Madam Speaker, hate propaganda is one of the most despicable forms of human foolishness. Those who use it without thinking have not learned anything from history, while those who spread it wilfully commit a crime against humanity.
Hate propaganda can easily be concealed in the most seemingly harmless comments; it goes against the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of expression, and those who use it do not care about public opinion, which disapproves of its use.
In fact, you cannot define hate propaganda; you see it, you hear it, and you measure it by the provocative effect of the words and actions of those who use it. It defies definition under our democratic law. Every time we legislate to combat hate propaganda, it resurfaces in a new, unsuspected, active form.
Our Criminal Code has included a few minor provisions on hate propaganda since 1970. Sections 318 and 319 deal with advocating genocide and with public incitement to hatred against groups which the law calls "identifiable". The Code currently defines the offence based on the group to which the victim belongs. This does not take into account historical and social realities.
Any form of hate propaganda against any social group, by anyone, should be strenuously opposed. The current Criminal Code only includes acts against certain groups, distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.
For example, the age, language, sex, sexual orientation, social environment and condition, political convictions, profession, marital status or lifestyle of individuals forming a social group are not elements of identification of victims of hate propaganda.
I think that restricting potential victims to a few groups is not justified when we are dealing with a crime against humanity as a whole. Instead of designating a few "identifiable" groups, the law should prohibit any form of hate propaganda against any group. Public incitement to kill women, welfare recipients or homosexuals is no different than inciting people to kill Jews, Catholics or Muslims. Social hatred, in its expression and in its effects, is akin to universal hatred.
Consequently, I agree with the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell on the spirit of his proposed amendment to Bill C-214. However, I cannot support the bill itself, because it implicitly recognizes that the law would only protect certain groups of people, when it should include everyone.
This bill is similar to Bill C-204 tabled on December 18, 1988, and Bill C-207 tabled on April 7, 1990, which also provided for the inclusion of age as a distinguishing factor. Bill C-326, tabled on June 27, 1990, also added sex and sexual orientation to the list of factors.
The bill tabled by the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell adds age as a distinguishing factor for a group of victims, but what we have to do is abolish these restrictive designations of "identifiable groups", in order to extend the protection of the law to society as a whole. Again, this bill confirms the restrictive nature of the current legislation.
On the other hand, this bill gives us an opportunity to debate in this House the effect our legislation really has on hate propaganda in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the Zundel case, last year, and the Keegstra case, in 1990. As we know, the Alberta Court of Appeal was scheduled to hear another appeal from Keegstra on February 2, 1994, and has not yet issued a ruling.
While Keegstra was charged under the hate propaganda provisions, Zundel was charged under old section 181 on spreading false news. As we all recall, Zundel denied the Jewish holocaust ever happened and his comments were tinged with racism.
Zundel's motives could have been examined as part of mens rea determination. However, in the majority jugement of the Supreme Court, section 181 was invalidated by the Charter and, whatever his motives, Zundel had to be acquitted. In its ruling, the court mentioned it had ruled a few years earlier, in the Keegstra case that hate propaganda was protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, and added that all communications that convey or intend to convey a message fall under section 2(b) of the Charter, with the only proviso that the material transmission of the message be otherwise acceptable.
Unfortunately our Charter of Rights and Freedoms is protecting fanatics and eccentrics like Zundel who can spew out their insanities with complete impunity. As the law now stands, how would the Supreme Court react to section 318 which has not yet been tested, as we know?
I also know that this bill is premised upon the alleged impending importation in Canada of a game I prefer not to mention. No one has seen this game yet. I think that the panic stirred up by certain watch groups is actually playing into the hands of the game's promoters who are benefitting from an incredible amount of publicity. If there is such a game, it is shameful and should be stopped at the border or seized by the
police. I think that other provisions of the Criminal Code, if amended, could in fact allow such action.
Without getting into a legal debate on notions which elude the public, I want to call the attention of the hon. member and of this House to the fact that the Code contains provisions which prohibit the distribution of crime comics under offences tending to corrupt morals.
Pursuant to section 163(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, a person who circulates a crime comic commits an offence. However, I would agree with the hon. member that the definition of the scope of the offence is far from perfect and that customs officers and the police would not be able to act easily.
The game targeted by this bill depicts through drawings or photographs the serial killings of children. I would propose, as an alternative, that the definition in section 163(7) be amended to include any material that depicts pictorially the commission of criminal acts. I think that, from a constitutional standpoint, these provisions would be more effective and more valid in terms of stopping the distribution of this kind of game than the addition to the restricted categories of clauses respecting hate propaganda messages, as these categories are already protected under the Charter.
Finally, I am by no means convinced that even with the amendment put forward by my colleague, this type of game would fall under the definition of hate propaganda covered in section 318 or section 319.
For these reasons, and although I agree completely with the spirit of what the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell is trying to do, I cannot support the amendments he is proposing and I fail to see how they would be useful from a practical standpoint. Since the legislator cannot pass legislation for no reason, I think that Bill C-214 should, quite simply, be deferred.
