Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay

[An Act to Implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, March 12th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, a good part of my speech was about that, and I talked about it in my previous answer, but I have no problem repeating it.

Expanded meat access was one of the promises in the agreement with the European Union. Cheesemakers in Quebec were told to accept the breach, the slight setback, because in exchange, our meat could be exported to the large European market.

However, the European Union, or rather the United Kingdom, which has regained its trade sovereignty, is applying sanitary and phytosanitary barriers that are not based on actual scientific standards. Tariffs are indeed going down, but in reality, non-tariff barriers are preventing more of our meats from being exported.

If Ottawa knew how to negotiate, it would have ensured that there was an agreement or a real resolution to the issue of non-tariff barriers on Canadian meat before allowing the United Kingdom to enter into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

[An Act to Implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, March 12th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, the link between national security and economic security is obvious, especially at a time of grave geopolitical and economic peril like today. I would not call the Davie shipyard a success; it was a long time coming. There were many setbacks. There was a bipartisan consensus to create a lot of problems.

Having said that, I do not have a problem with the agreement itself. However, I would not call it a great success for Canadian diplomacy in this area, particularly for the reasons that I mentioned. When one knows how to negotiate and there is a major irritant with a country that is largely being given a favour and that will come out the big winner by being allowed to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the major irritant should be resolved. In this case we are talking about sanitary and phytosanitary barriers. That is what happens when one knows how to negotiate. Unfortunately, Canada does not know how to negotiate.

[An Act to Implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, March 12th, 2026]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C‑13. I always get these numbers mixed up. We always end up losing track because there are so many bills. However, as the Bloc Québécois critic for international trade, I want to reassure my colleagues that I know what this bill is about.

This is an agreement that the committee I serve on was able to study. Although this agreement does not change much in the sense that it involves the United Kingdom's entry into an existing agreement, it is still a good thing. However, we are going to take a few detours and talk about several aspects of this matter that are different. Members will recall that this concerns the United Kingdom's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an existing agreement that goes back several years. However, since the United Kingdom regained its customs sovereignty, most of the agreements had to be redone.

Allow me to take a brief detour and draw a comparison with the situation in Quebec. For a long time now, Quebec has been having a great debate, which is still ongoing and will soon come to an end in the next few years. I am talking about Quebec's independence, of course. An important referendum was held in 1995. In fact, we just commemorated the 30th anniversary of this referendum last fall. At the time, we were told that Quebec would not automatically be included in the trade agreements that were negotiated by Canada.

Jean Charest could pass for either a Liberal or a Conservative these days, but he was a Progressive Conservative at the time. He used to speak on behalf of the “no” side while waving a Canadian passport that was not his own, because it was the wrong colour. As a federal member of Parliament, his passport should have been green. He was waving a blue passport, which was not his, to express his pride. His pride was based on being someone he was not. Now, let me get back to the matter at hand.

At the time, Jean Charest said there would be a transition period. He said that an independent Quebec could perhaps take part in NAFTA, but that there would nevertheless be a transition period during which Quebec would not take part in trade agreements. During that time, companies would not have the guaranteed market access that is provided for in the agreements negotiated and signed by Canada. Certain precedents did exist at the time, but they referred to multilateral agreements. There was no real precedent for what happens when a country wins or regains its trade sovereignty or what happens with agreements negotiated by customs unions like Canada or the European Union.

We got an answer to what happens in that situation in the form of Brexit, which happened a few years ago. What happened? Brexit proved exactly what one might expect, and that is, common sense prevailed. The trading partners of a country that regains its trade sovereignty will usually all want to continue doing business with that country. It makes sense. It is crystal clear. It is that simple.

Brexit came into effect on January 1, 2021. In 2020, the United Kingdom quickly copied and pasted all the agreements previously negotiated by the European Union. They were known as temporary agreements. They included the continuity agreement between the United Kingdom and Canada, which Canada debated right here at the time. This proves that, in record time, the United Kingdom was able to simply renew the agreements that the EU had negotiated and signed and remain in those agreements. As a result, there was no period of uncertainty, no period during which British businesses were disconnected from the partners with which the EU had signed agreements. That same year, the U.K. was even able to sign an agreement with Japan, which did not have an agreement with the EU.

A nation that regains its trade sovereignty rekindles the interest of outgoing partners and can even create new partnerships, as with the U.K.'s entry into the Trans‑Pacific Partnership. The U.K. is a relatively small country in terms of population; it is an island. This supports Jacques Parizeau's point that, regardless of a country's size, it is completely viable when it is in a large market.

We are pleased to see this, and I thank Canadian parliamentarians, because by supporting the U.K.'s entry, probably unanimously, they are defusing the very argument they might have raised a few years from now against Quebec's independence. I thank my good friends in advance.

Thanks to the lottery, my colleague from Jonquière tabled a bill on behalf of the Bloc Québécois, for which I was the critic, that sought to enhance Parliament's role in trade negotiations and in the process of ratifying the results of the negotiations. These agreements are like vampires, in that they turn to dust in the light of day, so the goal was to change that and find a way for us to know a little more about what was happening.

Speaking of the United Kingdom, I was once in a committee meeting in which we were asked to review the agreement with the U.K. without having the text in front of us. That is the Canadian monarchy at work. That is what happens when a Parliament only cares about the executive branch and a handful of strong ministers. It claims to be part of British tradition, where Parliament is king and master of everything, but in reality, opacity is the order of the day and nobody knows anything.

It is well known that, in the Canadian system, parliamentarians have to study an implementation bill in which hardly anything can be amended. In committee, every time I try to amend bills implementing agreements, the first thing that happens is that the chair tells me that my amendment is out of order because it goes against the intent of the bill or because it would require new funding, a new budget. When we suggest creating new committees, oversight committees or other types of committees, we are immediately told that that would be out of order because we cannot change the intent. Only a few pages of the implementation bill can be amended, but trade agreements sometimes contain thousands of pages of regulations.

Of course, the agreement has already been signed by the time it is even tabled in Parliament. In the end, we just rubber-stamp it, but then later, whenever we want to change or object to something in an agreement, we are accused of being against the very principle of trade. The logical fallacy could not be clearer.

Another problem is the waiting period. On paper, there is no law requiring a minimum waiting period between the time an agreement—which, I would remind members, can sometimes be thousands of pages long—is announced and the time it is presented to Parliament. Theoretically, it could be announced one day and be tabled in Parliament the next morning. Nothing in the law prevents that. This is one of the elements of the bill that the Bloc Québécois highlighted a few weeks ago.

I find it astounding that a majority of parliamentarians are saying that they do not want to do their job, that they are not interested in doing their job and that they are going to trust the government. Even the official opposition says that it will blindly follow the government into the abyss, if necessary. Studying trade agreements would be too much work. That should not happen. Talk about an official opposition.

Our bill would have enshrined into law the principle of a minimum waiting period of 21 days from the time an agreement is made public to the time it is brought before the House. However, I remember that representatives of the Liberal Party rose and said that that bill was not necessary because there was already an official policy that referred to this 21-day period. Well, a policy is not legislation, as today's debate proves, because only 15 days went by between the time the protocol on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Trans-Pacific Partnership was made public and the time it was tabled in the House. That is proof that we need legislation and that it is not enough to just have a policy that mentions a minimum waiting period.

Shame on the government for doing this, thinking no one would notice. I am sorry, but I noticed. This shows why we need legislation setting out the minimum waiting period from the time an agreement is made public to the time it is presented and tabled here in the House. I think that is the bare minimum.

Furthermore, there is absolutely nothing in the Canadian Constitution that would allow a province that is opposed to an agreement to veto it. This stands in sharp contrast to Belgian federalism. In Belgium, if one region opposes an international agreement, the whole country cannot move forward, even if the Belgian parliament supports it. That is what open federalism really means. That is federalism that is respectful of its regions. Canada does not have that kind of federalism, and we have the proof right here.

There is also nothing that would allow Quebec or any other province to say that it would like its own negotiators, that it would like to nominate someone to sit at the table to negotiate agreements and defend its interests and values. There is nothing like that in there.

Now let us talk about the substance of the agreement. We do not have any major issues on that front. It is a free trade agreement. The U.K. is not generally associated with modern-day slavery. It will not violate human rights, nor is it responsible for major environmental disasters. It is a developed society. On the surface, there is no reason to believe it will engage in unfair competition.

The U.K. is also a country with a robust aerospace sector. It is Quebec's second-largest partner behind the United States. It is very far behind the U.S., but it is still the second-largest export partner. There is a lot of collaboration and exchange in the aerospace sector. The agreement is therefore welcome on that front. Members will recall that Montreal is the third-largest aerospace cluster in the world, after Seattle and Toulouse, and it is one of only three places where all the parts needed to assemble an entire aircraft are available. We do not assemble entire aircraft, but if we wanted to do that in the greater Montreal area, we could. We have enough SMEs and large businesses and sufficient wherewithal to say that we can provide the parts to assemble an entire aircraft. The aerospace sector is extremely important. I am also troubled by the fact that Canada does not have an aerospace policy. It is the only country with such a large cluster that does not have an aerospace policy. The government has repeatedly promised a policy, most recently at the end of its last term. However, no such policy materialized, and that is simply disgraceful, given the importance of our industry and our sector. Nevertheless, as I was saying, we are okay with that part.

There are no further concessions on supply management, either. Unfortunately, some concessions were made under the CPTPP, but the damage is done. With regard to the quotas that have already been lost, there was an agreement that with the United Kingdom's accession, they would be distributed across what had already been given up. However, the problem is that each time new concessions are made on supply management, we are told not to worry because we are supposedly gaining something else somewhere. With the agreement with the EU and with the CPTPP, we were told that the Canadian meat industry was going to get access to the European market. We know that with the United Kingdom specifically, as well as the EU, there are non-tariff barriers. It is true that on paper, tariffs on pork and beef have been lowered for farmers, but there are all kinds of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in place that have no scientific basis. What we need is reciprocity of standards. We should negotiate with these countries to reach an agreement to make sure that when a product is imported, the scientific rules are actually based on science.

I moved an amendment during the consideration of the bill we are discussing today. The amendment called for the agreement to take effect after a sanitary and phytosanitary protocol with the U.K. had been negotiated and signed. Unfortunately, the two parties did not want to support my amendment, even though that is how negotiations work in real life. In a way, allowing the United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP would be doing that country a favour, even though we will also benefit from an economic standpoint.

Canada has shown us time and again that it is an amateur when it comes to negotiations. I would think that a good negotiator takes time to sit down for preliminary discussions. If we say we are ready to allow the U.K.'s accession and that we know that we are doing the country a big favour, should we not at least sit and talk? Even more so considering that technically, the U.K. allows Canadian meat imports, but no Canadian meat actually gets into the country. It would therefore be appropriate to sit down and talk before allowing its accession to the CPTPP in order to reach an agreement to ensure that our meat actually gets into the U.K. Cheese from the U.K. has already been allowed into Canada. We have given them a few concessions here and there. In exchange, the U.K. has not allowed our meat into their country, so we should sit down and reach an agreement.

It is unfortunate that my amendment, which sought to prohibit the coming into force of this agreement before an agreement could be reached, was rejected. A case like this could have been dealt with very quickly. It is unfortunate that I saw the Liberals and the Conservatives carry on like the best of friends and reject an amendment that could have served our farmers and their interests.

I will now turn to my final point. I am still trying to understand why Canada signs agreements and why its official position is one of support for investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. I also spoke to that yesterday in my speech on Indonesia. I speak to that whenever trade agreements come up in the House. It always sounds very abstract, very legal and very complex. It seems very far removed from the concerns of average Canadians, but in fact, it is a huge deal. In practice, it is about giving multinational corporations sovereign powers and allowing them to sue states when governments or legislative bodies adopt measures in favour of better environmental protection, more social justice and stronger workers' rights.

For example, when Mexico imposed a tax on sugary drinks to combat the Mexican obesity epidemic, it was sued by a multinational corporation. When Egypt raised the minimum wage, it was sued by a multinational corporation. Canada is signing trade agreements that allow for clauses like this. When Australia moved to introduce plain packaging to limit cigarette promotion, it was sued by Philip Morris.

In my colleague's constituency, Lac‑Saint‑Jean, there is a lawsuit going on right now that was filed by an American company over the cancellation of Énergie Saguenay's Quebec LNG project. How much is it costing the government?

From a democratic standpoint, what does it mean when Canada proudly says it supports investor-state dispute settlement and supports self-censorship of its own policies? Why is it supporting the idea that, when Parliament stands up and overwhelmingly passes a law that aligns with the public interest, a profit-motivated multinational corporation can sue it before a tribunal established under trade agreements? Does that make sense? I really want to know. I do not think it makes sense, because peoples do have rights, after all. Democracies do have rights.

There may be other ways to resolve disputes. Before NAFTA made this mechanism so common, disputes were simply settled at the country level. If a company felt it had been wronged by a government policy in another country where it was investing, it would call upon its own country, its own government. Obviously, governments could misuse these mechanisms. Not everything is fair. However, it was more diplomatic, and if the dispute had to be resolved through a lawsuit, it happened between governments. I think that is much more sensible than elevating multinationals to the status of fully sovereign powers, which is very costly.

The two parties in the House that are friends of multinational corporations believe very strongly in the benefits of investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS, so I proposed an amendment to this agreement, like the one I proposed to the agreement with Indonesia, which we debated yesterday. Since ISDS is so great, I proposed that the minister table an annual report on its costs and effects. The two parties that are friends of multinationals rejected that amendment. They believe so strongly in the benefits that they do not want to tell us what they are. That is just great. Good job, guys.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that ISDS resulted in a win for the multinational or an out-of-court settlement in 60% of cases. That means that the multinational was able to completely or partially override the democratic will of the political system in 60% of cases. However, there is something that cannot be quantified, something that the figures do not show, and that is how this works upstream as well. Behind closed doors, political decision-makers must be deciding not to implement certain measures because they are worried about being sued. There is also an upstream self-censorship effect.

Once again, I do not understand why Canada is signing up for this.

I see that my time is up. We will continue this conversation with our our esteemed colleagues in just a moment during questions and comments.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, I understand that the question is about consulting businesses, entrepreneurs and so on. That probably happened to some extent.

As far as the premiers are concerned, I think I did a pretty good job of explaining how the provinces had no input and no say in the matter. Just because somebody gets a call and is asked what they think about a particular topic does not mean that they have veto power and that they can do anything they want.

I gave the example of Wallonia, which has a statutory right in the Belgian constitution. Even if the Belgian parliament were in favour of a particular agreement, if the Walloon parliament does not agree, Belgium cannot move forward with it. That has happened. Actually, I should talk about member regions. I referred to Wallonia in particular because there is an example of this in 2016, if I am not mistaken, in the context of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, where Wallonia nearly stopped the entire agreement. That is true federalism, where the provinces are involved. Canada is not like that.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, this gives me an opportunity to explore this issue in greater depth, because too few people are talking about it. Civil society is fairly well informed on this topic; there were protests in the 1990s against the worst cases of misuse of this clause in agreements. However, it sounds very abstract and legal when people talk about “investor-state dispute settlements”. People think they need to be a lawyer or a negotiator to understand what it is, yet it has real consequences.

Earlier, I mentioned the real consequences of lawsuits and the fact that they have caused governments to back down, but now I would like to talk about another effect, one that cannot be quantified: the upstream impact of ISDS. It certainly creates a climate of self-censorship among public decision-makers. Public decision-makers often decide not to implement a particular policy because they fear ending up in court. They fear losing the case. This is the kind of slippery slope that is not quantifiable, that is difficult to assess, but that nevertheless comes with the territory.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, can you give me another 20 minutes? That question cannot be answered properly in such a short period of time. Also, I think it would likely involve repeating things that I mentioned and elaborated on in my speech.

In committee, I tried to make what I thought were moderate amendments. It is unfortunate that my Liberal and Conservative colleagues did not accept them. For example, I voted against the investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS. I knew it would pass anyway, but I moved an amendment requesting a report on the costs of ISDS, including the costs of litigation. It was really quite straightforward; I just wanted a report. If everyone is so sure that everything is fine with ISDS, then they should not object to an annual report. Both parties voted against it. Unfortunately, the two parties that are friendly with multinational corporations voted against the amendment. That is what happened. If we could at least have a simple report, a bit of information, a bit more transparency, so that things could be documented and proven, that would already be a great start.

However, the next step is to offer recourse. We cannot amend the bill to include it, but we could have modified the agreement. I am talking about recourse for victims, binding recourse, and not just for multinationals that feel their profits have been harmed. I am talking about victims who are being abused by companies abroad or by governments. We need to be able to offer something to address that. There are other things as well that could be included in the legislative framework, such as legislation on the importation of goods produced by forced labour or legislation requiring greater transparency with parliamentarians.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, that is an excellent question. As I said, diversification is always a good idea. Could the government have done better, even in this regard? To circle back to my previous answer, there are some good and some not-so-good elements in the agreement. There are many good economic elements. There are not so many in other areas. Even though the government could have gone further, diversification in and of itself is not a bad thing.

What worries me, however, is seeing agreements that would be directly beneficial to Quebec, such as the one with Taiwan, gathering dust on the Prime Minister's desk simply because the government would rather pander to the Chinese giant and accept cars that will eavesdrop on our conversations.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, the beauty of 20-minute speeches is the opportunity to say that there are good things and not-so-good things. I think that is the beauty of this type of speech.

There are certainly some good things for our producers and exporters, but there are some very bad things in terms of the environment, the rights of multinational corporations, and human rights. I think that sums it up.

[Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Act, March 11th, 2026]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak about the proposed trade agreement with Indonesia. Indeed, everyone is talking about diversifying markets and partners these days. There is a lot of talk about this. It is an idea that has become quite popular just in the past year. I wonder why that is.

We are in favour of free trade, but not at any cost. I will come back to that shortly as I dissect the agreement. It is like how people are always talking about returning to a rules-based international order. Rules are all well and good. We need rules. We cannot live in total chaos. However, it always depends on what rule we are talking about. Not every rule is legitimate in its own right either.

The same goes for free trade. It is an economic principle that, when properly defined, applied and regulated, can have very positive outcomes, particularly for a small economy like Quebec's. It allows Quebec to become part of a large market and to have access to many partners.

However, it is important to be mindful of certain types of free trade agreements, like the ones signed in the 1990s, which grew at lightning speed during the glory years of globalization, if we may call it that, during most of the aggressive years of neo-liberalism. During that time, free trade was incorrectly taken to mean regulatory agreements that imposed the sovereignty of multinationals on specific communities and states. I will come back to that shortly.

I want to start with some positive remarks about this agreement. As the member for Saint‑Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, I am delighted by what is in this agreement. The city of Saint‑Hyacinthe is the agri-food processing capital of Canada. Of course, the rest of the riding, like the Maskoutains and Acton regions, are highly agricultural as well. I am pleased to see that this agreement will be good for our farmers. The agreement talks a lot about grain. It will be excellent for that.

I am also pleased that I managed to get two amendments adopted. In fact, the only two amendments to the agreement implementation bill were mine. I used exactly the same formula that I got adopted a few years ago in the agreement with Ukraine. The minister responsible for the agreement must submit an annual report on the human rights situation in the partner country and the conduct of Canadian companies there, so that we can get a yearly update. That is one of the two amendments.

I also had the other amendment adopted in relation to the agreement with the United Kingdom. We will discuss this again tomorrow. This amendment provides for a three-year review to ensure that, if we commit to something like this, we can re-examine it. I think it is quite reasonable to put the agreement on the table after three years, carefully review it and look at the results. That seems quite reasonable to me.

That is known as sweetening the pill. Now let us talk about the less attractive aspects of this agreement. Unfortunately, it is an agreement from another era. Honestly, I do not understand why Canada, which always claims to be a progressive country, continues to sign and negotiate such agreements.

Let us start with the process. We are accustomed to this, because this is a monarchy and, once again, there is no transparency with regard to parliamentarians and the provinces. This agreement is completely opaque, as are all such negotiations. We often hear from senior officials and negotiators who say that they have spoken with their Quebec counterparts. Forgive me for doubting that there was any real consultation. Forgive me for thinking that it is more of a fait accompli. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, in the Canadian Constitution that says that, if a province is against the implementation of an agreement, then it can withdraw from that agreement. There is nothing comparable to Belgian federalism, for example, where if one region of Belgium opposes something in an agreement, then the entire country does not sign it. That is true federalism that respects its member regions. We have nothing like that here.

There is also nothing that allows a province to say that it will send its own negotiators and representatives to negotiating tables abroad, because it wants to have a distinct voice and make its voice heard in such discussions. There is nothing in the Canadian Constitution that guarantees that, either.

Of course, transparency is just as elusive for parliamentarians. We are parliamentarians. We are elected by the people through a democratic process. We have constituents, people who give us a mandate to stand up for certain positions, values and interests. Why, then, are we kept out of the loop and given so little say in something as important as agreements with other countries?

On the surface, these agreements seem highly complex. In reality, their effects are anything but abstract; their impact on daily life is highly palpable. Why are we kept so far out of the loop?

In many other approaches used around the world, the opposite happens: Parliamentarians are involved, they take part in debates early in the process during which their thoughts on the issues are sought out even before the negotiators are called in. These parliamentarians are asked whether they want certain things to be pushed for and whether they are flexible on certain mattters. Nothing like that happens in Canada.

What happens here is so different that it reaches absurd levels. I have been a member of the committee since 2019, and we have even been asked to study an agreement without having the text in front of us. That shows just how much of a joke Canada is when it comes to trade negotiations. The shocking lack of transparency is nothing but a big monarchical joke.

Furthermore, there is no law requiring a minimum waiting period. Agreements can be thousands of pages long and written in complex legal language, and there is no law or obligation requiring a fixed waiting period between the time the agreement is announced and the time it is presented to Parliament. Theoretically, this could happen the very next day, when absolutely no one would have had time to read the agreement, analyze it and understand its ins and outs. We know that the devil is often in the details. The devil is often in the misplaced commas in a bill.

The problem is that the agreement has already been signed. We have no say in the matter. Then we debate a bill to implement the agreement. We debate a bill to implement the agreement, not the agreement itself, so we cannot change or amend anything. When I propose amendments to such bills, one of the first things the committee chair tells me is that the amendments are inadmissible because they would alter the intent of the bill or because they would incur additional costs that were not initially provided for in the bill. I find it extremely unfortunate and detrimental that there is not more consideration for the democratic power of parliaments when it comes to debating something as important as this.

Now, let us talk about the substance of the agreement. This agreement is problematic on several levels. First, there is the issue of investor-state dispute settlement. Again, I do not understand. Canada loses a lot of lawsuits and a lot of money. There is a case currently under way because Quebec abandoned the GNL Québec project in Saguenay. As a result, we are being sued by the American company. How is it that Canada is still signing agreements that allow this to happen?

These clauses began to gain popularity with the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, but they are no longer part of North American free trade. Even the agreement that brought this into being on a global scale no longer includes it.

However, Canada's official position is still that it supports the right of multinationals to take governments to court if laws, measures or policies adopted by said government could harm a foreign investor's profits. It is that right to profit that elevates multinationals to the status of sovereign powers.

This can happen if, for example, a country decides to adopt health measures related to the environment and public property. Mexico was sued for taxing soft drinks. Australia was sued for placing restrictions on smoking. One country in the Middle East, I think it was Egypt, raised the minimum wage and was sued by a multinational corporation. Why is Ottawa still signing agreements that allow this?

The UN has published reports on this. One came from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, or UNCTAD. It is a bit dated. I think it was published in 2013.

It shows that, in 60% of cases, multinationals managed to thwart the democratic will of governments either entirely, by winning lawsuits against the state, or partially, by settling out of court.

Canada supports a complete surrender of political sovereignty every time it negotiates and pushes for investor-state dispute settlement, which is an unfair, outrageous and undemocratic mechanism. I gladly voted against that clause in the bill implementing the Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement when we studied it at the Standing Committee on International Trade. In the end, I did not vote against the agreement. We passed it. I was the one who asked for it to be passed on division, but I still voted against that clause of the bill.

The other issue is human rights. Indonesia is not a model country in this regard, particularly when it comes to workers' rights. We know that there are certain regions where there is violence, where there are warlords, where there is a lot of unrest. I introduced Bill C-251, which is modelled on the American system, which works. The Canadian model does not work when it comes to screening out goods produced by forced labour. All in all, Canada has seized and kept about five shipments, if I am not mistaken. There were others that were seized but later released in most cases. Some were returned to the importer.

In some cases, shipments rejected at the U.S. border because the Americans suspect they contain products made with forced labour are simply sent to Canada afterwards. Canada stupidly takes them in. It is that easy. That is Canada's reputation. That is a serious problem, is it not? My esteemed colleagues are so right to be proud when they sing the national anthem on Wednesdays. There is a reason I do not enter the House at that time. That is Canada's reputation. It is tough.

Canada is unable to come up with a proper model, but all we have to do is copy the model of our neighbour to the south, which works. That would also help the Americans trust us more on this matter. Of course, a free trade agreement and lower tariffs on foreign products mean that more products will be coming in. In the case of the United Kingdom, which we will be talking about tomorrow, I am not too worried about forced labour. In the case of Indonesia, however, I am more worried. However, the agreement remains silent on this issue.

It is also silent on the environment. We heard from the Minister of International Trade, who said there was a chapter on the environment. Yes, there is a chapter, but it contains no principles, no mechanisms or rules, nothing binding, nothing meaty. The minister told us that it would open up a conversation on the environment as it relates to trade. I ran out of time, but I would have liked to ask him what happened with previous agreements that included chapters on the environment. What conversation followed? Were there additional results? If we take the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement from six years ago, or the agreement with Ukraine from two years ago, was there any follow-up on them? It is all fine and good to say that there is a chapter on the environment, but what purpose does it serve?

In the case of Indonesia and Canada, we know that Canada is going to send its problematic products, its toxic products, to parts of the world like Indonesia allegedly for “recycling”. Some people may say that having some parts of the world generate wealth this way is normal, that these countries increase their GDP by taking care of toxic waste, for example. However, although these countries might see an immediate rise in their GDP, the hidden costs are troubling, quite apart from the environmental aspect. We need only consider water tables. Workers who handle this waste will end up with health problems. These countries pay an economic cost, especially in relation to their health care systems. These workers are going to need care. Something will have to be done with them. Water tables will have to be decontaminated. Sending them potentially toxic waste and products for recycling does nothing for these countries. I am also talking about plastic waste, since Canada's plastic waste is sent to Indonesia.

I will now address the specific case of Canadian mining companies, particularly Baru Gold, a so-called Canadian mining company. I say “so-called” because Canada and its mining companies have a lackluster reputation.

I went to Colombia and Chile and heard stories of private security firms shooting people at point-blank range and stories of people being evicted. Projects are being promised to the people there. Companies get support at first because they promise jobs, but in the end, they bring in their own workers and do not even hire locals. I have heard of cases of air pollution and water poisoning.

For example, Baru Gold mines for gold on Sangihe Island in Indonesia. I mentioned Canadian mining companies earlier, but whether it is accurate to call them that is open to debate, because Canada is a flag of convenience. More than half of the world's mining companies are Canadian. That alone should set off alarm bells. All a company needs is a post office box in Canada to claim to be Canadian. This allows these companies to benefit from the Toronto Stock Exchange. It allows them to enjoy tax benefits, speculative advantages and more. There are no consequences whatsoever.

If the Indonesian government tells a company that it is not interested in this Canadian mining project, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, or ISDS, that I was talking about earlier would suddenly allow the company to sue Indonesia. That is what Canada is supporting. This so-called human rights leader is supporting that through the ISDS mechanism.

My colleagues might argue that there is an ombudsperson. The ombudsperson can receive complaints if a mining company or any Canadian company behaves badly abroad. It is a joke, and the ombudsperson position has been vacant for a year anyway. Nobody has occupied this position for a year. The ombudsperson does not even have the power to call witnesses as part of the investigations. The ombudsperson does not have the power to compel the production of documents as part of the investigations. That does not look good. It is simply an empty shell that the Trudeau government decided to create to partially appease the civil society groups that were advocating for some form of accountability for companies abroad. It is useless because it is an empty shell.

In any case, since the position has been vacant for a year, I would not be surprised to see this government abolish it in the near future. I do not want that, because even though it does not amount to much, it is better to have something than nothing.

This is also the same government that shirked its obligation to introduce a bill on forced labour by the end of the year. This was a promise it made in the March 2023 and March 2024 budgets. Those two years have come and gone, and we have not seen this bill, nor was it mentioned at all in the 2025 budget. After breaking the promise for two years in a row, the government simply stopped making it. I have to say, the Chinese are going to love that, so there is that, too. That must have been the reason. That explains it. I would not be surprised if it were dropped entirely.

To wrap up my speech, I would say yes to free trade, yes to trade in general. However, I still find it extremely sad to see Canada continue to negotiate agreements that are outdated, that do not include any human rights or environmental obligations and that continue to elevate multinational corporations to the status of sovereign powers. This is unworthy of a country that claims to be progressive and a champion of human rights.

Diversification, however necessary it may be, does not excuse everything. I hope the situation will soon be rectified.

[Iran and the Middle East, March 9th, 2026]

Mr. Chair, I rise on a point of order.

I simply want to explain to my colleague that there is a difference between hoping for regime change and hoping that the protesters succeed, and wishing for a military attack.