Afghanistan Committee on June 4th, 2008

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

What we saw in the last week and a half, when we were there, was that across the board, from top to bottom, from Karzai to the Afghan military, from top to bottom on our side, there is a similar assessment and acknowledgement of the challenges, but there is also progress. What struck us, or certainly me, was what I call the maturation of the whole of government approach.

Is it fair to say that this has been the objective of the mission all along, notwithstanding the timing of the Manley report?Really, that's the direction you were trying to get to, notwithstanding anything else, and it's accelerating, obviously, because of the recent successes. Is that a fair statement?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

From a military perspective, that has been our view all along. I've been briefing these three lines of operation for the last two and a half years. We have a leadership role in security, but securing is the foundation for governance and development for which other government departments are the lead.

The challenge over the last two and a half years has been that we've not had quite the critical mass of civilians required to deliver that civilian effect. That's coming. Remember, this is all relatively new.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

The Afghans are going to have an election in September 2009. What can you tell us about your expectation of increased insurgent activity relative to that, as they try to make whatever point they're trying to make? Can we expect that?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

I think they'll do whatever they can at the time most suited to their capabilities. In our opinion, that time is now and over the next couple of months. Then we'll see a repeat in a more concerted way in the time leading up to the election through May and June of next year.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

General, our mission to Afghanistan is supposed to include development as a key component. Security is one of the major components in the umbrella of this thing. I think Canadians are interested in knowing how the development is progressing in the regions in which Canada is providing the security.

Sometimes we hear that the security is very tight, the situation is very bad, there's been devastation. Next we hear that we are building schools, or that we have all of these civilians moving in and then moving out. This leaves Canadians with a muddled picture of the overall development of the region. Perhaps you could enlighten us on whether there has been solid development progress. This would be opposed to the perception that we build and then it's broken away because of the tough and violent situation. Perhaps you could enlighten us on this.

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

In classic counter-insurgency operational theory, the challenge is to gain traction on a bottom-up basis. In talking about traction, we use the notion of ink spots that spread over time while we're building national institutions.

We are more focused on the bottom-up piece of this: districts, villages. Back in 2006, I would say we were more focused on Kandahar as a province. We're still looking provincially at what assistance is required for governance. At the same time, though, we have to prioritize. We have to focus. We have to focus functionally and we have to focus geographically. What we have seen increasingly over the last year or so is a district- and community-level focus to try to create stabilization zones that we can expand upon.

In each of those stabilization zones, we need to superimpose a number of different effects. One is our own security effect, using our own forces. Another is a security effect achieved by Afghan National Security Forces. Superimposed on that, once there's a level of confidence from IOs, NGOs, and so on, we use CIDA funds to bring in contractors who are able to deliver concrete effects that include the building of governance capacity. This way the locals have confidence in the guy or the shura who has a responsibility for helping and protecting them.

That's why the whole-of-government approach that we refer to is so important—a single effect won't last. We can apply it, but it fizzles. The spark goes out relatively quickly unless we're able to superimpose something else on top.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Patry, you have five minutes.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Gauthier, I'd like to continue along the same lines as my colleague Mr. Ignatieff. You will probably be able to answer his question at the same time as mine.

You talked to us about training and mentorship of the ANA and the ANP, which I feel is essential if we want this mission to be successful.

How is this being done? Are you training the ANA and the ANP at the same time? Are you training only one of them? How long is the training? What is the success rate?

Once they're trained, do members of the Afghan army remain in the Kandahar region? Are they going out on patrol alone or do they have to patrol with you? I'd like to know a little more.

Are you also training officers? It's good to have soldiers, but if there are no officers, it won't work.

We have been told that there is a great deal of corruption within the Afghan police, particularly since police officers are not well paid. If they are not well paid, are they leaving the police force to go and work in the private sector?

What kinds of performance tests do you run? What is your aim in this regard, particularly with the Afghan army?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

Those are complex questions. Training isn't strictly physical training or instruction, it really is training. We establish a relationship with sub-units, units, a formation and a brigade which is affiliated with the Canadian formation.

Each Afghan infantry battalion has 500 to 600 soldiers. We have a team of mentors who work with them 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and each of those units follows a cycle. I can't go into too much detail because this is a security issue. The battalions follow cycles. They are operational and follow a training program for a certain period of time. They are on holiday for another period of time. Various units within the brigade follow those cycles, but we ensure that, on the ground, we have the personnel needed to ensure security.

Our mentors provide training, physical training and instruction during instruction and physical training periods. At the same time, they are deployed with units on the ground in the Zhari and Panjwaii districts. They provide mentoring and planning services. They help with planning so that the Afghan people can draw up operational plans so that the battalion commander can design, develop and communicate a plan and follow that plan on the ground with the assistance of Canadians.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Mr. Ignatieff would like to follow up.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

Very quickly, when I look at your statement you say we have moved from only 15 or so personnel involved in training and mentoring to roughly 220 Canadian men and women. That's obviously progress, but we have 2,500 troops in theatre. Are you saying to me that basically 10% of your military force is engaged in training? Do you envisage scaling up that number? Am I right to infer that only 10% of your effort is on training, because that strikes me as surprisingly low, worryingly low, and then the question is, are you going to scale it up?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

With all due respect, sir, looking purely at numbers is a little bit of a mug's game. Of course, what's not reflected in the numbers is that most of those folks are leaders. So in terms of leadership, we have more leadership capability or capacity invested in the OMLT component of our force structure than we do in our battle group, in the fighting element of our force structure. And the commanding officer of the OMLT organization is a full colonel, whereas the commanding officers of the other units are lieutenant-colonels. So intellectually, and from a leadership perspective, that investment is there.

I also need to add, of course, that an awful lot of what the rest of the joint task force does is in support of the Afghans. We conduct partner operations with them. We support them logistically. We support them from a communications standpoint, and so on. Increasingly, as I said in my statement, our expectation is that they will lead and we will support and enable. And that supporting and enabling is not just about the mentoring part of the structure; it's about the whole joint task force.

So I can assure you that we are already where you are suggesting we need to be, and we'll continue to move in that direction. One of the challenges, of course, is that we have a fixed number of Afghans to work with. The Afghan National Army is only of a certain size, and what we actually need is to see more Afghan National Army in the south and in Kandahar province. At that point we will find a way to provide more mentors to assist with that particular process.

But this is a positive story. It's important. We get it, and we will continue to put all possible emphasis in this area.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thanks very much, General.

Madame Boucher.

[Sylvie Boucher, Conservative, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Gauthier.

I will be splitting my time with my friend Mr. Gerald Keddy.

Mr. Gauthier, I am pleased to hear you speak. I am new to this committee. I am fascinated with Afghanistan, and I want to understand what's happening over there.

We have been in Afghanistan since 2002. There has been a great deal of progress achieved. Unfortunately, many people still think that success is instantaneous, that we need only snap our fingers to fix everything. On the other hand, we are told that the conflict in Afghanistan is different from other conflicts because this conflict is asymmetrical.

I am new to this field and I would like to know what the major difference between the conflict in Afghanistan and the other conflicts is. Are the strategies and the tactics being used in Afghanistan different from those we used during other conflicts? Are we on the right track with regard to this new strategy?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

As to the differences between conflicts, it all depends on which ones you are talking about. From a Canadian perspective, if we draw a comparison with the Second World War, the Korean War or the First World War, we realize that they are completely different. Even during the Cold War, we were dealing with a military adversary with whom we were very familiar, who was very well structured and who employed conventional methods. In that context, what is asymmetrical is the opposite of what is conventional.

What we are doing in Afghanistan cannot be summarized as putting down insurgents. We are talking about rebuilding or building a country, institutions, Afghan armed forces, and working in close collaboration with our partners within a coalition. This is an interesting situation and one that poses various challenges. We are making decisions not only in a military context but also a pan-governmental context. Today, on the ground in Kandahar, there are important Canadian leaders, including Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, who is a military leader, and a civilian leader, Ms. Elissa Goldberg, who represents Canada in Kandahar. These two leaders quite often make decisions together. They are not strictly military decisions. For all those reasons, the situation is completely different from that during the good old days of the Cold War or conflicts that preceded the Cold War.

This is much more complex and intense. Consequently, the way forward is less obvious to us. Instead of basing ourselves on old doctrine, we have to write a new one as we move forward, since this is a new situation. We are learning and adapting. We learn lessons every hour, every day or week. As I said in my opening remarks, we are applying those lessons to how we conduct our operations or arm ourselves in particular.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Mr. Keddy, you have about a minute and a half.

[Gerald Keddy, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margaret's, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Gauthier.

In the training of the Afghan forces, what have we done to encourage, within that Afghan force, an elite squad, a group that the rest of the Afghan army can look toward so that when you have a difficult situation, you can put that force in there on the ground, almost like special forces? It will certainly be required when the NATO forces withdraw. Have we looked at that, and looked at developing an esprit de corps for the Afghan army and forces?

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

We are absolutely on track for that and engaged to some degree. In addition to the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team force structure, we have a number of Canadians who are part of the U.S. command team building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Brigadier-General Al Howard is playing a key leadership role in building the ANA from Kabul.

In addition to the troops that we work with, a brigade of the Afghan National Army, Commando Kandaks, as they're called, have been in development. They have been deployed and are operational. There's one in the south of Afghanistan, and we are playing a role in mentoring them also. In the short time they've existed, which is a matter of months, they have done some pretty remarkable things. It's very positive.

We of course are encouraging capable units. There are a number of different arrows in the quiver you need to be able to apply to the right target, and they're going in a very positive direction.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thanks very much, General.

Ms. Barbot, you have five minutes.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Gauthier, I am a little concerned. You said that the army is not only there to conduct military operations, but that it is also rebuilding a country. Yet, when we considered the new motion with regard to refocusing the mission in Afghanistan, we were told that the army was ensuring a certain amount of security, but as time passed, civilians, CIDA or development organizations would be taking over.

I am having trouble understanding your remark.

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

I have not necessarily properly understood your question, but I am going to try to respond all the same.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

I can repeat it.

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

I think that I have understood the important part of your question.

When civilian entrepreneurs, international organizations and NGOs can set up shop because there is an acceptable level of security, our role is not as important. If we cannot convince them to be the first to go to a sector of interest, we have discovered, over the past few months, that we need to spend some money and put our military engineers on the ground, who will be able to supervise and provide the necessary materials for building roads. That is what we will have to do for as long as the situation is not safe enough for our friends to be able to work there.

It is a question of sequence and progression on the ground. We will continue to take part in those kinds of activities, just like the Americans, until our colleagues are able to go there with the needed resources.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I would like to speak to you about the Strategic Advisory Team, the SAT. You have a worthy objective, but the SAT also has its say and it has the ear of the President Karzaï. Canada wants to rebuild the country, but sooner or later, the fact that the president is advised by a military team will create a democratic inconsistency, even if it could be justified at the outset due to the fact that we could count almost only on the military for restoring the country. That being said, I place my trust in you.

Are we creating a democratic inconsistency? Are you thinking of asking that the president be surrounded by a team of Canadian civilians rather than by a military team? Perhaps the time has come to look closely at this question.

[LGen Michel Gauthier]

I am not authorized to put any questions, but have you had an opportunity to discuss things with the Strategic Advisory Team?