the Prime Minister. Three months ago the Prime Minister did not have an adequate plan to keep this country together. He did not have one last night. Does he have one today?