Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Prof. Wesley Wark]

Just briefly, I would say something very similar but expressed slightly differently, which is that in my view, Bill C-51 had good elements and bad elements. I think that was also the Liberal Party's position, frankly, when it was the third party in opposition, that there were some elements they could support and some elements that they were committed to overturning, if they ever came into office.

Bill C-59 represents some effort to fix the so-called problematic elements of Bill C-51, but it also provides space to add what I think are important new dimensions that were not addressed in Bill C-51. I would think it would be a time-wasting exercise, frankly, to go back and just repeal and simply eliminate all of Bill C-51 from the law books. Better is the approach that's been taken here.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

My response would be that, certainly from my perspective, Kent Roach and I did not dispute the policy objectives that Bill C-51 was trying to accomplish, with one exception, and that is the new speech crime. We thought it was unnecessary. If one were to repeal those provisions that Bill C-51 introduced, one would be left still with the policy issues that would have to be addressed. I see Bill C-59 is dealing with those same policy issues but putting each of the powers on a more sustainable footing.

I would agree with what my colleague Professor Carvin said earlier, that not only is this just a question of constitutional niceties. It's also a question of certainty. Many of the powers that were introduced by Bill C-51 were clothed with such vagueness that the services might be disinclined to try to test them for fear they would run afoul of a court or a commission of inquiry subsequently.

Again, the policy objectives were real. The drafting, in my view, was insufficient.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

No, that's great. Thank you.

First, this is quite lengthy legislation that we've been discussing. One question that comes to me when I speak to people in my community—and we do have a private member's bill in the House that's proposing it right now—is to just repeal Bill C-51 and leave us where we were pre-Bill C-51. On that broad question, if I can ask either one of you, why not just repeal Bill C-51 and leave us where we were?

[Professor Wesley Wark, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on Bill C-59, the national security framework legislation.

I'd like to begin with a look backwards. I had the privilege 16 years ago of testifying before a House committee on the original Anti-terrorism Act. I think it might have been, in fact, in this beautiful room. One of the lessons I drew from that experience was that Parliament, if given the chance, could have a significant impact on improving draft legislation and on enabling a strong, if inevitably contentious, public debate. Given the professed openness of the Minister of Public Safety to constructive suggestions, I am optimistic that a similar result will occur from deliberations on Bill C-59.

Bill C-59 represents a very ambitious and sweeping effort to modernize the Canadian national security framework. It should not be seen as just a form of tinkering with the previous government's Bill C-51. There are so many elements in Bill C-59, and as you will have appreciated from testimony by my colleagues, I, like them, am going to focus on only a few elements of this.

The ones I want to focus on are what I call the key forward-looking elements of Bill C-59. By “forward-looking” I mean the genuinely new elements in this legislation, which pose particular challenges for a committee like this in terms of trying to understand their precise potential impact and efficacy. Those three brand new elements, I think, are particularly visible in parts 1 to 3 of the legislation, so that's what I am going to concentrate on, but I'd be happy to take questions on other aspects of the bill.

Part 1 of the act creates a national security and intelligence review agency. I fully support this concept and its rationale, and it is exciting to me to see it embraced by the government. The challenge will be ensuring that the architecture can be made to work. To bring the legislation to light, it will be important to ensure that NSIRA, as I'll call it, has the right fiscal and logistic resources, a high-quality talent pool in its secretariat, excellent working relationships with the security and intelligence agencies, and a viable work plan. It will also be important to ensure that the bodies that are to be reviewed have the resources and proper approach to the enhanced scrutiny they will undergo.

NSIRA part 1 needs, in my view, a few fixes. One has to do with the mandate, in proposed section 8. I believe that the national security and intelligence activities of the RCMP should be specifically listed at proposed paragraph 8(1)(a). It is important to be clear in the legislation that NSIRA will take over some of the current review activities of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP as it is doing for SIRC and for the Office of the CSE Commissioner. This should not be left simply to coordinating amendments buried in the back of the legislation.

The committee will also note that NSIRA enacts only a partial solution to the problem of dealing with national security complaints, at proposed section 16 and following. Its complaints remit is restricted to CSIS, CSE, and complaints regarding the RCMP that have a nexus in national security, and I would urge the committee to hear from the commissioner of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP about how well they think the legislation enables the NSIRA complaints mandate when it comes to the RCMP.

Finally, there's an important issue of membership, as you've already heard, in NSIRA. This is at proposed section 4 of the bill. The procedures proposed are, disappointingly to me, an automatic carry-over from SIRC, but SIRC membership has had a sometimes deeply troubled history. Membership size and profile need, I think, to be rethought. In my view, the SIRC membership should be enlarged to allow for more diverse and expert representation and to reduce the burdens on members hearing complaints.

NSIRA membership should also reflect, in my view, a wider range of expertise in security and intelligence issues, including expertise in security threats, on intelligence practices, on international relations, on governance and decision-making, on civil liberties, on community impacts, and on privacy. Those are seven sets of expertise right there.

The ability of NSIRA to get up and running once legislation is passed will be vitally dependent on the continued strength, capacity, and forward planning of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which will be NSIRA's core. It would be very unfortunate if anything occurred to weaken SIRC in the transition.

Part 2 of the bill is on the intelligence commissioner. Legislation to establish an intelligence commissioner to engage in proactive oversight of aspects of the work of CSE and CSIS is a novel concept that has no counterpart that I'm aware of among our Five Eyes partners. We are being truly innovative here. The concept that's been adopted, I believe, is a made-in-Canada solution to ensuring the legality and charter compliance of some of the most sensitive and important operations conducted by our main intelligence collection agencies, CSE and CSIS.

With regard to the function of the intelligence commissioner, I would like to offer two thoughts and one recommendation.

One thought is that it would be important that the system is and is seen to be a way of ultimately strengthening rather than diluting ministerial accountability, even while it gives some oversight powers to the intelligence commissioner. The second thought is that the ability of the minister to retain traditional powers of accountability while ceding some decision-making authority to the intelligence commissioner is linked in turn to the working of new reporting mechanisms proposed in part 1 of the act.

NSIRA will produce a much stronger stream of reporting to the minister on the activities of the key intelligence agencies, which, if that stream of reporting can be properly digested by the minister and his office, should ensure that the minister can issue authorizations that will pass muster with the intelligence commissioner. In this way part 1 and part 2 of Bill C-59 are intimately linked.

The recommendation I have to offer is that the intelligence commissioner function must not go dark. The Office of the CSE Commissioner, on which the function will partly be based, produced an annual report to the minister that was tabled in Parliament. This has been the practice since the commissioner's office was established in 1996. There is no such requirement at present for the intelligence commissioner. I believe the intelligence commissioner should be required to table an annual report that would review the commissioner's activities and findings.

Then there is part 3, the CSE act. I fully support the importance of creating separate, modernized legislation for CSE, distinct from the National Defence Act. CSE is one of Canada's most important, if not the most important, intelligence collection agency. It provides our principal contribution to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership. Getting the CSE act right is vital to Canada's interests and deserves close attention by the committee.

CSE received its first enabling legislation with the passage of the Anti-terrorism Act back in 2001. It is that legislation that is being modernized with Bill C-59. There were no changes to CSE legislation proposed in the previous Bill C-51.

The CSE act expands the current three-part mandate of CSE by adding two additional powers for what are called active cyber-operations and defensive cyber-operations. Let there be no mistaking that these are major new powers for CSE.

Both kinds of operations require ministerial authorization. Active cyber-operations engaging overseas targets require the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There have been some concerns raised in Parliament about the need for such consent. I think it is absolutely essential, given the volatile nature of such operations and their potential for blowback against Canadian international interests.

Active cyber-operations are what I call a digital form of covert operations, somewhat akin to classical Cold War covert operations designed to destabilize the capacities of a foreign adversary. In addition to blowback effects, they can also engage an escalatory spiral, as we saw, for example, in the aftermath of the cyber-operation known as Stuxnet, which targeted the Iranian centrifuge cascade that was central to their uranium enrichment program and nuclear weapons development. Active cyber-operations require high degrees of intelligence knowledge and technical skills, but they also require high degrees of political oversight and strong agency command and control.

It is also important to understand that many, if not all, of the operations that CSE might conduct in the future under its active cyber-operations mandate will be mounted within a Five Eyes context. I don’t think we’re going to be going it alone on these ones. This is all the more reason for there to be what has been called “a dual-key approach”. Neither active nor defensive cyber-operations require the consent of the intelligence commissioner, which is something the committee might want to look into, but such operations will be subject to review by the new national security and intelligence review agency.

The CSE act is a very complex piece of legislation. It might be a lawyer's dream, but it would be a layman's nightmare to read. It contains some very important provisions that are sprinkled throughout the bill with little connecting narrative thread. My recommendation with regard to part 3 is that there should be a values principle built into the legislation, perhaps at the proposed mandate section, to draw together some of these different component parts, and I will provide a brief on that.

I was going to add a brief set of remarks about what isn’t in the legislation, but I’m happy to address that in questions.

Thank you.

[Professor Craig Forcese, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Wesley has pointed at me, so I will go first.

I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the committee for inviting me here to speak on Bill C-59. It's always an honour to be asked to share my observations before this committee.

My colleague Kent Roach is appearing before you next week. He and I have divided up Bill C-59. Today I shall be addressing the new Communications Security Establishment act and the amendments to the CSIS Act.

I support most of the changes Bill C-59 makes in these areas. I recognize the policy objectives they seek to address. I believe the statutory language is usually carefully considered and robust, but I do have one serious concern.

I'll begin with the CSE act and make my single recommendation for today. I respectfully submit that this committee should amend proposed subsections 23(3) and 23(4) to indicate CSE may not, without ministerial authorization, contravene the reasonable expectation of privacy of any Canadian or person in Canada. Those two provisions are found on page 62 of the PDF of the bill.

I have provided a brief to this committee describing the rationale for this change, and I should disclose I've been an affiant in the current constitutional lawsuit brought by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association challenging CSE activities, but today I appear on my own behalf.

To summarize my concern, while engaged in foreign intelligence in cybersecurity activities, CSE incidentally collects information in which Canadians or persons in Canada have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is done without advance authorization by an independent judicial officer, and thus likely violates section 8 of the charter.

Bill C-59 attempts to cure this constitutional issue through a ministerial authorization process, one that involves vetting for reasonableness by an intelligence commissioner, a retired superior court judge. This is a creative and novel solution. It preserves a considerable swath of ministerial discretion and responsibility. It is not a full warrant system. Still, given the unique nature of CSE activities, I believe it is constitutionally defensible.

The new system will only resolve the constitutional problem if it steers all collection activities implicating constitutionally protected information into the new authorization process. The problem is this. Bill C-59's present drafting only triggers this authorization process where an act of Parliament would otherwise be contravened. This is a constitutionally under-inclusive trigger.

Some collection of information in which a Canadian has a constitutional interest does not violate an act of Parliament, for example, some sorts of metadata. The solution is simple. Expand the trigger to read as follows: “Activities carried out by the Establishment in furtherance of the foreign intelligence” or cybersecurity “aspect of its mandate must not contravene any other act of Parliament or involve the acquisition of information in which a Canadian or person in Canada has a reasonable expectation of privacy”, unless they are authorized under one of these ministerial authorizations that are subject to vetting by the intelligence commissioner.

This may seem a lawyerly tweak, but if we fail to cure the existing problem with CSE's collection authorization process, a court may ultimately determine that CSE has been collecting massive quantities of data in violation of the Constitution. Such a finding would decimate relations with civil society actors, placing CSE squarely in the crosshairs of a renewed controversy, and making it very difficult for private sector enterprises to partner with CSE on cybersecurity without risking reputational fallout themselves. With Bill C-59, we have a chance to minimize this kind of problem.

I turn to the CSIS Act changes. Bill C-59 does three things. First, it permits CSIS new authority to collect and potentially retain so-called datasets. Here the tension lies in balancing the operational need for CSIS to be able to query and exploit information against the privacy imperative. Rather than prescribe hard standards for what may be included in datasets, Bill C-59 opts for a system of in-advance oversight.

The intelligence commissioner is charged with approving the classes of Canadian datasets that the minister has deemed may be initially collected, and the Federal Court authorizes any subsequent retention of actual datasets. While I am wary of the idea of datasets, I cannot dispute the rationale for them and I can find no fault with the system of checks and balances. I have one concern with the retention of information that's queried in exigent circumstances. I don't know that the bill has the same checks and balances there, but I'm happy to address that further in questions.

The second change to the CSIS Act relates to revisions to CSIS's threat-reduction powers introduced in Bill C-51 in 2015. These provisions were rightly controversial. For our part, Kent Roach and I did not dispute the idea of threat reduction, but we worried that CSIS threat reduction done as a continuation of our awkward, siloed police and intelligence operations runs the risk of derailing later criminal investigations and prosecutions. This would be tragic from a security perspective.

From a rights perspective, Bill C-51 lacked nuance. It opened the door to a violation of any charter right subject to an unappealable, secret Federal Court warrant. The regime was radical, and in my view, almost certainly unconstitutional. It was, therefore, unworkable, whatever the strength of the policy objectives that propelled it.

Bill C-59 places the system on a much more credible constitutional foundation. It ratchets tighter the outer limit on CSIS threat reduction powers. By barring detention—a power I sincerely doubt the service ever wished—it eliminates concerns about the many charter violations for which detention is a necessary predicate. By legislating a closed list of activities that could be done where a warrant is authorized, Parliament tells us what charter interests are plausibly in play—essentially, free speech and mobility rights. I believe that if threat reduction is to be retained, this new system reasonably reconciles policy and constitutional issues.

Lastly, Bill C-59's CSIS Act changes create new immunities for CSIS officers and sources engaged in intelligence functions that may violate law during those activities. The breadth of Canada's terrorism offences makes it certain that a confidential source or undercover officer will commit a terrorism offence simply by participating with the terror group that they infiltrate. An immunity is necessary. The issue is whether there are sufficient checks and balances guarding against abuse of this immunity. Again, I think Bill C-59 does a good job of festooning the immunity provisions with such checks.

I will end, though, with a caution. Our conventional manner of siloed police and CSIS parallel investigations lags best practices in other jurisdictions that employ more blended investigations. As the Air India bombing inquiry observed, we struggle with what is known as intelligence to evidence. The government is working on this matter. We should be conscious, however, that what CSIS does in its investigations, whether in terms of immunized criminal conduct in intelligence investigations or authorized threat reduction, could derail prosecutions if not done with a close eye to downstream impacts. This issue might usefully be a topic of inquiry for the new security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to any questions.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

If anything, I actually thought the definition was probably widened in the current legislation as it stands. There was actually a limitation in C-51. I know I keep referring to Craig, but we podcast a lot, so we're kind of melding into one. First it was the chapeau piece, and that actually was taken away, so if anything, actually the ability to share information is technically broader under this legislation, which I think some people have concerns with.

But I agree that we absolutely, fundamentally have to protect information sharing, so if reforms are made, we have to bear this in mind. It's not just important for terrorism. Usually the classic example of passports is used—trying to stop someone with a passport from leaving the country—but also the Investment Canada Act, the ability to share information under that, is absolutely essential to our national security.

As it stands, I don't see major changes in this bill, but if reforms are coming from this committee, I think that should be kept in mind.

[Alex Neve]

No, we're still concerned. We think it is still overly broad and it stands in contrast to definitions that are used in the CSIS Act, for instance. There is a number of ways in which that definition and how it interplays with other provisions leaves open the possibility that people will be subject to information-sharing processes simply because they've been involved in protest and advocacy in a context where it perhaps connects up with opposition to critical infrastructure like pipelines, etc. That area of concern, which was of course a very serious problem in Bill C-51, in our view, has not been wholly addressed.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

Thank you for your question.

I will respond in English. Thank you.

I think one of the issues is that, without guidance, the security services do not know where to step. There is concern, for example, that with the broad scope of Bill C-51, knowing where the limits were was a challenge. One of the things that the service always worries about is another commission of inquiry. This is the number one thing you want to avoid because of the drain on manpower, resources, and these kinds of things. Without adequate oversight, without clear guidance as to where the lines are, the service becomes very scared about where it can actually proceed.

We've seen that, of course. Michel Coulombe and the new director have stated that they haven't really gone for the warranted powers in Bill C-51 that allow it to violate the charter, as far as I'm aware. You want powers that are clearly defined in law and that you know have the backing of the government and the backing of the courts, or else a kind of paralysis develops, in the sense that you don't want to do anything that could eventually end up with a commission of inquiry again. This is why I strongly support clearly defined disruption powers.

I believe disruption is important. One of the things I saw during my time was just the speed at which terrorism investigations sped up. They could go from being over two years to being a couple of weeks, when people saw the propaganda and would make the decision to leave.

These disruption powers are important, but I think grounding them in the charter and in interpretations of the law is absolutely vital to the actual operations of the agency.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Hello, Ms. Carvin.

In your presentation, you said that Bill C-59 would change the powers of CSIS officers. It is often said that Bill C-51 gave CSIS too many powers. There have been many calls to change that, and I would like to better understand the reason for those requests. Since you worked for that organization, you are familiar with the field. I would like to know more about that.

[Alex Neve, Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, committee members. Amnesty International certainly welcomes this opportunity to appear before you in the course of your review of Bill C-59. I'd like you to know at the outset that I'm here on behalf of both the English and francophone branch of Amnesty International Canada, and thus on behalf of our 400,000 supporters across the country.

Amnesty International has a long history of frequent appearances before parliamentary committees dealing with national security matters, be that studies of proposed legislation or reviews of existing legislation. That's not because we're national security experts. Our expertise, of course, lies in human rights. Our interest in Bill C-59, therefore, comes directly from our mandate to press governments to uphold their international human rights obligations. Documenting and responding to human rights violations arising in a national security context and pressing governments to amend national security laws, policies, and practices to conform to international human rights obligations have long featured prominently in Amnesty International's research and campaigning around the world, long predating September 11.

National security is often blatantly used as an excuse for human rights violations, clearly intended simply to punish and persecute political opponents or members of religious and ethnic minorities. National security operations have frequently proceeded with total disregard for obvious human rights consequences, leading to such serious human rights violations as torture, disappearances, and unlawful detention. Without adequate safeguards and restrictions, overly broad national security activities harm individuals and communities who pose no security threat at all. In all of these instances, the impact is frequently felt in a disproportionate and discriminatory manner by particular religious, ethnic, and racial communities, adding yet another human rights concern.

These concerns are by no means limited to other parts of the world. Over the past 15 years, Amnesty International has taken up numerous cases involving national security-related human rights violations related to the actions of Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies. These concerns have been so serious as to be the subject of two separate judicial inquiries, numerous Supreme Court and Federal Court rulings, and several significant apologies and financial settlements totalling well over $50 million to a number of Canadian citizens and other individuals whose rights were gravely violated because of the actions of Canadian agencies. I think of Maher Arar, Benamar Benatta, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, Muayyed Nureddin, and Omar Khadr. This is why we bring our human rights analysis to legislation such as Bill C-59—to ensure that provisions provide the greatest possible safeguards against human rights violations of this nature.

In commenting on the bill, I will touch briefly on five areas: first, the need for a stronger human rights anchor in the bill; second, the bill's national security review provisions; third, positive changes in Bill C-59; fourth, concerns that remain; and fifth, issues of concern that have not been addressed in the bill.

The first area is the need for a national security approach anchored in a commitment to human rights. In the review that preceded Bill C-59, we urged the government to use the opportunity of the present reform to adopt a clear human rights basis for Canada's national security framework. That is an approach that is not only of benefit, evidently, for human rights, but truly lays the ground for more inclusive, durable, and sustainable security as well. Currently, other than the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, none of Canada's national security legislation specifically refers to or incorporates Canada's binding international human rights obligations.

We recommended that those laws be amended to include provisions requiring legislation to be interpreted and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights norms. That was not taken up in Bill C-59 except for one very limited reference to the convention against torture. This is important in that it sends a strong message of the centrality of human rights in Canada's approach to national security. It is also of real benefit when it comes to upholding human rights in national security-related court proceedings.

Our first recommendation, therefore, remains to amend Bill C-59 to include a provision requiring all national security-related laws to be interpreted in conformity with Canada's international human rights obligations.

Second, we strongly welcome and support the provisions in part 1 of Bill C-59 creating the national security and intelligence review agency. Amnesty International has been calling for the creation of a comprehensive and integrated review agency of this nature since the time of our submissions to the Arar inquiry in 2005. This has been one of the longest-standing and most serious gaps in Canada's national security architecture. We do have three associated recommendations.

First, in keeping with the earlier recommendation I just made, the mandate of the review agency should be amended to ensure that the activities of security and intelligence agencies will be reviewed specifically to ensure conformity to Canada's international human rights obligations.

Second, the review agency must have personnel and resources commensurate with what will be a significant workload. We endorse the recommendation made by Professor Kent Roach that the provision allowing for a chair and additional commissioners numbering between three and six is inadequate, and would suggest that the number of additional commissioners be raised to between five and eight.

Third, we continue to be concerned about the review specifically of the Canada Border Services Agency. Unlike many of the agencies that will be reviewed by the new agency, the CBSA does not have its own stand-alone independent review body. The new review agency will have the power to review CBSA's national security and intelligence-related activities, but there still is no other independent agency reviewing the entirety of CBSA's activities, despite the growing number of cases where the need for such review is urgently evident, including deaths in immigration custody. This imbalance will inevitably pose awkwardness for the review agency's review of CBSA, and it underscores how crucial it is for the government to move rapidly to institute full, independent review of CBSA.

We'd like to highlight improvements. First, our concerns about the overly broad criminal offence in Bill C-51 of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general have been addressed by the proposed revisions to section 83.221 of the Criminal Code, which would instead criminalize the act of counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence, which was already a criminal offence essentially.

Second, the threat reduction powers in Bill C-51, which anticipated action by CSIS that could have violated a range of human rights guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and under international law have been significantly improved. However, we think it needs to go further, and there needs to be specific prohibition of the fact that CSIS will not involve threat reduction of any kind that will violate the charter or violate international human rights obligations. We also welcome the changes made to preventive detention, but have some recommendations as to how that can be improved.

We remain concerned about the Secure Air Travel Act provisions, which we do not think address the many serious challenges that people face with the application of the no-fly list. Much more fundamental reforms are needed, including a commitment to establishing a robust redress system that will eliminate false positives, and significant enhancements to listing and appeal provisions to meet standards of fairness.

Because I know my time is limited, let me end with some provisions that remain unaddressed in the legislation.

One of the most explicit contraventions of international human rights in Canadian national security law, going back over 20 decades now, is the provision in immigration legislation allowing individuals in undefined exceptional circumstances to be deported to a country where they would face a serious risk of torture. It's a direct violation of the UN convention against torture. UN human rights bodies have repeatedly called for this to be addressed. Bill C-59 passed on the opportunity to do so. We would recommend that be taken up.

Finally, Bill C-59 also fails to make needed reforms to the approach taken to national security in immigration proceedings. There were very serious concerns about Bill C-51's deepening unfairness of the immigration security certificate process, for instance, withholding certain categories of evidence from special advocates.

There needs to be a significant rethinking and reconsideration of immigration security certificate proceedings, rolling back those changes that were made in Bill C-51, and addressing still the other areas of concern with respect to the fairness of that process.

Thank you.

[Professor Stephanie Carvin, Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to speak on Bill C-59, the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform to national security in Canada since 1984. I would like emphasize that I am not a lawyer. However, I do have experience working in national security and intelligence, and I study this area for a living. Indeed, in the interest of transparency, I would like to state that from 2012 to 2015, I worked at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as a strategic analyst.

My comments are, of course, my own, but they're informed by my research and experience as the national security landscape in Canada has evolved in a relatively short period of time. All of this is to say that today my comments will be focused on the scope of this bill and will address some of the areas that I believe this committee needs to, at the very least, consider as it makes recommendations.

First and foremost, I wish to express my support for this bill. I believe it contains four important steps that are essential for Canadian national security and the functions of our national security agencies.

First, it provides clarity as to the powers of our national security agencies. There's no better example of this than part 3, the CSE act, which gives our national signals intelligence agency statutory standing and spells out its mandate and procedures to a reasonable extent. Given that the first mention of this agency in law was the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, this bill takes us a long way towards transparency.

Second, Bill C-59 outlines the limits on the power of our national security agencies in a way that will provide certainty to the public and also to our national security agencies. In particular, the bill clarifies one of the most controversial parts of the current legislation formerly known as Bill C-51, that is, CSIS' disruption powers.

While it might be argued that this is taking away CSIS' ability to fight threats to Canada's national security, I disagree. Having found themselves embroiled in scandals in recent years, it is little appreciated how conservative our national security agencies actually are. While they do not want political interference in their activities, they no doubt welcome the clarity that Bill C-59 provides as to these measures.

Let there be no doubt that the ability to disrupt is an important one, particularly given the increasingly fast pace of terror investigations, especially those related to the threat of foreign fighters. In this sense, I believe that Bill C-59 hits the right balance, grounding these measures squarely within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Third, Bill C-59 addresses long-standing problems related to review, and in some cases oversight, in Canadian national security. I will not go over the problems of our current system, which has been described as “stove-piped” by experts and commissions of inquiries. I will, however, state that the proposed national security and intelligence review agency, NSIRA, and intelligence commissioner—in combination with the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP—create a review architecture that is robust and that I believe Canadians can have confidence in.

Fourth, in its totality, Bill C-59 is a forward-looking bill in at least three respects. First, the issue of datasets is not narrowly defined in law. While this has been a cause of concern for some, I believe this is the right approach to take. It allows flexibility of the term, but at the same time it subjects any interpretation to the oversight of the intelligence commissioner and the minister. It subjects the use of datasets to the internal procedures of the national security agencies themselves—and limits who may have access—and the review of the NSIRA and NSICOP.

Second, it takes steps to enhance Canada's ability to protect and defend its critical infrastructure. Increasingly, we are seeing the abilities of states and state-sponsored actors to create chaos through the attacks on electrical grids, oil and gas facilities, dams, and hospital and health care facilities. Much of this critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. This bill takes steps to ensure that there is a process in place to address these threats in the future.

Third, Bill C-59 puts us on the same footing as our allies by mandating an active cyber-role for our national signals intelligence agency. I appreciate the legal and ethical challenges this raises, especially should CSE be asked to support a DND operation. However, the idea that Canada would not have this capability is, I think, unacceptable to most Canadians, and would be seen as unfortunate in the eyes of our allies, many of whom have been quietly encouraging Canada to enhance its cyber-presence in the wake of cyber-threats from North Korea, China, and Russia.

To reiterate, I believe this is a good bill, but there's room for improvement. I'm aware that some of my legal colleagues, especially Craig Forcese, Kent Roach, and Alex, of course, will be speaking to certain specific legal issues that should be addressed to make the law more operationalizable and compliant with our Constitution.

I encourage the committee to seriously consider their suggestions. However, I'm going to focus on four areas that may be problematic in a broader sense, which I believe the committee should at least be aware of or consider when it makes recommendations.

First, I think it's important to consider the role of the Minister of Public Safety. To be clear, I believe our current minister does a good job in his current position. However, the mandate of the Minister of Public Safety is already very large, and this bill would give him or her more responsibilities in terms of review and, in some cases, oversight. At some future date, the scope of this ministry may be worth considering.

Having said this, I acknowledge a paradox. Requiring the intelligence commissioner's approval for certain operations, as is clear in proposed subsections 28(1) and 28(2) of the proposed CSE Act, and potentially denying the approval of a minister is, in my view, at odds with the principle of ministerial responsibility in our Westminster system of government.

To be sure, I understand why this authority of the intelligence commissioner is there. Section 8 of the charter insists on the right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure. The intelligence commissioner's role ensures that this standard is met.

Why is this a problem? Canada has an unfortunate history of ministers and prime ministers trying to shirk responsibility for the actions of our security services, which dates back decades. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau used the principle of police independence to state that his government could not possibly engage in review or oversight of the activities of the RCMP even though the national security roles of the RCMP are a ministerial responsibility. There is simply a tension here with our constitutional requirements and with what has been the practice of our system for decades. If this bill is to pass through, it will be up to members of Parliament to hold the minister to account, even if he or she tries to blame the intelligence commissioner for actions not taken.

Second, despite the creation of no less than three major review agencies, there's still no formal mechanism for efficacy review of our security services. We will receive many reports as to whether or not our security services are compliant with the law, but we still will not have any idea of how well they are doing it. I'm not suggesting we need to number-crunch how many terrorism plots are disrupted. Such a crude measure would be counterproductive. However, inquiring as to whether the analysis produced supports government decisions in a timely manner is a worthwhile question to ask. Efficacy review is still a gap in our national security review architecture.

Third, while I praise the transparency of Bill C-59, I'm also concerned about what I'm calling “report fatigue”. I note that between last year's Bill C-22 and now Bill C-59, there will have been at least 10 new reports generated, not including special reports as required. It is my understanding that some of these reports are very technical and can be automatically generated when certain tasks such as, hypothetically, the search of a dataset is done. However, others are going to be more complex. More briefings will also be required. Having spent considerable time working on reports for the government in my former work, I know how difficult and time-consuming this can be.

Finally, and related to this last point, it is my understanding that the security services will not be receiving any extra resources to comply with the reporting and briefing requirements of either Bill C-22 or Bill C-59. This concerns me, because I believe that enhanced communication between our national security services with the government and review bodies is important. As the former's powers expand, this should be well resourced.

In summary, the ability to investigate threats to the national security of Canada is vital. I believe that for the most part, Bill C-59 takes Canada a great step towards meeting that elusive balance between liberty and security. In my view, where Bill C-59 defines powers and process, it should enable our security services to carry out their important work with confidence knowing exactly where they stand. Further, the transparency in the bill will hopefully go some way towards building trust between the Canadian public, Parliament, and our security services.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

Opposition Motion—ISIS fighters returning to Canada

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Madam Speaker, at the outset, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Scarborough Southwest.

Today, I am rising to speak against the motion brought forward by the Conservative opposition, and my reasons for doing so are straightforward.

Contrary to what this motion suggests, our government has already unequivocally condemned Daesh for committing acts of terrorism and genocide, as they should be. In addition, the Canadian Forces, law enforcement, and intelligent communities are fully engaged in combatting and preventing terrorism in all its forms, both abroad and at home. This is work of which we should all be proud.

Finally, Canadians can be confident that we have enacted a robust set of criminal laws, offences and preventative tools for law enforcement, to address terrorism, which are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, wherever and whenever appropriate.

In a moment, I will expand on how these measures are collectively working to keep Canadians safe, but first I need to express how regrettable it is to hear the opposition politicize national security time and again.

Far too often, we see the Conservatives wagging their fingers, lecturing Canadians, and pandering fear on this subject. However, one need only look at their record to see it is heavy on rhetoric and light on substance.

I hear hon. members heckling from the other side, and that will not change the facts. Let me tell everyone what some of those facts are.

During their 10 years in government, the Conservatives imposed dramatic cuts to national security. Indeed, in their last four years in power, they slashed close to $1 billion in resources to the RCMP, CBSA, CSIS, CATSA, and CSE. The opposition would do well to remember these figures, as I know Canadians will in sizing up the validity of this motion and the credibility of the Conservatives on the whole of national security.

Let me now say a few words about a number of the terrorism provisions within the Criminal Code that specifically apply to terrorist travel.

I would like to begin by acknowledging that thousands from around the world have indeed travelled to join terrorist groups and that this is indeed an important issue, which our government is grappling with domestically, internationally, and abroad with all our partners in the combat against terrorism.

Within the law as it exists in Canada, there are four specific offences of leaving Canada, or attempting to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing specific terrorism offences. In this way, the criminal law addresses the terrorist traveller phenomenon by having the substantive offence crystallize before the person leaves Canada and by applying the same maximum punishment to attempting to leave Canada, as well as leaving Canada, to commit these offences.

Over and above these targeted offences, the Criminal Code includes terrorism provisions designed to prevent the carrying out of terrorist activity and have a preventive focus. They are in large part designed to permit law enforcement to intervene and charge someone with a terrorism offence before a terrorist attack can take place. Such offences include knowingly facilitating terrorist activity and knowingly instructing someone to carry out a terrorist activity.

A particular example of this can be found in the participation offence, which is under section 83.18 of the Criminal Code. Terrorist travellers could be, and have in fact been, prosecuted under the offence of knowingly participating in any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to carry out a terrorist activity.

I will pause for a moment to say that in my former career as a federal prosecutor, I have first-hand experience dealing with these provisions. Again, I would draw the attention to Canadians that they can take great satisfaction and confidence in knowing we have a rigorous criminal law enforcement provision. I was honoured to serve with many prosecutors and members of the RCMP and CSIS, who continue to do a good job today in keeping our country safe.

As well, it is notable, in the current threat environment, individuals are often radicalized to violence and encouraged through online interactions and messaging. In Bill C-59, the national security act, 2017, the government proposes to revise the offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general to be one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, whether a terrorism offence is committed and whether a specific terrorism offence is counselled. The advocacy or promotion offence has been much criticized since its enactment in 2015 for being vague or overbroad. Bill C-59 proposes to revise this offence to use well-known criminal law concepts and facilitate its prosecution.

The bill continues to support the view that the active encouragement of others to commit terrorism offences, even without being specific as to which terrorism offence is being encouraged, should be an offence in the same way as it is an offence to counsel a specific terrorism offence.

Some of these criminal offence provisions have already been successfully used in court. To date, there have been 26 terrorism convictions in Canada and three trials are currently in progress.

I will now speak about preventive enforcement tools.

Certainly one of the most fundamental tools police and prosecutors have to keep Canadians safe from individuals who may have associated with terrorism groups abroad is the terrorism peace bond. This is a powerful preventive tool that can help to protect Canadians from terrorism offences.

In situations where police may not have enough evidence to justify charging a person with a terrorism offence, the terrorism peace bond is available to bring the individual before a judge rather than wait until it is too late. In such cases, the court has the power to impose “any reasonable conditions” to counter the threat posed by the individual concerned.

The Criminal Code also sets out that the provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, to prevent a terrorist activity from being committed, to include in the recognizance a condition that the defendant deposit, in the specified manner, any passport or other travel document issued in their name that is in their possession or control. If the judge decides that it is desirable, the judge shall add the condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies.

Furthermore, the provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, to prevent a terrorist activity from being committed, to include in the recognizance a condition that the defendant remain within a specified geographic area unless written permission to leave that area is obtained from the judge or any individual designated by the judge. If the judge decides that it is desirable, the judge shall add the condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies. Furthermore, If the provincial court judge does not add a condition, the judge shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding it.

With respect to the recognizance to keep the peace related to terrorism, this tool has been used by law enforcement agencies and by Crown prosecutors. The use of this tool has been on the rise since 2015. Specifically, there have been 19 applications for this recognizance in the past two years, compared to six between 2001 and 2014.

I would note that during the 2016 national security consultation, some called into question the threshold for a terrorism peace bond that was enacted in 2015 by former Bill C-51. That act lowered the threshold of the terrorism peace bond from “will commit” to “may commit”. After careful consideration, the government has determined that the lowered threshold is a balanced approach between the constitutional rights of Canadians and the need to protect the security of Canadians. This threshold has also been upheld as constitutional in the recent Manitoba case of Regina v. Driver in 2016.

Another preventive tool is the recognizance with conditions, which is available for law enforcement in the appropriate case to disrupt nascent terrorist activity.

The Canadian Passport Order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked in certain instances of criminality and where necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.

As can be seen, Canada already has a broad range of offences and tools to assist in the fight against terrorism. As the hon. Minister of Public Safety has said, we need them all and we use them all.

Opposition members have spent the last week criticizing national security, national defence, and deriding effective counter-radicalization measures that go a long way toward both combatting and preventing terrorism. Instead of that kind of partisanship we need a thoughtful debate that will strike the right balance between protecting Canadians as well as their charter rights.

I encourage all hon. members in the House to reject the opposition motion and to support the important measures this government is taking on this file.

Opposition Motion—ISIS Fighters Returning to Canada

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned in my questions to the parliamentary secretary, it goes without saying that we condemn the terrorist and violent acts committed by ISIS as well as by neo-Nazi groups, for example; we are disgusted by them.

Not only should all forms of terrorism be condemned, but we also find that our measures provide sufficient evidence to lay criminal charges. The parties all agree on that.

Mr. Speaker, with all due respect to the fantastic interpreters here in the House, it is worth repeating in both official languages that we find any violence committed by any terrorist group, whether it is ISIS or neo-Nazis, to be abhorrent and something we denounce. Insofar as we have the evidence required to go ahead with criminal proceedings and press charges, it should absolutely be done. That is not something up for debate, no matter which party is in power. On that, I certainly agree with the parliamentary secretary.

The sad part about trying to politicize a situation that is obviously very worrisome for all Canadians, as it pertains to their safety and security, is that when it comes to radicalization we have to ask ourselves what is the best way to address it. I heard the Conservatives say that this is not about people who are in the process of being radicalized, but about those who already were and have now returned.

With that in mind, it is very important to remember that the problem does not lie with our legislation or political will; in fact, we are talking about the justice system and not a political decision. It is about adapting to the standards of proof.

The way evidence is admitted in court is extremely important when we look at this particular issue of foreign fighters returning to Canada, in particular in what way intelligence gathered can be admissible as evidence in court. Even experts have had a hard time grappling with how we can lay charges with that evidence. That is something we acknowledge the government needs to look at and work on. It is certainly something that could help law enforcement press charges when they may be required.

When we are looking at pressing charges, it is not just what evidence is admissible. It is also the question of even laying terrorism charges, which is something we did not see in the previous Parliament under the previous government and that we have now seen twice under the current government. It is complicated, because as experts have said, often terrorism charges do not relate to the violence in and of itself, which usually falls under another part of the Criminal Code. Terrorism charges usually relate to the planning of said violence, which makes it very difficult, especially when we fall into the trap, as with this motion, of targeting specific groups.

I will explain why. Members will recall the horrible massacre in Moncton. By all accounts, this man committed a terrorist act. In fact, he confirmed that he wanted to attack the RCMP because it supported a government he thought was corrupt. I do not think this can be described as anything other than a terrorist act, and yet no one calls it that.

The attack at the Métropolis against a newly elected Quebec premier could also be considered a terrorist act.

However, in both of these cases, no terrorism-related criminal charges were laid. Criminal charges were obviously laid, but these charges fell under other parts of the Criminal Code.

This is a very important point, because it shows how difficult it is to judge motives and to define terrorism. This is unfortunately extremely complicated, and we need to work on that.

I also think it is important to trust the men and women who work for our national security agencies and police forces—in the case, the RCMP. It goes without saying that if they collect enough evidence, we can, and should, be confident that they will file criminal charges. The problem is how to obtain this evidence and whether the evidence is admissible. There is no point laying criminal charges if the person ends up being released because of a lack of evidence. This may be annoying, but this is the reality of our legal system, and we must respect that. This is exactly what terrorists want to attack. If we cannot respect this pillar of our democracy, we are doomed. This is very important here.

The other point is the question of resources, which is extremely important and which we raised over the course of the debate on what was Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We can change the law. We can make the strictest laws possible. We can say we are going to throw everyone in jail and throw away the key, but if the men and women in uniform do not have the human and financial resources to do the work, the law is useless. That is a key issue here.

The commissioner of the RCMP has said that the focus on radical Islam has taken away from other investigations at a time when we are seeing a rise in hate crimes, a rise in anti-Semitism, which are also forms of radical violence and are, in some cases, forms of radical terrorism.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not always a legal issue. It is sometimes the political will to provide the appropriate resources to the national security agencies and police bodies, something that, unfortunately, certainly was not done in the last Parliament, and there is more work to be done in the current Parliament. That is important to keep in mind if we actually want the RCMP, among others, to have the resources to do the work they need to do to keep Canadians safe.

Getting back to the subject of radicalization, which is at the heart of today's motion, I asked the sponsor why the Conservatives have been so intent on disparaging anti-radicalization efforts. I was told that this is not about being for or against radicalization, but right after his speech, his colleague spent at least five minutes sneering at anti-radicalization efforts. That makes absolutely no sense.

During the last Parliament, nothing of substance was done to fight radicalization. Although I frequently disagree with the public safety minister's stance on issues, I am pleased to see that something is finally being done at the community level to fight radicalization through a centre set up to fund local projects. The Conservatives scoffed at those projects in their motion, as did their critics in their speeches on the subject. That is a shame.

If we really want to keep our communities safe, we have to fight radicalization and make sure people do not leave in the first place. Extremist groups such as Islamic State and far-right groups such as neo-Nazis often exploit young people with mental health problems. We need to help those young people not because they should be treated as victims but to ensure public safety, which requires a concerted, community-wide approach.

I asked the parliamentary secretary a question about what is being done in prisons.

I overheard a comments from a Conservative that we are saying to not put them in jail, because they are going to be radicalized there. That is not what we are saying. We are saying that we cannot do one without the other. The experts all say that one of the worst places for being radicalized is in prison. If there are criminal charges brought and people are found guilty, certainly no one is debating whether they should be in prison. The issue is that when they are in prison, we need to make sure that the programs are there to get to the root of that radicalization that is taking hold and leading them to be a threat to national security and public safety. That is what is at stake here. If we just want to incarcerate and forget about it, to see no evil and hear no evil, those people, if they ever get out, will have slipped through the cracks and will not only be people society has not come in aid of but will be people who will pose a threat to public safety. If the objective here is to protect public safety, then let us make sure we are cutting the evil that is radicalization off at the root, and that means providing the proper programs.

As I said, I recognize the efforts the government has made to begin working with and funding best practices in some of those efforts, but more needs to be done. Again, prisons are one example. I appreciate the openness the parliamentary secretary has shown to recognizing that this is an issue and to working on it, but more needs to be done.

Let us move on to the matter of counter-radicalization, which is something else that is of great concern to me. What are we talking about? Some people go abroad and are labelled as “fighters”. In some cases, they do not commit any acts of violence, which is why it is so important to have evidence. In fact, sometimes these people are victims. Some of them are taken over there by their families. They are vulnerable people who quickly realize after arriving that they have made a mistake, and who then come back to Canada without committing any acts of violence.

Will some of these individuals be criminally prosecuted? Of course, but evidence is needed. Rather than heckling and shouting “yes”, we must understand the nuances of the situation. We have to understand that our system is a system of law. I am not talking about rights and freedoms. I am talking about a system of law, the rule of law. It is important to understand that simply making a list of people and sending them all to prison is not an effective approach to public safety. We have to have evidence, and we have to understand the challenges associated with that evidence, challenges that experts have told us about.

The Conservative member is heckling me by shouting “yes, we have to do it”. If we move forward with these criminal charges, we need to make sure that they will result in prison sentences. Rather than blaming the government and engaging in a senseless dialogue by claiming that some people in the House are seeking to jeopardize the safety of Canadians, we need to understand that there is work to do to ensure that the national security agencies and police forces that have the evidence they need to successfully prosecute will do so. Everyone would be pleased if that happened, because it would help keep Canadians safe.

Let us engage in a positive dialogue. That is the approach that we are advocating today. It is no secret that I disagree with the approach of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, but one thing is certain and leaves no room for debate: we want keep to Canadians safe and ensure public safety.

In that context, when we are looking at such an important issue as this one, to engage in dog-whistle politics and use expressions like “welcomed with open arms” and to throw things out about reading poetry, to denigrate counter-radicalization efforts, does a disservice to the men and women doing the serious work of making sure Canadians are safe, does a disservice to this House where we all believe in the importance of ensuring Canadians' safety, and does a disservice to the real efforts and debate that need to happen over the proper way of dealing with the situation.

As part of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security's review of Canada's national security framework, we travelled for one week, stopping in five cities in five days. We stopped in Montreal, where we had the opportunity to visit the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence. This centre is one of a kind in North America. It is so unique that it receives calls from families in New York who are worried about the possible radicalization of a friend, a family member, or even a child in some cases.

We sat down with the team at the centre and had a nuanced discussion. It was clear that these people fully understood that in many cases, the RCMP and our national security agencies have a role to play and a job to do if they are to catch those who pose a threat to public safety and security.

The collaboration between our police forces and national security agencies has been outstanding. They have also made an effort to reach out to the community and to concerned families and individuals. This work did not focus on any community more than another. An attack like the one committed at the Islamic cultural centre in Quebec City is just as troubling as an attack like the one that took place in Edmonton. Both are equally troubling, and the centre acknowledges that.

The people who fight against radicalization fully understand what we are saying today in the House. Yes, we need to consider prosecution. Yes, we need to make sure that anyone we can press charges against is actually prosecuted. However, we must also recognize that simply acknowledging one facet of an extremely complicated and important issue does not diminish the need to hold this debate and offer concrete solutions. Not only would concrete solutions help us ensure public safety, but they would also keep youth from falling through the cracks and possibly save them from the scourge of radicalization.

In closing I want to say, as I have said several times in my speech, that the minister and I certainly have our differences, and it is no secret in this place, but there is one thing to which we will always commit, and that is working together to ensure the safety of Canadians, no matter what the partisan issue is.

To do that, there is a lot that needs to be done. I have mentioned some of it: getting terrorism charges right, getting the peace bond process right, getting the evidentiary process right with regard to intelligence gathering. These are all challenges that we have in getting the counter-radicalization efforts right.

The government has taken some good steps. We think we can do more, including doing it in federal prisons, and making sure that, in some instances where there are best practices, there is more robust federal leadership despite the importance of supporting those grassroots efforts.

Those are all things on which we are ready to work with the government. It is part of the reason why it is so disappointing to hear the kind of hyperbole we hear today. When it comes to ensuring public safety, there are important measures that need to be taken. It is not about stoking and fanning the flames of fear, but rather about standing in this place and having the courage to take on these important challenges that we face, and that all experts agree are challenging but are at the core of the mandate we have as parliamentarians.

I am very happy to say that the NDP is committed to working with the government on all the points that I mentioned.

No proposal, whether Bill C-51, introduced during the last Parliament, or Bill C-59, should ever implement more draconian public safety legislation at the expense of rights and freedoms. However, that does not preclude concrete efforts from being made, for instance, providing more resources to the RCMP and other national security agencies and strengthening our counter-radicalization efforts. We have to do what we can to truly put an end to this scourge instead of simply focusing on one aspect of the issue and moving on.

There is still a lot of work to be done. Let us set aside this kind of rhetoric and ensure that we are doing our job properly because that is what Canadians expect from us.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the panel for being here.

I'm pleased that we're updating the existing Bill C-51, and I think there are some updates in here. I'm sure we all agree that in three or five years from now we'll be looking for more updates.

One of the things that has always been of interest to me and I think to Canadians is that, if we can disrupt and prevent things, it's always better to do that than it is to deal with the fallout afterwards. I wonder if Bill C-59 has changed the scope of the non-warrant disruption activities that could be designed to reduce threats and if so, how and why?

Does Bill C-59 require a CSIS officer to obtain a warrant to go to speak to a suspected person's parents about their child's radicalization or terrorist intent? I recognize that, when you go to a judge to get a warrant, there's a lot of work, a lot of time involved, and sometimes time is of essence. Would this then enter into that whole process?

[David Vigneault]

I will provide some comments, if the committee is comfortable with that.

First and foremost, it's important to say that all CSIS activities must comply with the charter. The minister explained the way the previous bill—Bill C-51, which became law—was constructed. There may have been an issue with the way it was constructed.

Bill C-59 essentially confirms that the law cannot create an opportunity to deviate from the charter. What it does in terms of threat reduction is to ensure that if ever we were to contemplate a threat reduction measure that would limit the freedom of someone protected by the charter, we would have to go to the Federal Court to apply for such an authorization. The Federal Court would then determine if the limit on that freedom is reasonable and proportionate, which the charter itself allows for. That is how the proposed Bill C-59 addresses the charter issue for the threat reduction mandate.

Also, the law will specify the types of activities that are contemplated, so that will be transparent in the law. I would then be able to interpret that, as the director of CSIS, to determine.... If it limits people's freedom, I have to go to the Federal Court for a test. If it's something that does not limit people's freedom, it's an activity I can do. The committee supervises our activities. The new agency would be informed and able to review the activity to make sure we have complied with the act.