House of Commons photoLost his last election, in 2015, with 22% of the vote.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 19th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, Bill C-30 will not move forward. We listened to what the public was saying and we reconsidered. That does not mean that in the future we will not propose bills that give police the tools they need to protect the public. However, Bill C-30, as it was written, will not move forward.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 19th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, we all aspire to ensure that matters of constitutionality are safeguarded. However, in instances when there are emergent needs to protect the safety of the public, it is not always possible to take measures such as making very copious notes or taking steps that may slow down the process that ultimately leads to guarding our safety.
While we respect the member's amendments in regard to having a full and complete record as to why a wiretap was used versus having obtained judicial authorization, emergent circumstances dictate that it is not possible to always write copious notes as to why such emergency measures were taken.
It is a matter of balancing the security of the public and the charter rights of citizens, and we feel that the bill, as it stands, meets all those requirements.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 19th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, to begin, I would like to thank the members of the opposition who are part of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights for having worked with us to get this bill passed quickly. It is very important for the safety and lives of those we should be protecting.
We are being criticized for how long it took for this bill to be introduced. But the justice department wants to be sure that it diligently examines a law's constitutionality.
We know that in this case, the Supreme Court suspended the bill, saying that it had shortcomings but that it was neither completely useless nor completely unconstitutional.
We therefore made another attempt and took our time going over it with a fine-tooth comb in order to correct the flaws and to ensure that it meets all of the constitutional requirements. We know that intercepting a person's communications is still an extreme measure to take.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 19th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of Bill C-55, the response to the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Tse act.
Bill C-55 is essential in maintaining the ability of police to protect Canadians from serious harm. It aims to ensure that the police retain their power to conduct wiretap without prior judicial authorization where it is needed immediately to prevent tragedy from occurring. The exceptional authority under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code allows police to proceed to intercept private communications without prior judicial authorization when an interception is urgently needed to respond to an imminent threat, such as kidnapping, a bomb or a hostage situation.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, in R. v. Tse, that the authority under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional. However, the court suspended its declaration of invalidity until April 13, 2013, in order to allow Parliament to address the constitutional deficiencies of section 184.4. The amendments in the bill would respond to this decision, make 184.4 constitutionally compliant and add some additional limitations and accountability safeguards to use as exceptional authority for situations of imminent harm.
The authority to intercept private communications, under section 184, must be carefully tailored to balance the competing interests of the protection of privacy and the need to act quickly to protect persons and property from serious harm. The amendments to section 184.4 of the Criminal Code proposed in Bill C-55 would ensure needed accountability and transparency, while maintaining essential capability for police to respond swiftly in a critical situation.
Bill C-55 was studied by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights and has been returned to the House without amendment. I would like to signal that the government greatly appreciates the assistance the House has provided in moving this essential bill forward as quickly as possible, while giving its important proposals due consideration.
To assist in its deliberations, the committee received written submissions from the Canadian Bar Association's national criminal justice section and heard from witnesses representing the Criminal Lawyers' Association and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. I am happy to report that these witnesses expressed support for the main elements of Bill C-55 and made very positive comments on the value and importance of the bill.
I would like to take a few minutes to go over the major components of Bill C-55. As indicated by the bill's title, and as I previously mentioned, the amendments proposed in the bill are needed to respond to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Tse. In the decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the authority under section 184.4 was unconstitutional, due to the lack of an accountability safeguard such as an after-the-fact notification. Bill C-55 would remedy this constitutional deficiency by adding requirements to the Criminal Code for after-the-fact notification to persons whose private communications have been intercepted under section 184.4. The notice would need to be provided within 90 days, unless an extension was granted by a judge.
In the decision of R. v. Tse, the Supreme Court also suggested that the government might wish to consider adding a reporting requirement, although it was not needed for constitutional compliance. The government is implementing this suggestion in Bill C-55, which proposes to amend the Criminal Code to require detailed annual reporting by the federal minister of public safety and the Attorneys General of the provinces on the use of section 184.4. This requirement essentially mirrors the existing reporting requirement under section 195 of the Criminal Code, which has always been considered an important mechanism to increase transparency in the use of wiretaps. Such annual reports are intended to form the basis for a public evaluation of police use of section 184.4 of the Criminal Code.
Bill C-55 also proposes to limit the availability of the authority to wiretap under section 184.4 to offences listed in section 183 of the Criminal Code in place of the broader reference to “any unlawful act”. This limitation was not seen as necessary by the Supreme Court, although it was favoured by the lower court in the Tse decision. The amendment was also commented on favourably by the witnesses who appeared before the committee to discuss the bill. The proposed change to the term “offence” makes for a narrower category of unlawful acts and is consistent with other wiretap authorities in part VI of the Criminal Code, which are also limited to offences listed in section 183 of the Criminal Code.
The Supreme Court of Canada also indicated in its decision in R. v. Tse that the government might wish to consider whether the broader category of peace officer under section 2 of the Criminal Code was too broad and whether to restrict the use of section 184.4 to a narrower group of individuals, such as police officers. The Supreme Court observed that this might be beneficial from a constitutional perspective, although it did not rule on this issue. The government agrees with the Supreme Court's suggestion. Accordingly, Bill C-55 restricts the use of section 184.4 to police officers instead of peace officers. As the law presently stands, section 184.4 powers can be used by peace officers, which is a broader category of persons that includes officials such as mayors and reeves as well as fishery guardians and customs and excise officers.
I would like to take this opportunity to assure the House that the proposed definition of “police officer” already exists in the Criminal Code in the context of dealing with forfeiture of proceeds of crime. It also exists in other statutes. It has been judicially interpreted as only including those who are statutorily appointed to carry out duties of preservation and maintenance of the public peace.
Privately hired individuals, such as security guards in shopping malls or office buildings, do not fit within this definition, as they are not statutorily appointed. I should also mention that in looking at section 184.4 of the Criminal Code and the additional restrictions on its use proposed in this bill, it is important to remember that section 184.4 already provides a number of important limitations on its use. It can only be used where other powers are not available due to the urgency of the situation. The interception must be immediately necessary to prevent serious harm, and the communications that are to be intercepted must be those of the victim or the perpetrator. These restrictions, together with the amendments proposed in this bill, would ensure that the use of this exceptional authority is appropriately circumscribed.
The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights has carefully reviewed the bill and supports it. The proposed safeguards and requirements in the bill not only meet but exceed the court's directives for constitutional compliance under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code.
I encourage all members to support Bill C-55.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 18th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, there was a lot of due diligence done to determine exactly what should be done in amending the act and making it constitutional. We know the government always takes great measures to ensure the constitutionality of all its acts. Therefore, the time it took was attributable to the fact that we wanted to ensure all constitutional requirements were met and that we could make the best amendments possible to ensure we protect the rights of private citizens.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 18th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, while many police officers may be qualified to seek the right to intercept private conversations, not all officers are designated to do this. As suggested by the hon. member, those who do go forth have specialized training to do these interceptions. There is a focus in the RCMP and other police forces to ensure that those who do intrude on the rights of individuals are specially trained. Of course, in exigent circumstances, to require additional delays that may put people's lives in danger is certainly not advisable.
We know that when these wiretaps are obtained in exigent circumstances, they act immediately; however, after the fact and as quickly as possible, that is usually followed by the police authorities seeking a judicial authorization. There is a temporary period when immediacy requires that they intercept, but it is usually followed, in most circumstances, with a requirement to get a judicial authorization warranting this intrusion.
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act March 18th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak today about Bill C-55, the response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Tse act. This bill responds to the Supreme Court of Canada decision that found section 184.4 of the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional. Section 184.4 provides authority to intercept private communications without prior judicial authorization in dangerous situations such as kidnappings, in order to respond to an imminent threat of harm when the time constraints do not permit obtaining a judicial authorization.
The purpose of Bill C-55 is to ensure that the critical preventive tool that I have just described remains available to police officers in life-threatening situations while offering the appropriate accountability and privacy safeguards in compliance with the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Tse.
The court declared the provision unconstitutional on the sole basis that it does not provide sufficient accountability measures and indicated that constitutional compliance could be achieved by the addition of a requirement for after-the-fact notification to persons whose private communications have been intercepted under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code, similar to the notification requirements for other wiretaps. This bill proposes to add this safeguard.
Bill C-55 also proposes additional safeguards that, while not required for constitutional compliance, would enhance the privacy of Canadians by increasing transparency and ensuring appropriate limits on the use of section 184.4. The bill proposes a reporting requirement that would require the Minister of Public Safety and the Attorneys General of the provinces to report annually on the use of section 184.4 of the Criminal Code. This requirement already exists for other wiretaps, so it seems logical to extend it to wiretaps used in exceptional circumstances as well.
Another safeguard proposed in this bill would limit the power to wiretap without prior judicial authorization in situations of imminent harm by restricting the availability of this power to offences listed in section 183 of the Criminal Code. Currently, the Criminal Code makes this authority available for any unlawful act, which covers a broader range of conduct.
Lastly, the government is proposing to limit the availability of this extraordinary power to police officers only. Currently, section 184.4 of the Criminal Code is available to peace officers, which, as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code, includes not only police officers but also mayors, immigration officers and fishery guardians.
Now that I have given a brief overview of Bill C-55 and its proposals, I would like to address what are now the five report stage motions that were tabled by the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands.
Motion No. 1 proposes to amend Bill C-55 to further restrict the class of persons for which the section 184.4 wiretap power is available.
This proposal is problematic. The definition of “police officer” that is included in clause 2 of Bill C-55 was taken from the existing definition of “police officer” in the Criminal Code. It is carefully tailored to ensure that it includes all persons who need access to the authority to intercept private communications in exceptional circumstances without a judicial authorization.
I would like to take this opportunity to again repeat that the proposed definition of “police officer” already exists in the Criminal Code in the context of dealing with the forfeiture of proceeds of crime and that it also exists in other statutes. It has been judicially interpreted as including only those who are statutorily appointed to carry out duties of preservation and maintenance of public peace. Privately hired individuals, such as security guards in a shopping mall or an office building, do not fit within this definition, as they are not statutorily appointed.
The removal of the category of “other person” from the definition of “police officer” as proposed in Motion No. 1 is unnecessary. For these reasons, this amendment is not advisable.
I will address Motions Nos. 3 and 5 together, as the change proposed in Motion No. 5 is a result of a change proposed in Motion No. 3.
Motion No. 3 proposes to add a requirement in the bill that a police officer make a record of the reasonable grounds that formed the basis for his or her decision to intercept private communications without a judicial authorization in exigent circumstances under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code. Motion No. 5 proposes to add this record to the annual report that would be made in relation to the use of the section 184.4 wiretap power.
Creating a record-keeping requirement as proposed in Motion No. 3 would undermine the goal of section 184.4, which is to enable a rapid response in cases of imminent harm. As was recognized in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Tse, it would be impractical to require the police to create contemporaneous records in exceptional situations in which the police need to act very quickly.
The Supreme Court of Canada was satisfied that an after-the-fact notice provision for those persons whose private communications were intercepted in exceptional circumstances, as envisaged by clause 5 of Bill C-55, would adequately meet that need.
An additional reason for not supporting Motion No. 5 is that the creation of an additional reporting requirement would be inconsistent with what it is currently being reported in relation to other wiretap powers.
The creation of a divergence from existing reporting practices is equally a problem for the proposals in Motions Nos. 4 and 6, which propose to add new reporting requirements with respect to the number of interceptions in relation to which no proceedings were commenced or no arrests were made in the offences that the police sought to prevent in making these interceptions. The proposals in Motions Nos. 4 and 6 are, therefore, not advisable.
The reforms proposed in Bill C-55 are designated to protect the safety of Canadians in a way that is appropriate, proportional and respectful of privacy interests. I am confident that the bill would achieve the correct balance in this regard.
Furthermore, although I appreciate the efforts of the member opposite, the report stage amendments proposed to Bill C-55 that are currently before this House for consideration are ineffective, ill-advised and inappropriate.
For these reasons, I urge the House to defeat the motions tabled by the hon. member for Saanich—Gulf Islands.
As well, I hope that all members will support the timely enactment of the bill as it was introduced. The Supreme Court of Canada suspended its declaration of invalidity in R. v. Tse until April 13 to allow the need for Parliament to ensure the constitutional compliance of section 184.4 of the Criminal Code. As it now stands, if the bill does not come into force before the suspension expires, section 184.4 would not longer be available for police to do wiretaps in the exceptional circumstances contemplated in section 184.4, which are designated, of course, as circumstances in which lives are at risk.
I urge this House to pass the bill.
Nuclear Terrorism Act March 7th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, certainly the Province of Ontario has been negotiated with, and has been dealt with very closely, because it is within its jurisdiction. It has to provide security. When we asked questions about the security of nuclear facilities, such as Pickering, the answers we received were very constricted and limited. The reasons for that are very evident. Basically, it is a matter of security.
Nuclear Terrorism Act March 7th, 2013
Quite frankly, Mr. Speaker, Rome was not built in a day. It is a step in the right direction. We will let Rome elect its Pope and we will move forward with all those important measures that we will take in order to protect the Canadian public.
Nuclear Terrorism Act March 7th, 2013
Mr. Speaker, this bill goes well beyond the issue of importing or bringing nuclear weapons or materials into Canada. We are attempting to bring the states that have adopted the important treaties which give extra territorial and possibly prosecutorial rights in line with the rest of the countries so that this important legislation, and treaties, can be ratified. That is really the focus of it, not small arms being brought into Canada, which is also a very important and pressing issue that we have taken measures to conquer.