Public Safety Committee on March 5th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I see we have quorum, so I call this meeting to order.

This is the eighth meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. We are doing our study on the findings and recommendations of the Iacobucci and O'Connor reports.

We would like to welcome our witnesses to the table this morning. We have Mr. Paul Kennedy, chair of executive services for the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, together with Michael MacDonald, the director. From the Security Intelligence Review Committee, we have Steve Bittle, Susan Pollak, and Sylvie Roussel.

We welcome you all to our table and look forward to the testimony you will give us. I am sure it will be very helpful in our study.

The usual practice here is to allow you to have an opening statement of approximately 10 minutes. We're not too strict on that because we look forward to the information you give us, and that's more important.

Mr. Kennedy, please go ahead.

[Paul E. Kennedy, Chair, Executive Services, Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you. I normally defer to the ladies, but the lady in this case has deferred to me.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would certainly like to thank the committee for inviting me to appear today. I believe, looking at the heading of your committee, that the primary purpose of my attendance today is to respond to your concerns as to whether the RCMP has implemented the recommendations made by Justice O'Connor on certain national security-related investigations carried out by the RCMP in the period following the events of 9/11.

I'd like to point out that our commission has historically not dealt with many national security investigations. During my approximately three and a half years as chairman of the commission, I can recall three files that could be truly considered of national security in nature. There are a number of reasons for that.

First, such investigations are generally conducted in a covert manner, and the subjects of the investigations would be unaware of their existence. Few such investigations actually result in the laying of criminal charges. Of those criminal charges that are laid, fewer still would be of such a nature as to self-identify as being related to national security. An investigation into the making of a false document, for instance, may or may not be related to an ongoing national security investigation. Accordingly, if you do not know, how can you complain?

Secondly, the current legislative mandate does not give the CPC access, as of right, to all information in the possession of the RCMP. The RCMP may refuse--and in fact have refused--to disclose confidential or privileged information. That would include classified information pertaining to RCMP national security investigations. It was only in 2005 that then Commissioner Zaccardelli signed a directive to RCMP members that required them to advise the CPC that it was not making information available and the grounds for such refusal. I suspect that prior to issuance of this directive the CPC was simply kept in the dark about the existence of such information.

Finally, the commission does not possess a general power to review or audit programs, policies, or activities of the RCMP. Any such reviews have to be part of a complaint process. I have the power to launch my own complaints, but I must have the knowledge of a potential problem before I can engage the process.

This situation is to be contrasted with the work of the CPC on the RCMP's use of the taser, wherein it produced a comprehensive review of RCMP usage, policy, and training for the period from 2001 to 2007 and for which it will be producing annual reports dealing with members' use of that weapon.

These legislative shortcomings have been known for decades. I believe the public statement by the former chair of the CPC that she did not have the means to adequately investigate the role of the RCMP in relation to Mr. Arar was a contributing factor to the government's decision to call the O'Connor inquiry. Accordingly, I cannot give you any assurance today that the RCMP has implemented the recommendations of Justice O'Connor, or if such recommendations, if implemented, are either being adhered to or are adequate to achieve their stated purpose.

These legislative inadequacies, as I noted, have been known for decades. More recently, the Auditor General, in her 2003 audit of review bodies in the national security area, specifically highlighted this problem. With respect to the CPC and the RCMP, she advanced the proposition that agencies exercising intrusive powers be subject to levels of external review and disclosure proportionate to the level of intrusion. This is certainly not the case with respect to the CPC.

I appeared before Justice O'Connor on November 17, 2005, in relation to phase two of his inquiry. I put forth at that time the elements required for effective review of all RCMP activities, a subcomponent of which is their investigative activities with respect to criminal activities arising from threats to the security of Canada. The recommendations found in Justice O'Connor's report as well as the 2007 report of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP, chaired by David Brown, Q.C., in fact reflected that model.

I have prepared a draft legislative mandate that further articulates what that regime would look like. The elements in that model would address all the myriad challenges that accompany an effective review of such a large organization. Key attributes of effective review are: unfettered access as a right to all information, but for cabinet confidence, with the accompanying safeguards; a positive obligation on law enforcement officers to account for their actions; enlargement of the scope of review to include retired members and non-members who work under the supervision of a police officer; an audit review power focused on the adequacy or appropriateness of policies, procedures, guidelines, and training, and the authority for the review body to conduct joint investigations and share information with other review bodies that have powers, duties, and functions that are similar.

With such a legislative mandate, I could provide you with the assurance that both the committee members and the Canadian public need and deserve in this manner.

Last but not least, the review body must have the human and financial resources to effectively fulfill its mandate. In 1988 the CPC had a budget of $3.1 million, whereas the RCMP had a budget of $1.3 billion. Today the CPC's permanent budget is $5.2 million, with some 40 full-time employees, whereas the RCMP has grown to $4.27 billion and 27,669 full-time employees, and that's as of the fiscal year 2007-08, and I suspect it's grown since that time.

Both the Auditor General and Justice O'Connor recognized that legislative powers must be accompanied by the financial means to exercise them. The previous Minister of Public Safety helped secure additional temporary funding in the amount of $3.7 million for the CPC in respect of the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009--and that's shortly coming to us. Those funds allowed the CPC to do a comprehensive review of taser use by the RCMP, to launch a comprehensive review of the impartiality of RCMP investigation of members alleged to have committed criminal offences, to investigate the 10 instances of death in Canada, proximal in time to RCMP use of the taser, and a systemic review of all complaints disposed of by the RCMP in the calendar year 2007. And this is to name but a few.

An enhanced legislative mandate, coupled with appropriate financial resources, would enable the CPC to play a similar role in respect of the RCMP's national security criminal investigations.

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have concerning our work. Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go over to Ms. Pollak, please.

[Susan Pollak, Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee]

Good morning. I'd like to begin by thanking you for inviting me to appear before you today on behalf of the chair and the other committee members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC. As SIRC's executive director, I will be speaking on their behalf.

It is a privilege for us to be here today to address you. I have with me our senior counsel, Sylvie Roussel, and our research director, Steve Bittle.

The last time SIRC appeared before this committee was in November 2006. As the membership of your committee has changed significantly in the interim, I'd like to use this opportunity to remind you briefly of SIRC's role and responsibilities. Then, of course, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Having been in regular contact over the years with organizations that have mandates similar to SIRC's, I'm confident that Canada's system is recognized as one of the strongest review functions in the world and as a model that has much to offer other countries that are still in the process of developing such systems. This is not to say that changes and improvements are not possible, but that we have in the SIRC model a solid basis on which to build.

As I am sure you are aware, SIRC came into being at the same time Canada created CSIS, its Civilian Security Intelligence Service. With the passage of the CSIS Act in 1984, Canada became one of the first democratic governments in the world to establish a detailed legal framework for the operations of its security service. Equally significant, the CSIS Act created a framework to make CSIS accountable in exercising its powers, a framework that, by and large, has stood the test of time.

Specifically, the CSIS Act defines the mandate of and the limits on state power in conducting security intelligence. It also spells out how the service's work is to be monitored through a rigorous system of political and judicial controls, including two review bodies, each with a distinct mandate to watch over the new agency.

I'm not going to describe in detail the role of the Inspector General of CSIS. Simply, this is an internal body that provides the Minister of Public Safety with a knowledgeable set of eyes and ears on CSIS operations. SIRC, on the other hand, is an external review mechanism that reports not to any minister but rather directly to Parliament and therefore, ultimately, to all Canadians.

While our role is relatively easy to describe, it's rather complex, at times, to execute. We have two basic functions: to conduct reviews of CSIS operations and to investigate complaints against CSIS. SIRC has, in law, the absolute authority to examine all of the service's operational activities and has full access to all of its files, no matter how highly classified that information may be. The sole exception to this is cabinet confidences.

Our reviews are done by assessing the service's past activities and operations against four instruments that together form a legislative and policy framework for the service. These are the CSIS Act, ministerial direction, national requirements for security intelligence, and CSIS's operational policies.

In each of its reviews, the committee examines certain fundamental questions. Did CSIS have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada? Was the level of investigation proportionate to the seriousness of that threat? Did exchanges of information between CSIS and domestic or foreign partners respect the agreements and caveats that govern information sharing? Last, but not least, did the service's investigation respect the rights of individuals who were involved in lawful activities, such as protests or dissent?

Normally our reviews take several months to complete and involve examining thousands of pages of documents and having numerous discussions with CSIS personnel. Once a review is completed, copies are sent to the director of CSIS and to the Inspector General. In some special cases, we send our reviews directly to the Minister of Public Safety.

Declassified summaries, with any national security and privacy concerns removed, are also included in SIRC's annual report to Parliament. Although the annual report is our main communication vehicle for informing Parliament and the public about our work, SIRC does carry on a modest communication program as well. The chair and senior staff respond to media inquiries and participate in domestic and international symposia with relevance to our work. I'm regularly invited to the universities to explain SIRC's role to students who are pursuing studies in this or related fields.

SIRC's website is another useful source of information for the public. There you can find all of SIRC's annual reports, speeches, presentations, backgrounders, and other publications as well as descriptions of who we are, what we do, and how we do it.

Moving now to the subject of complaints, you are no doubt aware that SIRC investigates complaints about CSIS brought by individuals or groups. These complaints fall into one of four categories. They can be about any act or thing done by the service; denials of security clearances to federal government employees or contractors; referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission in cases where the complaint relates to the security of Canada; and, very infrequently, ministers' reports in respect of the Citizenship Act.

When SIRC accepts jurisdiction, the complaint is investigated through a quasi-judicial hearing presided over by a committee member whose role is similar to that of a judge. At the conclusion of the investigation, the member issues a decision containing findings and recommendations to the minister, the director of CSIS, and, in cases concerning security clearance, the deputy head of the government department involved.

We also provide a declassified report on our investigation to the complainant, in which we provide to that individual as much information as we can without breaching our obligation to protect national security.

As far as SIRC is concerned, having review and complaints under one body has proven advantageous. Our reviews give us the expertise to evaluate and investigate complaints more fully. At the same time, complaints give us another window into CSIS operations, particularly their impact on the lives of ordinary Canadians. In some jurisdictions, these functions are kept separate, but our experience suggests that there are real benefits in having them under one roof.

Whether we are speaking about reviews or complaints, SIRC's recommendations are non-binding. The scheme of review that Parliament created was not meant to have SIRC substitute for either the director of CSIS, who is accountable to the minister, or for the minister, who is answerable to Parliament.

Nevertheless, CSIS has implemented the majority of SIRC's recommendations over the years and has publicly acknowledged that SIRC has made it a better organization. In late 2003, then director Ward Elcock said at a major public conference:

Twenty years of constant review activity have resulted in many recommendations on how we could run things differently, and many of these recommendations have mirrored adjustments that have been made to the Service's management procedures. SIRC's comments have extended into the heart of how the organization is run, including matters of source-handling, investigative methods, targeting decisions and other core functions....

Do we always share SIRC's views? No in some cases, yes in some...but that is not the point. The point is that the review process remains an ongoing debate on ways to ensure that the principles of the legislation are sustained as we evolve and adapt to new threats. That is what the legislators intended.

Having given you a very brief overview of SIRC, I would now like to take just a few more minutes to describe some of the issues that are preoccupying the committee members and myself.

On future challenges, first and foremost, the findings and recommendations of the policy review of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar quite evidently could have a significant impact on SIRC's work. In September 2006, Mr. Justice O'Connor released his report on the events relating to Maher Arar. This seminal report contained 23 recommendations on various aspects of the RCMP's and other agencies' national security activities. Three months later, Mr. Justice O'Connor released a companion report summarizing the work of his policy review.

Although nine of its recommendations dealt with an independent, arm's-length review mechanism for the RCMP's national security activities, it also proposed that independent review and complaints investigations be extended to encompass the national security aspects of the Canada Border Services Agency, Citizenship and Immigration, Transport Canada, the Financial Transactions and Report Analysis Centre, or FINTRAC, and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Mr. Justice O'Connor concluded that SIRC was the logical body to review the national security activities of the latter four entities.

It is now up to the government to respond to Mr. Justice O'Connor's recommendations. SIRC has stated that it is ready to assume an expanded role, subject to a full assessment of the mandate, workload, and resource implications. If, for example, SIRC were asked to investigate complaints against the other agencies identified, we would need to acquire in-depth knowledge and expertise concerning the national security activities and governing legislation of CIC, Transport, FINTRAC, and DFAIT.

As each of these organizations' work extends well beyond national security, unlike CSIS, whose entire raison d'être is to protect national security, the challenge of distinguishing the national security role of these four agencies from their other activities would in our view be considerable.

In conclusion, let me say that for more than 24 years SIRC has strived to carry out its work in an objective, fair, and balanced way. We recognize that in a free society we have to use every available resource to counter threats to our national security, the most significant today being terrorism. But at the same time, we must uphold the principles of accountability, fairness, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for individual rights.

I will admit that this task has become more challenging since 9/11, as allegations of human rights abuses in the name of fighting terrorism have surfaced in many countries. Canada has not been immune to such controversy. The case of Maher Arar, which SIRC reviewed before the government appointed a separate commission of inquiry, serves as a case in point.

The committee and SIRC staff take great pride that, since 1984, we have helped to make CSIS a more professional organization. We remain as committed to this objective as we were then.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to the Liberal Party, the official opposition, first.

Mr. Holland.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you very much to the witnesses.

Ms. Pollak, I'll start where you finished off, which is stating that it's now up to the government to act on Justice O'Connor's recommendations. It's staggering that we have to say that. It was 2006 when Justice O'Connor made his recommendations. At that time this committee was seized with the issue of Maher Arar. It was a flashpoint for a series of concerns of legislative inadequacies that allowed that situation, and perhaps others, to emerge.

And if Justice O'Connor's recommendations weren't enough, let alone the deficiencies that were identified before, we had recommendations that essentially were echoed by David Brown in his examination of the RCMP pension scandal. There was a special Senate committee on anti-terrorism that echoed the same recommendations. In fact, Mr. Kennedy, you've consistently made the same recommendations, and you've talked about the need to extend the legislative authority.

The only response we had from the government was from former Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day, who said that the government would be proposing a new oversight system. But we've never seen anything.

We're in a situation where these legislative deficiencies, which really captured the entire nation's attention.... We were told when Justice O'Connor made his recommendation that they would all be immediately implemented. We're still talking about what the government response is going to be.

My question, first, is to Mr. Kennedy. Would it be fair to say that the same legislative deficiencies that existed prior to Justice O'Connor's recommendations exist today?

[Paul E. Kennedy]

Yes, very much so.

I have to indicate as well that we've had, and certainly I've had in the last couple of years, excellent cooperation from the RCMP to actually try to make the legislation work, to optimize it. I'll give you a simple example.

We have an independent observer program and it isn't found in legislation. If, say, there's a shooting that results in serious injury or death--certainly perhaps in British Columbia, where there are 7,000 RCMP present--we'll go out and do monitoring of the investigation and make sure that the officers are independent. That's not in the book, but with the reality that there's so much public concern about the impartiality of police investigating the police, we try to do that.

My work on the taser actually flowed from a request from the minister. It's not in the legislation, but he obviously.... I was contacted and asked if I could do that. I said sure we could, as long as the RCMP agreed to cooperate. But there is no legislative compulsion. That's another one that was done off the book, if you can call it that.

What we have are certain key problems, and I can show you how problematic they are. If I'm doing an investigation flowing from an organized crime investigation, most of that might be with wiretaps and things of that nature. A national security one would be the same thing. The Criminal Code, part VI, has a statutory prohibition that criminalizes disclosure outside of the confines specified in the legislation. The police cannot give me that information without doing a criminal offence. So even where they want to cooperate, they cannot cooperate, by law.

I have authority to look at the witness protection program--it's written right in my act that I have responsibility in this area--but there's a prohibition in there about the police disclosing information that would disclose the identity of someone in the witness protection program. But the whole thing is to create a new identity for them. We have this bizarre situation where, even with the best of intentions, we cannot get over legislative hurdles that have been put in place and that are obstructing our ability to do our work.

As indicated, it goes back to, I believe, the very first report made by the chair of my commission. There were 33 recommendations indicated at that time. There were things that were clearly defective.

My concern as well is that cooperation is episodic. You have two personalities, the commissioner and me, who want to cooperate. You could have one of those personalities change and the cooperation disappear. So even with those personalities, we have problems. And if you don't have those personalities, there are many objections you can raise. In section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, you can cover all sorts of national security work such that we couldn't get in to look at it at all. The door would effectively be barred.

So there are problems, and I think it's accruing to the.... It's unfortunate, and to the detriment of the RCMP in this current environment, that we are not able to more effectively work to assess these problems.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

You've addressed a little bit, I think, the fact that you try to find workarounds; that despite the government making commitments repeatedly to introduce legislation, they haven't, so you're trying desperately to find workarounds because the concerns are so great.

Can you talk to us about the limitations of those workarounds, and about how we're left exposed by not making these legislative changes? Can you help Canadians understand what we're at risk of, particularly in light of what we've seen in the past, by not having these legislative changes?

[Paul E. Kennedy]

An obvious limitation is the fact that there is no obligation for an RCMP officer to answer any questions unless I call a public interest inquiry. The last public interest inquiries that were held were probably up in the range of $20 million to hold. My budget, as I said, is $5 million a year. So to call one inquiry...and we're not in an area where we want to add to the deficit.

I did the income trust complaint, for instance. That was one I looked at. Because there's no obligation for the police to cooperate, I had the unfortunate situation that the three most senior RCMP involved—Commissioner Zaccardelli at the time, a deputy commissioner, and an assistant commissioner—did not cooperate to explain what they did and why they did it. I thought that was a very important case, because the issue was whether or not there was an intentional interference in the democratic process. I cannot think of anything more seminal. Fortunately, I had someone there who did cooperate, but not the three main players, so I had to work around that in terms of doing a construct that I felt comfortable in saying here it was. As well, the commissioner retired prior to my launching that particular complaint, and if you're a retired person you're not subject to the review process.

Those things become problematic, and yet there's no doubt that anything you do while in office affects the credibility of that organization, and you should be held accountable for it because it affects the organization, not just the individual. So I think those things are important.

In terms of the risks, I guess the risks are that if you can't do it and you can't give the public assurances that you have all the information and you've looked under every rock that had to be looked under, then it goes back to what weight you can attach to my reports. When you do that, there are issues here of independence, competency, and public trust. Well, those are what flow out of it. So if you can't do it and I can't give the public assurances, then the public will always have lingering concerns.

In areas where I can look at it, great; if I can't, there are problems.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much.

We'll move over to the Bloc Québécois.

Monsieur Ménard, do you have any questions?

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Kennedy, you were kind enough to send in your paper with enough time for it to be translated. I read it and you can be sure that I was very concerned by what it revealed. There is no need for me to ask you to repeat what you said.

There is an inconsistency that I want to be sure that I fully understand. In 1984, when it was decided to take from the RCMP its investigative function in security matters and to create an independent security service in its place, an oversight body was also established. The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP is also fully mandated to oversee the RCMP's policing activities. I understand fully mandated to mean having the mandate to undertake investigations on its own initiative.

After the events of September 11, 2001, the decision was made to give the RCMP some terrorist intelligence activities. I gather that those activities are not covered by your powers of oversight over policing. Apparently, they are not covered by the powers of the body that oversees the intelligence services either. That is the inconsistency. You do not have the authority to investigate on your own initiative. And, as you have so clearly explained, since these things are done in secret, the people who might have reason to complain are not aware of what is happening.

[Paul E. Kennedy]

Yes, one of the things we have to bear in mind—you're quite right—is that CSIS was created in 1984 when the intelligence activities were removed from the RCMP, the old security service. What was not removed from them, and never was removed, was their responsibility to do the criminal investigations of crimes arising from threats to the security of Canada. As a matter of fact, in 1984, when the CSIS Act was passed, at the same time, the Security Offences Act was passed. The Security Offences Act—and I think I've provided a copy of it to committee members—says in section 6 that the RCMP has the “primary responsibility” to investigate criminal activities arising from threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act, which would include counterterrorism.

So bear in mind that they've always had a role. The only thing we had before is that you would have manslaughter charges, or counterfeit charges, forgery charges, whatever they might be, flowing out of terrorist activities. We've had terrorist acts right in the streets of Ottawa, attacks on the Turkish embassy, and things of that nature, and they were investigated by the RCMP as criminal activities.

What happened with Bill C-36 in 2001 is that there was a new class. We created a brand-new label where we could call some—

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Excuse me for interrupting you, but I only have about three minutes left. I understood you clearly and be assured that we will be considering it when we write our recommendations. I have heard you elsewhere as well. I understand the inconsistency very well.

I would like to move to another matter. You say that you have received additional funding to conduct a comprehensive review of the impartiality of RCMP investigation of members alleged to have committed criminal offences.

I would like a short answer. When you say “alleged to have committed criminal offences“, do you mean someone who has been formally charged in court or someone against whom a complaint has been made for behaviour that might constitute a criminal act and who, if the investigation revealed that he had indeed committed that act, would be charged in court?

[Paul E. Kennedy]

What we're looking at is any incident where an RCMP member, in my particular case, was involved in an incident that resulted in serious injury or death—or it could be sexual assault allegations, or things of that nature—where the police conducted an investigation. Some of those may or may not have resulted in criminal charges being laid. If criminal charges were laid, I didn't look at them.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Would the Blundell case be an example of that? Does the name mean anything to you? He is the investigator against whom four female RCMP officers filed complaints for sexual misconduct—to use a euphemism. You did not investigate that case.

[Paul E. Kennedy]

The initiative I'm looking at now—and we're going to come out with a report on this—is an historic look back at over 300 files, which we have distilled down to about 30 in depth. I'm doing this because the issue is out there: is there a problem? We're doing a historic review of those cases to tell you if there was a problem or not. Right now, the only ones I do are in E Division in B.C., where I will go in and look at them.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

I would like to ask Ms. Pollack a question. We now have a “No Fly List“ in Canada under the Department of Transport. In order to establish such a list, normally, intelligence services would be consulted, and you would think it would be automatic because they have the expertise necessary to decide if someone poses a risk in an airplane. There are a lot of complaints. Some people whose names are on the list, for instance, can show all they like that they just have the same name as someone who is considered a danger—or for other reasons—and still can get no action, it seems. A significant number of them get no satisfaction when they complain that their names have been put on the list unjustly.

There is a remarkable business man in Montreal who founded one of the best classical music record companies in Canada. He is the owner of Analekta, and he is desperate. Everyone knows that he should not be on the list.

Are you looking into how these decisions are made, how the recommendations are made at the Department of Transport, and whether the system is up to the task?

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

A brief response, please.

[Sylvie Roussel, Acting Senior Counsel, Complaints Section, Security Intelligence Review Committee]

The Security Intelligence Review Committee does not have authority as such with respect to the No Fly List, except when someone files a complaint under section 41 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. That act gives us the authority to investigate the activities of the service. If someone suspects that he is on the list because the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service has provided incorrect information on him, he can complain to the Review Committee. However, that must be pursuant to section 41. We have no authority as such over Transport Canada. People really come to the committee in connection with a complaint.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you.

Mr. Harris, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I thank the witnesses for their presentations.

Accepting, Mr. Kennedy, that your organization doesn't have sufficient power and needs to have the kind of review and oversight and audit functions that you've talked about, we've had in existence for some 20-plus years now the SIRC. I'm going to address my question not to you, but to Ms. Pollak.

It seems to me that you're still hamstrung by the problem that you are restricted only to looking at the activities of CSIS, as I assume an even expanded CPC would have. I want to refer to the headlines today and the case of Mr. Abdelrazik. Let's face it, the whole notion of Canadian complicity and torture has brought this issue to the forefront.

He has complained to your organization. His lawyers have been told, I understand, that we can't proceed until we have a hearing to determine whether or not the committee can fully investigate CSIS actions, given the alleged possible involvement of another government department or of other countries, and the fact that Mr. Abdelrazik is unable to be cross-examined because he's in Khartoum.

Given that Mr. Justice O'Connor identified more than 20 government agencies and departments that could be involved in national security investigations, would you care to comment on the adequacy of the legislation that your agency has to seriously investigate any complaint of this nature?

[Susan Pollak]

We'll share this response, if you don't mind. I'll let my counsel speak about the complaint process with you in a moment.

To the extent that our legislation was devised in order to give us full authority to review the activities of CSIS, I would say we have no complaint about the authorities we've been given. We have a very unfettered--except for cabinet confidences--access to all information held at the service.

The world has moved on since then. There are now more integrated security investigations going on. This was identified by Justice O'Connor in his report as a concern, and I guess in his view a deficiency, and there was a need for a more broad-ranging review.

As I said in my opening comments, though, at this point I see it as a decision that government has to make--how it intends to address that. And within the confines of our own work as the review body for CSIS, I have no concerns about the authorities we have. But if the government decides that we need to go further than that, then we'll go with whatever we're asked to do.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

But how can you investigate even what CSIS has done without knowing what the other pieces of the puzzle were? What was the involvement of Foreign Affairs? Maybe there were other agencies under Foreign Affairs? How can you do even this job? Did CSIS tell somebody that this fellow should be arrested, etc.? That's one piece, but it always comes together. You can't simply investigate what CSIS did, because the whole picture is left out.

It's the same as Mr. Kennedy is investigating what the RCMP did. Well, there were other people involved.

So you're saying you're satisfied that it's adequate but that it's up to the government as to whether or not they expand it.

[Susan Pollak]

It's adequate for purposes of reviewing what CSIS's activities have been. You're right, we can't go further than CSIS. And if the government makes the decision that it wants a review body that can go further, then whoever it is will take on the role.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

And you don't want to comment on whether such a thing is necessary?