Evidence of meeting #50 for Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was georgia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:35 p.m.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
My question is for both witnesses, if they can answer it.
Is that government propaganda working in certain segments of society?
We are seeing people who are protesting, who want more freedom and who are fighting for democracy. However, does the rhetoric of the government, which is clearly trying to use different means to achieve its ends, work on certain segments of Georgian society?
4:35 p.m.
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
Just briefly, I think it does work with a small segment of society, particularly in a country like Georgia, where there are patron and clientelistic-style elections, where there's an exchange of favours in some ways at some of these elections. Some of this propaganda does work with a segment of society, but I believe survey research has shown also that Georgia has a big chunk or a large majority of people who really do want democracy.
I'll save more time for Ketevan.
4:35 p.m.
Executive Director, Center for Development and Democracy
Thank you.
I want to say that, unfortunately, propaganda kind of works in certain amounts, of course. That's why I guess propagandists usually use propaganda. Misinformation and disinformation, with all the channels and available sources that the government has, of course is working. Fortunately, it's not working on the majority.
Again, 75% to 80% of Georgians are very strongly supportive of Georgia's EU and NATO integration. I think it has been extremely important that our western partners have been very fast. We have shared with you the links to our western partners' reactions, from the State Department to the EU to the UNDP, and all the different international organizations as well as concrete countries.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe.
Mr. Green, you have seven minutes.
4:35 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you very much.
I would like to begin with Ms. Chachava. I'm new to this committee, and I want to offer you the opportunity to provide context. I don't have a deep background in this. I want to acknowledge that right off the bat.
What would you say to people who might be watching this committee and looking at even just your office set-up, with an American flag, a NATO flag, a European Union flag and a Ukrainian flag? What would you say to people who might look at that and say, gosh, this isn't really an organization that's kind of centred and completely focused on Georgia?
I want to offer you the opportunity to respond to that, so that we can take that off the table.
4:40 p.m.
Executive Director, Center for Development and Democracy
Just to give a short background about Georgia, our neighbour, Russia, is occupying 20% of our country. Georgians have been fighting to survive for many centuries, and the choice of the Georgian people to move forward with a democratic, free society has been made.
Since we gained independence over 35 years ago, Georgians have been fighting for freedom and dying for freedom. We have been moving forward to become members of NATO and the EU. Every government that has won any election in this country has always been pro-western and has been very clear that NATO and the EU are the future for Georgia. This is where we strive to be.
When it comes to the Center for Development and Democracy, thank you for the question and an opportunity to say a few words about us.
We were established in 2008, actually when Russia had occupied additional parts of Georgia and we were in a war. For us, it is crucial that we bring our country closer to you.
One of our main founding principles has been to support awareness-raising, to work with people, and we actually work with religious leaders very closely. We work with different groups of society. We try to bring dialogue. We try to overcome the polarization that our country is facing.
As you mentioned, yes, we are not hiding. Yes, it's very clear where we stand, because this is what the mission and vision of our state has been. In the Constitution of Georgia, article 78 says that Georgia is going to become a member of the EU and NATO, and that's the mission of our country and every elected official in this country.
Of course we, as a civil society, fight for freedom—we fight for freedom of expression, we fight for freedom of speech, we fight for human rights and we fight for democracy.
We observe elections. We want to ensure the voters have their rights and that their rights are secured.
I have been educated. I just graduated from King's College London. With U.K. funding, I have been lucky enough to study in the U.S., and I have been lucky to receive Canadian support as well.
Of course, we try to bring our partners here and work together.
4:40 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Okay. From the outside looking in, I'm not on this committee, but I heard your testimony. What I'm trying to reconcile—and this is for all of the witnesses today—is that we look at this new response that we have in the west towards TikTok. We talk about foreign interference. We talk about foreign ownership.
My next question would be for Professor Lindstaedt. I know you're an expert in comparative politics. Recognizing that, how would you help us unpack what is being proposed in Georgia and this reaction that we're seeing in the west towards entities like TikTok, for instance?
4:40 p.m.
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
It's my understanding that some of the issues related to TikTok have to do with concerns about surveillance and so forth, and don't really have anything to do with supporting democracy. In this case, these NGO laws are really about trying to cut at the heart of groups that are so vital for democracy, transparency and the free flow of information; they aren't about surveilling the population.
It's a really good question, but I think there are really huge differences here, because some of the people who are working for these NGOs.... It's not foreigners who are working there. They are Georgians who are working there, and they rely on foreign funding to keep them afloat.
They are trying to help promote democratic values in their own country, which are important for any country that is trying to support free elections, civil society and all these types of things.
That's where I would see that the difference lies.
4:45 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
It's your testimony, and I totally appreciate that. I found it very helpful.
The TikTok conversation has an element around foreign ownership but is primarily driven on the platform—its algorithms, its AI, its ability to have backdoor access—whereas what we're contemplating here is more about active NGOs on the ground that are promoting ideology that might be counter to the government's line.
Is that a fair characterization?
4:45 p.m.
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
Exactly. They are threatening to become the Georgian Dream party.
4:45 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
I'm going to ask a follow-up. Yes, let's segue to that—it's a good segue.
The Georgian Dream party has claimed that the foreign agents bill aims to increase transparency in foreign funding. It says that it draws inspiration from western laws like the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act.
You'll note, likely, that here in Canada one of the recommendations on foreign interference is a kind of foreign agents registry framework as well.
Could you perhaps give us a little understanding about the distinctions between Georgia's foreign agents bill and the U.S. FARA?
4:45 p.m.
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
I think, in this instance, we're talking about the Georgian Dream party being threatened by its own people who want democracy—whether it be the opposition, journalists, academics or people who work for NGOs—rather than some sort of foreign entity. To me, that's where the distinction lies. It isn't about the free flow of information that is so critical in a democracy. It's about trying to undercut people who are trying to share transparency and information and to support civil society in—
4:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Professor. I'm sorry to cut you off. Your time is up.
I'd like to thank all the witnesses for appearing before us and participating in this study.
We'll suspend the meeting.
4:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
I call the meeting back to order.
I would like to welcome our witnesses.
We have Magdalena Dembińska, full professor in the department of political science at the Université de Montréal, appearing as an individual by video conference. We are also hearing from Jeff Sahadeo, professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, and Natalie Sabanadze, senior research fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Ms. Sabanadze is also participating by video conference.
You will have a maximum of five minutes for your presentation, which will be followed by a round of questions.
Ms. Dembińska, the floor is yours.
4:50 p.m.
Magdalena Dembińska Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
Good afternoon, everyone.
Thank you for your invitation.
In my view, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights must monitor three interrelated aspects of the current situation in Georgia: the content of the draft law on foreign agents; instances of violent repression of peaceful protests; and parallel announcements of legislative changes targeting the LGBTQ+ community that target “gay propaganda”.
The Georgian Dream government is presenting the transparency of foreign influence draft law as being similar to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act. The opposition, on the other hand, sees it more as modelled on the Russian legislation, with potential consequences for freedom of expression and civil society activism in general.
Comparing the content of the three statutes—the American and Russian statues, as well as the Georgian draft law—clearly leans toward the opposition's interpretation. While the U.S. act targets individuals and political organizations that are controlled and funded predominantly by foreign governments deemed to be enemies, the Georgian draft law targets all civil society organizations, media, academic institutions, religious or sports organizations and even humanitarian organizations that are funded at a rate of 20% or more by foreign sources. All of those organizations would have to register as agents of foreign influence and, as a result, their activities would be closely monitored.
Although the draft law does not mention which foreign power is concerned, the rhetoric of the government and members of Georgian Dream is clear: Western influence is being targeted.
An event slipped under the radar as a result of the tensions surrounding the draft law on foreign agents. On April 19 of this year, the Georgian Parliament introduced amendments to tax legislation. Those amendments facilitate financial exchanges, especially with Russia, and investments in tax havens. The amendments clearly benefit the founder of the ruling party, Bidzina Ivanichvili, a Georgian millionaire who got rich in Russia, and Russian oligarchs.
Why did the government decide to introduce the legislation on foreign agents now? Why do so at all, knowing that mass protests will follow? The same draft law had already been proposed in the spring of 2023, but it was withdrawn as a result of massive street protests. This is déjà vu. Experts are speculating, but there is every reason to believe that this is an election strategy. Parliamentary elections will take place in October 2024—I could talk more about that, as needed. It also may have seemed timely, as Europe and the United States are busy elsewhere, focused on their own upcoming elections and so on. Also, since it has already been a candidate for membership in the European Union since last December, Georgia feels, in the short term, that the stick is less important than in 2023.
Is the situation beyond Georgian Dream's control? Although the governing party was counting on the fatigue and exhaustion of the protest movement owing to the slow legislative process, the use of force against protesters can have the opposite effect on the resolve of protesters and the potential rallying of otherwise very fractured opposition forces. So this is an attempt to distract the public and divide the opposition further by bringing LGBTQ+ issues and legislation banning same-sex marriage back on the political agenda. However, despite the overwhelming support—some 80%—of the population for membership in the European Union and NATO, this societal issue is divisive and, with all the propaganda, has the potential to rally some of the undecided voters.
The Orthodox Church and social conservatism are still well rooted in the Georgian public sphere, all in a society where 62% of people report feeling unrepresented by existing political parties and where perspectives on society diverge between urban centres and rural spaces.
Another card that Georgian Dream is playing is the threat of a second front in Georgia opening if neighbouring Russia is provoked. The memory of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war is strong, as is the lack of western support to push Russia back from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
4:55 p.m.
Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
Although the government has so far been rather balanced between EU membership and increased trade and air travel with its northern neighbour, it is now clear that Georgian Dream is moving closer to Russia, benefiting the economic interests of some of its members. The society, which is largely pro-western, is at the same time torn apart by fear of armed conflict, by values, and by fear of the economic and social consequences of turning away from Russia caused by geography.
In short, the draft law on foreign agents goes beyond human rights. What is currently playing out in the streets of Tbilisi and in the elections in October is the type of political regime and the geopolitical orientation of the—
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Ms. Dembińska. I apologize for cutting you off, but I have no choice.
4:55 p.m.
Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
I've said everything I had to say.
4:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
That's perfect.
Mr. Sahadeo, you have the floor for five minutes.
May 7th, 2024 / 4:55 p.m.
Dr. Jeff Sahadeo Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
Thank you to the committee for inviting me.
I'm Jeff Sahadeo, professor of political science at Carleton University. I have lived and worked in Georgia for parts of three years now and have many friends and colleagues involved in the demonstrations.
I want to talk first about the motivations behind the bill's introduction. As it's been said before, with elections approaching in a few months, Georgian Dream wants, basically, to cut off any independent outlets that might critically examine the run-up to the election, offer the alternative parties a voice or survey the election to offer some kind of independent count.
Georgian Dream are determined not to lose this election. I do not think they will accept a loss in the election. Right now, their support hovers around 25%, which is more than any of the other parties in a proportional representation but certainly makes them far from comfortable that they will actually legitimately form a majority. They have already gone to the trouble of deregistering far-right parties so they can't split the vote, and Georgian Dream have moved to try to occupy that space themselves.
Another argument for the timing is basically a chaos theory argument that Georgian Dream want demonstrations. They want this opposition—perhaps they didn't appreciate the extent to which they would get it—to keep the opposition on the defensive. If there are clashes, they can blame youth or they can blame these pro-western organizations. They can also exhaust the opposition before the elections.
There's the question of state capture, where the ruling party controls more and more of the economy and society. This has already been discussed. Again, to follow up on Professor Dembińska's comments, this law allows them to go after everybody. They've been very open about that. They've argued that there are 26,000 NGOs in Georgia, a country of four million people. To count that, they have to count every independent organization that's not part of the government. There are very heavy fines. These include on media organizations and the like. They want to foster this narrative of decadent young people who do not profess to follow the language, fatherland and faith triad that Georgian Dream are actively pursuing.
In terms of a re-emergence of Bidzina Ivanishvili, who's come out of the shadows now, as a background, his fortune of about $5 billion is equivalent to one-third of the entire GDP of the country. It's 10 times more than any other oligarch has in any other country. He has largely wielded power behind the scenes, so when he came out and gave a speech last week in which he attacked the “global party of war”, it was ironic that he did not name Russia—which occupies 20% of Georgia and of course has invaded Ukraine—but rather attacked internal enemies.
It's a clear turn towards the language of Viktor Orbán in Hungary. We've seen how Robert Fico in Slovakia uses language. Irakli Kobakhidze of Georgian Dream, who's the prime minister, was at CPAC in Budapest. As has already been discussed, he is relying heavily on his anti-LGBTQ program.
In fact, I was talking to a colleague of mine who went home for Easter. In conversations with her older relatives in the village, they were saying that some of these people who believe this Georgian Dream propaganda are now actually starting to associate Europe with LGBTQ rights. This is exactly the Georgian Dream scenario.
Pro-European is now starting to mean different things, and that's how Georgian Dream is trying to manipulate society with propaganda, but there's a vulnerability to it. There is a very conservative portion of society in Georgia.
Ivanishvili, again, has not been attacking Russia. Money laundering from Russia to Georgia has increased significantly since the war. Georgian Dream has restored flights between Tbilisi and Moscow, which had been cancelled, so we are at a tipping point.
To conclude, this law's at the tip of an iceberg. What's motivating a lot of the protests is the mobility issue to Europe. From a country of four million, there's potentially about a million Georgians who are working illegally now in the European Union. Of course, there are many working legally, too. This need to escape to Europe is the card the European Union can play, the need for young Georgians to work in Europe.
In a society that's increasingly impoverished, Georgian Dream do not want to talk about socio-economic issues. They want to talk about foreign agents. They want to talk about LGBTQ.
Thank you.
5 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury
Thank you, Professor. That was perfect—five minutes.
Now I would like to invite Madam Natalie Sabanadze.
You have the floor for five minutes, please.
5 p.m.
Natalie Sabanadze Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thank you very much. It is a great honour to address you on this topic, which is very important for Georgia.
I would like to start by describing this law as a perfect case of the weaponization of transparency. Under the pretext of transparency and openness, it definitely aims at silencing and delegitimizing civil society, undermining independent media and simply suppressing dissent and freedom of expression and thought.
Georgia has a vibrant civil society, and this is entirely thanks to foreign, namely western, support. Georgia's partners have invested in democracy promotion since Georgia regained independence in the early nineties, and that is exactly what resulted in Georgia's being a free country, despite not being a perfect consolidated democracy.
In the official narrative justifying the law, it is being compared to similar American, British, French and other legislation. FARA, the American act, is most frequently invoked and, incidentally, was also most frequently invoked by Putin when he introduced a foreign agents law.
These acts aim at unfriendly countries and organizations that lobby on their behalf. The Georgian law aims at friends who helped out through difficult years of transition and invested in making Georgia more democratic and, in fact, more transparent. If FARA and similar acts target enemies, Georgian law targets friends, namely its western supporters, with whom we want to be institutionally linked through membership in the European Union and NATO.
According to this draft—we've heard this many times—every organization that receives more than 20% of foreign funding will have to declare itself as an agent of foreign influence. This will cover not only media and civil society organizations but also academic institutions and research centres. There is no significant local funding for this, and even if there was, I think you can imagine that the selection criteria would be very strict, a total loyalty to the ruling party. Both in its letter and its spirit, this bill bears a close resemblance to the foreign agents law passed in Russia.
This is why protesters in Tbilisi call it the “Russian law”, and we have seen how this law has destroyed civil society in Russia. Furthermore, Russia has been amending this law and making it even more draconian, expanding its scope of application from organizations to individuals. People are encouraged to spy on each other and denounce their acquaintances and neighbours as potential foreign agents or suspected foreign agents. The ease with which labels—such as “traitors” and “enemies of the people”—are applied is eerie, especially in the country that lived through the horrors of Stalinism.
The political motives that underpin both the Russian and Georgian laws are the same. These are prevention of the so-called coloured revolutions; suppression of critical voices; eradication of western influence, especially western democracy-promotion measures; and destruction of an open, pluralistic society. In the case of Georgia, there is an additional and very important factor: Georgia's European integration.
The adoption of this law will be a serious obstacle to the opening of accessions negotiations. When a similar law was adopted in Hungary, the European Court of Justice struck it down, deeming it incompatible with European law and values.
Official statements from high-level EU representatives all warn the Georgian government against the adoption of this law and call on the authorities not to jeopardize Georgia's prospects of full European integration.
Thousands of people who are standing in the streets of Tbilisi are fighting for their future. They see clearly the choice. One is turning Georgia into a Russian-style autocracy, and the other is becoming a European democracy. The majority of them have made their choice, except that it has to be defended now.
Thank you.