Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Scott Brison, Liberal, Kings—Hants, NS]

Do you expect the provisions in Bill C-51 to have an impact on the tracking of terrorist financing in your work?

[Dr. Pamela Palmater]

Bill C-51 as currently written would capture everything under Idle No More. Imagine that. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come of the Grand Council of the Crees offered a quote for my submission as well, to the effect that had their activities been done today as opposed to back then, the James Bay agreement would not have been negotiated. They would all be in jail. The Idle No More movement, which was a historical coming together of first nations and Canadians peacefully dancing, singing, and drumming, would now all be monitored—if not already, as the media has indicated—and maybe with arbitrary detentions.

All of these things are very frightening for this country. Keep in mind that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples protects us, grants us and recognizes international customary law that we can act autonomously, that we can occupy our lands. Under the Department of National Defence's manual, occupying our lands, advocating for our autonomy, and advocating for political rights are described as insurgency, alongside jihadists. It is no comfort that there is a proviso saying that lawful activity, lawful dissent, lawful protest, lawful art—whatever that is—won't be captured by this bill, because the second we do a round dance in the street without a permit, it very quickly becomes unlawful.

We have to remember—I already went over this—all of the very validly enacted laws that Canada has had that have ended up in the killing, murder, rape, violence, sterilization, and scalping of our people. Those were valid laws. The only way to protect ourselves was to act with unlawful resistance.

What we're saying now is that the clear and present danger to first nations and Canadians is environmental destruction and the contamination of our water. We have a right to defend our life, liberty, and security to protect our future generations. Under this bill, that will all be captured as a threat to national security and/or to be terrorism.

[Dr. Pamela Palmater]

Thank you for your question. It's an important one because, as I stated, it doesn't just impact indigenous peoples; it impacts the rest of Canada, including environmentalists, unions, women's groups, and children's advocates.

We have to get real about what the clear and present danger is here. How many Canadians have died from acts of terrorism on Canadian soil? Compare that with how many thousands of murdered and missing indigenous women and girls there are. Where is the Bill C-51 to protect them? How many husbands have killed their wives? How many serial killers have we had? Yet, we are focusing on Bill C-51.

The problem is that this bill isn't really about terrorism. If you do an analysis of this omnibus bill, the focus is, just as you've said, less about being anti-terrorism and more about protecting the status quo in terms of power relations and economic relations. This new national security law focuses on threats to sovereignty, territorial integrity, diplomatic relations—of all things—economic stability, and critical infrastructure. All of these things are an essential part of the daily lives of Canadians and first nations. Passing this bill for any activity, any person, any purpose that threatens national security so defined as financial stability and territorial integrity makes us all suspects.

Canada won't even have to pass this bill; the terrorists will have won. What is terrorism? Fundamentally, it's the denial of life, liberty, and security of the person. If Canada goes ahead and takes those rights away, terrorists just have to sit back, job done.

We worked far too hard in our treaty negotiations, the development of the charter and the Constitution, and all of the international laws that protect core, fundamental human rights, to allow that to happen because we want to protect some corporate economic interests.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to our witnesses, Ms. Palmater and Inspector Irwin, for joining us this morning. I enjoyed listening to your testimony.

This committee has heard a wide range and variety of opinions on the issue and the concerns. Probably without exception, we've heard from witnesses that there is a very real threat of terrorism to Canadians. Certainly Bill C-51 is an attempt to modernize the tools that law enforcement agencies have in dealing with this very real threat.

Inspector, you spoke of the evolution of threats. Certainly we've heard in the past that there's rapid advancement, evolution, and modernization of the things jihadi terrorists are using as weapons of their mission. I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit more about our need to keep pace with some of the modernized techniques that the jihadis are employing.

[Inspector Steve Irwin, Inspector, Toronto Police Service]

Thank you. Good morning. Thank you very much for allowing me to appear before this committee on behalf of Chief William Blair and the Toronto Police Service.

As stated, my name is Steve Irwin. I am an inspector with the Toronto Police Service. As of next month I will have completed 35 years with the Toronto Police Service. I'm currently seconded to the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Team in Toronto, and I'm responsible for national security investigations in the greater Toronto area and throughout southwestern Ontario.

I started my policing career as a uniformed officer in Toronto, and have worked in homicide, sexual assaults, hate crime, intelligence, and in 1995 was the sergeant who started the anti-terrorism unit within the Toronto Police Service to address what we perceived to be a terrorist threat emanating from the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. Since 1995 I've had a lead role within the Toronto Police Service on terrorism-related issues.

In relation to where we are today, 911 taught us there are no rules or boundaries for terrorism. We were shocked into the reality that anything goes. We adjusted our stance and created anti-terrorism sections of the Criminal Code to address that threat from a law enforcement perspective. More recently we recognized there were gaps in our criminal laws to address the evolution of the terrorist threat that manifested through the first decade of this millennium.

New criminal offences were created and preventive processes were recommended to be reinstated in Bill S-7, which we know was passed into law, and all those sections are beneficial in both the prevention of terrorism and in holding accountable those individuals intent on committing terrorist offences.

I'm going to briefly address some aspects of proposals in Bill C-51 from a non-federal policing perspective.

Regarding the Criminal Code amendments, I've dealt extensively with the hate propaganda sections of the Criminal Code since being assigned to the Toronto Police Hate Crime Unit in 1993. I have considered the application of the hate propaganda sections in numerous cases involving individuals who have publicly preached or advocated for the use of violence in the name of religious, ideological, or political belief.

Unfortunately, the sections are too restrictive for those who are clever enough or counselled sufficiently to avoid divulging any criminal intent. With the current terrorist threat there is a definite need for the new offence of advocating or promoting terrorism. Many hate-mongers hide behind carefully spoken words that lure a growing, vulnerable, often younger, group of people to adopt an extreme radical view that condones or advocates taking up arms against those who have different beliefs.

It is crucial that those who have a criminal intent be faced with the consequences of criminal conduct. Equally it is important to have appropriate tools to address those who use terrorist propaganda to influence those same vulnerable people to adopt a radical view that leads to terrorist acts.

Through these new criminal offences, we will be able to prevent the growth of the terrorist entities and groups. Lowering the threshold of “will commit a terrorist offence” to “may commit a terrorist offence” provides law enforcement and the courts an important preventive tool that will offer those misguided, vulnerable people a path away from serious criminal conduct and the liability that comes with that.

The tools in the Criminal Code are helpful to law enforcement, but truthfully, in my experience, are not sufficient to address all aspects of the current evolution of threats to our national security, both in the form of terrorism and of espionage.

The proposed changes to the CSIS act I see as progressive. CSIS is involved many times before law enforcement and could easily disrupt activities sufficiently so as to mitigate threats. By no means am I suggesting that they would always employ disruption strategies, but certainly having the ability to do so independent of law enforcement could be very effective, essentially for further enhancing the security of Canadians.

In relation to Canada's Security of Information Act, I believe that consideration for provision to include non-federal police services as agencies.... Information that can be shared would be important for a number of reasons, including the major municipal, regional police, and provincial police services. They are frequently involved in intelligence investigations in the early stage of national security-related investigations that are not obviously national security ones in those early stages.

Furthermore, municipal, regional, and provincial police are the police of jurisdiction along much of our international border and at points of entry in international airports.

Often there are no RCMP officers working in the areas, and where they are, it is not on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week basis, leaving the police of jurisdiction conducting investigations that are of national security in nature. Not having access to available information because they are not a federal entity creates a significant gap that could impact on the safety of the public.

Finally, the police of jurisdiction throughout this country regularly deal with “activity that undermines the security of Canada” as defined in clause 2 of the proposed act, including “interference with critical infrastructure” and “terrorism”, and could find themselves dealing with “proliferation of nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons”, as well as “an activity that takes place in Canada and undermines the security of another state.”

Respectfully, the RCMP in Ontario does not have the resources to always respond in a timely manner to incidents that could meet the definition and threshold stipulated in the act. I bring to your attention the fact that the RCMP performs the exact same municipal and provincial police duties in many communities in all provinces outside of Ontario and Quebec. It is only the fact that they are RCMP members that gives them access to the information that all other police officers in this country performing the same duties are excluded from.

In relation to the Secure Air Travel Act, consideration ought to be given to adding authority, including pictures and biometric information where available, for people on the no-fly list as aliases are not always known. That, I believe, is a significant gap.

Consideration ought to also include an inclusive list of non-federal police in clause 10, “Assistance to Minister”, paragraph (f), as many international airports are policed by municipal, regional, or provincial police. That includes airports in Toronto, the Toronto Island Airport. Buttonville Municipal Airport in York Region is an example. Also, the Hamilton airport. London, Ontario, has an international airport. All are policed by municipal and/or provincial police initially.

In conclusion, the proposed changes in Bill C-51 are another step forward in closing the gap that leaves Canadians and the public exposed to being victims of criminal acts involving our national security. Admittedly, the balance between the freedom we enjoy in Canada and the security measures required to ensure that freedom is not without its cost to our individual rights and privacy.

In my reading of the proposed legislative changes, the authorities required for the new powers that prescribe oversight and mandated audits, combined with the safeguards already in place for the various government agencies, I believe provide necessary protection from abuses and will safeguard many of the issues raised by those who are against Bill C-51. Recognizing there is no single solution to address the current threats to national security, Bill C-51 certainly will provide better tools to prevent many of those threats from becoming realized in actual terrorist acts or acts of espionage.

I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[Dr. Pamela Palmater, Chair in Indigenous Governance, Ryerson University, Department of Politics and Public Administration, As an Individual]

Thank you for inviting me here today to speak.

I first want to acknowledge that we're on the traditional territory of the Algonquin Nation, and that's not just a polite acknowledgement. It's the very reason why all of you get to sit here today. Were it not for the cooperation, generosity, kindness, and political alliances, Canada wouldn't be what it is. Were it not for the peace treaties between our nations that are now constitutionally protected and form part of the foundational aspect of Canada, none of us would be sitting here today. I think that goes to the very heart of Bill C-51 and why I am opposed to it.

Canada has placed Bill C-51 before indigenous peoples without any information, analysis, details on how it will impact our nations, consultation, information, or consent from our part. It is a gross violation of our nations-to-nation relationship.

I don't have time to go through all of the technical legal details and problems with this bill except to say that I echo all of the concerns that have already been brought and will be brought by the thousands of lawyers in this country, security experts, former prime ministers, and former Supreme Court of Canada justices. My main concern is how this bill would impact me, my family, indigenous peoples all over Canada, and our treaty partners, other Canadians.

Canada has a long history of criminalizing every aspect of indigenous identity. From the scalping bounties in 1949, which nearly wiped out my Mi'kmaq Nation, to the Indian Act, which has outlawed our culture and our right to educate our own children and even excluded indigenous women from our communities. Every aspect of our identity has been criminalized, both historically and into the present day. In every single instance, we've had to resist all of these laws, keeping in mind that these were all validly enacted laws. It was legal to take Mi'kmaq scalps; it was legal to confine us to reserves; it was legal to deny us legal representation. All of these things were law in Canada. We had to be criminals, in that we had to break the law in order to preserve our lives, our physical security, and our identities. We are being faced with this very problem again with Bill C-51.

Over the years, these laws have morphed into provincial and municipal regulations that deal even with our traditional means of providing subsistence—hunting, fishing, and gathering have all been so criminalized for indigenous peoples that we end up skulking around in the forest just to be able to provide food for our families. Every single court case that has been won at the Supreme Court of Canada has been a battle with indigenous peoples, who are trying to live their lives and exercise their rights and identities, facing some kind of criminal or regulatory charge.

In every single instance, we have been labelled as criminals and treated as criminals, and one need only look at the current prison population to understand that this is still the case; not just the case, but as Howard Sapers from the Office of the Correctional Investigator has indicated, a national crisis and embarrassment. And why is it? It's not because we're actually terrorists, not because we're more culturally predisposed to being criminals, but it's a direct result of Canada's discriminatory laws and policies. There have been endless justice inquiries, which have pointed to the infection of racism in our Canadian justice system. The Donald Marshall wrongful prosecution inquiry, the Manitoba justice inquiry, and the Ipperwash inquiry say that every aspect of our justice system, from the arresting officers, to the lawyers, to the judges, to the prison systems, overtly and systemically discriminates against indigenous peoples. That's our current reality.

Bill C-51 proposes to take that to the last and final step. All we have left now, as indigenous peoples, are our thoughts.

Our private thoughts will now be criminalized. It will now be possible to be considered a terrorist for storing alleged terrorist propaganda on our own personal computers. My declaration of sovereignty—and I'm going to say it before Bill C-51 passes—is that I'm part of the sovereign Mi'kmaq Nation. That kind of material on my computer could be considered terrorist and a threat to national security because it's a threat to Canada's sovereignty. Welcome to the new terrorist.

My name is Pam Palmater. I'm a lawyer, I'm a professor, I'm a mom, and I'm a social justice activist. I've won numerous awards for my work in social justice, women's equality, and children's rights. Depending on whose radicalized view you speak of, I have also been called a radical, bad Indian, eco-terrorist, enemy of the people, top-five-to-fear Canadian, dangerous militant, and whacko extremist.

My biggest concern isn't how I'm presented in the media or by government officials, I'm stronger than that. My biggest concern is how this impacts me right now, the level of government surveillance for a law-abiding, peaceful, social justice activist, who's never been arrested or convicted of any crime.

In response to my ATIP request to CSIS, they explain that they have a right to prevent subversive and hostile activities against the Canadian state, which is why they have a file on me. They don't offer me the courtesy of saying why I would be considered subversive or hostile. In fact, everything I do couldn't be more public.

In my ATIP request to Indian Affairs they would not confirm that they monitor me. They said that they do conduct an analysis of me and my activities because I'm an active voice. That analysis comprised 750 pages of documents that tracked all of my whereabouts, what provinces I was travelling to, where I was speaking, and the dates and times. They could not provide my security file because it was destroyed.

When I attend gatherings, rallies, protests, or public and private events, I often cannot make cell phone calls, send texts, or access my social media, my bank cards, or my credit cards. I can be at an Idle No More rally or protest and text my children, but I cannot communicate with the chiefs who are at the same protest. This causes me great concern for my safety. How am I supposed to help ensure the comfort and safety of the people at rallies and myself if I can't communicate with anyone? I don't have to remind this committee the staggering statistics and vulnerabilities of indigenous women in this country.

I contacted the RCMP as well. They never responded to my ATIP request. Individual RCMP officers at various events have confirmed that they were there to monitor me. At numerous protests I have been informed by RCMP and provincial police that I had to keep my protest peaceful. Sometimes they didn't identify themselves. At speaking engagements the host first nation would demand that any undercover RCMP, or Ontario, or other police officers identify themselves, and in many cases they did.

What's more concerning is the number of government officials that follow me around from speaking engagement to speaking engagement and often identify themselves when called upon to do so. Probably the most shocking is when I travel internationally in countries like Samoa, Peru, England, and Switzerland only to be informed by local authorities that Canadian officials are there to monitor me. That's very frightening in a country where I have committed no crime, but to advocate peacefully on behalf of my people.

In the prairie provinces the RCMP are very active. They will often call ahead to the First Nations University of Canada where I'm speaking and ask them to identify what my target will be or where I plan my protest.

This isn't just a problem for me. We've all heard about Cindy Blackstock and others.

I'll skip to my recommendations, because I can see that I'm out of time.

Bill C-51 must be withdrawn. There is no way to fix it. There must be proper public information consultation, specific consultation for indigenous peoples, and a proper parliamentary study. Directing Justice Canada to rubber-stamp the bill as compliant even if it has a 95% chance of being overturned in court is not democratic.

We need an independent review body to report on the ongoing surveillance of indigenous peoples that will take complaints, do proper investigations, and offer redress.

Finally, we are in desperate need of a special first nation advocate to be appointed for any and all court processes in all provinces and territories whenever applications are made in secret for court warrants. This person would be an amicus, a friend of the court who would be independent and could speak to all of the various constitutional and indigenous rights at stake. This is absolutely essential, especially if Bill C-51 is to be passed.

[Madam Louise Vincent]

My understanding now is exactly as Mr. Leuprecht said, that they would be doing surveillance. They would be able to talk to the parents. They would be able to stop it. They could put them in preventive prison, I think, for seven days, and that way they could make them stop.

There's another important thing. After Bill C-51 has been done, I think there's another step that needs to be done, which is to understand what's going on. We need to understand why this is happening. Bill C-51, to me, is to control what is going on and make it stop as much as possible. But at some point we'll need psychologists, sociologists. We'll need people to try to figure out what the heck is going on there, because this is not normal. There's something really wrong. Why are these young people, even young girls...? I'm so shocked. I'm a mother myself. I have three adult daughters, and it's incredible to see that. We're going to have to do that.

So Bill C-51 has to do that to stop them, to manage them, to control, and after that we're going to have to do some thinking all together to stop this.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Great, and the Belgian model is something that people can look at because you described it quite well at the time.

The second thing is that you indicated very well in the information sharing provisions of the new act within Bill C-51 about how important it is for there to be no silos for review agencies. Let's mix oversight and review here too, but review agencies, whether it's SIRC, the CSE commissioner, or the RCMP review body, I'm not sure if you're aware but the CSE commissioner wrote to say that he does not understand why of the 17 agencies listed in this new act he, as in his office of the commissioner, is the only review agency that is written in as allowing to share information.

I am wondering if you have the same concern. Is there any reason that this sharing of information would be written in as these 17 agencies plus whatever the minister adds by regulation, but only the CSE commissioner has been written in, so that in fact, the opportunity has not been taken to add sharing of information among review agencies.

Is that a concern for you?

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the three witnesses we have heard from during the second hour of this meeting. Their testimony has been a major contribution to Bill C-51.

I would like to thank Ms. Vincent in particular for joining us today.

I'm sure things have been difficult for you and your family since the events of October 19. That's why I wanted to extend my sympathies to you.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Monsieur le président, merci de l'invitation.

Security is like the air we breathe: you don't realize that it's gone until it's too late. I think part of the discussion that we have about security policy is so difficult because we've all been to schools so we think we understand the education policy and we've all been to the physician so we think we understand health care policy. For most of us, the worst that's ever happened to us is that we got a speeding ticket from someone on the highway. I think people have a very profound and inchoate misunderstanding of how our security agencies operate, their legislative framework within which they operate, and the accountability and the review structures that are in place. Having this discussion is so important because it elevates the level of the debate.

I'd like to point out some of what is the hypocrisy of some of the critics, perhaps some of the ignorance of some of the professionalism of our security agencies and those who work in our national security system, and the accountabilities that are in place. By hypocrisy I mean that it is those people who complain bitterly about the bill who will also be the first ones to ask why the state did not do more when it is their kid that leaves for abroad, or it is their kid that is injured or killed in an attack. We need to strike a balance here.

I think there is also a naïveté about the rapidly changing security environment, because in Canada for a long time we've lived far away from the shores of instability and political violence. I think that has profoundly changed as a result of globalization and two revolutions. One is the transportation revolution. The other is the communications revolution that brings all this instability immediately to our shores. The propositions that have been put forward in this bill many of our allies already have in one instantiation or another in their systems. We can show that democratic countries can handle these types of powers and reconcile freedom and security. The Nordic states have not turned into police states simply because they adopted certain disruption provisions for their security police, as they call them.

The institutions of the modern state are not well matched to the flows and to the movements of a globalized 21st century world, in particular, the illicit ones. The flows and movements are global and yet they have institutions that are still in a 1648 statute of Westminister type of framework. One of the challenges is how to reconcile the institutions we have with the flows and challenges we face. I would submit that we would need to ask, as in any type of security environment, three basic questions.

Who is it that is threatening our existence or that we are trying to address with regard to these laws?

What is our goal? Do we want to eliminate terrorism? Do we want to contain terrorism? Do we want to destroy groups that use terrorism tactics, or do we want to reduce the vulnerabilities and the effects of terrorism? I think it is this latter one that we are trying to aim for.

How much are we willing to spend?

I think there are a couple of answers here. One is that we are celebrating the 800th anniversary this year of the Magna Carta. What we all appreciate is living in a limited state where we clearly put constraints on state intervention. The state, under the preamble of section 91, also has an obligation for peace, order, and good governance in this country. We need to reconcile the limited state and the freedoms that it provides with the ability of the state to protect its citizens. We also need to make sure that the treasure that we spend is appropriate. In that regard, I much prefer to ensure that our security agencies have the right tool kit than simply putting more money into agencies that we have without giving them the appropriate tools to deal with what's.... I think making sure that our agencies have the appropriate tools is less of a threat than putting more money into these agencies, because ultimately, these are powerful agencies. I think we need to have the right balance here.

I would like to draw a clear distinction between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, two concepts that are confounded in this debate. Anti-terrorism is about actions taken to prevent, deter, or reduce the impact of terrorism and terrorist acts. Counterterrorism is the kinetic actions taken directly against terrorist acts. I think we fall short in this country with regard to the latter. Let me give you some examples. You've already heard some. We have youth leaving this country to go fight with ISIS, and apparently we have a security intelligence service that cannot even under strict reading of the current legislation tell the parents that their children or their child might be up to no good. We have innocent lives lost, as we've just heard. We have individuals who can board planes and are on the terrorism watch list because they do not under current legislation pose an immediate and direct threat to airline safety. You might have already flown next to a terrorist. We cannot stop foreign terrorist fighters from boarding planes back to Canada. This bill would address that by allowing some security agents to be placed on planes with them and other measures.

Concerning consular officials, when somebody shows up at our embassy in Beirut saying, “I have lost my passport and I need a travel document back to Canada”, well, Canadians regularly lose their travel documents. When somebody shows up at the embassy in Beirut with a bullet hole through their shoulder and is looking to return to Canada, well, Canadians often fall sick on their travels and they go to their consular officials, but when we have somebody who apparently has lost their passport and shows up with a bullet hole through their shoulder and the consular official is asked to provide an emergency travel document and that consular official can't even call CSIS to tell CSIS that somebody who might be a suspected foreign terrorist fighter is returning to Canada, that in my view is wrong. We need to share that type of data.

We need to protect Canadians, but we also need to protect Canadian interests, and we need to protect Canadians from themselves. These youths are some vulnerable individuals in our country. I have teenage children. We know that teenage children at times make poor decisions. The state has a certain obligation, I think, towards individuals to make sure that they don't harm themselves.

We also need to make sure that we don't inadvertently export terrorists or provide terrorist financing or material support from Canada to other countries because we don't have the adequate means to contain them.

I hope I have made a case for there being operational requirements to have a more diverse and a more nuanced tool kit than we have now, which is essentially surveillance on the one hand and powers of arrest on the other hand.

I also think that Bill C-51 makes an important contribution to Canada's meeting its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1624, 2178, and 2195. These are resolutions that are adopted under chapter VII of the United Nations charter. That means they are legally binding on all member states. These resolutions include such things as preventing radicalization leading to politically motivated violent extremism, prohibiting incitement of terrorist violence and recruitment for such purposes, disrupting financial support for terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters, and interdicting travel by foreign terrorist fighters. I hope I've demonstrated that we fall short on at least some of those.

I want to make two very short propositions as to what I think might be changed in this bill.

I think we need to expand the remit of SIRC to be able to follow intelligence once SIRC hands that intelligence over to one of, depending on how you count them, the about 15 other security agencies. The problem with SIRC right now is that once the intelligence is handed over, SIRC can call the RCMP or CBSA and tell them they would like to know what happened with that intelligence, but it turns out that SIRC does not have jurisdiction, and so the RCMP and CBSA just tell SIRC that unfortunately they are not going to answer that particular question.

I think that SIRC needs to be able to follow the intelligence. I'm not proposing a super-SIRC. I'm not suggesting that SIRC should have remit over national security investigations. But I do think SIRC needs to be able to follow the bread crumbs and make sure that intelligence is being handled by other agencies, once it is handed off, within the confines of the law in which it was collected and under the mandates and conditions under which that intelligence was shared with other agencies.

The other proposition I have is that review in and of itself I think is not the problem. CSIS is the most reviewed intelligence security service in the western world and therefore, I think we can safely say in the world as it is. I think the challenge is that Canadians are asking what the government can do to assure them that their rights and freedoms have not been violated. That means that it's not the challenge of review; it's the challenge of demonstrating to Canadians that the review mechanisms that we have in place are effective at making sure that agencies operate within the confines of law and within the constitutional and charter constraints that are being placed upon them.

To that effect, I would submit to the committee to consider adopting a version of the British system, whereby opposition parties can put forward a list of members and the Prime Minister can pick from that particular list. Those individuals would then be security cleared to a top secret clearance. They would be sworn in as privy councillors. We would set up a separate parliamentary committee that would allow the members of that committee to read the commissioner of CSE's report, to read the SIRC report, and to debrief with SIRC and with the commissioner.

I know that some members of the government will say that this is not a good idea because loose lips sink ships, but I think we have very experienced, very mature legislators among the people who sit in Parliament, and by Parliament I mean not just the House of Commons but also the Senate, so I would enlarge the list to be able to include members from both Houses of Parliament.

I think that this type of debriefing with the commissioner and with SIRC in an all-party committee is the sort of conversation that Canadians need to see happen in order to be assured that their rights and freedoms are not being violated. By virtue of their being cleared and sworn in as privy councillors, these people wouldn't be able to talk about anything that happens within that committee anyway.

In closing, let me say that these propositions are not costly, and they would require only minor legislative changes.

I would also like to remind the committee that we are not just making legislation for today, because inherently, as a result of the globalizing dynamics that I described, I would submit that both our legislative framework and the way our agencies operate are already behind the times. The bad guys are always quite happy to exploit vulnerabilities. We saw this amply during the late 1980s and early 1990s with the way Sikh extremists exploited vulnerabilities in Canada's security system.

I would say that we are also making legislation here for tomorrow. We are also making legislation for circumstances in which, in the unlikely event that Canada should find itself faced with a major calamity, we would not need to operate by orders in council, but would have robust legislative frameworks in place for agencies to deal with the calamity.

Let me end with this particular quote: the terrorist only has to be lucky once; the counterterrorist must be lucky every time.

[Madam Louise Vincent]

I was finished, but what I wanted to tell you is that it didn't touch only a family. It didn't touch only a province. It touched the whole of Canada. It touched the world. We received comments from Thailand, Australia, everywhere, so Bill C-51 is important.

Patrice Vincent must not have died in vain.

We need that.

Thank you.

[Louise Vincent, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to share my point of view and that of my brother, my sisters and my mother.

Why am I appearing here before you? My name is Louise Vincent, and I am the older sister of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, who was murdered on October 20, 2014, five months ago, by Martin Couture-Rouleau. That man, in the name of a religion he completely misunderstood, ran my brother over from behind with his car, robbing him of an opportunity to defend himself.

I am here to talk about what I see as the positive aspects of Bill C-51. What I notice and what everyone has probably noticed is that information is now moving extremely quickly. That's not necessarily a positive thing. It's probably too quick, leading to tremendous risks of radicalization. People probably have a propensity for, or a sensitivity to, something we have not yet understood. For the time being, I think that an initiative like Bill C-51 is necessary if we want to maintain our country's democratic values.

Another significant problem must be pointed out. Various government organizations must stop operating in silos. Major companies have understood that. The successful ones have stopped working in isolation. It's an important management concept. I believe that information sharing is important.

From what I understand, Bill C-51 would facilitate cooperation among various police forces and would help identify individuals who may be trying to hurt our country more quickly. Moreover, the threshold of evidence must be changed. According to Bill C-51, focus should be shifted from “will commit” to “could commit”, and I think that's very important. That's why the RCMP could not obtain a warrant from the attorney general, despite all the information it had gathered and all the testimony from Martin Couture-Rouleau's family. The RCMP did its job and built a case, but unfortunately, the burden of proof was not met. That's unacceptable.

It should be much easier to obtain monitoring tools, such as electronic bracelets. The authorities should also be able to freeze financial assets. That way, the assets of someone who may be planning to finance terrorist activities could be frozen.

Had Bill C-51 been in force on October 19, Martin Couture-Rouleau's family would have still informed the RCMP, but the organization would have had more information. The RCMP received information much too late. It would have known that radical imams had visited the mosque attended by Martin Couture-Rouleau. It would have probably been able to prepare even more material for the attorney general who, with a lower burden of proof, would have agreed to issue a warrant. On October 20 of last year, Martin Couture-Rouleau very likely would have been in prison, and my brother would not be dead.

I am hearing many people say that they are worried about freedom of expression. I also want to keep my freedom of expression. I would absolutely not be in favour of something that would take away our freedom of expression. Considering that there are 40 million Canadians, does it make any sense to say that every one of them would be spied on?

I have spoken to officials, and they told me that, last October, 90 radicalized individuals had their passports confiscated. They were supposedly being monitored, as were another 130 people who still had their passports. That's 220 people. But when I asked why Martin Couture-Rouleau had fallen through the cracks, I was told that not everyone could be monitored 24 hours a day.

To those who are worried this kind of legislation would increase monitoring, I would say that would be impossible, as the numbers don't really add up. All I ask is that police forces—the RCMP and the SQ—could at least monitor. That is what makes sense.

I have noted a few things. I feel that, when people read a text like Bill C-51, which is lengthy, they often skip over the “whereas” parts. They may seem to be a bit boring, but they are important.

Advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not affected. In fact, lines 29 to 31 on page 3, state the following, and I quote: “For greater certainty, it does not include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression.”

Bill C-51 does not impede freedom of expression. That right is protected by the Constitution of Canada. I have no doubt that the Quebec charter would still apply and would protect my privacy. I myself am a Quebecker.

I will skip some of the bill. On page 6, it is stated that Bill C-51 does not affect the disclosure of information under other acts of Parliament. I feel that disclosure of information and freedom are there. That's clear. I don't think our leaders would impose on us something they would not like to have imposed on them. I am sure that all of our leaders and ministers care about freedom of speech and want Canada to have certain values when it comes to that. I think they're the first to defend that right. If they were to take it away, they would be the first to pay the price.

For those who have concerns, there is something else I have noted. Nothing has changed in terms of what happens after the investigation, once a police force submits certain information. The judge must ensure that the recommended measures are proportional to what the individual is accused of.

On page 49, we can see that there are watchdogs everywhere. Nothing is easy or automatic. If a situation is encountered, the minister has to be asked for permission and then a judge has to be asked for a warrant. An order is always required.

On page 50, it is specified that the judge must assess the threat before issuing a warrant.

Nothing is easy. A case has to be prepared and presented. I find that the process is still very cumbersome in this regard, but I am prepared to accept it.

In closing, I will quickly show you some documents to give you an idea of what a hate crime that stems from radicalization can do. I have not brought all the documents, as there are too many. There are many signs, boards and tributes across Quebec. I have brought only a small number of them.

We have received some letters written by hand and some in other formats. The Royal Canadian Legion wrote to us, the Saint-Jude parish wrote to us in French and in English—they absolutely have to be bilingual—the President of RTO/ERO wrote to us, as have schools and students.

We have a lot of hand-made cards. I have here a card from a school. Schools have written to us, but I did not bring everything. We have heard from students and teachers. There have been little inscriptions. Mothers have written to us. We have 22 books like this one, hand-made.

There are lists with hundreds of people's names. Police officers and firefighters have written to us. We have been invited to participate in various events organized by firefighters. People from Saskatchewan, Quebec and Manitoba have written to us.

My mother insisted that I be very careful with this document, and you will see why. Prince Charles wrote to her. I have his signature. He wrote the letter in French. He also sent my mother flowers. His assistant also wrote to my mother. People from Westminster Abbey, the Association nationale des femmes de militaires, the United States Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, the Michigan American Legion and AMVETS of Michigan have written to us. It's very simple, but it's there.

In addition, Al Cameron, who takes care of veterans through the organization Veterans Voices of Canada sent us a flag. He called it a flag of remembrance. He will always remember Patrice.

[Hugh Segal, Master, Massey College, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Throughout recent post-war history, rapidly drafted and on occasion knee-jerk new laws, or quickly deployed old laws during times of apparent or possible emergency are often flawed. This is not because of any inappropriate intent by the government of the day, but a rush to engage because of apprehended risk, be it one of terrorism or insurrection. This approach often produces robust court challenges.

The worst of these events in recent past was the deployment of the War Measures Act by the Trudeau administration in October 1970. Hundreds of Quebeckers were arrested and held in custody for many days. The core principles of Magna Carta, habeas corpus, were tossed aside. This was the worst violation of Canadian civil liberties in the post-war era. Nothing we have seen since in any way compares. None of the risks associated with this bill in any way compares to what happened in 1970.

My concerns, and that of what was then the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism in 2011, about the absence in Canada, as compared to key NATO allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy—of any legislative oversight capacity, predates by several years the provisions of the bill before you.

Nothing in Bill C-51 has changed my own personal view on the need for oversight and nothing in the bill makes that requirement more pressing.

Accountability on the part of our security services to the whole of Parliament is not needless red tape or excessive bureaucracy. In fact, it is the democratic countervail to the kind of red tape and bureaucracy which might unwittingly lose sight of the security mission appropriate to a parliamentary democracy, where laws and constitutional protections such as the presumption of innocence and due process must protect all citizens without regard to ethnicity or national origin.

In the spirit of breaking down silos and maximizing the efficiency of prophylactic data sharing to prevent bad things from happening before they happen, and in the spirit of Mr. Justice Major's report on the Air India tragedy, the special Senate committee recommended that CSIS be allowed to lawfully disrupt terrorist plans or conspiracies. That was a bipartisan recommendation.

The term “lawfully” did not reflect any view on the part of the special committee that interruptions could operate outside the provisions and protections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Any provisions that seek to obviate the charter would likely be struck down by the courts in any event.

When the government of Prime Minister Chrétien brought in anti-terror legislation after the horrors of 9/11, its promoters, including ministers and senior bureaucrats, in the best of faith believed the law to be charter-proof. When the legislation was renewed, members of all parties on the Senate committee on anti-terrorism spent many meetings considering and putting into effect those amendments necessitated by a series of court decisions in order to bring the law into line with the Canadian Constitution. The law was far from charter-proof.

I have little doubt that whatever decisions this distinguished committee may choose to make about amendments or the lack of same, within a short period of time will see us finding another committee doing the same sort of constitutionally-driven and court-ordered refurbishment of the legislation before you, should it pass.

My general view of the law before you, despite some excesses and slightly overwrought provisions, is that it is a law that is, on balance, helpful and appropriate, given the new technologies, recruiting strategies, and asymmetric threats which form the basis of new threats to national security in Canada and other open society, non-police state democracies.

I wish to offer one very respectful, considered word of caution about the important work before you. Attempts to keep Canadians safe, the number one job of any government, should not include provisions that make us resemble those we are struggling to defeat.

[Dr. Salim Mansur]

Mr. Easter, from my perspective, I don't see the government as those on the treasury bench only and on the other side. I see the whole thing as a government. Where I'm coming from as a common citizen we expect our government to do what is necessary as you recognize the threat. From my perspective, the threat is immense and it is growing and we cannot afford to be lax, given what is at stake and what harm can be done.

Yes, the government has recognized—all of you have recognized—that there's a necessity and that is Bill C-51. Now the question is, how do you go about improving it? I agree with you that the effort should be made to see the flaws and improve on them. If you agree that the instrument is needed, we are heartened because we feel the threat is immense.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Do you see Bill C-51 as being able to assist CSIS to protect Canada, then?