Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Sibel Ataogul]

I certainly have some comments on the subject.

It obviously ties in with what the Honourable Nicola Di Iorio said about best practices in this regard.

We must always bear in mind that although we can draw inspiration from these practices, there's not necessarily a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in other countries, even some very developed ones. So we must be careful when importing what we consider to be other countries' best practices. It poses a problem.

We saw with Mr. Arar, and with everything the commissions showed, that information can be obtained under torture. Such practices are prohibited in Canada. However, the information can be shared and used by CSIS against people. Moreover, with Bill C-51, a chain can be established. It can justify an arrest, because it's believed the person could commit a terrorist act. Charges can be based on information of dubious origin, using secret procedures.

In short, this is what happens.

If the threshold for the consequences is reduced, that means whatever information you get under torture or under conditions that aren't acceptable in Canada can lead to consequences that are much more grave for the person involved.

That, I think, is where the problem is. If information has been obtained through torture, we must be careful not to make the consequences even more grave. That's what Bill C-51 does.

Furthermore, Bill C-51 allows all agencies and all governments to transmit the information as well, even though we don't exactly know where the information is from. That's even more problematic.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your remarks on this, Ms. Ataogul.

I'd like to know the following in relation to information-sharing, especially in the realm of human rights.

Some people say that Canadians have less protection when they're outside the country. The example that obviously comes to mind is the U.S., with its information collection under the Patriot Act. People who are not Americans don't have the same legal protections in this regard. They have no protection for their private data, for example.

I don't know if you have any comments about information-sharing with other countries, even our allies, and the problems this can cause by virtue of the powers granted by Bill C-51.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Ms. Ataogul, when you talked earlier you touched on Bill C-51 and what have you. One of the concerns I have there is that no legislation, it doesn't matter what, is ever perfect. I believe it's put in with the best of intentions, and even Mr. Cavalluzzo pointed out some faults with Bill C-22. In order to give police or authorities the power to detain someone who they have a pretty good idea could commit terrorism, if the clauses in Bill C-51 aren't perfect in your belief, what could be there to still give police the powers to do what they have to do?

[Sibel Ataogul, President, Association des juristes progressistes]

I will be addressing you in French, but, as you can see, I can certainly answer your questions in English.

I am here on behalf of the Association des juristes progressistes, or AJP. It's an association of lawyers, law professors, law students and other women and men who work in the legal field. Founded in 2010, it has several hundred members, and intervenes on a number of issues of current interest, and on recent laws and regulations.

In my own practice, I do a lot of work in the realm of constitutional law, and on the constitutional validity of laws. For example, I challenged a provision of the Labour Code that limited farm workers' freedom of association, a provision of the Highway Safety Code that limited the right to demonstrate, and by-law P-6 enacted by the City of Montreal. At the moment, I am challenging the pit bull by-law—this always makes people smile—but I think that principles related to the validity of laws are of great concern, especially at the AJP.

Our association stated a position when Bill C-51was enacted. We came out against the measures in the bill for a number of reasons. One significant reason was that, in our humble opinion, most of the measures in the bill probably violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That's why I'm here today to speak primarily about these measures. We intend to tell it like it is. A bill has been introduced to repeal certain provisions of Bill C-51, and consultations were promised during the election campaign. You will recall that the Liberal Party of Canada voted in favour of the bill, saying it would review the legislation later. We feel the time has truly come to do just that. Hence this presentation, which is the result of my colleagues' work. I won't spend much time on the subject being studied by the Committee; instead, I will focus on C-51.

I want to address two aspects. The first is the green paper, which was released to the public. The AJP has done a lot of legal education on the subject, and considerable public awareness work. What disappointed us about the green paper, and what disappoints us about these consultations, is that the green paper seems to present the current framework, including C-51, as something eminently necessary and/or positive. Naturally, we don't expect you to present the contrary view, but since this is a consultation, we believe the public should be able to comment with all the information in its possession.

It would have been interesting to note the controversies that the bill has sparked within the legal community, since most legal experts believe the law likely contains human rights violations. A constitutional challenge of these provisions, spearheaded by my distinguished colleague Mr. Cavalluzzo, is under way before the Ontario courts. We believe the public is entitled to this background.

As for the merits of the question, it's obvious we have a great deal to say, but I will limit myself to certain aspects of the provisions amending various acts, and will tell you why we think those provisions should be repealed.

The first consideration is the new crime of advocating or promoting terrorism. Specifically, anyone who knowingly communicates statements, while knowing that a terrorism offence will be committed or being reckless as to whether such an offence may be committed, is guilty of an indictable offence.

In our opinion, this provision serves no purpose, as there are already roughly 15 provisions governing all the terrorism offences, including terrorist or hate propaganda. The provision poses enormous problems with regard to freedom of expression. It is not just about people who have opinions different from that of the government of the day—we believe, of course, that this was the case at the time the law was enacted. It also applies to people with neutral positions, like journalists, professors and analysts. Such people might have an opinion about a conflict, but refrain from expressing it because that might cause someone, somewhere, to engage in some act. We believe the provision infringes freedom of expression, and that its usefulness has in no way been demonstrated.

On the contrary, this type of provision has an immense chilling effect.

Before my remarks, much was said about prevention initiatives, and about what is done to determine who is making such statements. You have created a provision for that purpose. I use the word "you", but I'm speaking in general terms, because I haven't heard anyone say they'd like to repeal this provision, other than something about a private member's bill.

You're ensuring that these discussions don't take place. Someone who might have thoughts of this kind, who needs support, and needs to talk with people from his community who would then ask him if he's really thought about what he's said, would refrain from talking about it, for fear of being charged under this provision. As a result, the discussions occur in somewhat more secret places. I think the provision is ineffective. In my view, it violates freedom of expression, and we will see what the court decides in that regard.

Furthermore, statements made in private benefit from no exception either, whereas other provisions do contain such an exception. I'm referring to discussions that take place in venues where one wants people to talk. One of the witnesses referred to a community where one wants people to discuss these ideas freely. Let me be very candid: as a lawyer, I would not advise my clients to have such discussions, due to the provision you've enacted.

Very briefly, I'd like to address the new powers granted to CSIS.

Mr. Cavalluzzo said that truly effective oversight power is needed, and I obviously agree, but first of all, we need to call on the Liberal government. It's the Liberal government that removed information-gathering powers from the RCMP, in the wake of the McDonald Commission.

You noted that granting these powers to CSIS was a step back. We're told that a judge can be seen beforehand. With respect, this does not account for our legal system, in which judges need to make decisions based on evidence. In this instance, a judge is being asked to guess whether a given measure could reduce a threat. So a judge who is not necessarily an expert in the field would have to determine whether a given measure would help prevent a threat, and after that, CSIS could act. Naturally, there is no way to present the judge with all the unforeseeable and spontaneous situations that can arise and justify granting a warrant. All kinds of things can happen in the course of a proceeding. Will it be necessary to go back before the judge each time?

We have a hard time understanding why this provision is needed, especially since, under the previous system, CSIS did not have these powers, and was already committing mistakes in good faith, according to my colleague Mr. Cavalluzzo.

I would now like to discuss a third point: preventive detention.

The Association des juristes progressistes believes the preventive detention scheme is already quite dubious under the Anti-terrorism Act, 2001. Indeed, the scheme permits preventive arrests if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist act will be committed. Even in such a case, a warrant must be obtained, whereas the provision proposed in Bill C-51 states that a peace officer can lay an information or arrest someone without a warrant, if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist act may be carried out.

I will cite the example given by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, which others have spoken about. It's the example of young Muslim adults having a lively conversation in the street. We don't know what they're talking about because we don't understand their language, but we wonder whether they might commit a terrorist act and whether they can be arrested preventively.

We believe this kind of provision goes very far and constitutes a major lowering of the thresholds for arrest and detention. For these reasons, it will probably be found contrary to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In the current context, where terrorism is the major concern and connections are made with the Muslim community, we believe it could lead to political profiling.

I was hoping to address other elements, but I will conclude my remarks with some comments on the no-fly list.

In our view, this list was already very problematic. Essentially, Bill C-51 codified the power of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to put Canadians on such a list. And in order to be removed from the list, one must apply to the Federal Court. I don't need to talk to you at length about access to justice, but I can certainly say a few words if you wish. It's not enough to show that the Minister was wrong; it must be shown that he acted unreasonably. It's a positively Kafkaesque scheme.

It's also interesting that people who are not entitled to fly can still go into schools and shopping centres, and to take the bus and the subway. When seen from this perspective, I think a no-fly list is absolutely useless. We have a lot of trouble understanding how it could be necessary.

I will conclude by telling you about certain reports on the subject from the United States. According to these reports, certain people's names were put on the no-fly list so they could be asked questions, and told that their name might be withdrawn if their answers were satisfactory. I am not saying that's the intention in Canada—far from it—but I think the risk is grave.

Obviously, we feel this violates the right to liberty. It's not the same thing as being arrested, but we believe it could violate the right to liberty, and section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Those are just a few examples of the problems caused by the provisions of Bill C-51; there is more.

Thank you very much.

[Paul Cavalluzzo, Representative, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Thank you.

In the presentation I'm going to make today, I want to talk about the relationship between parliamentary review by the committee that will be created by Bill C-22, and independent review, which will be done, hopefully, by an expert body that is independent of government. I have prepared a presentation, which I understand will be given to you after it has been translated.

Now, having been commission counsel to the Arar inquiry and a special advocate for a number of years, I can attest to the fact that national security agencies and police agencies working in national security make mistakes. I don't say that they do it maliciously. They do it innocently, but they do make mistakes because they are human beings. Indeed, in Mr. Arar's case, what happened to him was that he was sent to Syria for a year of torture as a result of inaccurate information given to the FBI and the CIA by our Canadian agency, the RCMP.

His case is not an anomaly. Many Canadians have been caught up in the response of our agencies to terrorism.

One of the main problems that the agencies are facing is that they're dealing in intelligence. They're not dealing in evidence. Intelligence has been described as “glorified rumours”. Intelligence comes from human sources, foreign agencies, and whatever, and it is often not reliable.

The other problem we have with our agencies is that they're not totally forthcoming with our adjudicative bodies when they do make mistakes. Indeed, last year and in the last few years, the Federal Court of Canada has been severely critical of CSIS because it felt that CSIS had not been forthcoming in respect of its mistakes.

The other aspect, which is very important in terms of why we need effective oversight and review, is that most of the activities of these national security agencies, like CSIS, are conducted in secret. They are conducted in secret. Indeed, even the court proceedings respecting the activities of CSIS are conducted in secret.

At the same time as their activities are conducted in secret, both CSIS and other national security agencies have unbelievably intrusive powers, which can intrude upon the rights and freedoms of Canadians. When we look at that total package, we have to say to ourselves that obviously we want to protect ourselves in respect of national security, but at the same time, we want to protect our fundamental freedoms, which are guaranteed in the Charter of Rights. How do we do that?

These are very important questions. Probably one of the most difficult questions in our legal system today is about balancing national security along with our fundamental freedoms, and I think the answer to that is effective oversight by a parliamentary committee and independent review by an expert body. Let me take you through that.

First of all, at the outset, let me say that I'm very pleased that the government is intending to create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee the activities of our national security agencies. I have a number of problems with Bill C-22, which I will share with you at the end of my presentation. I understand you're going to be dealing with it next week, and I have some comments on Bill C-22, but certainly, parliamentary oversight by this committee is a step in the right direction to strengthen our national security system, both national security agencies and national security reviews.

The question is, is it enough? My firm answer, having dealt with national security issues for the last 10 years and in dealing with top secret evidence and national security agencies, is that we need something more, and this something more has to complement the parliamentary overview of this committee or whatever committee there will be in respect of dealing with our national security agencies. On the one hand, we have oversight, which is done by a parliamentary committee, and on the other hand, we have review, which is done by an independent expert body.

Let me tell you the differences between that, because Commissioner O'Connor in the Arar report dealt with those concepts dealing with oversight. It's a good step, as I said before, to have parliamentary oversight by a committee. Most liberal democracies have that, and it's good that we're going in that direction.

What is oversight? Oversight deals with efficacy issues, such as how the national agencies are running and what policy system should be applicable to our national security agencies. It's a blue-sky review or analysis. As parliamentarians, you don't have the time to get on the ground to deal with the review issues.

What is review? Review looks at the national security agency, after the fact, on the basis of propriety against standards of lawfulness, policies, and other kinds of standards. It's what SIRC does. As you know, SIRC is the review body of CSIS.

On the one hand, we have parliamentary oversight dealing with systemic issues and policy issues, and on the other hand, we have review.

You may ask yourself, now that we're going to have parliamentary oversight with this committee of parliamentarians, we have SIRC, and we have the CSC commissioner. don't we have the best of both worlds? The answer to that is clearly not.

Over 10 years ago, Commissioner O'Connor, in the Arar report, said that our review system is inadequate. Now, with Bill C-51, the problems with review are even more glaring.

I will give you three examples of why the review system is not sufficient and adequate today.

First, our review system is siloed. It only has jurisdiction over one agency. It doesn't have jurisdiction over all of the agencies. All of our national security agencies operate jointly. You just can't have a review body over CSIS when it's working with the CBSA, RCMP, and so on. That siloed jurisdiction is totally inadequate.

Second, national security agencies have been given more and broader powers by Bill C-51, and our review agencies have to be given more powers and resources that deal with these expanded powers.

The third example is about personal information. Bill C-51 gives over 100 Canadian agencies the power to send personal information to 17 Canadian agencies, such as CSIS. Of these 17, 14 of these agencies receiving this information do not even have a review mechanism. There's a number of reasons why the system is fraught with difficulty and why we need a broader review mechanism that has authority over all of the national security agencies.

In the last minute or so that I have, I'll deal with the problems with Bill C-22.

The main problem is that the government can interfere with the mandate of the committee. The committee is given authority to do a national security review, unless the minister says it would be injurious to national security.

It's the same thing with respect to access to information. The committee can ask for information from a minister or an agency, but it can be refused on the basis that it's injurious to national security. The problem with that, as the Supreme Court of Canada said in the Harkat case, is that governments constantly over-claim national security confidentiality assertions not only in this country, but in the United States, the U.K., and elsewhere.

The decisions made by the minister under Bill C-22 to refuse information and to refuse this committee to investigate is not reviewable by a court, which is a power I have never seen in this country.

You'll see in my paper a number of difficulties with Bill C-22, which is going in the right direction, but it's not quite there yet.

Thank you.

[Roch Tassé, Acting National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

I'd like to begin by thanking the members of the committee for inviting us to share our perspectives on the national security framework.

The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group is a coalition of 43 civil society organizations in Canada. Among other organizations, it includes the major unions, NGOs, human rights organizations and churches. Our coalition was created in 2002 specifically to monitor anti-terrorism laws and measures in order to determine their repercussions on the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

Since its creation in 2002, our coalition has appeared many times before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. We were also heard by the O'Connor and Iacobucci commissions. Furthermore, we have intervened in numerous cases before the Supreme Court, on issues ranging from security certificates to no-fly lists.

I was going to speak about several challenges today, but given the time considerations, we will focus only on two aspects: a request to repeal the provisions introduced by Bill C-51, and agency oversight and complaint mechanisms.

We're fortunate to have Paul Cavalluzzo with us today to represent us. He was lead commission counsel with the O'Connor Commission, which, in 2006, tabled a report containing recommendations for a review mechanism.

I will immediately give the floor to Mr. Cavalluzzo, so we can delve into the heart of the subject.

Thank you.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

One last question, if I may.

You spoke about the importance of the network, but also a fear of criminalization, when a radicalization problem is reported. Some people say that increasingly broad and vague definitions in Bill C-51 risk undermining anti-radicalization efforts because of that very fear of criminalization.

Do you agree?

[Denis Barrette]

The state's surveillance and investigative agencies will always tell you their toolbox isn't full enough. That's normal. It's as old as the hills.

In my opinion, the proof has not been made, and it's up to those agencies to provide such proof. We must always ask—and this brings me back to the same question—whether an investigation would have been impossible without the anti-terrorism measures in Bill C-51, and in which respects these measures are helpful.

This is just one example among many. We must never forget that the context of Bill C-51 is terrorism and national security. National security is based on secrecy being maintained within surveillance agencies and the police. Consequently, the debates take place behind closed doors, because not only national security, but also, international relations, are involved. The information is from the outside. We're not arguing that it's improper for Canada to get information from other countries. We can't criticize that, since it's a normal procedure, and is bound to increase.

As we saw in the Maher Arar inquiry, the problem is that this information is often obtained through torture, or is erroneous. In fact, the two are often combined. Since the information is obtained through torture, it is often incorrect. This is why we often end up with investigations built on rotten foundations. It goes without saying that the results of those investigations are invalid. In short, the way investigations are conducted needs a thorough overhaul.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I'd also like us to address these organizations' duty to prove they need such powers.

In your view, have these powers been proven necessary, or, on the contrary, were the provisions that existed before Bill C-51 sufficient to ensure public safety?

[Dominique Peschard]

The fact that CSIS can take preventive action, even unlawfully under the legislation resulting from Bill C-51, does indeed bring to mind the actions of the RCMP. In fact, it's exactly why intelligence work was separated from police action at the time. The problem is that CSIS does not seek to gather evidence that will lead to criminal charges in a context where the accused will be able to defend himself in a fair and impartial process. Instead, things are done clandestinely.

As a result, people are sometimes subject to these police actions, as they were in the 1960s or 1970s, without being aware of it, and are then unable to contest the actions. The data banks of certain organizations can be destroyed, activities can be sabotaged, etc. Action is taken against individuals in the dark, as part of a framework that doesn't keep them informed, even after the fact. The rights of these people are infringed, but they have no way to challenge it. That is not an acceptable way to protect our country.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us.

My question is for Mr. Peschard and Mr. Barrette.

Reference was made to the McDonald Commission. Following that commission, it was decided to split the powers. As a result, we have the RCMP on the one hand, and CSIS on the other. Many people, myself included, argue that because of the powers included in Bill C-51, that separation is being eliminated, despite having been conceived for a very specific reason. Since your organization has been around for a long time, you've probably seen things progress, or regress, in that regard. I'd like you to give us more details about this situation.

[Denis Barrette, Spokesperson, Ligue des droits et libertés]

Garde à vue, or judicial police custody, has existed for a long time in France. Before the trial, the investigating judge asks questions, which the suspect must answer. These measures were included in the Anti-terrorism Act that results from Bill C-51. There's judicial investigation, and there's preventive detention, which the authorities want to extend to six days, as it has been in France. That said, France experienced the Bataclan attack and other incidents. The effectiveness of these measures is open to question. We, at the Ligue des droits et libertés, greatly doubt whether these types of measures are effective.

You'll recall the Air India affair, the only instance where investigative measures were used during an inquiry. It was considered a total fiasco. The trial of the people thought to be guilty fell to pieces. The evidence had not been gathered effectively.

The more tools the police are given, the more they are likely to use them. One should not assume the police would be unable to do their work effectively without these tools. Naturally, they will always say they need more tools. But one must ask whether they're really necessary.

As I said, this principle already existed in France, where the investigating judge is as independent as the president when he subjects a suspect in police custody to an examination for discovery. The system is different from ours. The police tell the judge responsible for the judicial investigation what questions to ask. In other words, the judge almost parrots—I apologize for the image—the police investigation. The prosecution gives the questions to the judge, who tells the suspect that he must answer. That is what Justice Fish said in his dissent, though not in those words...

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

I'd like to talk about that. Private Vincent was killed here in the Montreal area and Corporal Cirillo was killed in Ottawa two years ago. So-called experts say that if they'd have had the powers back then to detain, Vincent and Cirillo may still be alive today. You talk about some terrorist plots solved or that didn't happen. Just recently in Strathroy, Ontario, the powers that allowed the police to get that guy before he did something were in Bill C-51. So I don't buy your argument on that, in a respectful way.

Moving on, you quoted terrorism threats, and you mentioned some other events where numbers of people are killed. An airplane crash, car accident, or whatever accident is exactly that: an accident. Terrorism is no accident.

To go back to your point about holding a suspect for a period of time, I believe you said a week or more, how do we keep that identified threat off the street if they can't detain them? We've already talked about times when they knew a person was a threat; because they didn't have the powers to pull them off the street, the crimes were played out.

Perhaps you could answer that.

[Joël Lightbound, Liberal, Louis-Hébert, QC]

I invoked Bill C-51 just by way of example, but I was wondering if you had general thoughts about paragraph 8(2)(b) as an exception to information sharing.

[Vincent Gogolek]

It is confusing, and I think the government itself is confused, because in its backgrounder to the green paper on national security and Bill C-51, it talks about that very problem. At one point it says that because the act authorized disclosure, it satisfies paragraph 8(2)(b), which is the lawful authority exception, but the act says that it's subject to other acts that prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information.

You have two provisions that seem to contradict each other. Our view is that it is subject to the Privacy Act because of that statement in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act that says it is subject to acts and regulations that provide those protections.

It's not an easy question, and that is why it's important to improve the Privacy Act as much as possible.