Bill C-586 (Historical)

Reform Act, 2014

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act (candidacy and caucus reforms)

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to provide that the chief agent of every party is to report, in writing, to the Chief Electoral Officer the names of the person or persons authorized by the party to endorse prospective candidates.
It also amends the Parliament of Canada Act to establish processes for the expulsion and readmission of a caucus member, the election and removal of a caucus chair, leadership reviews, and the election of an interim leader, and to provide that these processes apply to party caucuses that vote to adopt them.

Alleged Process Used to Determine Liberal Caucus Membership—Speaker's Ruling

[The Speaker, Geoff Regan]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 9, 2019, by the hon. member for Markham—Stouffville concerning an alleged violation of section 49.8 of the Parliament of Canada Act.

In raising this matter, the member for Markham—Stouffville argued that caucus expulsions or readmissions require proper due process. According to her, members of the Liberal caucus were prevented from voting on the rules for this decision pursuant to section 49.8 of the Parliament of Canada Act. She stated explicitly that, in this case, the matter of privilege is very much about knowing which rules apply for expulsion or readmission; it is not about a possible caucus expulsion, as was the issue addressed in my ruling on April 8, 2019. In her view, although the Chair has no role in the interpretation of statutes, it does not relieve the Speaker of the responsibility to ensure that all members are aware of their rights in this House.

In response, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons informed the House that the chair of the national Liberal caucus had indeed sent the requisite letter to the Speaker, specifying that the provisions of the act regarding the expulsion and readmission of caucus members would not apply for the 42nd Parliament. This, in his view, makes this question of privilege moot and removes any confusion as to which rules apply. Furthermore, he argued that it is not the role of the Speaker to adjudicate such matters.

The issue at hand is quite simple: The Chair is being asked, as was the case with the recent ruling on a similar matter, to determine whether provisions included in the Parliament of Canada Act, as they relate to matters of caucus, have been violated. Section 49.8(1) of the act states:

At its first meeting following a general election, the caucus of every party that has a recognized membership of 12 or more persons in the House of Commons shall conduct a separate vote among the caucus members in respect of each of the following questions:

(a) whether sections 49.2 and 49.3 are to apply in respect of the caucus;

(b) whether section 49.4 is to apply in respect of the caucus;

(c) whether subsections 49.5(1) to (3) are to apply in respect of the caucus; and

(d) whether subsection 49.5(4) and section 49.6 are to apply in respect of the caucus.

These requirements, which came into force when the House adopted Bill C-586, Reform Act, 2014, in the 41st Parliament, establish processes for the expulsion and readmission of a caucus member, the election and removal of a caucus chair, leadership review and the election of an interim leader. It is the caucus of each recognized party, not the Speaker, which bears the responsibility for ensuring that these votes are held.

In fact, the only role of the Speaker is to be advised of the caucus decision. Section 49.8(5) of the act states:

49.8(5) As soon as feasible after the conduct of the votes, the chair of the caucus shall inform the Speaker of the House of Commons of the outcome of each vote.

The Speaker's role stops there. It does not, in any way, extend to interpreting the results of the votes, how the votes were taken or interpreting any other relevant provisions.

This is very much in keeping with the general restraint on Speakers when they are asked to interpret the law. Speaker Fraser stated this fundamental principle in a ruling on April 9, 1991, at page 19234 of the Debates.

...the Speaker has no role in interpreting matters of either a constitutional or legal nature.

This is in addition to another limit on its scope of authority, that is, parliamentary privilege and, thus, the authority of the Speaker is limited to the internal affairs of the House, its own proceedings. It does not extend to caucus matters. The member for Markham—Stouffville was right to state that the Speaker bears the responsibility for ensuring that all members are aware of their rights in this House. While caucuses may have some extraneous relationship to the membership of the House, it remains just that. There is nothing to suggest that its proceedings constitute or relate to a proceeding of the House.

This leaves caucuses alone with the authority to govern their internal operations. This is also made quite clear by the wording of section 49.7 of the Act which bars against judicial review, stating:

49.7 Any determination of a matter relating to the internal operations of a party by the caucus, a committee of the caucus or the caucus chair is final and not subject to judicial review.

With the full authority given to caucuses themselves in such unequivocal terms, it is clear that the Chair has no role in the interpretation or enforcement of this statute, even when members feel rudderless without what they feel would be clearly stated and understood rules.

For these reasons, the Chair is unable to conclude that the member for Markham—Stouffville has been obstructed in the fulfillment of her parliamentary functions. Accordingly, I cannot find that there is a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

Democratic Reform

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, on February 25, Bill C-586, the reform act, was adopted in this House by a vote of 260-17.

However, we are rapidly approaching the dissolution of this Parliament and the general election. There remains only five sitting weeks before summer adjournment. If the bill is not passed into law before the end of June, it will die.

There is an important constitutional principle at stake here. The Constitution and the Parliament of Canada Act provide for a bicameral Parliament where each chamber is independent of the other in respect of its own affairs and its own governance. The reform act concerns only the House of Commons, how the House of Commons and its caucuses are to be governed and how members are to be elected to the House of Commons.

On February 25, this House of Commons overwhelmingly pronounced on how it wants to be governed. Constitutional principles need to be respected and upheld, and the reform act needs to pass into law.

Procedure and House Affairs

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the 29th report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on Bill C-586, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act (candidacy and caucus reforms). The committee has studied the bill and has decided to report the bill back to the House with amendments.

Bill C-40—Time Allocation Motion

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is important to note that time allocation motions are objectionable not simply because they interrupt debate and thorough consideration in the House; they also constantly interrupt committee work.

This is a government that is constantly saying how important committee work is, yet it is constantly making sure that committees cannot do their job. I am supposed to be in the procedure and House affairs committee right now listening to witnesses on the bill from the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, Bill C-586, Reform Act, 2014, and hearing from Nelson Wiseman, professor at University of Toronto; Democracy Watch; Fair Vote Canada; Friends of the Reform Act; and Samara, but our committee has been cancelled because of this House leader.

I would like the member for Wellington—Halton Hills to ask his House leader at some point whether this was on purpose.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Mr. Speaker, next year at this time when the government is history, it will still go into the history books for two sad records. The first will be for having had more pieces of its legislation rejected by the courts than any other government in our nation's history. Half a dozen times now courts have said that its legislation is badly botched work and have thrown it back to the Conservatives. The second, perhaps even more important, is the sad record of having some 84 time allocation and closure motions. That has never been seen before in Canadian history.

There has never been such a lack of respect for parliamentary debate and dialogue, with the results that I have mentioned earlier, of more bills being rejected than of any other government.

The questions really are why this bill and why now? First, despite the laudable principle in creating the bill, it undermines the National Parks Act. Obviously the government wants to hide that fact from the Canadian public, which is why it is shutting down debate.

Second, why now, why this morning? Of course, we have Bill C-586 that the member for Wellington—Halton Hills has brought forward, and there were five witnesses scheduled to speak at the procedure and House affairs committee: Samara Canada, Fair Vote Canada, Friends of the Reform Act, Democracy Act, and Professor Nelson Wiseman, all wanting to speak on reform and to get their message across.

Obviously the House leader disagrees, so the real question is, why are the Conservatives trying to disrupt the procedure and House affairs committee and trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the Canadian public on Bill C-40?

Opposition Motion—Proportional Representation

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments from the member opposite on this issue of democratic reform. I know he has worked long on this issue over many years.

I want to make a comment. Let us say that we move to mixed proportional representation as a system of voting. We would end up with a House of Commons with some 300 members of Parliament. Let us say that 200 of those members of Parliament would be local members of Parliament representing local geographic districts across country. We would have another 100 members of Parliament who would be selected by the parties themselves, based on the percentage of the popular vote each party received in the general election.

Currently, however, section 67 of the Canada Elections Act gives party leaders the final determination as to who party candidates will be.

What we would in effect have is a system in which party leaders would have the final say on these 100 MPs, making them beholden to the party leaders and not to any other group or constituency here in this country.

I note that Bill C-586, the reform act, would remove that statutory requirement for the party leader's endorsement.

I wonder if the member would comment on the relationship of that bill to the NDP's opposition supply day motion.

Democratic Reform

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge—Mission, BC]

Mr. Speaker, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills has demonstrated for all of us an effective approach to doing business in this place. After he produced the bill and it was in the public domain he indicated that he welcomed suggestions to improve the bill to make it more palatable to a broader number of members, and that is what he has done.

As with all private members' business, we said we would take the time to carefully review the amendments that have been proposed by the member. These amendments would keep parties in control of their nominations and allow caucuses to set their own rules.

In light of these proposed changes, the government supported Bill C-586 at second reading and looks forward to seeing it when it comes back from committee.

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his intervention. This may be a brief response, not because it is not an important issue but because it is.

Democratic reform is a very serious and difficult task. I begin by commending the member for Wellington—Halton Hills for his important work in strengthening our democratic institutions and for bringing forward the reform act.

The reform act is an effort to strengthen Canada's democratic institutions by restoring the role of elected members of Parliament in the House of Commons. The member opposite said in his original question that the leaders of the three major parties threatened to kill the bill if it was not watered down. I would like to point out that, as with all private members' business, we said we would take time to carefully review the amendments proposed by the member to his own bill.

The reform act, Bill C-586, has now been read a second time and has been referred to committee, where it is right now. Of course, the committee is the master of its own destiny, but the hon. member for Wellington—Halton Hills proposed two changes in response to consultations held over the summer and to build support for his bill.

First, he concluded that perhaps the way it was written with respect to party nominations was too prescriptive, which would make it difficult for parties to, for example, meet diversity targets. In fact, the member opposite is from a party that is exactly 50% male and 50% female here in the House of Commons, but other parties have not reached that target yet.

The amendment the member for Wellington—Halton Hills has proposed is that instead of insisting that it be only a local decision in terms of who signs nomination papers, the party could determine who would sign these nomination papers. It could be somebody locally. It could even be the leader, but it would not be prescribed to be the leader, as it is currently in the Canada Elections Act.

The second change he is proposing is that each House of Commons caucus, after every general election, as its first item of business, in a recorded manner, could vote on whether members wanted to accept the template laid out in his bill or a different set of rules, and they would have the freedom to do so.

Quite simply, the bill takes the current unwritten convention and makes explicit in statute the rules and process for the caucus to review the party leader. Additionally, the reform act proposes that a party leadership review may be initiated by the submission of a written notice to the caucus chair, signed by at least 20% of the caucus members, and would mandate that the caucus chair make public the names of those caucus members requesting a vote.

When a majority of caucus members voted in favour of a leadership review, a second vote by secret ballot would occur, and they could select a person to serve as the interim party leader until a new party leader was elected.

Our government has continually delivered on its democratic reform commitments. More backbench MPs have passed bills into law through this majority Conservative Parliament than under any government since 1972, and we still have a year to go.

I should add that The Globe and Mail analyzed 162,000 votes over almost two years and found that Conservative MPs are far more likely to vote independently from their party than opposition MPs, as opposed to the NDP, for example, in which not a single MP voted against the party line.

As the member opposite knows, the Prime Minister and our government supported the bill, and as it comes back from committee, this House will have the privilege to examine the bill again at third reading.

[Bruce Hyer, Green, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, tonight, I want to talk about the state of this House.

Let us face it, Canadian democracy is in deep trouble, especially since the current government came to power. It is not just the Conservatives, though, that are responsible for this mess we are in. The leaders of the Liberals and the NDP are more interested in crushing dissent within their parties than encouraging debate. MPs are often forced to vote against their consciences and against the will of their constituents. Anti-democratic attitudes abound in party backrooms.

For the past year, we have been discussing the proposed reform act introduced by the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. I truly believe that with this reform act, in its current form, we have an opportunity to transform Canadian democracy for the better.

Canadians can imagine my disappointment, but not surprise, when the three main parties waffled on their positions and criticized parts of this important bill. Canadians want change. They want democracy restored. The groundswell of support from ordinary Canadians for this bill is significant. Everyone I have spoken to has told me they are calling on their MPs to support this important legislation.

This reform act makes some long overdue changes that will make Parliament work better for Canadians again, instead of for party leaders. It would make party leaders more accountable to their MPs by establishing a leadership review process. It will end the requirement for a candidate's nomination papers to be signed by the party leader, the anti-democratic but little-known change to the Elections Act made by Pierre Trudeau in 1970.

This reform act will empower MPs to once again stand up for their constituents. It is the primary reason why I am supporting the bill in its current form. I even introduced a similar motion back in 2012. The reform act is important because it scales back the excessive powers of party leaders and restores local control over party nominations. However, recently, changes were proposed, I can only assume to placate the party leaders, that will weaken the most important parts of the bill and hand endorsement power right back to party leaders.

The reform act is only the beginning for democratic reform. Several other changes must be made to make Parliament more productive and less partisan. We must make our voting system more proportional to reflect the actual choices of Canadians. We must increase cross-party co-operation to end mindless partisan tribalism. We must take away the power of the Prime Minister to declare any bill a matter of confidence and to stop him from bullying Parliament, imposing bloated omnibus budget bills, and ignoring his own fixed election date law.

It is time we prevented parties from forcing their MPs to vote with their party. This summer the Green Party unanimously passed a resolution to ensure that their MPs would always be free to vote independently.

We must also restrict the unilateral power of the Prime Minister to appoint, without any oversight, senators, judges, parliamentary officers and many other positions.

The reform act, in its current form, is a step in the right direction. I urge my colleagues to recognize that it is time for all MPs who care about democracy to re-empower themselves and support the reform act in its current form, without weakening it further.

Will Conservative MPs, and indeed all MPs in this House, have the courage to vote for the reform act in its current form?

Reform Act, 2014

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-586, the reform act, addresses several issues, not one issue. All of these issues are part of a general problem or a cluster of problems that have been collectively referred to as Canada's democratic deficit. The democratic deficit can be summarized as follows. The ways in which the Canadian party system, including its caucus system operates, is considerably less democratic, on close inspection, than Canadians think it is, or think it ought to be.

Bill C-586 is divided into two parts, each of which amends a different statute, the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act. The two sets of amendments are concerned with issues that are completely unrelated other than the thematic similarity noted above. Therefore, each of the two parts of the bill has to be considered on its own merits. That means if one of those two parts turns out to be so seriously flawed that it cannot be fixed while the other is a useful improvement to the status quo, that would put all of us here into a quandary.

Let us start with the proposed amendments to the Canada Election Act.

Clauses 4 to 8 of Bill C-586 would create a position styled “nomination officer”. The nomination officer would have the authority to approve, and therefore disallow, party candidates, a power that therefore would be removed from the leader of the political party. Each party would have, in each province, a single nomination officer, elected by presidents of the actual district associations in that province for a four year term.

I do not think that the creation of this new officer would actually eliminate the party's ability to refuse a candidate nomination, something that could have been done. It just centralizes this power in a different officer in what is an unintentional division of the powers of the leader, rather than the elimination of an unwarranted power, as I have to think would have been the idealized way of dealing with the problem of centralized authority over nominations.

We ought to ask this question. What is the purpose the leader's signature serves in the first place and why not just get rid of it altogether? The answer is this. A registered party has a brand, a trademark, like a franchise and this is not the property of any individual person or candidate to use for his or her own purposes or agenda, which might be quite divergent from those of the party. It belongs to the entire party, and one individual who goes significantly off message can destroy the electoral prospects of many candidates.

Those of us whose history dates back to the old Reform Party remember that we were all castigated as, among other things, western separatists, racists and so on, based on a few completely unrepresentative comments made by people who were not part of the party's overall philosophy and who were dealt with by having their nominations removed. These people sought to exploit the credibility that the party and its then leader, Preston Manning, were building. Therefore, this is something that is of no small significance.

The other thing we have to worry about, as we deal with the attempt to balance these two considerations, the importance of the trademark and the danger that the leader will misuse his or her powers, is that this splitting of power does not mean that it is not subject to abuse in the future. Interest groups or party factions could take over the position of nomination officer. This would allow them to control candidate approvals in a given province. The nomination power having a veto over candidates could effectively support one faction from the party or one aspirant for a leadership race. If anyone doubts that could happen, one need only to look at what happened in the Liberal Party during the Chrétien-Martin struggle for power. The fact is that there was a real problem in the way in which nominations were being controlled and distributed in order to favour one faction over another.

In a provision that has been almost entirely overlooked by the media, the Canada Elections Act would also be amended to allow electoral district associations to establish their own rules governing timing of nomination races and the rules governing nominations. Based on my own experience in my own constituency, dating back to my first nomination, there is a real danger of gatekeeping practices designed to keep out candidates other than the one who has been chosen by the then current board of the riding.

When I discussed my own experiences from way back then, I discovered that many other people had similar experiences. The fact is that having some oversight of the central party can serve a useful purpose, although I grant it can also be misused.

Let me turn now to the other half of the reform bill. Section 9 of the bill would amend the Parliament of Canada Act in four ways. First, it would for the first time ever come up with a definition of the word “caucus”. Up until now, caucuses have been, from a statutory point of view, entirely informal. That is to say, they are creatures of usage, of convention, to the extent that they have ever been before the courts of the common law. Under a new section 49.1 of the Parliament of Canada Act a caucus would be defined as “a group composed solely of members of the House of Commons who are members of the same recognized party”. That would exclude senators.

Second, third and fourth, since there were four changes here, the bill would create procedures for three processes that are not now governed by statute: first, for caucuses to remove and replace leaders; second, for caucuses to admit new members or expel existing members; and third, for electing and removing caucus chairs. I will not be able to deal with the election and removal of caucus chairs except to say that I think the process laid out in the bill is probably a pretty good one.

I do want to dwell, however, on the leadership election process. The first thing to understand here is that other Commonwealth countries, and the most frequently cited being the United Kingdom and Australia, do use a system similar to this for having caucuses choose their leaders. There is no doubt about that.

Neither of those two countries, none of the others I am aware of, nor any of the Australian states, none of the sovereign jurisdictions we are looking at, have statutes dictating the process by which this occurs. These are entirely dealt with by the parties themselves. We know, for example, that the rules used by the labour party in Britain are not the same as those used by the conservative party in Britain. The labour party requires 20% of the caucus to trigger a leadership review and the British Tories require 15%. The British liberal democrats, an entirely different system, require 75 local riding associations to trigger a review.

The systems are different again in Australia and they are not unproblematic. To make this point I am going to give the House the history of recent leadership reviews in the Australian labour party.

There is a Wikipedia article on absolutely every subject under the sun, including leadership spills in Australia, the term used for a leadership review vote. I want members to keep count. Leadership spill one, June 2003, Mark Latham attempts to oust Simon Crean as leader of the labour party. He fails. Number two, in December, he succeeds. Number three, in December 2006, Crean and Latham are both gone but Kim Beazley is kicked out by Kevin Rudd. Number four, Kevin Rudd, who is now prime minister, is replaced by Julia Gillard. Number five, Kevin Rudd is not replaced by Julia Gillard, although there is an attempt. Number six, March 2013, Simon Crean attempts to cause Julia Gillard to be replaced by Simon Rudd who refuses to participate. Number seven, in June 2013, Kevin Rudd replaces Julia Gillard as leader of the party through their seventh leadership spill in the space of a decade. Shortly after that the labour party loses the election and then changes its rules to make sure that this kind of serial replacement of leaders is stopped.

The reason I have mentioned all of this is not because Australia's system is good or bad, but it is to make the point that it had the power to change its own rules because it was not entrenched in statute. That is the significant point.

Let me turn now to the very last point I want to deal with and that is the expulsion of members of caucus by means of a vote of the caucus. The proposed law would allow for a 50% vote to expel a member from a caucus. There would be no other way of expelling a member from a caucus. That is not a bad way of handling things.

I do not however like the proposal that members would be able, by means of collecting a series of signatures without revealing their identities, to begin this process. We would not get to do this under this proposed legislation when trying to replace a leader but we could when we are trying to kick a colleague out of caucus. I for one would want to be able to face my accusers if they were attempting to kick me out of the Conservative caucus.

Whatever happens, we can expect that if the bill goes forward and finds its way before a committee that would be one change that I would be looking for and there would be some others as well.

Opposition Motion—Time allocation and closure

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to stand in the House today to speak against the motion moved by my opposition colleague. Essentially, the motion put forward today would prevent the government from using time allocation or closure on any bill amending the Canada Elections Act or the Parliament of Canada Act.

Before getting into the substance of today's opposition day motion, I just want to comment on how remarkable the choice of the Liberals is for today's debate. The top priority of Canadians is our economy. Canadians expect us to be here working on ways to keep our economic recovery going. Meanwhile, the Liberals have two days this spring when they get to pick their topic of discussion. Did they offer up an economic proposal or any economic idea? Absolutely not. Then again, maybe that is not surprising, since the Liberal leader thinks that our budget will balance itself, and he is still working on a definition of just who is in the middle class.

Let us come back to today's debate. I respect the intent of the hon. member's motion. Bills amending the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act are of particular interest to members, as they concern the very functioning of our democracy. It is understandable that many members would wish to speak to such bills. However, the motion is not necessary. If we respect Parliament and trust the traditions permitted to authorities of Parliament, we need not selectively limit them in this way.

In my speech today I will demonstrate how the rules of this House already provide an appropriate balance between the needs of the government of the day and the needs of the opposition. There is no need to further limit the government's flexibility to ensure that debates conclude and that decisions are taken on issues relating to Parliament and elections.

It would be helpful for hon. members to remember more generally why we have provisions in our rules for time allocation and closure in the first place. Before I do that, let me quickly review what exactly time allocation and closure entail.

Time allocation and closure are tools under the Standing Orders that allow the government to curtail debate on an item. The rules for time allocation are outlined in Standing Order 78. Essentially, they allow a minister of the crown to propose a motion to allot a specified number of days or hours to the proceedings on the stage of a bill. The Standing Orders differentiate between three scenarios and provide escalating restrictions on the government, depending on the level of agreement the government is able to secure from opposition parties.

First, when there is agreement among all the parties, a minister may propose a time allocation motion covering any or all stages of a bill. The Liberal motion would even block agreements among all three parties from being implemented.

Second, when there is agreement among a majority but not of all the parties, the minister's motion can only cover one stage in the legislative process, although the motion can apply to both report stage and third reading. The motion can be moved without notice.

Third, if there is no agreement with the other parties, the government can propose a time allocation motion unilaterally. In this case, the motion can cover only one stage of the legislative process. The amount of time allocated for that stage may not be less than one sitting day, and previous notice of the intent to move the motion is required.

The rules for closure are outlined in Standing Order 57. They allow the government to move a motion to prevent the adjournment of debate on any matter and to require a vote on the matter at the end of the sitting if the closure motion is adopted.

What is the purpose of time allocation and closure? Why do these rules exist in the first place?

In our system of government, it is important to balance the needs of the government and the needs of the opposition. Our rules of debate ensure an opportunity for the voices of members to be heard and for the opposition to do just that: express opposition to the government. However, so too must the rules allow the executive to have a legitimate expectation to govern.

Time in the House is precious and must be used carefully. The government must ensure that decisions see debate but not paralysis. We cannot and will not allow our system of government to fall prey to the legislative gridlock that can occur in other countries. Our ability to deal with global economic turbulence and other challenges facing our country relate to our ability to effectively and efficiently manage and allocate time in our House. Canadians expect no less of us. Canadians expect results from their legislature. They expect members to work hard and get things done on their behalf. We agree.

The government has been clear that it will ensure a productive, hard-working, and orderly Parliament that achieves those results. Timetabling bills is a way to organize government business while allowing a reasonable opportunity for voices to be heard.

However, there must be limits. Without time allocation and closure rules, we can theoretically have a situation where the opposition uses obstructionist and dilatory tactics to prevent a government bill from going to a vote.

O'Brien and Bosc state, on page 647:

One of the fundamental principles of parliamentary procedure is that debate in the House of Commons must lead to a decision within a reasonable period of time.

There are checks and balances built into our rules to ensure that matters enjoy a reasonable period of debate, but at a certain point, debate must end and a vote held to brings matters to a close.

I have outlined why time allocation exists. I now wish to highlight a few examples of time allocation.

First, I will highlight how time allocation is built into the Standing Orders governing debate on certain other items. Then I will provide some examples of time allocation being used on bills to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act.

Let us consider the Standing Orders that govern debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, the budget, and private members' business.

Under our rules, all of these debates are timetabled.

Standing Order 50(1) provides for a maximum of six days' debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne and any amendments proposed thereto.

Standing Order 84(2) provides for a maximum of four sitting days of debate on the budget motion and any amendments proposed thereto.

Finally, the Standing Orders governing private members' business contain several provisions for the timetabling of these items. These include Standing Order 93(1)(a), which provides that there be no more than two hours of debate on the second reading motion for an item of private members' business; and Standing Order 98(2), which provides for report and third reading stage to be taken up on two separate sitting days.

If timetabling is appropriate for issues of such fundamental importance as the government's budgetary policy and items of concern to constituents brought forward by individual members, it is hard to imagine why my hon. colleague thinks it is not appropriate for bills concerning Parliament and elections.

There are other examples in our Standing Orders of rules that ensure the orderly and timely conduct of business in this House.

Standing Order 66(2) provides for no more than three hours of debate on a motion to concur in a committee report.

Standing Order 38(1) provides that adjournment proceedings last no more than 30 minutes.

I would also argue that the provisions of Standing Order 76.1(5), which provides the Speaker with the power to group report stage motions for debate, are a type of timetabling. The intent behind this rule is to attempt to avoid a repetition of the committee stage of a bill or other dilatory tactics.

However, the supreme irony is that today's debate is itself time allocated. Under the Standing Orders, the Speaker will stand at 5:15 p.m. to interrupt the debate and put the motion to the House.

There are a number of other provisions of the Standing Orders that reflect the need to ensure that timely decisions are taken on matters brought before this House.

I will now turn to some specific examples of bills amending the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act and how such bills have been, or in the case of my first example, will be timetabled.

My hon. colleague, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, recently introduced Bill C-586, the reform act, 2014. The member was added to the order of precedence when it was replenished last evening.

Bill C-586 would amend both the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act. As a private member's bill, it would be subject to time allocation under our Standing Orders, with no more than two hours of debate on the second reading and no more than two hours of debate on the report and third reading stages of that bill.

Is it fair to timetable a private member's bill amending the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act while denying the government the same opportunity with a government bill amending the same acts? In other words, is it fair for the rules of this place to allow a private member's bill on a certain subject to come to a vote, while potentially preventing a timely decision on a government bill on a similar subject?

I think at this time it would be prudent to point out to the House that my hon. colleagues from the opposite side of the House are trying to prevent a practice that they themselves have used in the past.

On June 10, 2003, a former Liberal government, lo and behold, moved a time allocation motion stipulating that no more than one further sitting day, just one, be allotted for consideration at report stage, and no more than one further sitting day be allotted for consideration at third reading, of Bill C-24. What was Bill C-24? Well, Bill C-24 amended the Canada Elections Act with respect to political financing.

Another example is found on February 22, 2000, when that same Chrétien Liberal government used time allocation on Bill C-2. Bill C-2 was the Canada Elections Act itself.

Maybe the Liberals think that replacing the Canada Elections Act should actually be exempt from a law that simply amends it. What is more, Bill C-2 was referred to committee before second reading. Debates for that procedure back then were capped at three hours. So, yes, those very same Liberals thought that a whole new elections law needed just 180 minutes of discussion in the chamber before getting sent off to committee.

Time allocation on an elections bill was considered to be appropriate back then. It is unclear to me what has changed since then.

There is no doubt that bills amending the Parliament of Canada Act or the Canada Elections Act are of particular importance to this place. So let us consider what would happen if this motion were adopted at some future time when the government brought forward an urgent bill amending these acts.

If this motion were to be adopted, the government of the day would have only one recourse to ensure that a timely decision were taken on such a bill, and that is through unanimous consent. Even if all the parties were in agreement, it would only take one member to deny that consent. The government must have the flexibility to timetable important legislative initiatives and bring things to a vote, especially bills concerning elections and the functioning of this legislature.

At its heart, time allocation is an effective scheduling and time-management tool. That is why I cannot support this motion.

In conclusion, time allocation and closure are necessary tools for the government under the Standing Orders. The government must be free to organize its business and to ensure that decisions are taken no matter the subject matter of the issue at hand.

Timetabling debate provides an appropriate balance between the opposition's right to be heard and the government's right to govern. Perhaps opposition members will vote against certain items of government business, and it is certainly their right to do so, but we must ensure that we get to the point where a vote is held and decisions are taken. Canadians expect no less. That is why I urge my hon. colleagues to vote against this motion.