Madam Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for Don Valley West.
I also want to thank the member for Wellington—Halton Hills for bringing forward the motion because I think it is an important debate and an important motion.
I want to start by making a comment on the member's preamble to the action aspects of his motion, which I agree with and will get to in a moment. In point (i) of the motion, it states that:
(i) the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening Canada’s national interest and its values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada’s borders....
I believe that statement, sadly, is increasingly true, but it was not always that way and I do not believe it has to remain that way. The motion is, in effect, calling out the Chinese leadership. Let us get back to normalizing our relationship and work together like we have done in the past.
I say it was not always that way and I will tell colleagues why. It was Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the former prime minister, who went to China in 1973 and worked to open up a relationship with China and then make that relationship important for both countries.
We have had some considerable background in China. It could be called a “leg-up”. In the country, when then prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau went there, Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian, was seen as a Canadian hero among the Chinese population for saving people's lives. Canada, because of Dr. Bethune, had a place in the Chinese culture and the Chinese mind.
An agency that I was involved with in the farm movement, the Canadian Wheat Board, was the first international agency that went to China to open up trade and did it on credit. The Conservatives, I know, during the former Harper government, destroyed the Canadian Wheat Board as a farm marketing board. It has now been bought out by Saudi interests, but that is beside the point. The fact of the matter is that we had an in with China, where that marketing agency provided credit so that China could feed its people. Eventually those loans were paid back.
Let us not forget the somewhat positive history we have had before this time, despite our relationship being considerably negative today.
I have been to China a number of times. In fact, I also hosted a former ambassador in Prince Edward Island and later hosted a group of Chinese legislators in P.E.I. Out of those meetings, and through some of Prince Edward Island's educational institutions, we were able to build a close working relationship with educational institutions in China. That relationship goes on to this day and is beneficial to citizens in both countries.
I say that because it was not always that way. We need to try to get back to a better relationship of trust. Certainly the arrest of the two Michaels, Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor, and what is happening in Hong Kong gives us plenty of reasons to be concerned and to lose trust in the Chinese leadership. I say to the Chinese leadership that it is at the moment certainly going in the wrong direction.
Before I get to the key recommendations of the motion, I want to give the background of where the government is at on national security, because we kind of overlook that from time to time.
The government's priority remains to protect Canada and Canadians against activities that undermine democratic values, economic interests, sovereignty and overall national security. The government is aware that certain foreign states may conduct themselves in Canada in a manner that is inconsistent with our values.
This threat is not new and not limited to any one country. Governments worldwide have been engaged in efforts to mould public opinion and government policies in other countries to advance their own interests. When this is done in a transparent, peaceful manner within the law, it is called diplomacy or treaty negotiations. When it is covert or clandestine, employs threats or intimidation or consists of lies and disinformation aimed at misleading people, destabilizing the economy or society, or manipulating the democratic process, a red line gets crossed.
It could be the old-fashioned way, with certain intelligence services collecting or stealing political, economic, commercial or military information, but increasingly, the interference is higher tech. Social media has been used to build anxiety, and even hysteria, around sensitive issues. Fake news masquerades as legitimate information.
Several recent reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, a 2019 CSIS public report released on May 20, 2020, states that espionage and foreign-influenced activities “are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign state, using both state and non-state entities.” Foreign powers have also attempted to covertly monitor and intimidate Canadian communities to fulfill their own strategic objectives.
Further, the annual report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians outlined foreign interference activities by a handful of states, like China and Russia, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The Government of Canada's security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates.
As an aside, I was at meetings with a number of governors of states in the United States some time ago. It actually shocked me what the governor of West Virginia had to say. They were talking about attempts to hack into their security systems. The governor indicated that in the previous year, either 2016 or 2017, in the state of West Virginia, they had 82 million attempted hacks.
There are whole departments in some governments and that is all they do. They try to hack into intelligence systems or steal secrets from other countries. That tells us how serious the problem is with that one example. Canada too has to be prepared for that kind of intervention into its system.
From a law enforcement perspective, foreign interference activities can be investigated when criminal or illegal activity is involved. The RCMP, for instance, has a broad, multi-faceted mandate that allows it to investigate and prevent foreign intelligence, drawing on various legislation.
As part of its mandate, CSIS provides the Government of Canada with timely and relevant intelligence on these threats for actions as appropriate. The Communications Security Establishment works to monitor the cybersecurity environment and to use that understanding to identify, address and share knowledge about systematic threats, risks and vulnerabilities.
A key point of the motion is “make a decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion”. I am not sticky on the 30 days. There may be another option there. However, I can say the fact is this: Australia, the United States and the U.K. have all set restrictions on access to their 5G networks, not allowing equipment into national development.
We have a long history with these Five Eyes partners. We have to stand with them to protect our interests in common with each other, and that means we cannot allow a foreign interest into our security and intelligence system.
