Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Matt Sheehy, Director (Canada), Jetana Security, As an Individual]

Thank you. I'll read my statement, sir.

I would like to thank the chair and the members of the committee for inviting me here today to testify. The last time I appeared as a witness here in Ottawa was back in 2002, just a few months after the terrorist attack on 9/11. I was in front of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence as the chair of the security committee for the Air Canada Pilots Association at that time.

What strikes me is that it's over 13 years ago, and we find ourselves still struggling to find answers and solutions to the most critical issues of our time. We had just pushed back at 9 a.m., for an on-time performance from gate 21 in Montreal on that fateful, crisp, clear day, September 11, 2001. We had a minor mechanical problem, so we decided to return to the gate to try to fix the problem. Needless to say by the time we returned to the gate all our departures were cancelled and the world as we knew it had changed forever. I'm sure that tragic day is indelibly seared on all our collective memories, and I'm sure that we are all committed to preventing such a terrible attack from ever happening again. The question for us is: how do we accomplish this mission?

Since I've been involved in the security community for over 30 years in one capacity or another—I've been on the front lines as a pilot and as an auxiliary police officer—I can say without a doubt that we are in a very dangerous and highly fluid and unpredictable environment.

I think it is vital that we must try to overcome our differences and realize that, unless we can put aside our partisan and political differences, we will lose this battle. There's a real urgency to what this committee is tasked with, and that is to work through the issues and positions, pro and con, and come up with viable solutions. Let's put aside our partisan issues and make this process work.

I reviewed the anti-terrorism act, 2015, Bill C-51 with a front-line perspective. I found it to be an excellent piece of legislation that will address many of the outstanding issues and gaps in our legislative needs and requirements. The new act moves the strategy to a more proactive and early intervention, rather than a less static response of reactive reinforcement. Part 2, the secure air travel act, again, is getting out in front of the threat as well by not only interdicting would-be sympathizers from reaching their fellow travellers in the conflict areas, but it is also an effective strategy to find and prevent misguided and disaffected young radicals from travelling to what in many cases are their own deaths.

This new act also provides our law enforcement and security agencies more options and more latitude to not only intervene at a much earlier time in an individual's radicalization, but also provides a more integrated intelligence sharing that will enhance the accuracy of decision making. We have to keep in mind the always-demanding time constraints that can make the difference between a successful interdiction and a missed opportunity.

I understand how important it is to have an effective oversight mechanism. I think the introduction of a more robust and more resourced Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, with a clear oversight mandate, a schedule of audits, and a mandated reporting system would probably satisfy most of the concerns.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

Welcome to the second-hour session of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studying Bill C-51.

We welcome our witnesses here today. For the second hour, from the Centre for Security Policy, we have Clare Lopez, vice-president, research and analysis. We have Kyle Shideler, the director of the threat information office, as well. We're glad your arrangements allowed you to get here in time. Thank you very kindly.

From the Air Transport Association of Canada, we have John McKenna, president and chief executive officer, and also Michael Skrobica, senior vice-president and chief financial officer. As an individual, we have Matt Sheehy, director, Canada, for Jetana Security.

We will go ahead and start with opening remarks. For each organization, your remarks will be limited to a maximum of 10 minutes. Of course, if you could keep them even briefer. That would certainly be appreciated in that it will allow us more time for Q and A.

We will start off with Mr. Sheehy. You have the floor, sir.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank all the witnesses who are at this table and who are joining us by video conference. We greatly appreciate it.

My first question is for Ms. Housty.

The federal government monitored and gathered information on certain peace activists, including Cindy Blackstock, and even Pamela Palmater, who testified before us just a few days ago.

Are you concerned about the provisions in Bill C-51 that are related to the exchange of information or the definition of what constitutes a threat to the security of Canada?

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

I don't want to take too much time, and I know you raised some concerns about consent of the Attorney General in here as well, but we'll have to talk to some of the Justice people about the fix.

The other point you raised was that terrorism offences in general are those under section 83.01 of the Criminal Code. You assumed that's what terrorism offences were. I would suggest your assumption is wrong. Based on the testimony that has come before committee, there's a lot of concern that the bill is much too broad as to what terrorism offences are versus what is outlined in the Criminal Code. Some have suggested—and I'm not sure whether it was the Bar Association or who—that they should be restricted to what is defined as terrorism offences in the Criminal Code, so we'll look into that. I just want to point that out, and you can look at that, and maybe we can have a discussion on that later on. But I think you're wrong in assuming that the terrorism offences in Bill C-51 are those defined in the Criminal Code.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you. My next question will be for Mr. Matas or Mr. Kurz, whoever wants to respond.

Mr. Matas, I believe you said previously that many of the critics of the bill are advocates of the status quo, the old balance. However, the world has changed and the balance has to change too. The victims and potential victims need better protection than they have had at present.

We heard that, obviously from you, in terms of the number of direct activities against the Jewish community. We also heard it from the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, as well as from other witnesses here. I wonder if you could explain why you see how Bill C-51 is important and how it will affect this.

[Tom Stamatakis]

I would have to cart in, in some cases, in a complex investigation, the pages and pages of documents that go into successfully obtaining a warrant to search, for example.

I'll just go back to Bill C-51 in terms of the provisions around extending the period that someone could be detained. I guess a perspective I would offer is that being able to take some action and detain someone for a period of time so that you can properly investigate probably gets you to a better place in terms of making sure that, when you are detaining someone with the intent of charging them with an offence, you have all of the evidence you should have in order to be able to pursue a charge like that. That is opposed to the alternative, which we currently have, that often puts police organizations under a lot of pressure and makes it very difficult to take any action, even though we have pretty good evidence to support that there's some risk to the public.

I just don't see, in the provisions contained within Bill C-51, some of the things that I know some of the witnesses have suggested.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Chair, and thanks to the witnesses for coming. My first set of questions will be for Mr Stamatakis.

We've heard a lot of different things on Bill C-51, so I would like you to think about this. In your reading of the bill, do you see where the info-sharing act could label or criminalize someone for terrorism? This is an argument that seems to conflate information sharing and the Criminal Code. What are your thoughts or comments on that?

[Jessie Housty]

Yes, I have really deep concerns that the kinds of practices that Bill C-51 would allow, and that similar pieces of legislation allow, do a great deal of damage to first nations people, or have the potential to do a great deal of damage to first nations people, who are defending their rights and interests.

I believe that bills like this serve to perpetuate the incredibly racist stereotypes that already severely problematize relationships between first nations and mainstream Canadian society. More broadly, I have deep concerns about any party or government that, as a practice, makes caricatures and bogeymen out of any marginalized group to build favour with its voter base.

My strong belief is that we all have a fundamental choice about whether we want to build bridges or burn them, and those choices are reflected in everything from a party's policies and practices to its election messaging. All I can say is that Canadians are watching, and I have faith that progressive values will win out over race-baiting and fearmongering.

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill, MB]

Thank you.

I also want to echo that the Canadian Bar Association made the claim that first nations groups should be very concerned by this legislation, of course, echoing what you've said here today and what other indigenous witnesses have said to us.

Do you think that C-51 has the potential, much like other legislation we've seen from this government, to engage in race-baiting and division against indigenous people in our country?

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill, MB]

Thank you.

Thank you to all of our witnesses.

Ms. Housty, thank you very much for joining us today from British Columbia. We certainly appreciate your testimony as a young indigenous woman and an activist. Your perspective is unique, given the discussions we're hearing today. I know what you've brought forward is on behalf of many young indigenous people who are on the front lines similar to you.

You've shared your opposition to C-51, you've outlined some key concerns that we can glean from, and you've echoed other speakers we've heard in this committee. Given your activism on the front lines, I'm wondering if you can tell us briefly what you're up against and why you and so many young indigenous people where you are take to demonstrations to get your voices out.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much. I am going to go over now to peace bonds and preventive detention.

Could you comment on other Criminal Code amendments being proposed in the legislation, namely the lessening of the threshold for peace bonds and preventive detention, given that the recognizance with condition tools have not been used?

Do you believe in lowering that threshold but—and this is the pivotal part—ensuring that there is judicial approval and review of detention and that it could be a valuable tool for front-line law enforcement? Of course, to police officers, peace bonds are something that happens very frequently. This is specific, of course, to terrorism. We also know that, encapsulated in that proposal in C-51, judges can put on them any conditions that they deem necessary, including reporting back and other conditions.

Do you believe they would be useful tools? I wonder if you could comment on them in your experience.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you, to the witnesses, thank you for appearing today.

With no surprise, my first questions will be to Mr. Stamatakis.

Mr. Stamatakis, today, we heard from Ray Boisvert, a former member of CSIS, in—quite frankly—senior positions. He echoed some of your concerns with regard to information sharing that often, not only in the world of security that he lived in, but in my experience.... You mentioned the right hand and left hand not knowing what they are doing. As we have seen in the past with terrible crimes being committed, we were unable to find who the perpetrator was. Yet if the information had been shared within police forces—I can start rhyming them off and I think you would know as many, if not more, than I do—we would have solved those crimes and perhaps even saved lives in the interim.

I'm going to direct your attention to that part of Bill C-51 that promotes information sharing. I wonder if you can comment on that from your perspective, after having read the bill, making note that what may seem like a minor incident or some minor piece of information to one entity might just be the tipping point for another. In other words, with something that seems inconsequential, somebody may be doing a project, and all of a sudden that piece of information now connects a lot of dots, and they can solve or find a perpetrator.

Could you make some comments on Bill C-51 in relation to information sharing amongst departments?

[Jessie Housty]

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for the invitation to speak to you today. As I have been introduced, my name is Jessie Housty. I am a first nations woman from the Heiltsuk Nation, who come from the outer coast of British Columbia. The geography of my homeland is part of western Canada's front line of activism in response to multiple forms of resource extraction.

I serve my people as an elected councillor on the Heiltsuk Tribal Council. However, I do not come here today to speak to you as a councillor or on behalf of the Heiltsuk Nation. I speak to you today on my own behalf. I am an activist. I am a storyteller. I am a community organizer. My work at its core is grounded in a desire to protect our lands, waters, and cultural practices for my generation and for future generations. I speak to you today from that place.

In my work, and under current laws and regulations, I have witnessed the extent to which first nations people asserting their sovereignty are already labelled as radicals and agitators. In speaking to you today, I intend to share some specific concerns around the further implications that Bill C-51 may have for indigenous nation-building.

In summary, I am concerned about the bill's expansion of state power to place people under surveillance to monitor everyday activities. I have concerns that the bill will authorize criminalization of activities involved in advancing and protecting our rights and title, indigenous dissent and activism, and more broadly, democratic activities that are based on a goal to protect and improve our environment for our generation and for future generations. I am also concerned that this will give CSIS powers to act physically to disrupt the peaceful protests that form a strong part of the foundation of our attempts to uphold our rights, interests, and sovereignty as first nations people.

Before I begin my own comments, I would like to acknowledge and adopt the testimony of several witnesses who have spoken before me. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the advocacy and testimony of National Chief Perry Bellegarde of the Assembly of First Nations, Grand Chief Stewart Phillip of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs and Dr. Pam Palmater. They have spoken aptly to many concerns of first nations people and I echo their analysis of the proposed bill.

I will now speak briefly of two specific concerns about the proposed bill. First, regarding the proposed security of Canada information sharing act, it is my opinion that this should not be enacted. Other witnesses, including professors Roach and Forcese have spoken at length about issues with the proposed act, so I intend to keep my comments brief.

The stated purpose of the security of Canada information sharing act is to encourage and facilitate information sharing between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine the security of Canada. The language in the act is very broad and subjective, and I am concerned that it will result in unnecessarily classifying certain activities as terrorist in nature.

Unfettered access to information and the ability to share it widely with any person for any purpose is dangerous and fundamentally disturbing. Upholding ideals that are not considered to be in the national interest, ideals like first nations' right to sovereignty, may, under Bill C-51, open individuals to harassment and persecution with little ability to answer to the information being collected and shared about them. I am concerned that this may result in a chill on non-violent and direct action, the very action my community utilizes to mobilize support for acknowledgement of our rights and interests.

Protests and demonstrations have often been a key element of first nations' efforts to assert sovereignty and uphold rights, in keeping with widespread cultural values around business being conducted in a public and inclusive way. Fear of legitimate action being caught in the wide net of this proposed bill may have the effect of oppressing an important expression of nation-building efforts by first nations people.

I have heard Ms. Roxanne James explain to some witnesses that the exemption for lawful protests must be read with the rest of the section and that the activities must be those that undermine the security of Canada. However, I am concerned that this is too subjective as, if the cause being put forward is not supported by the government of the day, it may be labelled as an activity that undermines the security of Canada. My concerns are not allayed by the present wording of the bill.

Second, I would like to speak briefly to the issue of additional CSIS powers. Bill C-51 proposes troubling amendments to the CSIS Act, permitting CSIS, if it has reasonable grounds to believe that an activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada, to take measures within or outside Canada to reduce the threat.

With these changes, democratic protest movements with tactics that do not square in every way with even municipal law will not have the benefit of exclusion for lawful protests. They may be the subject of CSIS investigation and may even be subject to CSIS disruption.

I am troubled by the trend of the scope of lawful protest becoming increasingly narrowed, with powers of physical enforcement being expanded to CSIS with even less accountability and oversight than we see at present. I am specifically concerned that the new powers contemplated to be granted to CSIS will allow CSIS to potentially disrupt peaceful first nations protest movements for recognition of our rights and title. I echo Dr. Palmater's concern that any expression of first nation sovereignty is at risk of being construed as a threat to national security insofar as it is inherently a threat to Canada's sovereignty.

As a first nations woman I am guided first and foremost by my Heiltsuk laws. At the foundation of Heiltsuk law is the principle that all business is carried out in a public and transparent way. My concern is that peaceful protest movements around rights and title may now be captured as a security issue and addressed with little oversight behind closed doors, at odds with the way I organize, with the way my people carry themselves, and with the way my laws are carried out. This is especially frustrating given the intent and foundation of our practices and the laws of our ancestors, which strive to be peaceful and non-violent. If there were more understanding of our traditional first nations laws and values, I believe there would be less suspicion of us and less concern about violence.

In summary, my view is that this bill represents a real threat to the tool box that indigenous peoples rely on for advancing our rights and title. For that reason, as well the many reasons that other witnesses have so capably spoken to, it is my opinion that the bill should not be enacted.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you, and I look forward to your questions.

[Tom Stamatakis, President, Canadian Police Association]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to appear before you this evening as you continue your study into Bill C-51.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chair, I'm here this evening on behalf of the Canadian Police Association, an organization that represents 60,000 front-line law enforcement professionals, which includes both civilian and sworn members in every provincial and municipal police service across the country.

As is my habit when appearing before you, I am going to try to keep my opening comments as brief as possible to allow you enough time as you need for questions. As I've been following the debate on Bill C-51 very closely, I would like to begin by offering the context around my appearance here tonight, and where I believe I can offer particular insight that might benefit you all in the course of this particular study.

There's no question that the issue of oversight has become a focal point in the discussions around our security and intelligence services, both here in Parliament and among the public in general.

As a front-line police officer myself, I'll be the first to admit that my experience is not as a covert intelligence officer, but it is as someone who has dealt with civilian oversight in the public safety sector on a daily basis, in a practical and not academic or theoretical setting. That's not to suggest other witnesses who have appeared before this committee, and who have commented publicly on this proposed legislation, haven't raised interesting questions and concerns, but in my experience simply calling for more oversight, without examining the practical applications and consequences of that oversight, is only giving half of the story.

Let me give you an example. Here in the province of Ontario, all professional law enforcement officers are subject to no less than three separate civilian oversight agencies: the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, the Special Investigations Unit, and the Ontario Civilian Police Commission. Despite these multiple layers, any time an unfortunate incident occurs that involves law enforcement personnel, the calls for additional oversight come quickly from almost all sectors.

This example isn't meant to suggest that there isn't a role for oversight to play in the public safety sector; however, I would take issue with calls for oversight bodies to take a more active role in the operational nature of the jobs we entrust to highly trained and very accountable professional law enforcement, whether a police officer employed by a federal, provincial, or municipal agency or an intelligence officer employed by the federal government.

Those who have criticized the Security Intelligence Review Committee for only providing "after the fact" oversight often underestimate how difficult real-time operational oversight can be to achieve, particularly in the context of a fast-moving investigation with very real public safety consequences. Those criticisms also undervalue the often positive effect that ex post facto oversight can have in our industry. Identifying where inappropriate actions may have been taken or where different and more positive decisions could have been made is the very foundation of our services and the training and education that often come from those service reviews.

From a law enforcement perspective, I'd suggest that while discussing whether an oversight body like SIRC has adequate resources to handle the role they've been given is important, perhaps asking whether the resources necessary to properly train our law enforcement and intelligence officers in the new powers they're being granted with this proposed legislation might be equally, if not more, important.

As the saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. That being said, there are a lot of positive steps being taken within Bill C-51 that our association wholeheartedly supports.

I know the members of this committee have heard almost two weeks' worth of witnesses on these issues, so I won't go too deeply into the details or repeat what others have already said, but provisions that allow reasonable exchanges of information, where it pertains to national security concerns, among government departments will help alleviate one of the biggest problems facing public safety in this country—that the left hand often isn't allowed to know what the right hand found out six months ago.

In fact, I would suggest that while it may not be a popular opinion, given the multi-service nature of most national security investigations, and the fact that municipal and provincial police services are often called to play a role, the language in this legislation may not go far enough in listing the agencies with which particular information can be shared.

I would also like to highlight our support for changes to the Criminal Code that allow law enforcement agencies to detain a suspect for up to seven days when an officer suspects a terrorist activity may be carried out. These new measures, if adopted, will provide our members with the necessary flexibility to conduct more in-depth and thorough investigations, while still subjecting our actions to the very appropriate and necessary judicial review process.

As I mentioned at the beginning, I wanted to keep my comments brief, though I'm not sure I've succeeded in that regard.

Bill C-51 is an important piece of legislation that takes a number of steps to modernize our national public security apparatus, and the public and professional law enforcement have a large role to play in this regard.

The members I represent face the very real challenges posed by increased domestic radicalization, as we saw in the attacks against Canadian Forces personnel in Quebec and Ottawa only a few short months ago. With the proper training and, yes, oversight as well, they will continue to meet this challenge head-on in the professional manner we as Canadians have come to appreciate and expect.

Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear. I look forward to your questions.

[David Matas, Senior Legal Counsel, B'nai Brith Canada]

Thank you. I will speak specifically about proposed changes to Bill C-51.

In general, as you've heard, we're in favour of the advocacy and promotion of terrorism becoming an offence. We would like to see, and we appreciate through Bill C-51, a re-equilibration of the balance between freedom of speech and protecting victims of terrorism in light of the enhanced terrorist threat with which the planet in general and Canada in particular have been confronted.

There are three specific suggestions we have that we believe are consistent with the spirit of the bill.

One is to import a defence for the offences of promotion or advocacy, which already exist for the offence of promotion of hatred. The Criminal Code now provides that no person shall be convicted of wilful promotion of hatred who, in good faith, intended to point out for the purpose of removal, matters tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group. Something similar should be drafted for the offences of advocacy and promotion of terrorist activity.

Second, the proposed offences prohibit promotion and advocacy of terrorism offences in general without indicating what those offences are. We assume that this phrase “terrorism offences in general” refers to those offences found in section 83.01 of the Criminal Code, but whether this assumption is correct or not, the phrase “terrorism offences in general” should be defined so it is clear which offences are intended.

Our third suggestion relates to the consent of the Attorney General. For clause 16 of the bill, the seizure of terrorist propaganda and their deletion from computer systems requires the consent of the Attorney General. However, prosecution for promotion or advocacy of terrorism does not require that consent, and the absence of consent means that private prosecution is possible. We are reluctant to endorse the possibility of private prosecution for speech offences because our experience has been that once that sort of prosecution becomes possible, it is used for frivolous purposes to harass those with whom the private prosecutor disagrees.

While frivolous prosecutions are inevitably dismissed, it's no small matter to be dragged through the criminal courts, even if the result is acquittal. Attorneys General, we realize, have the power to direct a stay of private prosecutions, but mobilizing any Attorney General to exercise that power takes time and effort; and criminal private prosecutions, unlike civil lawsuits, do not allow for the awarding of costs against the unsuccessful prosecutor.

A requirement of the Attorney General's consent has, we acknowledge, its own problems. The relevant Attorneys General for these offences are the provincial Attorneys General, except for the territories. Our experience with the offence of wilful promotion of hatred has been that some Attorneys General were most reluctant to consent to prosecution of this offence, even in clear-cut cases. So we would suggest, in addition to the requirement of Attorney General consent, that there be guidelines for the use of that consent. In our written materials, we suggested several guidelines, but just as suggestions. The guidelines could be policy instruments of the Government of Canada, which they could publish after the legislation is enacted, and a committee could recommend that the government draft these guidelines. Alternatively, the legislation itself could incorporate these guidelines, somewhat like the sentencing guidelines already in the Criminal Code.

Well, that's all I wanted to say, but I just would conclude by saying that our general approach, both in proposing the requirement of Attorney General consent and suggesting guidelines is that a law criminalizing advocacy or promotion of terrorism should not be too easy to invoke, but it should not be a dead letter either.

Thank you very much.