Procedure and House Affairs committee  That's correct. As we've mentioned, we see activity of foreign interference or attempts at foreign interference in terms of trying to influence, but not enough to have met the threshold of impacting the overall electoral integrity.

Procedure and House Affairs committee  No, I find Alia answered quite well. I would just reiterate that we work in a democracy. Managing social media, knowing that it is very much a tool used by foreign actors, is, of course, of concern, and we encourage awareness and liaison with these platforms so that they recogni

Procedure and House Affairs committee  We are constantly reviewing the powers and tools we have. As I said earlier, the technology is evolving, as are the laws and the complexity of the environment. We are in constant discussions with other departments or agencies of the Government of Canada and with our allies to und

Procedure and House Affairs committee  I would add that a lot of information continues to circulate on the Internet. People have to protect themselves and be suspicious of the emails they receive. People have to stay up to date on threats and pay attention to the information they publish on the Internet themselves, to

Procedure and House Affairs committee  Perhaps I can start, and Alia can answer after that. A lot of it is awareness and communicating to Canadians, to various communities, that, if there's any concern, if they see any information that they feel is questionable, and certainly if they feel threatened, our RCMP colleag

Procedure and House Affairs committee  As I mentioned, I can't get into—as I'm sure you can appreciate—operational details of our investigations. What I will say is that we know that the Chinese Communist Party is involved and interested in promoting its own national interests. It is an actor in foreign interference.

Procedure and House Affairs committee  Yes. As I mentioned earlier, we know that China, among other countries, tries to target elected officials at all levels of government to promote its own national interests and to encourage individuals to speak or act, if you will, as proxies on behalf of the Communist Party of Ch

Procedure and House Affairs committee  It's fair to say that it would use a number of techniques, including threats to communities here, including using proxy agents so that you don't necessarily know it's the Government of China behind it, and including attempts to use community resources. It's fair to say that there

Procedure and House Affairs committee  I hesitate to give a frequency. Again, I would say we are increasingly concerned. We have seen, as was mentioned earlier, the laws the Chinese Communist Party has passed, making it obligatory for everybody in China, including the private sector, to work on behalf of the governmen

Procedure and House Affairs committee  We are concerned about the use of media by many of the hostile state actors, including China. We know there are attempts. We've talked about disinformation and misinformation attempts using all types of media. The media are very much a victim or a tool that is used for foreign in

Procedure and House Affairs committee  I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question.

Procedure and House Affairs committee  I would say all available vectors in media would be able to be exploited by hostile state actors, so all types of media are certainly vulnerable to exploitation.

Procedure and House Affairs committee  I want to highlight what we said earlier, that we respect.... Obviously, we are in a democracy. We respect the media, and we do not want to be seen as interfering in the media. I want to underline that. That is certainly not an activity the service would undertake. Without being

Procedure and House Affairs committee  You are absolutely correct. That is very much one of the vectors used to, as an example, try to find a divisive issue in society and amplify it one way or the other. I'm pleased to say that the increased awareness and discussion about foreign interference highlights how society

Procedure and House Affairs committee  Again, focusing on our mandate, if I look back to the threats to the security of Canada, what we saw, certainly during COVID, was interest by hostile state actors to try to spread disinformation. We saw that from hostile state actors. We also saw attempts to conduct espionage aga