Foreign Affairs Committee on May 31st, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Good morning, colleagues. This is meeting number 59 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

This morning, we leave our report and our regular study of democratic development to have a briefing session on disarmament.

Our witnesses will include, from Project Ploughshares, Mr. Ernie Regehr, who has appeared before a number of committees of Parliament; and also, from the Middle Powers Initiative, we have the Honourable Douglas Roche, former senator and long-time advocate of this.

I was just handed a report that is almost 10 years old now, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-first Century. A number of our guests today appeared before the committee in regards to this report issued nine years ago by our committee. So we appreciate their long-standing expertise in and input into this subject.

You've been here before, and you know how the committee works. We'll have opening comments from both of you of approximately 10 minutes, and then we'll go into the first round.

Welcome. It's good to have you here.

Also, in the second hour we'll have another witness, Mr. Meyer, who also testified before the committee back when we did our report. We really look forward to that as well.

The time is yours.

[Douglas Roche, Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm here representing the Middle Powers Initiative, which submitted a report called “Towards 2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus” to the recently concluded first preparatory meeting for the 2010 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I've attached this report to my statement. I think it has been distributed to the members in both languages.

This report summarizes seven priorities for action identified by the MPI based on four meetings of the Article VI Forum, which were held over an 18-month period in New York, The Hague, Ottawa, and Vienna, involving 30 invited like-minded states, including Canada.

The seven priorities are as follows: verified reduction of nuclear forces; standing down of nuclear forces, which is known as de-alerting; negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty; bringing the comprehensive test ban treaty into force; strengthened negative security assurances; regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply; and improved NPT governance.

I want to thank the Government of Canada for the support received for the Article VI Forum process. I commend the work of officials in the foreign affairs department, notably the Ambassador for Disarmament, Paul Meyer.

Canada has consistently upheld the need for a balanced implementation of the NPT's three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. But more high-ranking political leadership is now urgent. MPI’s analysis of the Canadian and other middle power statements made at the NPT preparatory meeting shows that stronger political weight is needed to respond effectively to the present nuclear crisis.

The facts are stark. The total number of 27,000 nuclear weapons is, in the words of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, headed by the Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, “extraordinarily and alarmingly high”. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan says the world is sleepwalking toward nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Yet the declared nuclear weapons states are all engaged in efforts to modernize their nuclear arsenals, despite the ruling by the International Court of Justice that they must conclude negotiations toward elimination.

Moreover, India and Pakistan each have an estimated 50 to 60 nuclear weapons, and Israel has 200. These three countries do not even belong to the NPT and all are engaged in modernization. The eight countries now in the nuclear club have a combined population of 3.1 billion, which means that 48% of the people in the world live in a nuclear weapons state.

World attention is focused on North Korea, which tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, and Iran is now claiming an ability to move toward large-scale enrichment of uranium. Of course neither country should be allowed to build nuclear weapons. But these states are flashpoints off a volcano. The volcano is the present arsenal of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear crisis can be stated in a nutshell: a two-class world in which a few states arrogate unto themselves the possession of nuclear weapons while proscribing their acquisition by any other state is not sustainable.

Where is the voice of Canada in this world crisis? Where is the policy statement by the Government of Canada addressing the totality of nuclear weapons, the paramount security issue in the world? Is there not a two-class standard in criticizing Iran for enriching uranium while remaining silent on the U.K. government’s decision to extend its Trident nuclear system well into the second half of the 21st century?

The moral, legal, and military case against nuclear weapons is better understood than ever before. The intellectual argument that nuclear weapons are needed for security is now largely rejected by most states as baseless.

Nuclear weapons opponents recently gained surprising support when four prominent American figures, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, who have all held high posts in the U.S. administration and Congress, came out for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In an op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal, they warned that “the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era”.

Their article, calling for a series of action steps, was in vivid contrast to the negativity displayed by the Bush administration. Of 31 votable nuclear disarmament resolutions at the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 2006, the U.S. cast the sole no vote 12 times. Altogether, the U.S. was in a minority of four or less 20 times.

What is Canada doing to work with such like-minded states as the New Agenda Coalition, comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, to influence the most powerful country in the world that its policies must be revised to save the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010? What is Canada doing to press the U.S. to get its tactical nuclear weapons out of the European countries: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey? NATO’s continued insistence that nuclear weapons are “essential”—that's their word—flatly contradicts the NPT. Canada cannot have it both ways: to support elimination of nuclear weapons through the NPT and also to support NATO’s continued nuclear weapons.

The Canadian government should show a greater sense of urgency in dealing with the overarching problem of nuclear weapons. This is the point made by Senator Roméo Dallaire, who, on April 17, 2007, said, “Why does Canada, as a middle power that does not have any nuclear weapons, not take this leadership role and initiate the process to abolish and eliminate these nuclear weapons?” On May 3, he returned to the subject, stating, “It is Canada's moral obligation to assume a proactive leadership role to save the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—our last best hope to stave off a frightening cascade of nuclear proliferation from which there can be no rescue.”

Mr. Chairman, it is Senator Dallaire's motion, which was unanimously adopted by the Senate on May 3, that urged: “That the Senate urge the Government of Canada to take a global leadership role in the campaign of eradicating the dire threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons.”

On July 5 to 7, 2007, the Middle Powers Initiative will join with the Pugwash movement and work with Senator Dallaire in sponsoring an international extraordinary workshop, Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament, to observe the 50th anniversary of Pugwash. This is a moment for Canada to step forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Roche.

We'll go to Mr. Regehr.

[Ernie Regehr, Senior Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here. I'm pleased to address the committee on behalf of both Project Ploughshares and Veterans Against Nuclear Arms.

We've produced a longer paper on the subject of our disarmament agenda for Canada, and I'll see to it that all members of the committee receive a copy. I encourage you to review the brief history of VANA in that report in particular. It is an extraordinary organization of veterans who understand the realities of war, who know that the virtually limitless destructive power of nuclear weapons is not a source of security in the world, and who have channelled their particular experiences as veterans into a decades-long call for the world to end this overarching danger.

This year’s preparatory committee for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference has confirmed two central realities. First, if the ailing NPT is to fulfill its foundational role in advancing global security, it must be solidly balanced on its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses. Second, the international community is now well beyond simply debating a range of disarmament and non-proliferation options; rather, it is looking for meaningful implementation of an already agreed-to agenda.

While all states are bound by the articles of the NPT treaty, there are four types of states in the non-proliferation regime. Each type of state faces particular implementation roles and challenges.

The biggest category is non-nuclear weapons states. In exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons themselves, they have received the legally binding promise of disarmament by the nuclear weapons states, and they have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Access requires that they continuously verify their non-weapons status through safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Many have yet to fulfill their obligations, and of course Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are in much more serious violation of their safeguards and NPT obligations. Furthermore, about three dozen of these states are in possession of nuclear power technology and thus must sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty before it can enter into force. Several of them have yet to do that.

Nuclear weapons states, the second category, are under legal obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. They renewed their commitment to do that at the 2000 review conference, although they are not bound by a specific deadline. In the meantime, nuclear weapons states are obliged to fulfill specific commitments they made through the NPT and through the review conferences of 1995 and 2000. I won't go through that list; Senator Roche has already referred to much of it. Irreversible and verifiable cuts to arsenals are at the core of their obligation. Failure to meet these obligations constitutes non-compliance with the treaty, just as failures by non-nuclear weapons states to meet all of their safeguard requirements does.

In the third category are India, Israel, and Pakistan. They are de facto nuclear weapons states, but they are not signatories to the NPT. That does not mean they escape all disarmament obligations. They are bound by the NPT norm of nuclear disarmament, and as members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, they are certainly obligated to pursue in good faith the currently agreed objectives of that body, which includes the prevention of an arms race in outer space, legally binding negative security assurance to non-nuclear weapons states, and a fissile materials cut-off treaty. The CD also negotiated the test ban treaty. All three states with nuclear technology must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. India and Pakistan also are in direct violation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1172, which unambiguously calls on them to end their nuclear weapons programs.

The fourth category is non-nuclear weapons states within NATO, a group that obviously includes Canada. They find themselves facing a stark contradiction: affirming within NATO that nuclear forces are essential to alliance security, while at the same time affirming within the NPT that nuclear disarmament is essential to global security. It is a contradiction that must be resolved in favour of the latter commitment.

So what priorities should Canada pursue within this broad and essentially agreed disarmament agenda?

The first and foremost item is that to continue to set the right course, each new Canadian government should, as a matter of course and at the highest level, reaffirm Canada's fundamental commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. With that unwavering goal always at the core of its efforts, Canada should continue to actively promote the early implementation of the broad nuclear disarmament agenda that we've been talking about.

There will necessarily be some shifts in priorities according to their circumstances, but within that, Canada should focus on several items that it has a good opportunity to influence. First among these is attention to the disarmament machinery. Nuclear disarmament depends first and foremost on the political will of states simply to do it, but the institutional mechanisms through which they pursue that fundamental and urgent agenda are critically important.

The continuing dysfunction in the CD suggests that it is once again time for Canada, along with like-minded states, to explore having the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly form ad hoc committees to take up the fourfold agenda that lies dormant now in the CD—that is, the non-weaponization of space, negative security assurances, the fissile materials cut-off treaty, and new approaches to nuclear disarmament broadly.

In the context of the NPT, Canada should continue to press for a more effective governance structure involving annual decision-making meetings, the ability to respond to particular crises such as the declaration of a state party's intent to withdraw, and a permanent bureau or secretariat for the treaty. In that context, Canada has made and should continue to make a point of promoting transparency through regular reporting by states on their compliance efforts and fuller NGO participation in the treaty review process.

Second, the conflict regarding Iran's uranium enrichment program raises important issues about the spread of weapon-sensitive civilian technologies to which all states in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations are now legally entitled. It is in the interest of nuclear disarmament that access to these technologies be severely restricted and placed under international control through non-discriminatory multilateral fuel supply arrangements. Canada, as a state with high levels of competence in relevant technologies, should take an active role in investigating and promoting international fuel cycle control mechanisms.

Third, the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal has led to proposals to exempt India from key guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Canadian technology and interests are directly engaged. Canada must be at the fore of international efforts to bring India, Israel, and Pakistan under the rules and discipline of the nuclear non-proliferation system. In particular, and at a minimum, Canada should insist that the Nuclear Suppliers Group require that India ratify the test ban treaty and abide by a verifiable freeze on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes before any modification of civilian cooperation guidelines is considered.

Finally, Canada cannot avoid promoting within NATO a resolution of the NATO-NPT contradiction, in favour of the NPT disarmament commitment.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Regehr and Mr. Roche.

We'll go into the first round of questioning.

Mr. Dosanjh, you have seven minutes.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I will share it with my colleagues. I'm sure they may have some questions.

Thank you very much for your presentations. Both of you are quite learned on these issues, which are very complex issues, and I don't pretend to understand them in their full complexity.

However, it seems to me that both of you touched on the point that if those nations that are sort of officially nuclear don't progressively and actively engage in disarmament, how can anyone credibly ask anyone else to not seek nuclear weapons? It is not about big nations or small nations; it is about each nation believing it has the right to do what it pleases, unless others encourage them to be part of a network of states.

The picture you paint is very complex, but it's also very depressing, because you say that these states that are officially nuclear have no specific timetable to follow but have a commitment to disarm. I think that we, as Canadians, because of the NATO duality that we engage in, lose credibility on the international stage. As a government and as a country, we have to tackle that issue, and we are falling behind. We are not in a leadership position.

You obviously have outlined some of the issues of what we should be doing. But what do you think is the single most important step the Canadian government at this point can take? Is it dealing with the duality around NATO, or is it something else?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We'll get the answer, and then we'll come back to Mr. Wilfert for another question. Thank you for the question, Mr. Dosanjh.

Mr. Roche.

[Douglas Roche]

Thank you, Mr. Dosanjh. You pose a challenge to us to name the single most important thing.

There is a range of things that have to be done. But when Hans Blix was asked that very question as the chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, whose report came out about a year ago—and I know he was here in Ottawa—he was asked, of all his 60 recommendations that are in this report, which is the single most important, he said unhesitatingly that it was to get the comprehensive test ban treaty ratified to shut off nuclear testing everywhere in the world.

Therefore, I would have to say in answer to your question that the single thing, if you forced me to confine it to one, would be for Canada to press the United States to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. I went through an unfortunate experience in 1999 when the U.S. Senate actually voted against the ratification of the CTBT. I won't go into all the reasons for that, but it certainly revolved around a lot of domestic issues that do not pertain at this time.

So if we want to stop North Korea from testing, or anybody else, we have to have a universal regime. There are 10 states that are required under the terms of the CTBT—there are 44 altogether and there are 10 remaining—that have to ratify. It is my belief that were the United States to revisit this, and there are some signs that they may be willing to revisit it in the next administration starting in 2009, the other states that have still to ratify it would fall in line.

So I think Canada should put pressure on the United States to do this. It's in the interests of the United States as well as in the interests of everybody else to have a world in which nuclear testing is a thing of the past.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Regehr, you wanted to add to that.

[Ernie Regehr]

Very briefly, it is to second what Mr. Roche has said, but also to say that because there are various issues that come up, I think it's fundamentally important that Canada have the fundamentals absolutely correct and on record.

The Prime Minister spoke at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 2006 and made a very limited reference to nuclear disarmament there. It was on the Iran question, and I'm not sure that the present government at the political leadership has made a clear and unequivocal declaration on the objective of nuclear disarmament.

That needs to be clear front and centre, so that when we encounter the India decision, for example, and what we do on the U.S., we don't calculate it on the basis of what are Canada-U.S. relations and try to finesse something, but that we are pursuing a fundamental principle, that when we are in NATO forums we understand there is a fundamental principle that we are pursuing in those forums.

On the specific item, absolutely, I think the need to articulate clearly that principled position is important as well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Regehr.

Mr. Wilfert, you have another couple of minutes.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sorry, Mr. Roche, I missed the beginning of your presentation, but I have a couple of quick questions.

Our last nuclear statement as a government was made in 1999, and so it is out of date. It very much reflects the paradigm of the time with regard to the Cold War. The Canadian government, both this one and previous ones, have condemned any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries, but we continue to treat nuclear weapons as useful, even necessary, I would suggest, as an element of our national defence and that of our allies.

First of all, do you agree that we should be updating our statement? Secondly, how practical is it for us to withdraw our support for NATO nuclear policy, which clearly is in conflict with the NPT obligations, and at the same time work with our like-minded allies for advances given the present conditions that we see both in Europe and obviously with regard to our relations with the United States? This would clearly, in my view, put us at significant odds with Washington.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Could we have very quick answers, if possible?

[Douglas Roche]

First of all, yes, I do believe that the Canadian government should update its petition. There should be, as I indicated earlier, a statement at the highest levels of the government, a Canadian petition to support and become proactive in the diplomatic and political engagements in pursuing negotiations toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Canadian government's position, of course, irrespective of who has been in power all through the years, has been to oppose nuclear weapons, but we do this in an ambivalent way, which you hinted at in your question. On the one hand, we supported the year 2000 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which declared an unequivocal undertaking of the total elimination of nuclear weapons via a program of 13 steps. Canada, of course, signed on to that. At the same time, we're manifesting support for a continuation of NATO's position, which is to call nuclear weapons essential, the supreme guarantee of security, and to have tactical nuclear weapons stationed in the five European countries that I mentioned. This is absolutely incompatible, incoherent. I believe that the ambivalence in Canadian policy should be cleared up and that now is the time to move ahead.

The chairman made reference earlier to the report that this committee did in 1999, which is an outstanding report. It led to Canada's getting NATO to review its policies. Well, they did review their policies, but they repeated them. Now, I think, there is less opposition within the non-nuclear ranks of NATO to pursue a study that would lead to some reformulation of the strategic concept, which would take nuclear weapons out of the equation and, of course, take them out of Europe. This, I think, is a very important issue for Canada, and it ought to be pursued.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Roche.

Go ahead very quickly, please, Mr. Regehr.

[Ernie Regehr]

Briefly, I think the practicality of predicting an outcome is not great, but Canada's commitment to NATO is not in doubt. It's not ambiguous, and I think it's in a strong position to keep raising the question. It can't be done unilaterally by Canada; you have to do it together with like-minded states in Europe. There are those, so build alliances with Norway, Belgium, and so forth. It's very practical to pursue it, but to predict an immediate outcome is another matter.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Regehr.

Madame Lalonde, pour neuf minutes.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Thank you to both of you for being here. It is always a pleasure to hear from you. It seems to me that every time we meet with you, the world is a more dangerous place. I don't know whether it is an illusion, but I believe this to be the case.

I would like to start by asking you the following question. Are there not at this very moment new countries that are considering getting nuclear arms because they believe that it would be a political asset? Have countries such as Iran, Korea and others concluded that Saddam Hussein has seen his country invaded and bombed because he didn't have any nuclear weapons? In order to avoid finding themselves in the same situation, are these countries trying to acquire such weapons?

Regarding Iran, I regularly read the Haaretz newspaper in its English version. Several Israeli leaders have been urging the United States to put an end to Iran's nuclear program because they cannot tolerate such a situation. They also stated that if the United States would not do it, they would deal with it themselves. Everybody remembers what happened in Irak in 1981.

It seems to me that this dimension is extremely important and is being neglected. Could you give us some guidance so that we may understand and correctly interpret the situation and act accordingly? We can do everything else that has to be done, but if the dynamic is such as described, we could be heading blindly together toward a catastrophe.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame Lalonde.

Mr. Regehr, do you want to start on this one?

Either/or. Go ahead.

[Douglas Roche]

Thank you. With your permission, sir, I will answer in English.

Iran poses a dilemma for the world because it's symptomatic of what the real problem is. The real problem in the world is not Iran pursuing the development of nuclear energy, which has the capacity for their building a nuclear weapon if they pursued it that far. That is a problem, to be sure, but it's not the real problem. The real problem is getting the cooperation of the international community to implement the fullness of the non-proliferation treaty, which calls for disarmament steps, non-proliferation, as well as the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

What right do we have to say to Iran that they cannot develop nuclear energy or that they cannot enrich uranium when other states are doing it too? Even here in Canada, Canada should be careful of its credibility on this issue, because it is contemplating a situation in which uranium would be enriched within our country. If we're going to say to Iran, you can't do it but other states can, because we're good states, this gets into another two-class system in the world. It leads to the fundamental issue of nuclear weapons today, namely, a two-class world.

I think Canada is eminently positioned to speak in the international community for the integrity of a nuclear weapons policy that would affect everyone.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Roche.

Mr. Regehr.

[Ernie Regehr]

Briefly, it is a dangerous situation, and we've been reading about the numbers of states in the Middle East that have declared their intention to pursue nuclear power: Jordan, quite actively; Saudi Arabia; and some of the gulf states. Unfortunately, I think part of that interest is not simply a benign interest in energy, but also it's to keep options open in anticipating what Iran is going to do.

That brings us back to Israel and the declaration in 1995 and subsequent declarations of the commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. That's a very particular and important objective. I think it relates to the issue of the proposed deal with India. If we are now in a position of relaxing the nuclear cooperation arrangements with India, that will also inevitably devolve to Pakistan and to Israel. Then we have a situation of Israel being permanently, in effect, accepted as a nuclear weapons state, and the possibility of preventing Iran from acquiring weapons in that context is very, very difficult. Then you can see a kind of alarmist falling of the dominoes in the whole region. These are interrelated items, as they are related to the role and record of the nuclear weapons states themselves.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madam Lalonde.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Thank you.

This does not reassure us, but it indicates one possible road map.

I have a technical question. At the end of Mr. Regehr's report, in paragraph 2, entitled The Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, it says that Canada has some experience.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madam Lalonde, I'm sorry, which report is that?