Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague, the member for Victoria, presented a very thoughtful presentation in the House. He outlined a number of different suggestions as to how we might improve the bill as proposed.

I know the member has good intentions with respect to working across government to make the bill the best possible bill that we can have in the House. I wonder if the member could comment on which of the recommendations suggested by my colleague from Victoria she might be willing to support and work collaboratively on.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for Vancouver East for her dedication to the protection of the essential civil rights and privacy concerns of her constituents and other Canadians as well as a strong security safety net.

The bill, like other bills, will go forward to a committee where there will be ample opportunity to make the case for why there might need to be changes, and there may be amendments proposed. There may be amendments accepted.

This government has already shown its willingness, for example, on Bill C-7, the RCMP collective bargaining, to accept amendments from the House committees. That is new. It is one way we are doing better than the previous government. As opposition members prior to the last election, we felt it was a waste of the abilities, intelligence and commitment of MPs to have us be in committees when there was no chance of amendments going through.

That era is behind us and there is an invitation to committee members to put forward their best arguments, discuss those and bring forward amendment, and who knows? It is possible that amendments will be accepted or not, but that opportunity is there and it has been shown to be there.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, today we are discussing Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

We do not support this bill because it is ineffective in its current form. The Prime Minister has all the authority. He chooses the members and the information the committee can have and present to the House of Commons. Having parliamentarians review the actions of the government when it comes to security and intelligence is very important, but this bill does not give us a realistic chance to do that.

This legislation demonstrates another Liberal smoke and mirrors show, another deviation from an election commitment.

I want to go through and in fairly precise detail talk about the mechanisms that this law would create.

I was in the House to listen to the government House leader's presentation. With great respect to the work she is doing, the reality is that many of the things she said, and I pointed one of them out in questions and comments, simply did not accord with the text of the legislation.

It is not sufficient for the minister to reassure us of the government's good intentions, or to somehow interpret what the government is trying to do, or wants to do or wants the legislation to mean. What is important is the substantive text of Bill C-22. If we think through the actual process in place, the mechanisms that the bill would provide, there is not any kind of seriousness in terms of parliamentary review or oversight being proposed.

I want to remind members of a commitment the government made during the election, and I found this on the Liberal Party website. It said that it would create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibility. Clearly, all-party was mentioned as well as providing meaningful review of past and oversight of present operations. This clearly was the commitment that was in place.

The House passed private members' bills that were proposed by members within the government. The parliamentary secretary who just spoke proposed Bill C-622 and the member for Malpeque previously proposed Bill C-551. It is interesting to look at what was being said by that party when in opposition in terms of structure and mechanism and what this would do, what those private members' bills proposed to do, and the slight of hand variations that were not even being acknowledged in the speeches but are present in Bill C-22. These are the major concerns we have.

Let us just go through it. I am going to talk about the limitations with respect to the appointment process as well as the provision of information, and then finally about the limitations in terms of the reporting process.

In terms of the existing appointment process, unlike Bill C-622 that was proposed previously by the now parliamentary secretary, this bill would provide for not only the appointment of the chair by the Prime Minister, but also the appointment of every member of the committee. It does say that not all of the members can come from the government, but the three members of the House of Commons who are not members of the governing party could be anyone who the Prime Minister chooses.

These could theoretically be independents recently departed from the government caucus. I do not know if that is likely but that is possible. There is nothing in this legislation to suggest that the official opposition would necessarily be represented. There is nothing to suggest that the committee structure should be reflective in some sense of the composition of the House or similar to some degree with what exists in parliamentary committees. This would be a committee where the Prime Minister could, at will, choose seven members of Parliament who he thought should be on that committee and then also two members of the other place.

There is a requirement for consultation with the leaders of parties from which members are appointed if that party has recognized status in the House of Commons. There is no requirement for consultation with the leadership of Senate caucuses or with the leadership of a party in the context of appointments in the Senate. There is no requirement for consultation in the case of members being appointed who are not from recognized parties. Perhaps more importantly, there is no requirement that the consultation actually be meaningful.

The legislation does not say that the leader of another party has to agree. What would be much more sensible, I would argue, if this process were more serious, would be to have the leaders of the different parties put forward names of those within their parties, as is normal practice, and the committee would then select its own chair. However, there is not a meaningful requirement for the engagement of other parties. It is totally and completely up to the Prime Minister as to who gets appointed.

I want to draw the attention of members to subclause 4(3) of the legislation, subtitled “Not a committee of Parliament”. The committee would not be a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses. That is a distinction we need to appreciate. The legislation says very specifically that this would not be a parliamentary committee. It would be a committee that happens to include parliamentarians but parliamentarians who are appointed by the Prime Minister and who effectively report directly to him, which I will talk about.

It is interesting, as well, that the way the committee would operate is different from what those of us who participate in parliamentary committees are used to. I will just read a couple of other sections of the bill. These are important to read into the record, as people earlier in the debate were saying things about the bill that just do not reflect the substance of what we are seeing in the bill. Clause 18 states:

Meetings of the Committee are to be held in private if any information that a department is taking measures to protect is likely to be disclosed during the course of the meeting or if the Chair considers it to be otherwise necessary.

Therefore, it would not be up to the will of the committee to determine whether they move in camera, as is the normal practice. It would be solely at the discretion of the chair.

The voting rules would be different as well. The bill states:

The Chair may vote at meetings of the Committee and, in the case of an equality of votes, also has a deciding vote.

This is again different from the normal procedure. Effectively, the chair would always vote, as I understand this section, and in the case of a tie, the chair would vote again. This is a situation where although the government would have only four members from the House, and potentially two appointed members from its own side from the Senate, the chair would effectively have two votes. He or she—but we know who it is going to be; it is going to be a he—would have the ability to vote twice. That is unusual. That is a pretty substantial deviation from the way the process normally operates.

These are limitations in terms of appointments. It is very clear that the government has designed an appointment procedure that gives all the control over who sits on the committee, and by extension, over aspects of its deliberations, directly to the person who happens to be the Prime Minister. Clearly, it would not be a parliamentary committee. It would be a committee made up of some parliamentarians but would not at all be a parliamentary committee.

We go on to the issue of the provision of information in the bill. What information is to be provided, and how would that information then be considered and synthesized by the committee? Again, there are substantial limitations in terms of the work of the committee.

I attended the technical briefing last night, and we were told by the Minister of Public Safety that the goal is to include, as much as possible, both retrospective review and oversight of current operations.

Yet if we look at clause 14 of the legislation, which deals with exceptions, the exceptions would effectively include any possible scrutiny of ongoing operations. I draw the attention of members to clause 14:

(b) information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, including the nature and content of plans in support of those military operations;...

(e)information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution;

Effectively then, it would be anything related to investigations that may hypothetically lead to prosecutions or anything related to military operations. I do not dispute the value of some exclusions, although these are people who are going to go through the process of getting security clearances. They are going to be approved for the purpose of doing these kinds of reviews. It is interesting that right at the outset, these exclusions would effectively seem to exclude most of the kinds of information that might be related to ongoing operations. Those exclusions would happen right at the outset.

That is not all. It is not just those automatic exclusions. In clause 16 we have sort of a discretionary exclusion for the minister involved that is extremely broad. It says:

(1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security.

Again, in the official opposition, we understand the importance of the sensitivity of this information, but this would be a matter of the opinion of the minister; this would not a matter of saying that in the opinion of experts there is a risk to national security. This would purely be a subjective determination by the minister saying that we do not want to give this information to this committee, because in the view of the minister, it is injurious to national security, but we do not actually have to justify that belief in any objective sense.

The legislation is clear that the committee would not have a mechanism, for instance, to challenge the exclusion in court.

The committee, already appointed by the Prime Minister, dominated by members of the government, where the chair, appointed by the Prime Minister, would effectively have two votes, could still be refused information solely on the basis of the opinion of the minister without any kind of review of that determination by the minister.

We talked about the limitations and exclusions in terms of appointments. It is clear that there are substantive limitations and exclusions in terms of the information an already secretive committee would receive itself privately.

Let us go on to the limitations in terms of reporting. Who would the committee report to? The Prime Minister would be appointing it, and the Prime Minister could determine that it would not receive information. Who should the committee report to? Well, let us keep it in the family. The committee would report to the Prime Minister. That is right. This committee of parliamentarians would not report to the House; it would report directly to the Prime Minister. Of course, the Prime Minister would then provide that information back to the House within a certain number of days. I believe it is within 90 days, but the Prime Minister would have total unfettered discretion in limiting what he tabled. I am going to read again from the legislation itself, subclause 21(5):

If, after consulting the Chair of the Committee, the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege or, in civil law, by immunity from disclosure or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information.

I am sorry, it was not 90 days. The timeline between the Prime Minister receiving this and when he would be obliged to table it would be 45 days.

In terms of this section, it is very clear that, first of all, the Prime Minister would have full and complete discretion in terms of what is and is not tabled. He could go back to the committee and require it to make these kinds of changes before it was tabled. However, it is also clear from this section that he would not even need to invoke national security or national defence, because the section includes, as well, a reference to international relations.

In other words, if the Prime Minister believed that something in this report, which would then be tabled in the House, might have a negative impact on the reputation of the government and therefore would have some implications for our international relations, then on that basis, not even on the asserted basis of security, the Prime Minister could then go back to the committee and say that it needed to exclude that information.

What options would the committee have? Of course, in a normal situation, where we were not dealing with secrets, there would be an opportunity to publicly raise some objection. However, the committee could not do that. There would be no ability for the committee to then draw the attention of the public to this information in some other way, and quite appropriately, in this context.

However, we have to ask what is actually going on here. What is the effective check on the power of the government? Surely that is what is behind the very notion of parliamentary oversight, that there would be some opportunity for parliamentarians to meaningfully check the activities of the intelligence agencies that are accountable to the government.

However, there is no such check. The Prime Minister would fully dominate the appointment process. The Prime Minister and the cabinet would fully dominate the question of what information would flow to the committee, and the Prime Minister would be directly and fully in control of what information was or was not tabled in the House. This clearly is not in any sense a meaningful mechanism of scrutiny, at least as the bill presently stands. It is not a meaningful mechanism for checking the exercise of power by the government.

It is also worth looking at some of the differences between the legislation before us and the other private member's bills we have heard. Again, a few of them I have mentioned. Some of these other proposals refer to an all-party committee and not just to other members being chosen by the government. They also refer to the election of a chair by members.

Also, the legislation before us provides for significant remuneration not just for the chair of this committee but for all the members of the committee. That is a difference from what was promised in the past. The stipend available for the chair, and again the chair position has already been promised to someone, is substantially higher than the normal stipend for committee chairs.

We see these deviations, but we do not see a meaningful check in place.

I would very quickly mention that there are alternative models. The government has referred to our Five Eyes allies. It is worth underlining, for example, the British model, which does involve a parliamentary committee. It is not just a committee that happens to be made up of parliamentarians but is an actual parliamentary committee that reports to Parliament and is, of course, bound by all the same laws this committee would be bound by in terms of respect for secret information. However, it is ultimately accountable to the law and to Parliament, not to providing a report exclusively to a prime minister.

We also have a Canadian law that, frankly, has worked very well. The government has to explain how this addition would interact with our existing, highly effective Canadian model. It is not a parliamentary oversight model. It is a model of genuinely expert, independent oversight.

We have an intelligence review committee that is actually chaired by a former parliamentarian and has the expertise and the ability to provide an effective check, which this legislation just would not. Unfortunately, this is smoke and mirrors, not a substantive check on the power of the government.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, as I posed a question earlier today with respect to the Conservative Party's approach to the bill, maybe I could be a bit more concise and specific in asking the member whether or not he actually supports, or the Conservative Party supports the legislation.

It is important to note that the Conservative Party, for well over a decade, has opposed a parliamentary oversight committee. Now, we, the government, have actually put forward parliamentary oversight, something that was a part of an election platform. The member made reference to that platform issue. We were listening to what Canadians wanted. It was highlighted, especially during the great debate regarding Bill C-51. Conservative after Conservative, both in cabinet and outside of cabinet, stood and said, “We don't need a parliamentary oversight committee”.

Now, we have a Prime Minister and a government, concerned about rights and freedoms and security, that has brought forward a piece of legislation that is good for all Canadians.

My question for the member, very specifically, is this. Does the Conservative Party, today, support a parliamentary oversight committee?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, let us be very clear. The legislation would not provide parliamentary oversight. It would introduce a group of parliamentarians who are commissioned to provide advice to the Prime Minister on the basis of information that the government chooses to provide them. That is not at all a serious mechanism of parliamentary oversight.

I think it is important for us to look at individual proposals that come forward, when it comes to oversight. There are different mechanisms that work. There is nothing wrong with having an ongoing conversation about changes that could be made to improve how we do things. I do think it is worth acknowledging that Canada's experience in this respect has been very good. We have had an effective body that has done this for a while. However, what the government is proposing just is not parliamentary oversight in any sense worthy of the term.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciated the speech made by my colleague, the member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan. We differed with him on Bill C-51, as we differed with the Liberals. Last year, the NDP was the party that stood up against Bill C-51 because we thought that the cost, in terms of civil liberties and rights and freedoms, was too high and we raised a whole range of measures that the government could take to increase security without diminishing our civil liberties.

Now, on this particular issue, the government has been bringing forward oversight but refuses to put in place an independent chair. As the member knows, most of the countries that have this type of oversight actually allow for an independent chair of that committee.

I want to hear the member's views on why he thinks the government has taken this approach when most of our allies, and other countries that have put this type of structure in place, have an independent chair who is elected by the members of the committee.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I do credit the NDP for standing up for what it believed in on Bill C-51. Of course, he points out that we had a different point of view on that issue. I will note that some of the powers in Bill C-51 are being used by the RCMP, and our agencies have talked about how they have used the powers and the value that those things provide.

However, I will say, with respect to the issue of parliamentary oversight, it appears that actually doing it is not really a priority for the government. It wants to say that it has checked the box, but substantively, it is not introducing a system where members of Parliament have a meaningful ability to study, to exercise oversight, and to report that back to Parliament.

The member refers to other international examples. I talked briefly about, and I will just underline again, the British experience in this respect. The British committee was actually changed in 2013 and expanded, in terms of its powers. Members of that committee are appointed by Parliament. They come from both Houses. They report directly to Parliament and they are required to do so on the basis of security legislation. They are responsible for doing that and the model is working well.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my hon. colleague for again a very thoughtful and thorough examination of the shortcomings of the legislation before us. In fact, he has made clear, as all of the opposition speakers have today, that in fact this proposed parliamentary oversight committee is nothing like the British parliamentary oversight in at least half a dozen key areas.

I would like to ask the member about an observation in his remarks that caught me a bit off guard. He said he attended a briefing last night on the detail of the legislation. He informed the House that in fact the Minister of Public Safety conducted this briefing, where, as a number of us have lamented in debate today, the minister did not present and defend his legislation but left it to the House leader to do so.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, just to clarify, both ministers were present at the technical briefing, the government House leader and the Minister of Public Safety. Most of the detailed information on the legislation was provided by the Minister of Public Safety.

The point the member makes is important, about the active participation of ministers in this debate. Of course it is not parliamentary to draw attention to the presence or absence of ministers or members in the House, and I would not dream of doing it.

However, I would say it is important that ministers are here to discuss the legislation, especially when we have an opening speech from the government that misunderstands fundamental aspects of the legislation. It talked about reporting to Parliament, for example, instead of reporting to the Prime Minister. I cannot speak for what exactly the process is on the other side of the House, but I think it is important when they have a detailed piece of legislation to engage in the detail and to accurately describe that detail in our debates.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, maybe I can help the member. The government House leader is the minister who is responsible for the legislation's introduction because the legislation would have an impact on, I believe, 17 departments plus many other aspects in terms of the issue of accountability, dealing with freedoms and securities, individual rights, and so forth. The Minister of Public Safety will in fact be making a presentation today, as other members will make presentations.

It is a bit disingenuous of Conservative members to take away the importance of the legislation not just to one department but to a number of departments. This is something that the Prime Minister and the government have been very clear on. It is not just one department that the legislation would affect. The most appropriate minister would in fact be the government House leader in terms of its introduction.

Will the member not at the very least acknowledge that the bill applies to more than one department and that in fact it makes sense to have the government House leader introduce the bill? Would the member want all 17 ministers and be critical of those ministers for not making presentations?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I want to be very clear about this. I at no point criticized the fact that the government House leader proposed the legislation. Whichever minister the Liberals wish to have propose it is of course the business of the government. I have risen to discuss the substance of the legislation, which, as always in discussion with my friend from Winnipeg North, I try to bring us back to because it is important for us to be evaluating the substance of what we are talking about.

My point about the government House leader was not about the fact that she was the one who moved the legislation. It was simply about the fact that some of the things she said about the legislation do not reflect what is in the legislation. That is the issue. The issue is that members need to know that we are talking about a committee that would be appointed by the Prime Minister, whose access to information would be fundamentally controlled by the Prime Minister and cabinet, and that would report back to the Prime Minister, and that the Prime Minister could choose not to have information tabled in the House even if he does not see it as a threat to national security. He could even use potential harm to international relations as the basis for excluding information.

It is just important that members know the facts on the legislation and are analyzing it carefully. Unfortunately, the point about the government House leader's speech was simply that there were things that were said that did not reflect the substance of the legislation.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, I would like to indicate that I will be splitting my time with my friend and colleague, the member for Surrey Centre.

I am honoured to speak today to Bill C-22, which would create, for the first time, a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. There can be no more important obligation of government than the responsibility to protect the safety and security of its citizens, both at home and abroad. However, there is another equally important obligation for government in a country like Canada that values our hard-earned freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law, an obligation to uphold the Constitution of Canada and ensure that all laws respect the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people who live in a free and democratic society.

The need to balance these two obligations simultaneously lies at the heart of the bill before us today. The legislation responds to the threats and attacks that have afflicted countries around the world, including Canada and some of our closest allies, in the face of which we must remain clear-eyed and ever vigilant.

Bill C-22 also responds to the many calls over many years for enhanced accountability of departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Hon. members will remember that these calls intensified last year when the previous government introduced the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, also known as Bill C-51 at the time.

Then, the Liberal party made the argument that Canada's approach to national security legislation should avoid both naïveté, on the one hand, and fearmongering, on the other. The threats are real, and so is the need to protect civil liberties. That is why we included improvements to our national security framework, including the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians as a major part of our campaign platform in the last election.

The bill before us would establish a committee with nine members. Seven of the committee members would be drawn from the House of Commons, of which only four can be government members. Two members would be drawn from the other place. This committee will be different from other committees and offices established to review security and intelligence matters.

In the accountability system now in place, some review bodies can access classified documents, but only for a specified department or agency. The members of these committees are not sitting parliamentarians. Where parliamentarians do have a role, they do not have access to classified documents.

None of the existing independent review bodies, including the Security Intelligence Review Committee that reviews CSIS, the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, includes sitting parliamentarians. On the other hand, parliamentary committees examine security and intelligence matters, but carry out their mandates primarily through listening to testimony at public meetings.

In the other place, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has a broad mandate to examine any legislation or issues related to national defence or security. In the House, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studies legislation or issues related to Public Safety Canada and the other agencies in the public safety portfolio. They do exceedingly valuable and good work, but as a rule, neither of these committees has access to classified information. They have neither the mandate nor the resources to dig deep into the details of national security matters in order to hold the government and national security agencies truly accountable.

Under the bill before us today, members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would obtain the appropriate level of security clearance and would, therefore, have access to highly classified security and intelligence information regarding national security and intelligence activities across the Government of Canada.

I would also point out that our Five Eyes partners have review bodies that function in similar ways. In those countries, select parliamentarians have access to highly sensitive intelligence so that they can help to protect the public interest with regard to civil rights while also helping to protect public safety by ensuring that national security organizations are functioning effectively.

Until now, Canada has been alone among the Five Eyes partners in not having a committee where parliamentary representatives can access classified information. This bill would close that gap. In fact, in some regards, our proposal goes further than our allies in the Westminster democracies. This committee would review any and all government departments and agencies that are involved in security and intelligence. It would also have the authority to investigate ongoing operations.

When it comes to establishing a national security accountability mechanism, the bill before us sets a new standard that some of our allies might well follow. The powers given to this committee, its members, and its secretariat are robust. The committee would be able to access any information it needs to conduct its reviews, subject to some specific and reasonable limitations. As is the case with similar committees in other countries, while committee members would not be able to publicly divulge the classified information to which they would have access, they would be empowered to bring tremendous pressure to bear on a particular agency or on the government of the day by letting Canadians know if something is not right.

Clearly, this new committee represents a major step forward in strengthening the accountability of our national security and intelligence system. It would give the people's representatives a true opportunity to evaluate our national security policies and operations, and ensure that both Canadians' safety and their civil liberties are protected.

For those reasons, I urge hon. members to join me in supporting this very important and historic bill.

[Anne Minh-Thu Quach, NDP, Salaberry—Suroît, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his input into the discussion on the security committee of parliamentarians, a committee that the NDP has been calling for. In fact, this recommendation has been on the books for 35 years and has never really been applied.

The committee would ensure that Canadians would have renewed trust in our national security system. With Bill C-51 being passed and supported by the Liberals, we really need Canadians to believe that their information, rights, and security are protected.

Even though this is a step in the right direction, many experts have expressed concern over flaws in the process of forming the committee, including the Prime Minister's power to censor the committee's reports, which in fact we want to limit.

For example, under the current wording, the Prime Minister has a great deal of latitude for requiring the committee to revise its reports in order to exclude information, but nothing requires the final report to spell out the fact that some passages were redacted and what types of information were excluded. Transparency would be lacking. There needs to be a great deal of transparency for Canadians to be able to trust the committee.

What does my colleague opposite think about that? Would his party agree to an amendment?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to share the sentiment that there has been, for quite some time, a public conversation about the need to elevate the standards of accountability through the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee.

We heard earlier today in the House that the origins of that conversation go as far back as the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the McDonald commission recommended as much.

I would also like to take this opportunity to point out all of the hard work of my colleagues the member for Charlottetown and the parliamentary secretary to the President of the Treasury Board, for their work in past sessions, where they advanced the important work of elevating the standard of transparency and accountability through the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee.

For all of those reasons, I am very proud today to stand here in support of Bill C-22.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it is striking to hear the way the government members are characterizing this legislation. In my speech, I read directly from it some of the ways in which it is very clear that the process is dominated from the beginning to the end by the Prime Minister's Office.

I would ask to specifically hear the member's reflections on clause 21(5), which I asked the government House leader about. It says that the Prime Minister can exclude from the final report information that he believes, subjectively, would be injurious to international relations. If the government is going to have such a general criterion that does not even reference security, should there not be at least some external expert review of the Prime Minister's use of this power, because otherwise this exercise is totally meaningless? If the Prime Minister for such justification can limit the tabling of information in the House, then surely that is not in any way a substantive check on the power of the government.