Pierrette Venne

[Supply, May 12th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I admit my ignorance of soccer, so I will have to trust you.

We were talking about the law of retaliation. If it was ideological, I would say that such positions are disturbing because they arise from convictions that might one day result in laws that could not be enforced. I do not believe that it is ideological. The Reform Party's motion has much more to do with electioneering than with philosophy.

Anyway, just saying that the Reform Party's positions might be philosophically motivated would shock them, I am sure. They are not philosophers but politicians. The basis of this motion is nothing but public sentiment that the Reform Party is trying to use to its advantage. That is very easy.

Riding the wave of public feeling, the Reform Party is declaiming that young people are not charged for the crimes they commit, that young people commit more crimes than adults do, that the sentences imposed on young people are ridiculous and that most violent crimes are committed by young people. That is the rumour. Even if the hon. member does not say so openly, his whole argument is based on these propositions.

One can present such a motion without believing that juvenile delinquents are a large enough criminal group in society to really threaten public safety.

On the contrary, all the statistics available so far show that young people are charged more often than adults for their offences.

According to the 1991 report of the federal Department of Justice, the charge rate for young people was 61 per cent compared with 25 per cent for adults, and the data shows that 16- and 17-year-olds are treated more severely than adults.

On the other hand, according to the same figures, the conviction rate on charges laid against young people is still much higher than for adults. Finally, since it is the most serious offence, young people who commit murders may be tried in adult court.

A young person convicted of murder in a superior court of criminal jurisdiction is liable to life in prison. It is only when the individual is not tried in adult court that the maximum sentence for murder is five years.

If the Crown does not ask that he or she be referred to adult court, he or she will be tried in juvenile court. And even if the Crown makes that request, it will be up to the judge to decide depending on the circumstances of the case. This system works, Mr. Speaker. Unless we systematically challenge the judicial system, we must admit that the judges are in the best position to assess the objective and subjective circumstances of an offence.

I think the law is quite adequate in letting judges decide whether or not the case should be referred to adult court. That is why I think the law should not be amended in any way in this regard. All the parties concerned with juvenile delinquency say that the current system works well. Not perfectly, of course, but well.

That is not good news to the Reform Party, which urges us to focus on isolated cases. Canadian figures are generally consistent from one province to another. I therefore can say without a doubt that juvenile crime is not more prevalent in Western Canada than in Quebec or the Maritimes.

At this point in time, nothing can reasonably justify the hysteria of those who blame young people in their fight against crime. On the contrary, everything shows that crime is a reality of adult society. The proportion of teenagers guilty of Criminal Code offences is quite marginal compared with adults.

I have before me the latest figures from the Quebec public security department, and the same ratios can be applied to the Canadian population as a whole. In 1993, only one out of 51 qualified murders may have been committed by a young person.

The ratio is 6 out of 25 for second-degree murder and 0 out of 4 for manslaughter.

On a grand total of 90 murders committed in Quebec in 1993, young people may have committed 7, or less than 10 per cent. Of 241 attempted murders, 25 or about 10 per cent may have been committed by young people. As far as crime against property is concerned, young people committed 644 out of 3,177 robberies or about 20 per cent and 2,244 out of 21,592 offences against persons or a little over 10 per cent.

With respect to drugs, the facts are overwhelming. The vast majority of drug offenders are adults. Less than 5 per cent of offences for heroin possession, trafficking or smuggling are committed by young people. For cocaine offences, the rate is 8 per cent. Who can argue that the crime rate is higher among young people? Or that the proportion of criminals is about the same among young people as it is in the adult population? Let us face it: While adults represent 75 per cent of Canada's population, they commit over 90 per cent of crimes. Mr. Speaker, the reality is clear. Young people are not criminals. In their teens, that short period from 12 to 18 years of age, a very small proportion of them, less than four per cent in fact, will commit an offence, and that includes any incident, from the most ordinary to the most serious one. The majority of these offences will be assaults following arguments, as well as acts of vandalism and statutory offences.

The current Young Offenders Act is based on a long study of juvenile delinquency. We cannot talk about juvenile crime, because the reality does not support that false perception. The overwhelming majority of young people will reach adulthood without any problem, while two adults out of three could one day become part of the statistics on criminality.

Faced with such evidence, what is the relevance of a motion such as the one which is before us and which we will vote on? If the hon. member for New Westminster-Burnaby looked at the issue carefully, he knows that amending the Young Offenders Act as proposed in his motion would have the immediate effect of making that act almost useless. Since juvenile courts almost always hear cases involving young people aged 16 to 18, why does the hon. member not simply suggest repealing the act? It would be simpler, more honest and more direct. Such a measure would not be hidden behind a pretence of good intentions.

On what philosophical view of human nature is this notion of criminal responsibility based in the case of ten-year-old children? I agree that a ten-year-old child knows the difference between good and evil, but does the hon. member truly believe that a ten-year-old understands the nature of what is evil? Does he think that a child of that age is already corrupted and bad to the point of purposely doing something wrong and drawing from it a gratuitous satisfaction related to the fact that he is copying adults?

Who does the member represent? Does he speak on behalf of these paranoiac groups who have nothing better to do than throw the population into a panic? Or those individuals who flood us with hysterical correspondence reeking of hate? Or those new right-wing extremists who think that a jail sentence is still the best solution for young offenders?

In 1984, the new Young Offenders Act was based on a humane approach to juvenile delinquency. Realizing that young people were not criminals and that the dependency on their parents had the effect of reducing the risks, the legislator, after countless consultations, passed a law which favours a helping relationship between the various officials and the young person guilty of an offence.

The purpose of the law-and I repeat it again in case the member for New Westminster-Burnaby did not catch all the subtleties and nuances-is to help the young offender become a responsible person, by ensuring an effective intervention by all the professionals involved.

Instead of imposing a judicial sentence which would immediately turn the young offender into a criminal with a record, the law favours the effective rehabilitation of that young person through a series of actions. And if you read the act carefully, you will see how generous its provisions are in that respect. If that law helps only one young offender stay away from a life of crimes, it will have achieved its goal. The Criminal Code, on the other hand, serves no purpose other than to punish those who are guilty of an offence. If you make a guilty offender out of a young person, he will remain guilty for the rest of his life. However, if you give that person a chance to see what his options are, you will probably save him.

I realize that such a solution is not acceptable for someone who is bent on revenge, but if adults seek revenge, let them first use that solution on themselves. Let them build social, family and political structures adapted to the young before avenging an isolated offence committed by a young person to whom they were unable to teach honesty. This motion is simply deplorable. It might have afforded me the opportunity to discuss the amendments that the Minister of Justice gave us notice of some months ago, if it had had the merit of proposing something substantial in the administration of the Act. I know that there is a strong temptation among the Liberals to yield to certain pressures to make the Act more severe. I know that some day we will have to examine certain situations that the Act did not make provision for when it was adopted because the social reality at the time did not demand it.

I am prepared to admit that the system should be adjusted to new realities, particularly regarding organized crime. I am aware of the danger from bands of young people in certain urban areas. I believe that this is a phenomenon with which we must come to terms specifically, but we will certainly not do so by changing the focus of the Act, by stripping it of all its impact on the practical level and by lowering the age of criminal responsibility. I do not believe that bands of young people have many members between the ages of 10 and 12.

The problem of bands of young people is related to that of adult organized crime. In this regard, we will take a position at the proper time. For the present, I ask this House to reject the motion of the member for New Westminster-Burnaby.

[Supply, May 12th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, some people's sensitivities must certainly be spared. So I will continue talking about the Reform Party's motion.

I said that I thought it was calling for the law of retaliation.

By the way, Mr. Speaker, I would like to know if the time you took to think it over will be given to me to continue after?

[Supply, May 12th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, once again, a reactionary roar full of sound and fury has risen up from the Reform Party benches. This motion tabled by the hon. member for New Westminster-Burnaby is one more skirmish in a hysterical and perverse crusade by the Social Panic Party.

Who are these Prairie crusaders ganging up on now? Young people who are not eligible to vote and who are represented in this Parliament by adults, adults who are running scared and who want young offenders to be punished like adults-who are their role models-for the same crimes. It is clear from all the statistics that juvenile delinquency is marginal in proportion to the general crime rate. However, it takes only a few isolated and unfortunate cases for a pack mentality to develop and demands to rise for exemplary punishments for young offenders. The focus is on punishment.

Reactionaries are swept up in an irrational thirst for retribution. Why? To appease their own adult consciences because they realize these crimes are committed by young people who imitate them. They tell us: These young people have committed adult crimes, so they are adults and should be punished as adults. They tell us: Forget 30 years of research on the treatment of juvenile delinquency. They say: The statistics on the genuine and positive rehabilitation of the vast majority of young people supervised by youth protection agencies are so much garbage. Forget social clemency for children whose criminal tendencies are usually the result of disintegration for which adults are largely responsible.

Echoing this hysteria, the Panic Party is now calling for exemplary punishment under the Criminal Code for young people over 16, for penitentiary terms and even life sentences.

I am shocked and appalled by this motion, a motion that was communicated to us on very short notice, although its tone and substance is what we have come to expect.

I spoke previously on a motion by the Reform Party which stated that criminals enjoyed privileged treatment before the courts and that victims were ignored by the judicial system. At the time, I said that this statement was not supported by any verifiable statistics and reflected a complete ignorance of the facts.

On the same occasion, I reproached the mover of the motion for lending her voice to reactionary groups and for playing along with the media. I also remember how the Reform Party responded to my statements in this House on gun control and the provisions in the Unemployment Insurance Act that discriminate against married women. I must conclude that the Reform Party is entirely consistent in its ideology.

The motion before the House this morning is part of a disturbing trend. I hope that all Canadians will see what Reform Party members perhaps do not see in their political positions. I see all the signs of a nostalgic fascism still unaware of its implications. I see a desire for reverting to a society that our democracy rejects. I hear a call for "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". But if it were ideological-

[Reproductive Technologies, April 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, does the minister intend to amend the Criminal Code and prohibit the marketing of human embryos, which is a measure recommended in the Baird report and largely supported by the public?

[Reproductive Technologies, April 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice.

Last February 9, the minister stated that the recommendations in the Baird report on new reproductive technologies were being thoroughly reviewed, but the government has still not indicated what it intends to do with these recommendations. I want to point out that Canada is one of only a handful of industrialized countries with no legislation on reproductive technologies.

Does the minister agree on the need to act and regulate practices related to reproductive technologies, as is recommended in the Baird report, and will he undertake to table a bill before the House recesses for the summer in June?

[Unemployment Insurance Act, April 21st, 1994]

moved that Bill C-218, An Act to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act (excepted employment), be read the second time and referred to committee.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank all the hon. members who have expressed support for this bill. Unfortunately, they could not all be listed in the Order Paper because there are too many of them. As we know, pursuant to our Standing Orders, no more than 20 names may appear on the list of seconders published in the Order Paper. Allow me then to extend my thanks in this House to those members whose names are on the list as well as to all the others who, without being listed, support me nonetheless.

Bill C-218 is a bill to repeal paragraph 3(2)(c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. It may sound technical but in fact, I am simply asking this House to repair a serious injustice done to nearly one million Canadians, of whom 650,000 are women.

We all remember the omnibus reform of the unemployment insurance system. We are now starting to appreciate the extent of its social effects, some of which are plainly discriminatory.

The former Unemployment Insurance Act clearly excluded from entitlement to benefits any person working for his or her spouse or a company controlled by his or her spouse. The legislation was clear and simple, and openly discriminatory. No one would ever want of such a system today. In those days, a woman working for her husband was automatically excluded from contributing to the plan and receiving benefits. It was clearly stated in the act and regulations.

This act was challenged before the courts and tested under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Predictably enough, the courts moved to restore the entitlement. Because the Act applied only to spouses, and not to all people operating at arm's length, former paragraphs 3(2)(c) and 4(3)(d) of the Act were ruled invalid and ill-founded by the Human Rights Tribunal of the Federal Court-Appeal Division, the Tax Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of Canada.

The present Act was enacted on October 23, 1990, and paragraph 3(2)(c) was amended to reflect the judicial decisions regarding its unconstitutionality. The Conservatives found a way to get round the problem in their legislation. From then on, women working for their husband were no longer the only ones excluded from benefits under the Act.

From now on, everyone not dealing at arm's length with their employer is excluded from benefits. In this way, legally, the law no longer seems discriminatory. Any employees not dealing at arm's length with their employer are no longer automatically entitled to benefits. Apparently, the employer's son, brother or junior partner, as well as the woman working for her husband, are now on an equal footing. They must all show a Revenue Canada official that they are "clean" because it is up to that official to determine if the employee is cheating or not.

The law is clear: if someone worked for an employer with whom he was not dealing at arm's length, he will have to prove that the job would have been given to an outsider under the same conditions.

Just read paragraph 3(2)(c) to convince yourself at first glance of the different way the Conservatives treated employees who were "guilty" of working for a relative or a spouse.

No other category of unemployed person has to prove to the satisfaction of the Minister of National Revenue that he is not trying to defraud unemployment insurance, but the law requires relatives and spouses to prove it.

At first, it may seem normal to pay particular attention to the cases of people whose job might give rise to obvious collusion by the employer.

In some quarters, people might think that fathers and sons, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters are potential cheaters. For many people, it is not a real job if the employer is a spouse or a relative. It is only a step from this view of the labour market to the conviction that people not dealing at arm's length are out to cheat the government, a step which the Conservatives gladly took by passing the new Unemployment Insurance Act.

Before, the law applied only to spouses. But no matter, since it was discriminatory, they had to go one better. By submerging the category of spouses in the whole category of those not dealing at arm's length with an employer, they thought that they had really solved the problem.

Since spouses were no longer the only ones excluded, the law was no longer discriminatory. It was not discriminatory because it automatically excluded from benefits anyone whom the Income Tax Act considered not to be dealing at arm's length, not just spouses.

The presumption of honesty in all these cases is now replaced with a presumption of fraud. It is now up to the employee to prove to the discretionary satisfaction of the income tax official that the labour contract has all the features of a job that the employer would have given to someone completely unrelated to him.

In reviewing the claim, the official can conduct every investigation he deems appropriate at the employer's place of business. He can, in particular, check financial records, approach clients and suppliers, look at bank statements, examine work flow in the plant or office, and interview third parties. In short, the official can pursue his investigation as far as he considers necessary to form an opinion. In fact, that is exactly the way things are done.

These thugs' only goal is to demean recipients. The smallest doubt can lead to exclusion. They do not try to determine eligibility but to prove that a fraud has been committed.

I stress that investigations are conducted by the Source Deductions Division of Revenue Canada, Taxation. After the investigation is completed, Revenue Canada gives its opinion to the unemployment insurance people who then decide whether to pay or withhold benefits.

Withholding benefits triggers off a series of administrative and judicial appeals. First, a review application is filed with the Appeals Division of Revenue Canada. If the decision is upheld, a final appeal can be made to the Tax Court of Canada. Then, if the unemployed person still has strength, resources and a good deal of optimism, he or she may go to the Federal Court of Appeal as a last resort. The minister or the taxpayer can still appeal to the Supreme Court against the Federal Court's decision.

Meanwhile, the unemployed person-usually a woman-lives off her hopes while trying to understand why she is being singled out by the system.

Why is the employer's spouse or relative being penalized? How do we justify such actions? Why do we assume that a certain class of employees are cheaters? Why are we more distrustful of relatives than of strangers? Is it easier to cheat between relatives than between residents of a small village where they all know each other so well that they feel like family?

It is unacceptable for legislators to use distrust to enforce the law. That is exactly the effect of the current paragraph 3(2)(c).

Under the act, spouses and relatives are considered as suspects. The government tells them they are not like other citizens because they worked for a spouse or a relative. It then asks them to prove their honesty.

What democratically minded Canadian citizen can accept such an attack on fundamental values? Mr. Speaker, it may be that employees and employers who are married or related to each other cheat the UI system, just as perfect strangers may and do commit fraud, perhaps with even greater ease than within a family. But the criminal provisions of the act are explicit and punitive enough to cover all fraudulent claims.

What is objectionable in this case is that it is up to the unemployed to prove as soon as they file the claim that they did not commit fraud. No other class of beneficiaries must bear such a burden of proof. Not only could this person be liable to prosecution, to criminal prosecution, for breaking the law, but it would be assumed that from the outset of the application process, the person intended to commit fraud.

I would be just as stunned, but perhaps less motivated to ask for the repeal of paragraph 3(2)( c) , if it applied to a wide range of wage earners. But, in point of fact, the legislation targets a clearly identifiable group. In my view, the primary effect of the legislation, whether intended or whether the result of social circumstances, is the systematic exclusion of women who work for their spouse.

There are 650,000 women in this situation, Mr. Speaker. If they were to lose their job, these wage earners who work in a business managed by their spouses, who work "in partnership" with them, so to speak, would currently be excluded because of

their status from receiving unconditional unemployment insurance benefits.

Women who fall into this particular category of wage earner account for the vast majority of excepted employment cases provided for in paragraph 3(2)( c) . Furthermore, when we look at the persons designated by the cumulative provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Unemployment Insurance Act, we see that the group that is excluded the most is women who work with their spouses. There is no point denying this fact. The current law denies women the right to equality in the area of unemployment insurance.

Some will say to me that if the law is so discriminatory, then the courts will tear it to shreds as soon as the opportunity arises. Let the courts do their jobs then, they will tell me. My answer to them would be that it is incumbent upon legislators to amend their laws. The courts intervene only as a last resort to correct any injustices that may flow from the legislation. And, until such time as a final court of appeal rules on a fundamental issue, how many cases will have been abandoned for lack of resources or hope? To leave it up to the courts to make the law is to abdicate our own political and social responsibilities.

I would also say to these people that even if the courts did not find the legislation to be discriminatory from a legal standpoint, we should still intervene to point out the unfair aspects of the law from a human and political standpoint. And finally, unfortunately, even though the legislation institutionalizes this injustice, I do not think that the Canadian courts, using modern-day criteria, would find it discriminatory. Technically speaking, it is not discriminatory. However, given our social and demographic reality, the ramifications of the legislation would indeed be discriminatory. It is the main reason why we must act now and act fast. The courts will not do it.

In its 1990 reform, the now defunct Conservative government had managed to get around the gains made before the courts by women who work in partnership with their spouse. Indeed, several decisions had sent very clear messages to law-makers. The old act was invalid because it discriminated against spouses engaged in a working relationship. As a result of these decisions, women working for their spouse were entitled, albeit for a very short period of time, to premiums and benefits. But that was before the Tories' social conscience got the upper hand.

The break was short-lived. Through its 1990 amendments, the Mulroney government caught up with these women and sent them back to square one. It was done under the cover of an extremely confusing piece of legislation in which the amendment went nearly unnoticed. By putting spouses in a seemingly larger group, those in a non-arm's length situation, the new legislation is probably true to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I believe that, as in a recent case the Supreme Court ruled on, the courts would be very reluctant to find paragraph 3(2)(c) invalid. I am referring to the Symes case on which the Supreme Court rendered its decision in December 1993.

It involved a lawyer who wanted to claim her child care expenses as operating expenses. We know that under the Income Tax Act, the maximum allowed for child care expenses is $1,000. She wanted to claim the whole amount of her child care expenses, just as it can be done for entertainment expenses. After all, if golfing expenses are deductible, why should people not be allowed to claim child care expenses incurred as a result of their work?

Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court found that the legislation had to be analyzed according to its concrete results in today's context. Finding that it had been proved that child care expenses were nearly always borne by women, she concluded that in today's social context, the Income Tax Act must be interpreted and enforced in the light of the Charter. She ruled in favour of the lawyer because, in her case, the law would have discriminatory effects.

I share this opinion based on a progressive and context-sensitive approach to the legislation.

I agree with Justice L'Heureux-Dubé, who said that when issues are examined in context, it becomes clear that certain so-called objective truths may apply only to the circumstances of a particular group in society, while the process may be entirely inadequate in the case of other groups.

Unfortunately, that was not the majority opinion in the Symes case. The courts are not likely to introduce contextual analysis of the law very soon. They will continue to abide strictly by the letter of the law, as they did in this case.

The Supreme Court therefore refused to examine the constitutional aspects of the appeal, after concluding briefly that the Income Tax Act contained its own system of reference. For tax purposes, the law treats all taxpayers the same.

In fact, any individual may deduct child care expenses, although in most cases today, these expenses are paid by women. I am convinced that the courts would react similarly when asked to rule on paragraph 3(2)( c ) of the Unemployment Insurance Act.

I think it is useless to wait for a final decision from the Supreme Court and that we should act immediately to provide for fair treatment of women employed by their spouses and, in fact, for all Canadians employed by a family member.

Women who work in partnership with their spouses, and who often contribute to our GDP while giving up a substantial share of their remuneration, should be treated with the respect they deserve as active members of the labour force.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and I do not need the additional minute.

[Drugs, April 21st, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, what does the Solicitor General intend to do to restore Canada's reputation in this area?

[Drugs, April 21st, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, last Saturday, the daily La Presse said that according to the latest U.S. government report on international narcotic control, Canada is a haven for laundering money from drug trafficking.

My question is for the Solicitor General. With the information at his disposal, can the Solicitor General confirm the finding of the U.S. government report as mentioned in La Presse ?

[Criminal Code, April 21st, 1994]

moved:

Motion No. 1

That Bill C-8 be amended in Clause 1 in the English version by replacing line 30, on page 2, with the following:

"grounds that the inmate or any other inmate of the".

Madam Speaker, the amendment I am proposing this morning is very simple not only because it is short and self-explanatory, it is simple in every way. It proposes a simplification of the wording of the bill. In other words, I am suggesting we express what is clear in clear terms and that we state the two possibilities separately in both official languages. I am trying to give the legislative purpose of the bill a comparable, equivalent and similar form in the two official versions, French and English.

I am not questioning the content of the bill because I agree with it. I do not feel that these amendments to the Criminal Code will modify the state of the law. They simply give a structure to parameters the courts have already established around section 25 concerning the use of deadly force by policemen.

I am not convinced that all policemen will submit themselves to the five-step test imposed by the bill when faced with a life and death situation; on the other hand, I do not think this new legislation is changing anything much. Our consultations with

the judiciary and police forces have shown us that the spirit of the bill is accepted almost unanimously. It is not the content which is questionable but the form.

This bill gives us the opportunity to discuss a very serious legislative problem, a problem in the drafting of legislation. For a few years now, federal bills have taken on a very specific style in each of the two official languages and I am not talking about their literary aspect. I invite members to read at random parts of federal legislation.

Earlier this week, during the debate on Bill C-7, I commented on this obscure new drafting technique. I will certainly come back to it some other time. Let me just say for now that any piece of legislation, particularly in the case of criminal law, must be easy for ordinary people to understand.

What concerns me in the case of Bill C-8 for which I am proposing an amendment, as for all federal legislation, is the fact that the French and English versions generally do not match. My amendment is very simple and proposes to make both texts identical, not only similar or comparable but absolutely identical.

The statutes of Canada are enforced all over the country and both versions are equally official. They are enacted, printed, and published in both official languages. According to the Official Languages Act, both versions are "equally authoritative".

It must then be concluded that, where the English and French versions are diametrically opposed, two different laws must apply. Besides, the Official Languages Act itself illustrates that point perfectly as it includes its own contradictory clauses. Members of the House will understand what I mean merely by skimming through that act.

In Canada, we really have two official languages acts, just as we usually end up with two laws whenever we adopt a particular piece of legislation. No doubt, this situation is unique in the world, and we must make do with it, for better or for worse.

As I just said, even the Official Languages Act has two different official versions. Section 13 of the Act, which declares both versions equally authoritative, does not say it with the same meaning and effect in French and in English.

As one might expect, since the Official Languages Act has two official contradictory versions, so do all federal enactments.

For example, in the English version of Bill C-8, section 25(5) authorizing the use of deadly force against an inmate who is escaping reads as follows: "any of the inmates- poses a threat of death- to the peace officer or any other person-"

In the English version, the threat of death comes from all inmates and is directed against the peace officer concerned and any other person. In the French version, the peace officer can use deadly force against that inmate and any other inmate.

We understand that "all inmates" includes the inmate who is escaping. We also understand that, in spite of a different wording, the peace officer is justified in using deadly force whenever he is threatened by an inmate who is trying to escape.

But why must we say it differently in English and French? Why must we always complicate things and risk creating confusion? "Any of the inmates" does not mean " ce détenu et tout autre détenu ''. We must say clearly <em>un détenu</em> '' to translateany of the inmates'', or this inmate and any other inmate'' to really translate ce détenu ou tout autre détenu ''. Let us stop complicating simple things.

That is the purpose of my amendment. As I said, it is simple and it is aimed at ensuring simplicity, and, if I may say so, at ensuring clarity and agreement between both official versions.

[Controlled Drugs And Substances Act, April 19th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, we are talking about the regulations which cabinet makes from time to time, as I said in my speech. In fact, cabinet may propose regulations in the case of administrative laws but not in the case of criminal legislation. However, the present wording of the bill gives the government or cabinet the right to make criminal laws.

We had a similar case in the debate on gun control legislation, and at the time it was said that the regulations would have to be tabled in the House 30 days before adoption and publication, during which time they could be discussed in the House. That is what we decided, and that is what will happen in the case of our gun control legislation.

As for the second part of the hon. member's question in which he referred to the lack of response on the part of pharmacists and the general public, who do not see these things the way I do, I simply want to say there is no response at the present time because they do not feel concerned by this legislation. They are not mentioned in the bill. Why should they respond? The same applies to dentists and physicians. At the present time, no one is responding and no one is concerned by the bill. Why? Because for the time being, the individuals and professions that will be in this bill have not been identified.

So this is one way to get legislation through Parliament without people realizing what is going on, until the regulations are tabled and people are told these apply to veterinarians, physicians and dentists, and then they will react, but it will be too late.

That is why, as a member of the opposition, I see it as my duty to condemn these practices the government is trying to get through the House.