Scott Reid

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am hoping at some point, perhaps over a glass of wine or a cup of beer, we can further discuss royal recommendations, a matter of no small interest to me. I am anxious to pick your brains and learn more about this.

Turning to Motion No. 1, the manner in which the motion is put forward is in the highly technical language of amendments and would therefore make no sense to anybody from outside reading it. This is a matter of no small relevance given the unwillingness of the government to provide the necessary documentation in a timely fashion. This is a problem which incidentally could have been cured by simply using more photocopiers over the weekend.

With respect to clause 4 of the bill, the amended version would change the definition of terrorism. Specifically, it would strike out paragraph (A) of the relevant subclause. Thus, it would change from reading that terrorism is “an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause and, in whole or in part, with the intention of intimidating the public or a segment of the public” et cetera. What is being eliminated is the part that speaks of political, religious or ideological purposes, objectives or causes.

For the life of me I cannot see why we would say that an act of terror, a criminal act that is committed for an ideological or a religious purpose as opposed to an act of terror that is committed out of pure venality, pure greed or general hatefulness would be a more severe offence under the law. The other side of this is why something that is done purely for the sake of one of these more mundane reasons is somehow less hateful under the law. It seems to me that the terror activities of the biker gangs in Montreal, such as planting bombs, are no less bad or harmful than similar bombs that might be planted by someone who is motivated by some insane reading of Christianity, Islam or any other religion.

These actions are crimes. A crime is a crime regardless of its motivation. It is a fundamental principle of our law that we do not look at the ideological and religious motivations of any action. We have always understood in Canada and in the tradition from which Canada's laws have descended that these are private matters. These are within a sphere in which the government has no say and no interest.

It is relevant and very important that the government protect all its citizens from violent actions. Actions that are designed and work in a conspiratorial fashion, as terrorist activities tend to do, ought to be governed by laws that are universal in their application, that is, that apply to those who seek to undertake those actions out of motivations that have nothing to do with religion or ideology.

This is no small point. If we look at the history of terrorist activity and at the history of organized criminal activity both here and abroad, it is quite striking that terrorist organizations evolve over time into mere criminality. If we look at the history of the Mafia, we will find that its ancestry and roots go back to Sicily of course and to those who sought to fight against the tyranny of the Bourbon kings in Sicily.

It started out as a secret society fighting and engaging in activities of intimidation and what might be described as terror in order to further a political goal. Over time the ideology moved out of those activities and they became driven purely by greed, purely by the desire to further the individual well-being of members of the Mafia at the expense of the rest of society. The code of secrecy that had been so important when it was a political and ideological movement remained in place. That code of omertà is what drives forward that organization.

I cannot see what the difference is between the kinds of activities that those groups conduct and the activities that are conducted by terrorists who are driven by ideology insofar as they affect the good of the public or insofar as they harm the public. It seems very clear to me that there is in fact no public policy difference.

This is a very dangerous route to go down and one which I suggest is very nearly unprecedented. It seems to me in looking at this clause that quite frankly it is in violation of the reading I would have of our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of the earlier bill of rights which of course is still in effect.

It is conceivable, as the government and the Minister of Justice are constantly reminding us, that the courts might find this to be not in violation of section 1 of the charter which allows for restrictions to be placed on freedoms, and I suppose including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and freedom of thought, when these restrictions are found to be not in violation of the normal procedures of a free and democratic society.

I suggest that the test which the supreme court applies when it is looking at whether or not section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been violated is that it says, on the balance of the probabilities, is this particular violation of freedom of conscience, or religion, or assembly, or whatever it might happen to be, the least harmful available to the government which seems to me it is not on the balance of the probabilities. In other words, is there a better than 50% chance that some less intrusive mechanism could have been found to achieve the legitimate policy objective. It seems quite clear that when we consider this test, we realize that section 1 is not much of a guarantee of our fundamental rights and freedoms.

All that is needed is five out of nine justices on the supreme court deciding that there is a better than 50% chance that a less intrusive manner of dealing with the particular problem was not available and the result is that it remains constitutional. That strikes me as being a very weak test.

When we are dealing with something as fundamental as freedom of religion, freedom of thought and freedom of speech, I do not want to be in a country where crown prosecutors are going to go before the courts and say that they are seeking to prove that the suspect in a terrorist activity had the weapon on his or her person, or the dynamite in the trunk of his or her car and that the individual had a guilty mind, a willingness to go ahead and commit some harm, perhaps some deaths, some injuries as defined in the act and in addition, that the individual was a sincere adherent to a certain otherwise legitimate religion. I find that absolutely appalling. Quite frankly I am astonished that this is included at all.

I cannot see one ounce of extra protection from terrorism that is provided to the Canadian people. I cannot see one ounce of reassurance to those members of the sorts of groups that would find themselves being targeted illegitimately under this law. I cannot see any protection for these people from this clause. I cannot in fact ascertain what public policy purpose this clause should have. It is very bad and I would urge all members in the strongest possible terms to vote in favour of the amendment in order to strike out this particular clause of the law.

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

moved:

Motion No. 1

That Bill C-36, in Clause 4, be amended by replacing line 46 on page 13 and lines 1 to 4 on page 14 with the following:

“(i) that is committed, in whole or in part with the”

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

I always defer to your expertise, Mr. Speaker, but a royal recommendation is required for spending that is mandatory. This is in fact conditional. It strikes me that does not actually qualify. From my understanding of the relevant constitutional provision, this is not a mandating of spending.

I think one of the great dangers we are in is expanding the relevant section of the constitution beyond its intended meaning. Therefore on reconsideration I think it could be found that this is in fact very much in order.

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I am just a bit confused. One of those motions is my own, Motion No. 5. In your earlier comments you said that it was because of a concern regarding the constitutional requirement for a royal recommendation. As we know, a royal recommendation is required for any bill that goes forward in which money will be spent. However, in reference to the right hon. member's comments, you said that it was because it was similar to a motion that had come up in committee. I am just a little unsure as to which is relevant. If it is the prior reference, I actually do have a point of order on that, but I would like to get clarification first, if I could.

[Points of Order, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, to emphasize my right hon. colleague's points, he is quite correct that the reason I was able to get amendments on where others were not was due to the fact that I am an Ottawa member of parliament. I am here and my staff is here. We were able to pool our resources and work on this thing in a way that was not available to other members of parliament.

It is striking that much of the most forceful and thoughtful opposition to the bill has come from Canadian Alliance MPs who, not being in the Ottawa area, were unable to add their amendments to the bill. It is striking as well that much thoughtful consideration had been given in earlier debates by members of the New Democratic Party. They had a party convention and were unable to be present during the period of time under consideration.

I got a copy of the final version of the bill this morning. Until that time it was difficult to ascertain how to word our amendments because the pages have changed, section numbers have changed and so on. This handicapped us in our ability to provide the kinds of thoughtful amendments that are suitable for this stage.

Something else is striking in the same vein and has not been mentioned so far in this discussion. My office went to the clerk of the relevant committee and asked to see the various amendments proposed for the bill. We were told they had all been destroyed.

When we are trying to work on amendments to get a sense of what has been discussed and what has been proposed and discover that we do not have access to them, it is impossible as members of parliament to carry out our job in the appropriate manner. Committees can do as they see fit in their own affairs, but when it starts to affect the operations of the House, to which they are subservient, I suggest that it effectively hamstrings the House in its responsibilities. That certainly cannot be something that is in order.

I would ask Your Honour to give consideration to these factors as well in rendering your judgment and in considering whether to extend the deadline.

[Tax Point Transfers, November 21st, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, one has to wonder if the minister would not rather see the Parti Quebecois re-elected than have to deal with a federalist government in Quebec pushing for decentralization.

Instead of hampering the efforts of his allies in Quebec, why does he not make a commitment to follow in the footsteps of his Liberal predecessors, who were not afraid to transfer tax points?

[Tax Point Transfers, November 21st, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, on the question of tax point transfers, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs once again missed a perfect opportunity to demonstrate that the federal government can be open and flexible.

In hiding behind the equalization increase, the minister tried to dodge the real issue.

Why does he refuse to listen to his fellow Quebecers, who are unanimously demanding the transfer of tax points?

[Terrorism, November 19th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the government seems confused as to why Canadians are unimpressed by its approach to terrorism. We are unimpressed because we know the Liberal history of being soft on criminals but tough in times of crisis on the civil liberties of innocent Canadians.

Allow me to take members on a guided tour: first, from 1914 to 1920 the Union Conservative-Liberal government dispossessed Ukrainian Canadians and sent them to internment camps; second, in 1940 the Liberals set up a firearms registry that included a question on racial origin and then confiscated guns belonging to German and Italian Canadians; third, in 1942 the Liberals sent 20,000 Japanese Canadians to internment camps; and, fourth, in 1970, 400 Quebecers were arrested and held without charge, without compensation and without apology because of imagined connections to the FLQ.

The record shows a congenital Liberal preference for maintaining order by suspending the civil liberties for thousands of law-abiding Canadians rather than by securing our borders in the first place.

[Criminal Code, November 8th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise today to address Bill C-284, an act to amend the criminal code, sponsored by my hon. colleague from Churchill.

The bill would amend the criminal code in order to introduce new provisions for corporate criminal liability. Bill C-284 originated in response to the horrible catastrophe that occurred at the Westray mine in Stellarton, Nova Scotia in 1992 in which 26 people, just named by my hon. colleague, were killed.

On May 9, 1992, all the miners in the Westray mine were killed following an explosion that could have been prevented. A commission of inquiry was established under Mr. Justice Richard of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Richard concluded that the miners were in no way responsible for the explosion but rather that safety conditions at the mine were at fault.

It was also revealed that the miners who worked at Westray had been attempting to reform their working conditions but to no avail. Their efforts were seemingly ignored by management, by regulators and by the government.

Justice Richard recommended that parliament introduce criminal code amendments to strengthen corporate criminal liability and to introduce a new offence of corporate killing.

Since that time there have been two legislative initiatives in this regard. Bill C-259, similar to the current bill, was introduced by the member for Halifax in the 36th parliament. The member for Pictou--Antigonish--Guysborough later introduced a motion to bring forth similar legislation and the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights voted unanimously to act in accordance with the motion. The bill was introduced in this new parliament and we have it before us today.

Bill C-284 contains provisions that would have the effect of holding directors and officers of corporations criminally liable for the actions or omissions of the employees of a corporation. It would also hold directors and officers criminally liable for failing to provide a safe working environment for employees. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have embarked upon similar legislative provisions.

I will begin my assessment by stating that I believe in principle with the general intention of the bill in addressing the issue of negligence on the part of corporations in providing safe working conditions for employees. I believe all actors in society, including corporations and government agencies, act rationally in their own self-interest and that it therefore makes sense to craft laws that provide incentives to act in a manner that promotes the well-being of their employees and of their clients.

I do however have certain concerns with the bill in its current form. I believe we must tread very carefully in our legislative endeavours for fear that we may inadvertently alter our legal system in such a fashion as to provide a basis for criminal culpability without criminal intent, which would not be congruent with natural justice.

I believe firmly that in any case of criminal prosecution the person or persons absolutely responsible for any acts or omissions must be held accountable. Generally, however, the larger a corporation gets the more divorced the directors are from day to day operations and decision making by management. I do not mention this fact to deflect responsibility from these directors. I mention it in order that we may most accurately direct matters of investigation, responsibility and prevent potential culpability in order to ensure that the intended end of fewer workplace deaths is actually achieved.

Directors of corporations tend to deal with issues such as strategic marketing and profit margins, whereas middle management tends to deal with operations on the ground. Is it fair to say that the manager who oversees the safety conditions in the factory is not ultimately responsible for the safety conditions in the factory, whereas the director who spends his or her time studying pie charts relating to relative market share is culpable of corporate killing?

If corporate directors knew of the risks involved, as they did at Westray, then they should face penalties. If they did not, and could not reasonably be expected to do so, then no culpability can properly be assigned.

Our criminal code contains provisions for criminal negligence. Perhaps these need to be strengthened for there is no question that workplaces are responsible for the safe conduct of business. Should we go down a path that would automatically pursue company directors, even when they are entirely removed from day to day operations, in order to satisfy a need for quick blame and closure? I am hesitant to believe so.

Equally important, I find a great deficiency in the bill as it addresses private corporations while leaving Canada's largest and most impersonal institutions, that is to say, government departments and crown corporations, outside its reach. Let me offer an example.

Several years ago here in Ottawa an employee of the transit company, OC Transpo, walked into his workplace and opened fire at his colleagues. There were fatalities. The later investigation revealed that the abnormal behaviour of the person in question was reported on more than one occasion to staff supervisors but that they had failed to take action.

Surely that would be a textbook example of the kind of criminal culpability the bill seeks to create. However, under the proposed legislation, the fact that OC Transpo is publicly owned would exonerate its directors and managers and the politicians who oversee it. It seems incomprehensible to me that no one would be held criminally responsible, other than the shooter, for the simple reason that these events transpired in a public sector workplace rather than in the private sphere.

However I do think there is a need for such measures to be applied in a manner that creates liability for governmental and semi-governmental agencies so that they too can be prosecuted when they abuse their trust. This should certainly be so in cases that lead to needless deaths and, let me suggest, it should also be so in cases where the abuse of power leads to a loss of property or civil liberties.

One interesting example of how this was done can be drawn from the United States. Under a 1997 law, government agencies, such as the internal revenue service, now face severe financial penalties if they abuse their power in order to engage in malicious prosecution, when they conduct actions toward those who are in their care in bad faith, or when they otherwise violate their legal mandates. This law, which is known as the Hyde amendment, has been remarkably successful in reining in this notoriously abusive agency.

If such a law were to apply in Canada with regard to any gross abuses in the behaviour of governmental and semi-governmental agencies toward their employees, we might see some form of justice toward the victims of tragedies like the one that occurred at the OC Transpo sheds.

I wish to conclude by congratulating my colleague from Churchill. She is right to highlight the need for improved workplace safety. I say to my colleague, yes, the cause is just, but we must be careful not to create new injustices in our efforts to remedy existing ones.

[Terrorism, October 30th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call attention to a grave danger contained in the government's anti-terrorism bill. The bill defines terrorist activity in such a way that criminal prosecution would begin to focus on the underlying beliefs of terrorists. The bill singles out crimes committed for political, religious, or ideological purposes.

A crime is a crime is a crime. Our justice system must judge actions, not religions or ideologies. An act of violence does not become any more or less an act of violence because it was committed for religious or ideological purposes or for any purpose whatsoever. Our justice system does not prosecute motive, specifically in order to preserve Canadians' rights of religious observation, their right to belong to political parties and their right to freely believe what they believe.

The law should be hard on those who commit terrorist acts, but when we begin to prosecute personal thought we erode the very freedoms we are seeking to protect. Thought crime is a dangerous path that we ought not to follow.