Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Federal Accountability Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

Before the House proceeds to the deferred recorded divisions in relation to the motion respecting Senate amendments to Bill C-2, I wish to remind hon. members that the voting process is subject to a special order adopted by the House yesterday.

Pursuant to this order I have consulted with the parties and we will proceed as follows:

First, the subamendment will be the subject of one vote.

Second, if the subamendment is adopted, the amendment will be subject to two votes: one on part C and one on part D. However, if the subamendment is defeated, the amendment will be subject to four votes: the first one on part A, the second on pard B, the third on part C and the fourth on part D.

Third, the main motion will be the subject of one vote.

I encourage all hon. members to prepare themselves accordingly.

The House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the subamendment in relation to the Senate amendments to Bill C-2.

The question is on the subamendment.

[Yvan Roy]

I have looked into Bill C-2 quite carefully. I'm not one of the architects of Bill C-2, but in my job I've had to be careful with it and to analyze this carefully. I can only give you what my view is of the matter around this. In my view, the neutrality of the public service is not, in any way, shape, or form, jeopardized by this piece of legislation.

I will go back to first principles. The public service is there to serve the government of the day with respect to the policies that this government wants to put forward, but never, ever in a partisan way. What we're doing is providing options, providing advice on those options, providing different variations on themes, but it is always the government that makes those decisions. That is the reason the policy development on that side of the operation remains something that takes place between the bureaucracy and the government of the day.

What Bill C-2 is saying is that we are going to get the deputy ministers, who are not political actors, to go before parliamentary committees and explain how they manage the resources that have been given to them. That, to my way of thinking, sir, has nothing to do with politics. It has a lot to do with good management, and there is, therefore, nothing partisan that would, in any way, shape, or form, infringe on the neutrality, so to speak, of the public service.

That is what this piece of legislation is doing. Let's face it, it is putting into legislation what has been the practice for the past 100 years, and it's good that it's now in legislation. Once called upon, deputy ministers will appear before committees and will explain how they manage the resources, not the advice they have given to ministers because that falls into a different category, and rightly so, in my humble estimation. With respect to the resources, we'll come to tell you how they have been spent.

[Navdeep Bains, Liberal, Mississauga—Brampton South, ON]

I'm not sure if this has been discussed, and I don't believe it has: public service neutrality. We talk about Bill C-2, the increased accountability of deputy ministers and the impact it would have on the public service and on their ability to make decisions, and specifically the neutrality. Ministers are obviously partisan. They represent government. They have a political affiliation and they make policy and they're held accountable in a different light, and the buck stops with them. With Bill C-2 and the proposed changes to the Accountability Act and the increased accountability for deputy ministers, does that impact, in your opinion, the neutrality and their ability to function in that fashion?

[Louise Thibault, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much.

My next question may be more for Mr. Roy but anyone at the table may respond.

Mr. Roy, I understand quite well that you are talking about the future and I greatly appreciate the fact that you're doing so with enthusiasm and energy. Earlier, we addressed the issue of demographic data which indicated that we need to be prepared because public servants will be hitting the magic age for retirement and will be leaving the public service.

I want to refer to the same document on your plans and priorities, this time on page 12. I want to read it:

Supporting the renewal of the public service to improve approaches to recruitment, development of management. Focus on leadership, including team work, mentoring, training, development and celebrating excellence...

Sir, things were also done in the past, quite major exercises within the public service whereby managers looked at everything. They took part in it. I remember La Relève task force under Mr. Peter Harrison, among others. But the way this is expressed here—and I don't think it's intentional—may lead someone to believe that this is a new initiative.

Amounts will be allocated to this, (inaudible). I would like to know how you intend, you and your partners in the departments, organizations and agencies, to use past experience. Over the years, there has been endless reference to best practices; this is the vocabulary being used. Surely this is somewhere, surely this was useful, surely there were some successes, and so forth.

How will you amalgamate all this, instill this so-called new momentum, since you are tying this to Bill C-2, the Federal Accountability Act. I am not criticizing the bill but even without it, things were done in the past. Some things worked well and some things need improvement. But how will you take that into consideration? That is my question.

[Yvan Roy]

I can try to add to the answer given by Mr. Borbey.

One of your colleagues on the other side was referring earlier to Bill C-2, and we were talking briefly about the role of the accounting officer, who happens to be the deputy minister. That bill, if passed, will create in legislation the requirements for the deputy minister to come before a parliamentary committee when called upon and to answer questions having to do with the very measures you're concerned about.

If you wish to go back to the text itself, I would refer you to page 187 of the bill as passed by the House. That would become section 16.4 of the Financial Administration Act once passed. There is a legal obligation as opposed to being the practice. As I was answering the question I was indicating that in practice deputy ministers appear before committees and explain what they have been doing with the resources they have. It's going to be in legislation, and once a parliamentary committee wishes to see a deputy minister he or she will appear and will answer those questions for you.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

Mr. Speaker, since yesterday, a number of members have risen and spoken to Bill C-2. Many have criticized the fact that the Senate made a number of amendments, countless amendments in fact, which took several weeks of work.

Many other members also pointed out that the study of Bill C-2 last spring was rushed and done so quickly that many witnesses could not even give proper testimony, nor was there enough time to fully explore their observations.

I would like to know my colleague's opinion concerning the fact that, after the parliamentary committee had studied the bill, it was the non-elected members of the other House who went ahead and proposed a series of amendments. I think this goes against democracy to some degree, since this should normally be done by elected members.

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to emphasize that the Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-2 in principle and in much of its practice.

There is no denying that nothing is more important than ethics and accountability in the work of an MP. The way we practice politics and the way people have access to public office holders clearly reveals the strength of democracy, which is the beauty of our democratic system, even if it is not perfect.

Earlier, I heard my friends, the neo-Bolsheviks, talk about electoral reform, suggesting that the current system, the first past the post system, had given Bloc Québécois members over-representation in this House.

No matter how hard I rack my brain, I do not see how this House could possibly do without a single member of the Bloc. In fact, the Bloc Québécois caucus is a formidable democratic tool, and each and every Bloc member makes an invaluable contribution to the work of this House. Naturally, I am bound by the confidentiality of our caucus meetings, but I can assure you that every Bloc member does an outstanding job. With every voting opportunity, our constituents have the opportunity to assess the relevance of the Bloc's role, and every time, in the end, we are supported in our conviction that it is important to have a political party dedicated exclusively to defending the interests of Quebec, a party that will not compromise its principles, and one that has the ability to accurately discern what Quebeckers want.

That said, of course we are not completely opposed to the idea of holding a debate on the issue of better representation. When Quebec becomes a sovereign nation, it is not certain that we will maintain the current voting system. In fact, sovereignists have thought long and hard about this issue. I am thinking of the former member for Borduas, Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, as well as André Larocque, who was deputy minister to Robert Burns, the member for Maisonneuve, in the 1970s. Robert Burns was the minister responsible for one of the most important laws enacted by René Lévesque's government, the democratic financing legislation, which is based on the concept of knowing on whose behalf we speak.

I remember certain discussions with American senators. In the United States, it is virtually impossible to get elected if one does not have millions of dollars. Yet, in many cases, having such a fortune means that individuals become spokespeople for special interest groups. In contrast, our democratic system makes it possible to secure financing thanks to strong popular support.

For example, during the last election campaign in Hochelaga, I spent $25,000. Obviously, that is not very much given the number of voters in my riding. That money did not come from businesses, interest groups or lobbies. Members of the Bloc Québécois executive in my riding, Hochelaga, raised the money during meetings with grassroots activists. That is what we do every year.

Let me say a few words about Bill C-2, which was introduced by the President of the Treasury Board. The Bloc Québécois supports the underlying principles of the bill. However, much like its creator, the President of the Treasury Board, the bill is clearly not perfect. That does not prevent him from being a respectable parliamentarian, of course. The Bloc Québécois supports this bill because it provides for a ministerial code of ethics to be entrenched in the law.

The Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-2 because it will put an end to the tradition that enabled political staff to gain privileged entry to the public service. Of course, that is not to say that the people who work in the offices of ministers or members cannot be useful in the public service, or that they are not competent people, but we have said and we still say that they should not gain entry by a somewhat privileged mechanism but rather by means of properly conducted competitions.

The Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-2 because it gives greater power to the Auditor General, Ms. Fraser, and it gives more power to the Ethics Commissioner. It should be remembered—and obviously I say this very seriously—that for many weeks, and indeed for several months, the Bloc Québécois has led the battle to extend the Auditor General’s powers of audit and control. My former colleague, the member for Repentigny, had tabled a bill to extend the control of the Auditor General to include a certain number of foundations. The principle of the bill had been agreed to by the previous government, and it has also been accepted by the Conservative government. That is good news because these foundations hold and manage millions of dollars that come from the public treasury.

The Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-2 because it will lead to the disclosure of compulsory reports in the case of leadership races. It will restrain the potential for uncontrolled spending in the great public relations exercises that leadership races have become.

The Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-2 because it contains many of the traditional demands of the Bloc Québécois. I am happy to remind the House of the battle that several members of the Bloc Québécois fought to ensure that returning officers are chosen through a more democratic process. I see my friend, the parliamentary secretary, who is the youngest member of this House. Obviously, as everyone knows, being young is a failing from which one suffers a little less each day. However, I know that my colleague, who is the youngest member of this House, and who is also the parliamentary secretary to the minister, has worked very hard in committee.

For a long time now the Bloc Québécois has tried to justify a more democratic process for returning officers. It cannot be possible, on one hand, for a person at the riding level to be responsible for making the system work, ensuring there are no irregularities, that all rules are being followed and that all the candidates have equal chances, and, on the other, for these same returning officers to be appointed by the government. In my riding there was a returning officer who was very well respected as an individual, but who certainly was not neutral politically. Mr. Léger, a notary, served as returning officer in Hochelaga—Maisonneuve. He is a very respectable person, but he was my opponent in 1993.

In 1993, I had to show him a thing or two about elections and I won a majority by several thousand votes. It was at the time when Lucien Bouchard, one of the great sovereignists of the movement, was Premier of Quebec. He ran an absolutely extraordinary election campaign and, if my memory serves me correctly, the Bloc Québécois won 49% of the vote and 55 members were elected. We clearly had a very strong hold. It was a young political party and there were a number of young members such as Pierre Brien and Michel Bellehumeur. At the time, yours truly was in his early thirties. I was 31 when I was elected and I am 44 now, but I feel just as young as I did then.

Obviously, I no longer have the same resources. There was a time when I could work for 15 or 16 hours without sleeping. Today, I could no longer do that.

To get back to the subject, and to Bill C-2, the bill contains very wise provisions to allow returning officers to be selected by competition. This was a Bloc Québécois initiative, which is to some extent reflected in Bill C-2.

The Bloc Québécois would have liked to see more democratic funding. It had also hoped that we could have refocused the provisions relating to whistleblowers. It is important that when improper conduct, bad management or fraud is witnessed by people who have responsibilities, particularly strategic responsibilities within the public service, they be able to report it to their superior and report it publicly without suffering reprisals.

An amendment has come from the other place that expands the concept of reprisal. We must of course ensure that such reprisals do not in any way prevent a public servant from pursuing a worthwhile career plan in the public service.

We support Bill C-2. In fact there are few questions that will call for more of our attention in the years to come than the question of ethics. What is our vision of public governance that meets ethical responsibilities? That is one of the questions that will concern us in the years to come.

A debate is underway in Quebec regarding the place for minorities in society. I am sure that such a debate is also taking place in other provinces. There is also the question of reasonable accommodation. How do we reconcile our broad democratic values with recognizing the place for minorities and preserving a spirit of a common public culture? How do we organize our social contract? This is what we mean by reasonable accommodation. How do we interpret the charters, be it the Quebec Charter, one of the most generous charters when it comes to human rights, and compatibility with individual values, particularly when it comes to religious convictions?

I hope that the parliamentary secretary will give us an explanation of this a little later. We do not understand why the government has not chosen to revise the Access to Information Act, when that act was part of the Conservative Party’s campaign platform. When we talk about democracy, political party financing and voting methods are not the only issues; our ability to make our institutions function in a way that allows us to have access to information within a reasonable time is also an issue.

The Access to Information Act is a major concern. Recently, I had the opportunity to take part in a seminar. Three weeks ago, my party whip asked me to make a speech on a Friday at 6:30 p.m., here in Ottawa. I cannot begin to tell the House how grateful I was that he would give me this opportunity to share the stage with a number of experts on the Access to Information Act. The seminar took place at the government's conference centre. What an archaic piece of legislation.

Here is a very specific example. In June, the Bloc Québécois made about 40 requests under the Access to Information Act. To this end, we relied on our research services and on my friend, Dominic Labrie, a powerful intellectual and an extremely brilliant man who is very familiar with the whole issue of the Access to Information Act. He is a highly educated person with great intellectual finesse, as there are in all political parties.

As we know, there are costs associated with this. A five dollar deposit is required for each request. We must also pay for each page of information that is provided to us.

Believe it or not, we submitted those 40 or so requests for information in June, and only about five of them had been dealt with by the time I made my speech, two or three weeks ago. We have yet to receive the information that we requested back in June and this is now November, just 10 days away from the month of December. Moreover, I was told that there is an increasingly common practice whereby a fee is charged for those access to information requests, based on the number of hours of research required to get the information. I was also told that this change coincided with the arrival of the Conservatives in office. I hope that this trend will be corrected.

Again, we cannot fulfill our parliamentary duties properly and we cannot have a true democratic system if we do not have access to meaningful and conclusive information. The Bloc Québécois longs for the day when each access to information request, and its reply, will be stored in the Library of Parliament, as is the case with the notices in the order paper. It would definitely be a good thing if all parliamentarians could benefit from that information.

I have even been informed that certain departments now refuse to produce written information for strategic executive meetings, for fear that someone will request access to it.

Once again I do not understand why the government did not make more of this bill, which has much to be said for it and which the Bloc Québécois supports. Indeed our political party believes in ethics and we know that this question will be of great concern in the coming years.

Our fellow citizens will no longer accept authoritarian models, ways of doing things in which members of parliament are not fully involved in the development of public policies.

It is quite unbelievable, I repeat, that the government chose to table 200 clauses in this bill. Would it not have been better to review the Access to Information Act? I recall that the Conservatives made a commitment to modernize it. The Conservative platform even contained this promise:

A Conservative government would:

Implement the Information Commissioner’s recommendations for reform of the Access to Information Act.

The Information Commissioner himself tabled a complete bill. He did the work; he proposed a complete bill in October 2005.

I think this is hard to understand.

I am going to end with the following comment, because time is running out.

The bill, once it came back from the other House, also proposed a number of points which the Bloc Québécois unfortunately could not agree with. I understand that the other House would have liked there to be a commissioner.

I am going to conclude by recalling three major points. For the Bloc Québécois, it is important to be able to say yes to this bill, on the basis of a number of historical battles waged by the Bloc Québécois: the appointment of returning officers by competition; more work and greater authority for the Auditor General respecting trusts and foundations; and the possibility of restricting expenditures in leadership races and making them subject to public disclosure.

We nonetheless would have liked the Access to Information Act to be modernized so that it would work better and members of parliament would have more information, and especially so that requests for access to information might be filed in the Library of Parliament.

We would also have liked to have a broader definition of the budget officer’s role. In spite of all this, the Bloc Québécois will support the proposed amendments in Bill C-2.

[Yvan Roy]

I'm a tad surprised by the question, in that it implies that the Privy Council Office has been resisting changes. That is not my understanding of what transpired following the discussions that took place and what you will find in Bill C-2.

PCO has a role to play, like any other department, but we are not in charge of this area or responsible for making decisions at the end of the day. Let's always bring this back to what it is. We're providing advice to the government that is completely non-partisan, and the political overlay and decisions are made by ministers. I am able to answer the question of what; it's much more difficult for me to answer why we are doing this or that.

[Olivia Chow, NDP, Trinity—Spadina, ON]

Thank you very much for that.

On another area, access to information relating to Bill C-2, tell us about the role you have in resisting some of the reforms. There have been a lot of discussions. What kinds of connections in terms of ATI reform related to Bill C-2...? What role did you play in that whole discussion?

[Peggy Nash, NDP, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, first I want to join with my colleague in recognizing the work of Mr. Broadbent and in saying that all of his colleagues in the House and, I believe, the people of Canada recognize his decency and the great respect he had for the trust the people put in him in being a representative in this House.

I also want to briefly say that the importance of a minority Parliament in being able to make the changes that we have been able to achieve in this bill is very significant.

I want to echo what my colleague has addressed on the issue of trust funds. Whatever we call it, money that is squirreled away, money that sloshes through the system to bankroll campaigns or various undertakings, or any kinds of things that are shrouded and hidden from the public, it is in these areas where we need to shine the light.

While I do not believe the light shines strongly enough in Bill C-2, I believe we are making progress and that some of these dark corners are little less dark because of the work we have done here over the past few months.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased that my colleague from Parkdale--High Park has spoken about some of the successes reflected in Bill C-2 before us and also has highlighted some of the omissions.

It seems particularly appropriate this week that we acknowledge the tremendous contribution of the former member from Ottawa Centre, Ed Broadbent, in the work that he did around both electoral reform and the cleaning up of patronage politics in this country. It is especially appropriate this week that we acknowledge the portions of Bill C-2 that are very much attributable to some of his earlier work in the House, but also that we underscore the importance of proportional representation, because Ed Broadbent is about to be honoured very publicly on Thursday for his significant contribution to electoral reform.

That work by the former member for Ottawa Centre will be well recognized by members of the House who had the thrill, as many of us did, to sit with him in the House over that period of a year and a half prior to the last election, when he did not re-offer.

What is probably less understood and known by many members of the House is that much of the early anti-patronage work and the work to clean up electoral party financing was accomplished in a previous minority government, a minority government in which the New Democratic Party leader, David Lewis, pushed very hard and in fact got a concession from the then Liberal government to introduce election financing legislation that for the first time required full disclosure of both sources and amounts of political party contributions.

I think it is not surprising that many of the improvements in this government bill have been brought about by very good work in that same David Lewis-Ed Broadbent tradition by my colleague from Winnipeg Centre, ably supported by the current member for Ottawa Centre.

In the few remaining moments, I want to ask the member about the issue of trust funds. It is clear that the member for Winnipeg Centre was very instrumental in pushing for much tougher regulations and provisions in the law governing the use of trust funds. To this day in Nova Scotia, unbelievably, the Liberal Party still finances its election campaigns with ill-begotten trust funds from the biggest electoral party financing scandal in the history of the province.

With respect to trust funds, is it the member's view that this is an important achievement in the bill before us, notwithstanding the omission of a number of other issues, which she has already noted?

[Peggy Nash, NDP, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, 90% of the world's democracies use a system of proportional representation, even those which formerly used a first past the post system. They do this because it is more respectful of the wishes of the electorate. It gives a truer picture of the desire of the people for their political representation. I thank my hon. colleague for raising this issue.

I want to give a couple of brief examples of how our current system skews the political process. In the last two general elections, the Liberals had 50% fewer seats in western Canada than they would have had under a proportional representation system. However, there are situations such as that of the previous Reform Alliance Conservatives, who were consistently underrepresented in Ontario even though they did get a number of seats. When Preston Manning was leader, he got 20% of the vote in Ontario, but how many seats? Zero. That does not seem to represent the wishes of the electorate.

Today in the House of Commons, the Bloc Québécois has 16 more seats than it should have under a proportional representation system. Certainly the NDP should have 48 seats in the House of Commons, not 19.

I say to my hon. colleagues that if we are truly talking about democracy and the wishes of the people of Canada to have a Parliament that represents their views and interests, then something very basic is that every vote should count. For every vote truly to count, we should have a system that includes proportional representation.

Commissions have recommended this. The Canadian law commission has recommended it. A quarter of a century ago, the Pépin-Robarts task force recommended that this system needed to be changed because it does a great disservice to Canadian people and to Canadian unity in that it skews regional representation in Canada.

Bill C-2 has failed to address this issue. That is very unfortunate, because we do not often get to deal with new bills around the issues of accountability and democracy. This is truly a missed opportunity, but I would call on my hon. colleagues to keep this in mind and keep this issue on the front burner. It is an issue that we desperately need to address.

[Yvan Roy]

Of the Privy Council, as such? We are a department like any other department around town, so the issues having to do with conflict of interest, having to do with contracting--you have part 5 of the bill, which deals with contracting--applies to us, the same as anyone else. I don't think it would be fair to tell you that we see Bill C-2 as providing us with a new tool to, for all intents and purposes, supervise the whole of the public service.

With the resources that we have, one, it would be impossible, and we'd be selling you something that you're not willing to buy. Two, in law this is not how this works. I happen to be a lawyer and I like to go back to that kind of framework. The Financial Administration Act continues to apply, and it will be strengthened by Bill C-2. It will be the responsibility of Treasury Board to ensure that these things take place.

What we provide in PCO is the challenge function. We try to coordinate issues. We try to make sure things are coherent. But Bill C-2 has not made PCO into policemen for the whole of the civil service. That's not what was intended, and that's not what we intend to do with it.

[Peggy Nash, NDP, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is clear that we are elected in this House by the communities where we live, by the citizens in our ridings. We are not elected by lobbyists, by corporations or special interests. Therefore, our behaviour in the House and the actions that we take must be in the best interests of the communities that we represent.

In my community, there are many people who depend on the cultural sector for their livelihoods. We have artists, musicians, painters, film producers, television broadcasters and all kinds of people who work in the cultural sector. These are people who want to see cultural policies in Canada that defend Canadian interests, that speak about Canadian stories, that create jobs in Canada, and that help Canadians converse one with the other across our country and with all the multiplicity of cultures and peoples that we have in Canada.

If the minister is focusing her attention on the narrow needs and goals of a particular lobby group to the detriment of Canadians who depend on our government and on our regulators to defend their interests, to defend their culture, to preserve their jobs, and create new jobs in this sector, then I believe that this a grave issue that should be addressed by parliamentarians.

I know that in my community many people have contacted me about the cultural sector and want me to speak out on this. I am concerned that Bill C-2 does not go far enough in protecting us from lobbyists and I thank my hon. colleague for raising this issue again and reminding us about how we need to keep working in this area.

[David Tilson, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

This leads perhaps to my final question. I don't know if any of my colleagues have questions on this side at this time, but you've given a specific example of when there's a potential conflict--perhaps a question, maybe not the word “conflict”--when a question is raised between a deputy minister and a minister. I understand that's one example. The question that has been suggested is what effect theFederal Accountability Act will have on the routine operation of the Privy Council, if any.