Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Respond very, very briefly, please.

[Heidi Hulan]

I think our sanctions have had both direct and indirect impact. I can particularly speak to the indirect impact, which is that they are bleeding resources from the Russian military, which Wagner depends upon utterly for equipment and cash.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We will now go to Madam Larouche.

Ms. Larouche, you have six minutes.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to start with a brief comment. This morning, the committee held an informal meeting. I encourage the committee to rethink how such meetings are conducted, to ensure that interpretation into French is available. It can't happen any other way. We went through the same experience at the Standing Committee on the Status of Women, where interpretation is now provided during informal meetings. I hope, too, that we'll take into consideration the fact that receiving briefing notes in English only violates the rights of members. I urge the committee to reflect on that.

That said, I'll now move to the questions that I want to ask our witnesses from Global Affairs Canada.

Ladies and gentleman, we see that the emergence of the Wagner Group coincides with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and that the group has become increasingly important throughout the world since then. It has positioned itself, particularly in Africa, as a paramilitary partner of choice for leaders of countries such as Syria, Libya, Mozambique, the Central African Republic and Mali. In those countries, the group's services are provided in exchange for privileged access to natural resources and commercial interests for companies owned by Russian oligarch Prigozhin. The alignment of the Wagner Group's activities and Russian foreign policy is a frequent occurrence, be it in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa or during the invasion of Ukraine.

I'd like to come back to the sanctions. When did you impose sanctions on the Wagner Group, and if recently, why not back in 2014?

[Heidi Hulan]

I don't have the date right in front of me, but I'll turn to Andrew Turner to answer that question.

[Andrew Turner, Director, Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

We imposed sanctions on Prigozhin and the Wagner Group on February 24, 2022, as a direct response to the invasion of Ukraine.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Okay. In your opinion, why wasn't that done in 2014? Why wasn't it done right from the start, knowing what that group was doing?

[Andrew Turner]

In 2014, the group was far less important and had a far lower profile than it does now. The invasion was an opportunity to demonstrate our determination to bring the strongest possible economic pressure to bear in response to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That's why it was done at that time.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

We're wondering where the Wagner Group gets its funding. A documentary entitled Wagner, Putin's Shadow Army, by Ksenia Bolchakova and Alexandra Jousset, reveals how the Wagner Group started operating a mine in the Central African Republic, taking over from a Canadian mining company.

What's your response to that kind of manoeuvre? What's your response when someone uses Canadian mining companies?

[Heidi Hulan]

Wagner has many sources of financing. They are understood to be financed from within Prigozhin's own network of companies and his vast corporate empire generally. They receive direct payments, and they're also known to receive payments in kind through natural resources concessions.

I'd like to turn to Marcel Lebleu to answer more specifically about their African engagement.

[Marcel Lebleu, Director General, West and Central African Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

The Wagner Group does indeed have a presence in the Central African Republic, as well as in Mali. I'd say that the group's business model—if I can call it that—changes, depending on the country.

What Ms. Larouche said about the Central African Republic is true. In 2019, the Central African government confiscated a mining concession from AXMIN, a publicly traded Canadian mining company, and handed it over to the Wagner Group. AXMIN went to mediation and, in February 2023, announced that it intended to go to international arbitration for losses and damages in the dispute between that private company and the government. The model in the Central African Republic is clear: the Wagner Group is reportedly operating the mine.

In Mali, there's a traditional service contract, according to our information and open sources. Under the contract, the government is reportedly paying approximately $10 million per month to the Wagner Group in exchange for the services of approximately 1,000 mercenaries, who are in the country and working alongside the Malian armed forces.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

What discussions have you had with the Central African Republic and Mali about the presence of the Wagner Group? You're talking about arbitration involving companies, but I'd like to know what direct discussions you've had with those two countries.

[Marcel Lebleu]

In Mali, the government is the result of a military coup that took place in 2020. When the coup d'état occurred, we expressed our concerns publicly. When we received the initial confirmation that the Wagner Group was in Mali, we published a statement with 15 allied countries expressing our very serious concerns with respect to that presence.

There are files documenting human rights abuses, if not crimes. The United Nations issued a report about a month ago detailing the massacre of 500 Malian citizens in Moura, carried out in conjunction with the Malian army. I would also highlight the use of sexual violence, resulting in 58 documented cases of rape. In a joint statement with the United States and the United Kingdom, we expressed our concerns and asked the Malian government to confirm those facts and contribute to an investigation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

For the final six-minute round, we'll go to Ms. McPherson.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much to the witnesses for being here and sharing their expertise with us.

Mr. Lebleu, that was very interesting testimony you provided with regard to Canadian companies using the Wagner Group. Can you give us a sense of how many Canadian companies are implicated in and perhaps working with the Wagner Group? Are they all within the extractive industries? Would there be, then, a role for the Canadian government, perhaps through the CORE or through the national contact point, to deal with these infractions, as I would call them?

[Marcel Lebleu]

Of course. To my knowledge, we've documented a single case, that of AXMIN, which is not co-operating with the Wagner Group and whose mining licence was confiscated by the Central African government.

In Mali, we aren't aware of any instances of collaboration with the Canadian private sector. Indeed, Canada has significant investments in the gold sector, with major mining companies operating in the country. We work closely with Canadian companies, not only through the Office of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, but also in the context of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights initiative, which we promote to our companies. Canada is also a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

The most important thing to us, particularly in terms of the trade commissioner service, is the integrity declaration that we ask companies to sign to obtain services from the Canadian government. The declaration is a commitment from the company with regard to its behaviour and conduct, and it must explicitly state that it isn't involved in any corruption, wrongdoing or any outstanding legal proceedings involving other countries.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you for that.

Obviously, that doesn't always work. We've seen that Canadian companies have committed pretty horrific atrocities around the world and have not been held to account in any meaningful way.

You spoke about Mali. I assume what you're saying, though, is there are no examples, except from within which you've mentioned, where Canadian extractive mining companies are involved.

The other things we've been talking a lot about are Mali and the CAR, but the Wagner Group has been quite heavily implicated in what's happening in Sudan and certainly in South America. We have heard there is an African strategy that may or may not be an African framework that may or may not be coming.

Ms. Hulan, can you talk to us about where the Wagner Group stands with that? How is that going to be incorporated into that strategy or framework?

[Heidi Hulan]

Regarding the idea of an African strategy and where this fits in, I'll defer to Marcel.

Regarding the general issue of how its presence around the world feeds multiple objectives, it is very clear that Wagner is heavily, heavily invested in Africa. It is also present in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela, we understand, but the African presence is really notable.

As I said in my opening remarks, but I'll expand on it here, it serves as a force multiplier for Russian diplomacy, which is very active on the African continent, in an attempt to split the African continent from countries like Canada on issues like Ukraine.

Regarding the question of the Africa strategy, I'll go to Marcel.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I'm going to jump in really quickly before I go to the African framework or strategy.

You talked a bit about the absence and how they're using that as a diplomatic tool. Of course, it's vital that Canada is present on the ground as well, and I'm not sure that we are as much as we should be.

You also talked in your testimony about the idea that this group is not ideological, that it's profit-driven. Is it not also ideologically driven, though, especially if you're talking about it having a role with regard to diplomacy and having a role spreading Russian ideology around the world?

[Heidi Hulan]

I believe...no. I believe that it is non-ideological as an effort.

What we know is there's a close relationship with the President of the Russian Federation and the head of Wagner, but the driver is a profit motive. In the sense that their profit also serves to amplify Russian diplomacy, they're involved, but we see this as a corporate enterprise.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

Also, I'll hear you on the Africa strategy, please.

[Marcel Lebleu]

To respond specifically to that question, I would say that the government launched consultations on the Canada-Africa economic cooperation strategy approximately 10 days ago. The strategy was among the objectives set by the Prime Minister in the mandate letter for Minister Ng, which her department is implementing. As I just mentioned, we launched consultations about 10 days ago, and they will continue throughout the summer.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

It is through the trade arm of foreign affairs, not through development and not incorporating aspects of development, diplomacy and trade. Is it predominantly being done through trade?

[Marcel Lebleu]

No.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Minister Ng is leading it.