Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Ihsaan Gardee, Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Good morning, members.

Thank you very much for your attention and time today.

My name is Ihsaan Gardee, as mentioned, and I serve as executive director of the National Council of Canadian Muslims. I am joined today by my colleague, Professor Faisal Bhabha, NCCM's legal counsel and the chair of our national security policy committee.

The NCCM was founded in 2000 as an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit grassroots organization that for over 17 years has been a leading voice for Muslim civic engagement and the promotion of human rights. The NCCM's mandate is to protect the human rights and civil liberties of Canadian Muslims, advocate for their public interests, build mutual understanding, and challenge discrimination and Islamophobia.

We work to achieve this mission through our work in four primary areas: community education and outreach, media engagement, anti-discrimination action, and public advocacy. The NCCM has a long-standing and robust public record of participating in major public inquiries, intervening in landmark cases before the Supreme Court of Canada, and providing advice to security agencies on engaging communities and promoting public safety.

In terms of our position, the NCCM has always supported the government's responsibility to ensure national security. We commend the current government for fulfilling its election promise to review Bill C-51 as its condition for supporting the bill in the first place, and to consult with Canadians. While we welcome, for instance, that Bill C-59 proposes to create a national security review agency with more oversight and review than we currently have, our general objection remains constant. This law goes too far. It virtually guarantees constitutional breach, and it offers inadequate justification. It strengthens the security establishment when the evidence available gives every indication that the institutions carrying out national security intelligence gathering and enforcement mandates are in disarray, rife with bias and bullying from the top down. Oversight of those agencies is not sufficient. Real reform is necessary.

While we share the concerns of others you have heard from, including Amnesty International and others, for the purposes of our opening statement today I'll be focusing our testimony on two major substantive concerns we have with Bill C-59. Number one is the powers given to CSIS, and number two, the failure to address systemic problems with the no-fly list.

In terms of our reasons, Canadian Muslims are just as concerned about security as other Canadians. We face the same risk of untimely death or injury at the hands of terrorists as any Canadian. In fact, globally the overwhelming majority of victims of political violence, including ideological extremist violence, have been Muslims. Being a population with global connections, Canadian Muslims are threatened and impacted by global terrorism as much, if not more, than other Canadians. We thus have a high interest in Canada developing a strong and sound national security policy with robust oversight, accountability, and redress mechanisms to guard against abuses and mistakes.

At the same time, members of Canadian Muslim communities have been victims of Canadian national security policy. Over the last 15 years we have seen three separate judicial inquiries, numerous court rulings, out-of-court settlements, and apologies that acknowledged the constitutional violations committed against innocent Muslims by national security intelligence and enforcement. Canadian Muslims are not only disproportionately affected by these errors and abuses, but we also bear the brunt of social impact when xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiment surges.

NCCM agrees with the plurality of experts who state that more power to security agencies does not necessarily mean more security for Canadians. National security mistakes not only put innocent people at risk of suspicion and stigma, but also divert attention away from actual threats and obstruct effective action to promote safety and security. At the same time that Alexandre Bissonnette was dreaming up his murderous plot to attack a Quebec City mosque, the RCMP were “manufacturing crime”, according to the B.C. Superior Court judge in the case against John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. They were Muslim converts and recovering heroin addicts living on social assistance, whose terrorism charges were stayed last year after a court found they had been entrapped by police.

Bill C-59 strengthens the security establishment but does not address the security needs of Canadian Muslims. While the idea of prevention is laudable, any potential benefit from this approach will be negated by the incursions on charter rights that disproportionately affect members of our community, and which will continue to happen under the guise of threat reduction, information sharing, and no-fly listing.

If the government wishes to collaborate with communities on prevention, it needs to build trust and confidence first. For many young Canadian Muslims, the documented and admitted involvement of intelligence and enforcement agencies in rendition and other human rights abuses, and the complete lack of accountability and perceived impunity that have been created as a result, have bred a lack of confidence in the Canadian security establishment.

This past summer, a group of CSIS employees filed a civil claim against the service, alleging discrimination, harassment, bullying, and abuse of authority. They described a workplace environment within the service that is racist, Islamophobic, sexist, and homophobic, where the culture is like an old boys' club and where minority representation in management is abysmally low. The day after the claim was filed, two senior former CSIS employees were quoted in the media saying they were not surprised by the allegations.

In October 2017, CSIS released the report of an independent, third-party investigation into allegations of harassment in the Toronto region office. The findings noted an “old boys' culture”, demeaning treatment, swearing and discriminatory statements, distrust among employees towards management, and a lack of diversity among the staff.

If these kinds of reports are indicative of the overall culture that exists within these organizations toward their own employees, it does little to assuage concerns within Canadian Muslim communities about unfair profiling and error.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission conducted employment equity audits of CSIS in 2011 and 2014, and the findings are shocking for a powerful public institution operating in a 21st-century, multicultural, democratic society.

There were zero per cent visible minorities in senior management positions at a time when visible minorities were about 20% of the Canadian population. We have to infer from that not just a glass ceiling but an actual bar. The CHRC also noted an institutional culture that undervalued minorities and reproduced attitudinal barriers, which resulted in fewer hiring and advancement opportunities for minorities.

The security agency's loss of trust within Canadian Muslim communities has been exacerbated by the lack of accountability for past wrongs committed against innocent Muslims. While the government has concluded significant settlements and made apologies, no one from within those agencies has been held to account.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been no disciplinary action and no public acknowledgements. Instead of accountability, some of those involved in the well-known torture case of Maher Arar have even been promoted within the agencies.

At best, there was individual and institutional incompetence in the security agencies. At worst, it was gross negligence or bad faith. Neither is acceptable and the taxpaying Canadians who fund these agencies deserve better.

The lack of accountability projects a culture of impunity within the Canadian security agencies that reinforces the insecurity Canadian Muslims experience. The problems with CSIS will not be mitigated by Bill C-59. No amount of administrative oversight can cure the systemic ills. These agencies need reform.

We do not see any attention given in this proposed legislation to the real impact that bias in national security has in producing insecurity and harm within our communities. Without a clear statutory mandate and direction from our government, we do not believe that civil society alone can change the culture within CSIS and other security agencies.

We are willing to help, but that burden cannot fall only upon us.

I'll now pass it over to my colleague, Professor Bhabha, to conclude with our recommendations.

Criminal Code

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the member for Peace River—Westlock, who I think did a great job of expanding on this bill. It is indeed a real privilege for me to stand and speak about Bill C-51.

I think the last time I spoke about Bill C-51 was about two years ago when the Minister of Public Safety introduced it as an anti-terrorism measure. I was very happy to work on the public safety committee at that time and to be part of the committee work that brought that bill forward. It was indeed a wonderful piece of legislation, which I may remind the Liberals they wholeheartedly supported.

Today, Bill C-51 is an omnibus bill, as was previously mentioned. I Googled it just for the sake of understanding maybe what an omnibus is. It could be a four-wheeled bus. That is not the case here. It says “items previously published separately” is what constitutes a bill as being omnibus. Certainly this is an omnibus piece of legislation, something that the Liberals railed against during their time as the third party in this House.

From that perspective, we are going to talk about it a little more. It means that we are going to have to cover a bunch of unrelated items, but they are all stuck in this bill. The first part of the bill I would like to speak about is found in clause 14 of Bill C-51. It was introduced to remove section 176 of the Criminal Code.

For the benefit of the folks watching these proceedings, I would like to read the section as it is being presented. Subsection 176 (1) of the Criminal Code says:

(a) by threats or force, unlawfully obstructs or prevents or endeavours to obstruct or prevent a clergyman or minister from celebrating divine service or performing any other function in connection with his calling, or

(b) knowing that a clergyman or minister is about to perform, is on his way to perform or is returning from the performance of any of the duties or functions mentioned in paragraph (a)

(i) assaults or offers any violence to him, or

(ii) arrests him on a civil process, or under the pretence of executing a civil process,

Section 176 provides explicit protection in the Criminal Code. It makes it a crime to unlawfully obstruct, threaten, or harm a religious official, before, during, or after they perform a religious service. It also makes interrupting or disturbing a religious service a crime.

In a time when there is an increasing amount of violence directed against religious groups and religious gatherings, removing this section made little sense. Yet, for some reason, the Liberal government wanted to get rid of the only protection for Canadians performing and participating in a religious service.

The Liberals said that attending a religious service was no different than attending a lecture. However, the many and varied religious groups which exist in Canada came forward in one collective voice, speaking one collective message. The message was simple: religious services and members of the clergy require protection under the law because they are different in kind from other sorts of public gatherings.

Removing section 176 would treat the disruption of a religious service as a mere mischief charge. To religious Canadians, a religious service is more than just an event to attend; it is a formative experience to their individual and community identities. Disrupting such a ceremony is not a small matter, but an act which offends their most fundamental right to gather in a peaceful assembly while sharing their most cherished beliefs.

A mere mischief charge in a time of growing intolerance would not have been sufficient. Indeed, repealing section 176 seems to show an intellectual disconnect on the part of the Liberals.

I am wondering what they were thinking by removing section 176, at a time when we see religious persecution all over our globe. We have seen attacks on religious institutions here in Canada, and the Liberals want to remove the only explicit protection that members of faith institutions have while they are conducting a worship service.

I want to talk a little about my own personal experience, because I grew up as the son of a clergyman. I have a pretty good idea, at least in the Christian faith, of what a clergyman does, and what part of his duties are. I am sure it is similar in all faiths.

That is the beauty of section 176. It is not explicit to the Christian faith. This is protection for clergy and for worship services that applies to all faiths. Whether they are Christian, Jewish, Sikh or Hindu or Muslim, this provides protection for members of the clergy. It provides protection in the Criminal Code for all forms of worship services.

I remember clearly as a young person, growing up and into my early adulthood, the time when my father was a pastor. My father died at the age of 51 from the same rare throat cancer that one of our colleagues passed away from earlier this year. He too had a son by the name of Theodore, as did my father. My father passed away at an early age, but I do remember the work that my father was engaged in and some of the things he did. One of the things he was obviously called upon to do as a pastor was to conduct worship services on a Sunday morning for his congregation, and that is something that section 176 of the Criminal Code clearly identifies will be protected.

Some of the other things were that when he had parishioners or members in the community who had experienced tragedy in their lives, who maybe had encountered some personal difficulties, found themselves in the hospital with a debilitating or life-threatening disease or facing death, often the clergy are called to administer comfort to those individuals. In my father's case, he was able to share the saving grace and power of the knowledge of knowing Jesus Christ with the individuals who were facing imminent death. It gave them reassurance and comfort to know they could put their faith in Jesus and have security and eternal life. These were functions that my father performed on a regular basis. I remember hospital visitation was very important to my father. Section 176 is something that would provide protection for clergy as they go to visit their parishioners, or members in their community who may be suffering from illness, or the illness of a family member.

Something else my father did was to conduct marriage ceremonies. It is an important part of everyday life when a man and woman decide they are in love and want to commit to spend the rest of their lives with each other. They call a member of their clergy and say that they would like to get married.

It is an exciting part of life, a new part of life, so the clergy are called upon to perform marriage counselling, which is part of the work that clergy do. They give marriage counselling, and it is a very important part of the work of the clergy. In the coming and going of their particular duties in performing marriage counselling, but also in performing the actual ceremony, the Criminal Code, through section 176, would provide protection.

One could ask how often that protection is required. People have been successfully prosecuted under section 176 for interfering in a religious or worship service, or also interfering with or obstructing clergymen in the dispatch of their duties. It is kind of like an insurance policy. The comfort of knowing it is there to provide protection for people and their loved ones is very reassuring, even though they obviously hope they do not need it. Certainly our hope, as Conservatives, would be that we would never have to experience a situation where section 176 of the Criminal Code is used. However, it certainly provides a deterrent for individuals from seeking to disrupt clergymen in the dispatch of their duties, disrupting a worship service, or disrupting worshippers and parishioners as they are in a gathering where they are encouraging one another and expressing their deeply held faith convictions, and worshipping the creator they serve.

There are lots of good reasons to support Bill C-51. Through many efforts of Canadians right across our country, who made their voices heard and their opinions known to the committee, to the justice minister, and to the Prime Minister, the Liberals listened. and they amended the bill. They are going to keep section 176 in Bill C-51. I am happy, as a Conservative, to support that bill.

Public Safety

[Scott Duvall, NDP, Hamilton Mountain, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the Liberals are claiming it is not possible to repeal the Conservative Bill C-51. My colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke is proposing just that with his Bill C-303 to fully protect Canadians' rights.

Under the 138-page Liberal Bill C-59, CSIS still has extensive and invasive powers. The privacy of Canadians is still under threat and oversight of government agencies is insufficient.

Will the government divide Bill C-59 into separate bills so they can be properly studied? Canadians' rights are at stake.

[Lex Gill, Advocate, National Security Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association]

Mr. Chair, another deeply problematic aspect of Bill C-51 that has not been touched are changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that undid important protections for named persons in security certificate proceedings. Bill C-51 limited the requirement for disclosure of relevant information to special advocates and introduced a series of procedural barriers which further disadvantaged the rights of the named person.

In our legal challenge, CCLA has argued that these amendments are an unconstitutional violation of the section 7 guarantee to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Our Supreme Court has affirmed that the individual named in the security certificate “must be given an opportunity to know the case to meet, and an opportunity to meet the case”, an impossible exercise in the absence of a coherent legal framework for full disclosure.

This committee recognized as much in May 2017 when it recommended amending IRPA in order to give special advocates full access to complete security certificate files. We urge that Bill C-59 be amended to correct this issue.

We move now to the new elements of the new national security landscape that Bill C-59 has introduced. Our written submission will address a much wider range of issues in relation to the CSE Act, but we would like to highlight two parts today.

First, the proposed active and defensive cyber-operations aspects of the CSE's mandate essentially allow the establishment to engage in secret and largely unconstrained state-sponsored hacking and disruption. The limitation of not directing these activities at Canadian infrastructure is clearly inadequate given the inherently interconnected nature of the digital ecosystem. Such activities are also bound to impact the privacy expression and security interests of Canadians and persons in Canada, and may threaten the integrity of communications tools such as encryption and anonymity software that are vital for the protection of human rights in the digital age.

In the case of CSIS's disruption powers, which are in some ways analogous to these new aspects of CSE's mandate, the government has set out a complex framework for prior judicial authorization and a longer list of prohibited activities. While we do not concede the adequacy of that framework, it is notable that, in contrast, CSE's cyber-operations activities involve no meaningful privacy protections, require only secret ministerial authorization, and involve only after-the-fact review.

Second, while the majority of CSE's activities cannot be directed at Canadians or persons in Canada, this is an inadequate safeguard against CSE's overreach in the face of unselected bulk collection. Bill C-59 exacerbates this privacy risk by creating a series of exceptions for the collection of Canadian data, including one which allows its acquisition, use, analysis, retention, and disclosure, so long as it is publicly available.

This definition is so broad that it plausibly includes information in which individuals have a strong privacy interest, and potentially allows for the collection of private data obtained by hacks, leaks, or other illicit means. Furthermore, it may encourage the creation of grey markets for data that would otherwise never have been available to government—a client with deep pockets.

The government has failed to demonstrate why this exception, as worded, is necessary or proportionate, or what risk it is meant to mitigate in the first place.

[Cara Zwibel, Acting General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association]

Yes, my apologies to the committee for coming in late.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association appreciates the opportunity to make submissions with respect to Bill C-59.

CCLA was a vocal critic of the Anti-terrorism Act passed in the last Parliament and initiated a constitutional challenge to a number of aspects of that law, which remains in abeyance pending consideration of Bill C-59. While this new bill has partially addressed some of Bill C-51's constitutional deficits, it has certainly not resolved all of them. The bill also grants our national security agencies a number of extraordinary new powers that have not been adequately justified and that do give rise to very real civil liberties concerns. The government has framed this bill as being about protecting both national security and rights, and CCLA supports both of these goals, and our comments and recommendations are made in that spirit.

We will begin by identifying the positive changes Bill C-59 makes to former Bill C-51, outline the issues that remain unaddressed, and finally, set out the new problems created by Bill C-59.

Since we certainly can't cover everything in 10 minutes, we'll also be filing a more detailed written submission. Beginning with the items that Bill C-59 has improved, we are reassured by the government's amendments to the terrorist speech offences. Without these amendments, the provisions violate sections 2 and 7 of the charter and may also undermine community-based deradicalization efforts. While the amended offence is arguably unnecessary, given the large number of pre-existing terrorism offences in the Criminal Code, counselling offences are a known quantity in the criminal law and follow a clear legal framework. However, the language of “terrorism offence” in the amendment would be better changed to “terrorist activity”, which is a defined term in the code.

On information sharing, Bill C-59 adds new proportionality and reporting requirements, which is a distinct improvement over the largely unaccountable system introduced in Bill C-51. However, the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” that triggers information disclosure remains unduly broad and circular. It is not clear why this definition is so much broader than the one included in the CSIS Act, and we remain concerned that constitutionally protected acts of advocacy, protest, dissent, or artistic expression, particularly by environmental and indigenous activists, will continue to be swept up in the process.

One of the most controversial aspects of Bill C-51 was the threat reduction powers granted to CSIS and the accompanying warrant provisions that appeared to allow for judicially sanctioned charter breaches. We do not doubt that there are times when CSIS may see an opportunity to take action to reduce the threat to the security of Canada. What is unclear is why this goal cannot be achieved through better communication and co-operation between CSIS, the RCMP, and other law enforcement bodies. This is a very significant shift in mandate that appears to ignore the historical reasons for separating law enforcement and intelligence in the first place, and there has been no convincing case made for why this shift is necessary.

Moreover, the legal framework for the exercise of these powers established in Bill C-51 was deeply problematic and clearly unconstitutional in our view. The scheme as modified by Bill C-59 is an improvement. It establishes clearer contours around what actions are permitted and what is prohibited, and the warrant scheme appears to be intended to ensure that the charter rights of individuals are respected. If CSIS is to continue to have these powers there are a number of ways in which we believe the scheme should be improved.

First, the requirement for CSIS to consult with other federal departments or agencies to see if they can reduce the threat should be amended to clarify that if a law enforcement body is better placed to do so, CSIS should not pursue threat reduction. Second, the list of measures set out in proposed section 21.1(1.1) only require a warrant where CSIS determines that they may violate the law or limit a charter right. A warrant should be required in any case where these measures will be pursued by CSIS. It is vital that the determination of whether a law is being violated or a charter right limited not be left solely to CSIS.

Finally, the new national security and intelligence review agency should be required to report on the number of warrants issued under proposed section 21.1, and the number of requests that were refused. SIRC does so now, and reducing reporting requirements is not consistent with Bill C-59's stated goal of enhancing accountability.

Some of the most problematic aspects of Bill C-51 received only cosmetic improvement or none at all. As this committee is aware, the passenger protect program continues to raise serious constitutional problems. The process by which individuals are placed on the list remains opaque, and proposed redress mechanisms are inadequate. Bill C-59 also fails to correct the flawed appeals procedure, which parallels the system in place for security certificates prior to the Supreme Court's Charkaoui decision in 2007.

While the no-fly list is undoubtedly different from being named in a security certificate, both have the ability to substantially interfere with the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of an individual and to seriously impact their lives and families. The current process allows the use of hearsay and secret evidence, without access to a special advocate able to test that evidence or to represent the interests of the listed person.

This committee recognized these profound issues in May when it recommended the use of special advocates in no-fly list proceedings, among other safeguards, and yet Bill C-59 does not address these concerns. It should do so by adopting this committee's initial recommendation. We would note that the terrorist entities list raised similar issues.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

I have one final question. You wrote an overview of C-51 in The Globe and Mail shortly after the bill was released. You said, “In a country governed by the rule of law, it should not be left for national security and other government agencies to determine the limits of their own powers.”

On balance, are you satisfied that Bill C-59 has addressed this concern?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for being here today, Mr. Therrien.

I have a question about the connection between speech and privacy. I think you would agree that free speech and the right to it and to privacy enjoy a very intimate and indeed interdependent connection. Bill C-59 would replace one of the most controversial features of Bill C-51, the advocating of terrorism offences in general, with a more traditional offence, that of counselling specific terrorism offences.

We heard just the other day from Professor Stephanie Carvin, who in a piece for The Globe and Mail, wrote:

This better respects freedom of expression while still recognizing that much speech — including terrorist recruitment and instruction — is a reasonable target for criminalization.

Can you comment on this change in Bill C-59 and what you make of it from a privacy perspective?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

I want to come back to the collection of information. When Bill C-51 was introduced, people were worried about intelligence agencies being able to spy on their computer activities. They wondered just how much agencies would be able to invade their privacy.

Do you currently see that as a problem? Do you think Canadians are subject to an excessive invasion of their privacy?

Do you think our intelligence agencies are likely to spy on our computer activities?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

You were actually very critical of Bill C-51 at the time. Now, you are not satisfied with Bill C-59. You consider the collection of information to be acceptable and see it as normal. However, you have concerns about Bill C-59's purpose. That's what you said this morning.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, Mr. Therrien.

We agree that, when it comes to the threat posed by terrorism, 9/11 was the tipping point for the public.

Last year, I visited NORAD headquarters. Although it concerned a military issue, you will see the connection. The people at NORAD, in Colorado Springs, told us that, prior to 9/11, they dealt with threats originating outside the U.S. and that the federal aviation agency was responsible for domestic threats. According to the commander in charge, after 9/11, the two organizations never hung up the phone. The communication and connection remained constant.

That leads me to the following question. In March 2015, you said that Bill C-51 would allow too many federal government agencies—up to 17—to share information. Do you still think the information sharing involving those organizations is too broad?

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

This is my last question. We promised Canadians to improve the accountability of national security agencies. We promised to fix the overreaching and in some cases unconstitutional nature of Bill C-51, and then Bill C-51 overall with Bill C-22 and Bill C-59.

Do you think we've done that?

[Prof. Wesley Wark]

Mr. Motz, I greatly appreciate the opportunity. I'll be very brief on this. I think these are very important issues and of course no piece of legislation, as sweeping as it might be, is going to capture them all, but there's lots of work to be done to truly modernize Canadian intelligence.

I'll give you my short list—there's a longer list—and Professor Carvin referred to these things in a different kind of dimension. I think Canada needs a comprehensive national security strategy. We've only issued such a thing once back in 2004, and we need a commitment to updating it. I think that we need, crucially, because Bill C-59 in terms of new powers is all about collection, an integrated, properly resourced, centralized intelligence assessment function. This is one of the great gaps in the system.

I think—this is a subject for another debate—we need a dedicated foreign intelligence agency distinct from CSIS. We need to move forward, as I said, with the proposed national security transparency charter. We need a revision and an updating of the Security of Information Act, which was part of the old Bill C-51 and is now I think completely out of date. We need modernized access legislation, particularly to resolve issues around access to basic subscriber information. There's more but that's my short list.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Wark, I want to quote a couple of things here.

This is a sentence from an article you wrote in The Globe and Mail shortly after Bill C-51 was introduced. You say, “Strengthened accountability may well be our best bet to ensure that new security powers are balanced against rights protections.”

After Bill C-59 was released, you wrote, “Canada may have restored its place in the world as it pertains to national security review and democratic controls, a place we gave up after 1984.”

This is a general question. I think it shows that Bill C-59 has made an important advance, but I wonder whether you could give us your thoughts on where we were and where we are now as a result of Bill C-59.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I wasn't party to the drafting of Bill C-51 so I can't comment on the circumstances that drove its manner of drafting. Certainly, Bill C-51 opened the door to the service doing threat reduction of any sort, which before was a disputed issue. We know from what the director has said approximately 30 times now that, I believe, the service is engaged in threat reduction, albeit never crossing the line to threat reduction that might violate a Canadian law or transgress a charter right. Bill C-59 opens the door to a more assertive use of threat reduction where it could violate a Canadian law, which would require a warrant, but sets up a warrant system that I think would survive an inevitable Constitutional challenge. It broadens the ambit of useful powers for the service.

I can give you an example where this may come up. In the course of an investigation, the service is engaged in an intelligence investigation, and it decides for a public safety reason it needs to swap out an explosive materiel in the possession of a target with an inert material so that it no longer poses a security risk as the service continues its security intelligence operation. Now it's possible for the service to get with warrant authorization to do threat reduction to break and enter for the purpose of swapping out that material, and Bill C-59 makes it more likely that confronted with that request the court would think this regime was plausible.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In her remarks, my colleague Ms. Dabrusin drew a comparison between Bill C-51 and Bill C-59. That is important for the committee. It is my understanding that Bill C-51 was enacted in response to an emergency at that time. It was very important for national security. Today, Bill C-59 is simply a refined version of Bill C-51. The latter was useful when it was adopted, but we want to clarify certain things.

Is that also your understanding?