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Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was federal.

Last in Parliament May 2004, as Canadian Alliance MP for Calgary Southwest (Alberta)

Won his last election, in 2000, with 65% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his question.

I suggest that the two options are not mutually exclusive. The point of the military intervention is to try to force the Yugoslav regime to that negotiating table which I think all members would prefer to be the forum in which this issue is resolved. The two issues fit together.

We all wish that these people would come to the negotiating table without the persuasion of bombs and air attacks. That would be the hope of every member in this House. But if that will not happen, and it has not happened, then we say regretfully that we endorse the military action required to bring about the negotiations that members in the House would hope would bring a solution.

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, on what important issue are we not subject to those kinds of pressures? That is part of the democratic process.

Members from all parties today were not even asking for the form of the motion. They were just asking that if the commitment of ground troops is part of the possible future action in the Balkans that the Prime Minister would commit today to get a mandate from parliament through a vote before that action was taken.

I do not think that is unreasonable. I think any representations on that issue by the public to ourselves would certainly be welcome, at least on this side of the House.

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, in preparing for this debate I asked myself what do Canadians want from their parliament and from their government with respect to the issue of Kosovo and the escalating violence in the Balkans.

Of course they want parliament and they want the House, in the words of the motion, to take note of the continuing human tragedy in Kosovo. However Canadians want us to do much more than take note of the obvious. They want us to put partisanship aside and develop a united position on a situation involving issues of life and death, war and peace, and national and international security. They want clear answers to such questions as why we are involved with NATO and Kosovo and the Balkans. What is it we hope to achieve politically and militarily? How do we expect to achieve it, in the air, on the ground and at the conference table?

If we are agreed on the moral, political and military objectives of our involvement in the Balkans, I believe Canadians would also want parliament to give the government a clear mandate to pursue those objectives subject to any conditions which parliament may consider prudent.

The motion before us is very fuzzy with respect to objectives and does not really seek guidance or a mandate from the House on such crucial issues as Canadian support of NATO air strikes or the commitment of Canadian ground troops to any expanded NATO effort.

The Prime Minister's remarks have filled in a few of the gaps but they have done very little to fill in the gaps on the military objectives or how we will achieve them. It appears it will be up to other members to help clarify what Canada's objectives in the Balkans should be, what mandate we should give the government, particularly militarily, to pursue those objectives, and what conditions, if any, we should impose on that mandate.

This I will now proceed to do on behalf of the official opposition and with the aid of my colleagues who will be speaking later.

First, what is the ultimate reason, the moral objective of Canada's involvement in the Balkans? This is the one issue on which there is universal agreement. We say and most members here say that it is to halt the ethnic cleansing being perpetrated by the Yugoslav government in Kosovo and to care for the victims of Serb aggression. This is the moral objective. The importance and urgency of pursuing it cannot be overemphasized.

Over the Easter break I had the opportunity to spend some precious time with our two little grandchildren aged 18 months and 9 months. These little lives, thank God, have not yet experienced any real pain or privation or violence or hatred. Those who love them will do everything in our power to make sure that they never experience those things.

When we look at the Balkans and see the stream of refugees from Kosovo, now numbering in excess of half a million people, mothers, fathers, old people, children, babes in arms, victims or potential victims of ethnic cleansing, violence from military and paramilitary and police officials, children whose eyes have seen things that no human eye should ever see, children whose ears have heard things that no human ears should hear, I say that the moral imperative of a NATO presence and a Canadian presence in the Balkans becomes abundantly clear and it becomes imperative.

In stressing this moral imperative, I am not ignoring the very real need to create a better legal framework for multinational action against inhuman acts by the government of a sovereign state. Nor am I denying the danger of developing and practising double standards with multinational groups acting against ethnic cleansing in one instance but declining to do so in others.

As we know in the Balkans there is scarcely any ethnic group without blood on its hands. We acknowledge that the Serbs themselves have been victims as well as perpetrators of violence against ethnic minorities. At this point in time, with the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo reaching the proportions that it has, I do not think we can allow these unresolved issues to stand in the way of concrete, collective action to halt the ethnic cleansing being perpetrated by the Yugoslav regime.

Second, this debate should clarify what is the political objective of NATO's intervention in Kosovo and Canada's involvement in that intervention. What is the political solution that we would like to see achieved by negotiation rather than by clash of arms?

Are NATO and the Canadian government still committed to the Rambouillet agreement calling for an autonomous Kosovo within Yugoslavia? Or is NATO and our government now inclining toward supporting an independent Kosovo? If so, would Kosovo be partitioned? Would a UN or NATO patrolled safe haven be established? What would be the wider implications of an independent Kosovo for stability and ethnic peace in the region?

I believe that most members of this House support the notion that the answers to these questions are best provided not by our speculating on them, but through internationally supervised negotiations among the affected parties themselves. A clearer statement of NATO's and Canada's political objectives with respect to Kosovo, a clearer statement than that contained in the take note motion, would be to say we are determined to create a safe home for Kosovars in the region and to stabilize relations between the republic of Yugoslavia and its neighbours through internationally supervised negotiations.

Third, I turn to the area I felt the Prime Minister did not discuss thoroughly enough. What is the military objective that we are pursuing with our NATO allies through the current action against the Yugoslav regime? The motion before us is completely silent on this subject. Yet surely this is the issue on which the public has the most questions and one where we would expect the government to be seeking a more explicit mandate from this House.

The Prime Minister has not elaborated on that subject today. In fact he has tried to avoid it. From the statements made by other NATO spokespersons, we conclude that the military objective of our involvement—and I think we should be precise about this; if we are misunderstanding it, let us get it corrected—is to damage the military capability of the Yugoslav government to thereby reduce its capacity to practise ethnic cleansing and to bring that government to the negotiating table. That is the whole purpose of the military operation in the Balkans.

The official opposition supports this objective and Canada's participation with its NATO allies to achieve it. We support it as the regrettable means to a desirable end, namely to halt the ethnic cleansing and to force negotiations.

As we have said before, we are supportive of the NATO air strikes and Canada's participation therein. We believe this effort should be given time to have the desired effect. We should not be stampeded into premature expectations by the video game mindset that governs the TV media coverage of such operations.

It is also our view, as I wrote the Prime Minister on March 31, that once the decision was made to commit Canadian air forces to the NATO effort in Yugoslavia, we in this parliament should not engage in second guessing the mission when it has scarcely begun. Rather, we should offer our steadfast support, our political support, our moral support, our vocal support, to those brave Canadian personnel who are involved.

I would hope that every member in this House would agree that achieving the military objective of damaging the military capability of the Yugoslav regime requires us to look ahead. Surely the expectation of the public is not that we just discuss the situation today—yes, we must discuss that—but to look ahead. What if something more than the NATO air strikes is required to achieve these objectives? Where does Canada stand? Where does the government and parliament stand?

Speaking for the official opposition, we are prepared to support the commitment of Canadian ground forces to the NATO effort in Yugoslavia subject to two very important conditions. First, we are prepared to support that commitment if NATO can demonstrate that such a commitment is necessary to halt the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and provide a safe home for Kosovars in the region. In other words, if that is necessary to achieve the ultimate moral and political objective, we are prepared to consider it.

If we are truly committed to the moral objective of halting these atrocities, we must not give the Milosevic regime any indication that our resolve is either limited or weak.

The official opposition is therefore prepared to support the commitment of Canadian ground forces to the NATO effort in Yugoslavia if this is necessary, but also subject to the condition that the Canadian government demonstrate to the House that the commitments requested are within Canada's capability.

The Minister of National Defence has repeatedly assured us that Canadian armed forces are adequately equipped to do the dangerous jobs they are called upon to do. But the government's foreign policy repeatedly expands our commitment to peacekeeping and peace making while its management of defence budgets has shrunk our defence resources from $12 billion per year to $9.3 billion.

Our land forces have been especially neglected. Concerns with regard to Canadian land forces equipment have been raised by the auditor general as well as by many other experts. In some categories of equipment, Canada is at least a generation behind its NATO allies.

If our Canadian forces are called upon to do a job in Kosovo or anywhere else, we must insist and do insist that they be given the tools to do the job. Hence the second condition, the need for hard questions about the adequacy of our resources and the need for straight answers.

In conclusion, we are supportive of this take note motion before the House, as far as it goes, but as hon. members will gather, we believe that the House can and should do more than simply take note and concur with generalities. We believe that parliament should spell out clearly for the benefit of all Canadians the moral, political and military objectives of our involvement with NATO in Yugoslavia. Canadians will support these objectives if they are clearly spelled out, but if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who will rally to its call?

If we are agreed on objectives, I also believe the government could then ask the House for an explicit mandate to pursue those objectives. Speaking for the official opposition, we would be prepared to give that mandate, provided that the military objectives were subject to the two conditions which I have outlined.

In other words I am urging the government to follow up this take note debate with a more substantive motion along the lines of the following:

That this House take note of the continuing human tragedy in Kosovo and the government's determination to work with the international community in order to: one, attain the moral objective of halting the ethnic cleansing being perpetrated by the Yugoslav government in Kosovo and caring for the victims of Serb aggression; two, achieve the political objective of creating a safe home for Kosovars in the region and stabilizing relations between the republic of Yugoslavia and its neighbours through negotiation; three, pursue the military objectives of damaging the military capability of the Yugoslav government, to reduce its capacity to practise ethnic cleansing and to bring the Yugoslav government to the negotiating table;

And that this House mandate the government to pursue this military objective through the commitment of Canadian forces to participation in NATO operations subject to the following conditions: (a) that NATO demonstrate that such commitments are necessary to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to provide a safe home for Kosovars on their own soil; and (b) that the government demonstrate to this House that the commitment of Canadian forces requested by NATO is within Canada's capabilities.

That is the type of motion I would have liked to have seen and would expect to be brought by a government seeking a mandate of the House. To encourage the government to bring forward such a motion and to seek such a mandate, I move that the take note motion before the House be amended by simply adding the words:

And that this House take note that the government's determination to resolve the conflict would have more credibility after the adoption of a motion submitted to this House specifying the moral, political and military objectives of Canada's involvement with NATO in the region and a request for a mandate to continue that involvement, subject to such conditions as this House may impose.

I would expect that if that motion were put in the grand democratic traditions of the House, it would be a votable motion.

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister has talked eloquently about the objective of ending the human tragedy in Kosovo and no one here disagrees with that goal. However, he had an opportunity today to ask for a mandate to pursue the military actions that are required to achieve that humanitarian objective.

The way one asks for a mandate for military objectives is to spell out what those objectives are, the resources and the options available, any conditions that should be attached to the use of those resources, and then to seek a mandate from parliament through a vote.

In 1991 the current Prime Minister attacked the government of the day for failing to hold a vote in parliament on advancing a decision to go war in the gulf. I am sure the Prime Minister would not want to repeat that mistake.

Will the Prime Minister show some democratic leadership and agree, not today but in the immediate future, to bring a motion before the House seeking a specific mandate for the military objectives necessary to achieve that humanitarian goal?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, is the Prime Minister saying that democracy and the exercise of democracy are weaknesses of Canada? I thought the primary reason we were in the Balkans was to try to restore democracy there. Demonstrating democracy is a strength, not a weakness.

Why does the Prime Minister not just back up and commit that if we are going to involve Canadian forces in ground operations in the future in the Balkans, that he will submit that to a vote in the House prior to making that commitment?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, this is a simple question that requires a yes or a no from the Prime Minister.

In 1991 when the Conservative government committed troops to the war in the gulf the Prime Minister was on his feet demanding that there be a vote in this House and saying it was illegal when they did not get the vote.

I ask the Prime Minister again: Will the government agree to a vote in this House before committing Canadian ground troops to any action in the Balkans?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister has said that the government is not considering committing Canadian ground troops to NATO action in the Balkans. Should that position change, will the Prime Minister commit to submitting that issue to a vote—not a discussion, not a debate, but a vote—in this Chamber?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, today in Brussels some officials conceded that most of the original Rambouillet peace framework had been overtaken by events and would not rule out partitioning Kosovo as part of any settlement.

Is the government considering supporting the partitioning of Kosovo as part of any negotiated settlement to resolve the crisis in the Balkans?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, yesterday U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and other senior American officials called Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic a war criminal. The American president's chief of staff called for his removal from office as a necessary precondition of Serbia's regaining its status as a democratic nation.

Does the government support these statements? If so, how do we negotiate for peace with a leader who has been labelled a war criminal?

Kosovo April 12th, 1999

Mr. Speaker, Canadians across the country generally support Canada's involvement in the NATO campaign to stop Serb aggression in Kosovo. They want to see ethnic Albanians resettled to live in peace and democracy in Kosovo.

Today in Brussels, NATO foreign ministers are gathered to assess the best means of obtaining that peace. I wonder whether the Prime Minister would tell the House what message our foreign minister took to that meeting in Brussels on behalf of Canadians.