Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  It's a great question. The first thing we can do, as we heard in the previous speaker's statement, is to show our support for the protesters in Georgia to make it clear that we do not tolerate violent actions by the security services. I know that we don't have an embassy on the

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  I think the answer is no. I think this is why Ivanishvili came out with that speech last week. It was to make that pivot. Now, his official line is, “Oh, we'll join by 2030, when we can be sure that the EU will allow us to keep our own sovereignty.” To this argument that we nee

Subcommittee on International Human Rights committee  Thank you to the committee for inviting me. I'm Jeff Sahadeo, professor of political science at Carleton University. I have lived and worked in Georgia for parts of three years now and have many friends and colleagues involved in the demonstrations. I want to talk first about t

Foreign Affairs committee  Russia's interests have definitely lessened. When Pashinyan came into power in 2019 and opened a pro-western orientation, Russia was hostile to that. That could have been one reason that it decided to back away from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2022. Of course, there are the chal

Foreign Affairs committee  I could talk about Georgia for hours, but I have one minute. Georgia's government right now is approaching a more Russian orientation. They also rely upon Azerbaijan for gas supplies. After the 2008 war, they switched a lot of their energy supplies to Azerbaijan, but they try t

Foreign Affairs committee  The frontier line right now is imaginary. It depends on what these countries say it's going to be, so we do see Azerbaijan basically not being willing to enter into peace talks with a precondition that they accept the frontiers of Armenia.

Foreign Affairs committee  They are to try to open a channel with Turkey to start peaceful negotiations through them, and then to use our embassy in Yerevan to try to build democracy and humanitarian aid in Armenia.

Foreign Affairs committee  I would agree with that. I think the greatest scale of violations took place in the 2020 war, so the ICC would be a place to bring that forward.

Foreign Affairs committee  I'd agree with Mr. Waters, and I'd agree with your question that without a strong response, I think we see Azerbaijan easily grasping the idea that they could take the southern parts of Armenia. I don't think Azerbaijan would do so alone. This is why I mentioned Turkey in my rema

Foreign Affairs committee  [Inaudible—Editor] in a way that it's an Armenian ally, so there is a role—

Foreign Affairs committee  Yes, as I think the ambassador mentioned, those sanctions will have as great a chance to backfire as they would to actually do anything, because they might embolden the Azerbaijani government to ramp up its rhetoric against Canada. We could impose sanctions on individuals, perh

Foreign Affairs committee  Yes, I would agree. You haven't seen anything beyond blanket condemnations, but there are no targeted actions, with the exception of France, which has offered to sell arms to Armenia, but even then it has not imposed sanctions. I do think there is a realization of the potential

Foreign Affairs committee  I think it's very difficult. It's not just the gas supplies, although that's the primary economic motivator. Azerbaijan has done a very strong job in lobbying European capitals, so you have pro-Azerbaijani members of parliament or members of government in, for example, France,

Foreign Affairs committee  Azerbaijan supplies about 3.5% of the European Union's gas; it's not a huge amount. It's mainly to some of these eastern European states, like Bulgaria and Romania and places like that. Canada could act as an alternative supplier, certainly.

Foreign Affairs committee  Thank you very much for the invitation to speak. I will say that the situation in the south Caucasus is extremely fluid and unpredictable, and much is going to depend on what the stronger powers in the region do—these being Russia and Iran, but primarily Turkey—and how they see t