Science and Research Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2023

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

Maybe this is for Ms. Giles. Is there anything we can learn from other countries, such as the U.K. and Australia? Mr. Tochor indicated that they were perhaps ahead of the game. Is there anything we can learn from them?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

There are always things we can learn. Certainly, we're a learning institution. As a government, we're a learning organization and constantly seeking to improve.

They've learned from us in terms of the deep stakeholder engagement and the relations we have with universities, but we can certainly learn from them as well in terms of some of the additional partnerships and the way they're able to share information with the private sector. It has to be together—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you, Dr. Giles.

If I cut you off and you don't finish your answer, you can always give it to us in writing.

We'll go to Mr. Blanchette-Joncas for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I welcome the witnesses and thank them for being with us today to participate in this important study.

I'll begin slowly, Chair, as this is an important but complex study.

Ms. Giles, can you confirm whether any Canadian universities receive funding from China?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

In terms of the funding that Canadian universities are receiving, I want to stress that the role of CSIS is to analyze any research applications that are identified for national security review and that come to us. We then undertake a threat assessment based on our investigation and intelligence holdings, and provide that threat assessment to our Public Safety partners, who work with ISED, and ultimately to the funding agency to determine the decision on that specific funding proposal.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Ms. Giles, let me be more specific.

Does CSIS know whether China is funding any Canadian universities, yes or no?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

I'm not able to reply to any specifics.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

That is rather disturbing.

What about you, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, can you tell us, yes or no, whether the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness knows if China is funding Canadian universities?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

From what we understand, there is no direct funding of universities, but there could be some private funding.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much. That's slightly clearer.

Ms. Giles, I understand you don't have the information, but your colleagues at Public Safety Canada seem to have it. I think this will lead to a good exchange between us.

Do you know if these researchers of Chinese origin who are working in our Canadian universities have links with laboratories in China? If so, do you know exactly which ones they're collaborating with?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

I think it's safe to say that the functioning assumption we have is that there are continual efforts by PRC institutions and individuals to try to insert themselves into our universities' research and projects.

I'm certainly not able to provide information on any specifics, for reasons related to protecting our methodologies as well as for privacy reasons, but the reason we run our entire stakeholder engagement program is based on the premise that foreign actors are trying to interfere and influence our universities and the research outcomes, in addition to stealing valuable intellectual property.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you.

As a follow-up question, do you know if the researchers have links with the Chinese military?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Again, I'm unable to provide any specific information. I know this is a hazard of working for CSIS, but we are constantly vigilant and providing advice on how to be vigilant to our university and academic colleagues.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much.

With respect to the Department of Public Safety, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, you said that, though not directly, but possibly indirectly, a university might be receiving funding from China. Can you confirm this?

Do these researchers, who have indirect or even direct links, have links with the Chinese military?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

I do not have a complete inventory of all existing research partnerships with Canadian universities. I am therefore not in a position to answer that question directly.

In fact, that's not necessarily Public Safety Canada's role. Our role is really to ensure that we have the right methodology in place to determine which sensitive technologies to protect and which foreign entities represent a risk to Canada's national security. Our role is also to inform universities by maintaining contact with them to ensure that they are well informed and well advised when they need this information.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

I understand. Thank you very much.

Let's talk about methodology now. As you know, Canada's one and only national security policy came into being almost 20 years ago, in 2004, in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The words "Russia" and "China" do not even appear in the current national security policy. By way of comparison, in the United States, a new national security strategy has been introduced with every change of presidential administration since 1980. This is hardly a recent occurrence.

Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, in your opinion, what signal are we sending to Canada's enemies, as well as to its allies and the population as a whole, by failing to update our national security with a renewed policy that is in line with current events?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Thank you for the question.

Of course, the 2004 national security policy is probably in need of renewal, but that doesn't necessarily mean that national security agencies and the government aren't focusing on relevant threats.

A great deal of effort has been made over the years to change our stance and see that we have adequate funding, which allows us to defend against this threat. Certain policies are continually updated. I also think we have excellent credibility with our allies in this regard.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you.

Can you tell us if there are repercussions linked to the fact that this policy is not up to date?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Obviously, we'd like to have a unified national security policy, but that doesn't mean we don't have good guidance or…

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I'm afraid we're out of time.

You can continue your answer in writing, but I think we have the start of an answer there. Thank you.

We'll go over to Mr. Cannings for six minutes.

We'll be going until about 4:45 because we started 15 minutes late. We'll have a shortened round next, but we'll finish the six-minute round with Mr. Cannings.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you all for being here today.

In previous meetings of this committee on this subject, we've heard testimony on various aspects. I think the main concern is Canadian IP going to China through various means. Some is actually stolen through cybersecurity means, and some goes there perfectly legally, we're told, because researchers have partnered with entities in China. We've heard of researchers who've been lured into financial arrangements with Chinese entities and who, once they're in deep, don't really have many options other than to co-operate.

I'm not sure who here is best positioned to answer that. Perhaps we can start with CSIS.

What is the main problem? Is it cybersecurity or is it these legal partnerships with Chinese entities, whether or not they're associated with the army, in these areas of interest? It's a fairly broad question, but what is the aspect that concerns you most?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Thank you very much for the question.

I think the answer, unfortunately, is “all of the above”. We see the PRC—and I would add other countries as well, including the Russian Federation—target research through legal, illegal and other unregulated means, the cyber-threats being part of the illegal, in order to augment their science and technology sectors and their economy.

I think what's particularly insidious about it is that the PRC actually has a commission chaired by Xi Jinping that integrates its military and civilian technology together. Everything they're doing, whether it's with the private sector or with our universities, is going back into a system to create dual-use applications for the military.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

If CSIS or the CSE or whoever comes across a scientist who is doing important research, research that might be sensitive, and you're concerned about that, what's the process for approaching that researcher? What do you say to them? What happens if they say, “I'm not going to co-operate with you. I'm enjoying my research and this is how I get funding for it. I couldn't get funding from NSERC for it, so I'm going that route”?

What's the method? Where do you take it from there? I want to know.

[Lesley Soper]

I think maybe that's a Public Safety question, in a way. Part of the rationale behind setting up the research security centre was to give direct linkages regionally to institutions for them to be able to come to the federal government and leverage all the expertise that's available, and also to give them good advice about the types of risks they may be confronting in specific research domains and come up with solutions.

We have a tool to stop federal funding of partnerships. Right now we're looking at expanding federal money into biomedical research areas where they hit a national security threshold, but that's a very narrow aperture. It doesn't stop any foreign enterprise from coming in, looking at the research that might be going on in any Canadian university and looking for ways to buy their way into it, co-opt their way into it or cyber-exfiltrate their way into it.

I think it really does need a whole-of-government, unified approach to get there. What I would say is that we made tremendous inroads with the universities through the Canadian research support fund, which was launched in budget 2022. Universities are now building capacity to be able to have research security offices that work with the intellectual property offices and work with faculty and researchers to understand where their problems are. Then there's a reciprocal lead inside Public Safety who can make connections for them when they have questions.

It's a very nuanced problem that requires a rather nuanced answer. That's the bottom line, I think.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Mr. Khoury, do you have a comment on that? I have other questions for you if you don't.

Go ahead.