An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This bill is from the 42nd Parliament, 1st session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Dominic LeBlanc  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament has also written a full legislative summary of the bill.

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Bill numbers are reused for different bills each new session. Perhaps you were looking for one of these other C-22s:

C-22 (2022) Law Canada Disability Benefit Act
C-22 (2021) An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
C-22 (2014) Law Energy Safety and Security Act
C-22 (2011) Law Eeyou Marine Region Land Claims Agreement Act
C-22 (2010) Law An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service
C-22 (2009) Law Appropriation Act No. 1, 2009-2010

Votes

April 4, 2017 Passed That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass.
April 4, 2017 Failed That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following: “Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities”.
March 20, 2017 Passed That Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, {as amended}, be concurred in at report stage [with a further amendment/with further amendments] .
March 20, 2017 Passed 16 (1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security. (2) If the appropriate Minister refuses to provide information under subsection (1), he or she must inform the Committee of his or her decision and the reasons for the decision. (3) If the appropriate Minister makes the decision in respect of any of the following information, he or she must provide the decision and reasons to, (a) in the case of information under the control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (b) in the case of information under the control of the Communications Security Establishment, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment; and (c) in the case of information under the control of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
March 20, 2017 Passed 14 The Committee is not entitled to have access to any of the following information: (a) a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, as defined in subsection 39(2) of the Canada Evidence Act; (b) information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; (c) the identity of a person who was, is or is intended to be, has been approached to be, or has offered or agreed to be, a confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada, or the government of a province or of any state allied with Canada, or information from which the person’s identity could be inferred; (d) information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution.
March 20, 2017 Passed to sections 14 and 16, the Committee is entitled to have access to ed by litigation privilege or by solicitor-client privilege or the professional
March 20, 2017 Failed That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).
March 20, 2017 Passed and up to ten other members, each of whom must be a (2) The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five Committee members who
March 20, 2017 Passed That, in relation to Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, not more than one further sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at report stage of the Bill and one sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill; and That, 15 minutes before the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders on the day allotted to the consideration at report stage and on the day allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if required for the purpose of this Order, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the Bill then under consideration shall be put forthwith and successively without further debate or amendment.
Oct. 4, 2016 Passed That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:15 p.m.

NDP

Murray Rankin NDP Victoria, BC

Mr. Speaker, the member referred to Professor Wesley Wark who, along with three other experts, on January 27 of this year, wrote as follows in The Globe and Mail:

What united us was a concern that the government, in pursuing a laudable objective, had simply gone too far in restricting access by the Committee to secret information and in attempting to control the kind of reporting it could do.

He goes on to support the committee recommendations that, of course, we supported, as well.

A Liberal bill a few years back, Bill C-622, allowed the committee, in its oversight capacity, to subpoena witnesses and documents and get the information it thought it would require. That was supported by the current Prime Minister, the current public safety minister, the future chair of this committee, and many other current cabinet ministers. Does the member think they were wrong?

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:15 p.m.

Liberal

Kevin Lamoureux Liberal Winnipeg North, MB

Mr. Speaker, there are issues on which some have much more knowledge than I, and we have these experts who come forward. I cited a quote directly from Mr. Wark. Having said that, what I do know is that if we do a comparison between Canada and the other four eyes, Canada being the fifth eye, we will find that in certain areas there might be an argument that we might be able to improve and do better. In other areas, I would argue that we are doing better than other members of the Five Eyes.

What is nice about the legislation, and even the government House leader, if members listened to what the government House leader had to say, said this is something which we are starting. It is historic here in Canada. It is the first time we are having a parliamentary oversight committee to be able to protect our freedoms and our rights. We are not saying there is no way in which it cannot be improved in the future, but I can tell members that I believe that Canadians as a whole will support not only the bill but the amendments that are being brought forward. This government demonstrated that it is very sensitive and it listened to what was being said at committee and what other experts had to say about the legislation.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:15 p.m.

The Assistant Deputy Speaker Anthony Rota

Resuming debate, the hon. member for Perth--Wellington.

I just want to inform the member that time might be a bit short. He will have time to make his full 10-minute presentation and only have about two minutes for questions, but that will come up again when this item comes back to the House.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:15 p.m.

Conservative

John Nater Conservative Perth—Wellington, ON

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise in the House today to debate this important issue.

Listening to the debate thus far today in the House and hearing the parliamentary secretary talk about the amendments that his government is bringing in at report stage and the amendments that it rejected at committee made me think of one of the great orators that the House has ever heard, the Right Hon. Arthur Meighen, one of this country's prime ministers, a relatively short-lived prime minister but a prime minister nonetheless, who was actually from my home area of Perth County.

Arthur Meighen once gave a speech and his words are valuable to the debate we have at hand. He was speaking of Edmund Burke, one of the great British thinkers, when he said:

...a ministry must yield to Parliament and not contrive that Parliament be new-modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If the authority of Parliament...is to be upheld as long as it coincides in opinion with His Majesty's advisers, but to be set at nought the moment it differs from them, then the House of Commons will shrink into a mere appendage of administration and entirely lose its independent and effective character.

I get the impression from the structure and the makeup of this committee that is exactly what the government is trying to do.

Throughout the history of our great parliamentary democracies, the supremacy of Parliament has been well established. As a nation-state, there is no question our country owes a duty of care to the security and safety of our citizens.

Parliament has a duty to ensure that our laws are properly in place and that they protect our citizens. We must also be sure that we do not overstep the boundaries that are set out for us, which is why we are not entirely opposed as such to the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee, one that may be similar to that of the United Kingdom. The challenge though is that the government of this day has refused to listen to the important input of not only the committee but of members from this side of the House and from members down the way in the NDP as well. The government has refused to take the advice of our former public safety critic, the member for Durham, and the member for Victoria, both of whom have brought important contributions to this debate, but nonetheless, the government has refused to go about amending this bill and creating this bill in a way that would truly protect the rights of our citizens.

One specific element of the bill that I find troubling is subclause 4(3), which reads:

The committee is not a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses.

As such, the committee is called the security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It would be a misnomer to call it a parliamentary committee because it is not and the government has structured it as such, very deliberately, I would say.

I would suggest it has been done so to exempt the committee from some of the normal practices that parliamentary committees of the House operate under. The government in effect, I would argue, is creating the committee to be a branch of the executive branch rather than the legislative branch of Parliament, and the government has failed to truly justify this approach.

Upon further examining the details of Bill C-22 it becomes clear the Liberal cabinet is not looking to enhance parliamentary oversight but rather to expand its own power. In fact, clause 21 of the bill gives the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister alone, in consultation with the Prime Minister's appointed chair, the ability to revise sections of these reports. In other words, it would give the Prime Minister the opportunity to force a redaction of the reports before they are tabled in Parliament. This allows the Prime Minister to decide what Parliament can and cannot see. So much for a parliamentary committee.

I would remind the Liberal government of the words of one of our former Speakers who, on April 27, 2010, said, and I quote from the Speaker's ruling on that date:

The insinuation that Members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which Members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

In fact, it was members on that side, members of the now Liberal government, who argued vehemently at that time for the release of sensitive information. Now they have constructed a committee which would, in effect, give the Prime Minister, in consultation with his own appointed chair, the ability to redact and keep information from this chamber.

A committee of parliamentarians, or what should be a parliamentary committee, should be the master of its own domain. It should, in effect, be able to decide how to act within its own jurisdiction.

I am also concerned that Bill C-22 authorizes cabinet to not disclose certain information to the committee. According to the rules established by clause 15 of the bill, the committee does not receive information directly from the departments. The committee must instead submit a request to a minister.

Clause 15(3) states:

After the appropriate minister receives the request, he or she must provide or cause to be provided to the Committee, in a timely manner, the requested information to which it is entitled to have access.

The expression “in a timely manner” is difficult to interpret. The ministers can put off complying with the request. My experience with how ministers can delay responding to committees' requests indicates that this clause is highly problematic. The bill should establish strict deadlines for the departments' response.

What concerns me the most is the fact that after stating that it wants to strengthen the role of Parliament by enhancing the independence of committees, cabinet chose the chair of the committee. We learned from the media that the member for Ottawa South will chair the committee.

I have no particular opinion on the performance of the member for Ottawa South as a parliamentarian. I am certain he is an exceptionally adequate parliamentarian and representative of his riding, but the fact is that this chair was appointed by the Prime Minister. He was not elected by fellow committee members, who, in fact, have not even been appointed yet and may not be appointed for several months to come, but the Prime Minister has already appointed his preferred choice as chair of the committee, likely a year and a half before the committee is fully established.

I would remind the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness that they ran on a platform of being open, accountable, and transparent, but they appointed a member with really no particular experience in the field of public safety or national security organizations to provide oversight of Canada's covert security and intelligence activities. The Prime Minister chose such a member to serve as chair. Why? Could it perhaps be that the member for Ottawa South has a particular skill set, particular experience, in one very precise area, and that is being a long-time Liberal? He comes from one of the most famous Liberal families in Ontario.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:25 p.m.

John Barlow

Infamous.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:25 p.m.

Conservative

John Nater Conservative Perth—Wellington, ON

Mr. Speaker, I would not say “infamous” as that would be unparliamentary, but it is a very famous Liberal family. Could it just be that he is being rewarded for his long-time dedication to the Liberal Party, or could it perhaps be that it is simply a reward for having been left out of cabinet when the cabinet was formed?

Finally, the bill states that the committee chair will receive an annual allowance of $42,200. This amount is over three times the usual allowance of $11,900 given to chairs of standing committees.

In my riding of Perth—Wellington, $42,000 is a good annual salary. The chair of this committee will receive the equivalent of a Canadian worker's salary, in addition to the $170,400 parliamentary salary he already receives.

There is no question in my mind that Parliament and we as parliamentarians are open to a degree of parliamentary oversight of our national security agencies. This is something that our party is not opposed to. The challenge the Conservative opposition has, as members of this august chamber, is the way in which the Liberals have structured this committee. The way in which they have imposed their self-appointed chair on this committee and the way in which they have introduced amendments at report stage and rejected some of the amendments of the all-party committee simply go to show that this is more window dressing than actually an effective oversight committee of the House.

For these reasons and so much more, this bill simply does not reflect the international examples that have been provided in the past of effective parliamentary oversight activities.

Motions in amendmentNational Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 8th, 2017 / 5:25 p.m.

The Assistant Deputy Speaker Anthony Rota

We will have to stop. The next time Bill C-22 comes up the hon. member will have five minutes of questions coming his way. I am sure he will do a wonderful job with it.

The House resumed from March 8 consideration of Bill C-22, an Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:05 a.m.

Vancouver Quadra B.C.

Liberal

Joyce Murray LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It is a bill that would at long last enable Canadian parliamentarians to scrutinize our national security framework and our national security agencies, as our Five Eyes partners have been doing for years.

The creation of this committee would be part of achieving the dual objectives of keeping Canadians safe while safeguarding our rights and freedoms. It would also stand us in great stead among our international partners. In fact, the new Canadian committee would raise the bar for national security accountability worldwide.

I will touch on a bit of the history behind Bill C-22.

For many years, a great many Canadians, including me as an MP, have called for the creation of such a committee. The government of Paul Martin put forward a proposal that, unfortunately, died on the order paper.

Issues pertaining to the need for better oversight of national security organizations were discussed in 2008 in Justice Frank Iacobucci's Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, and in 2006 in Justice Dennis O'Connor's Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar.

While the Conservatives were in power, both the private member's bill, Bill C-551, from the member for Malpeque, and my own private member's bill, Bill C-622, were tabled, as was a bill with bipartisan support in the Senate, all of which would have seen this committee created years ago.

My bill, Bill C-622, which called for the creation of a parliamentary committee of oversight, built on the two previous bills and also included an additional set of measures to increase the transparency and accountability of the Communications Security Establishment. It would have put metadata under the law and created a framework of accountability for acquiring, storing, or sharing information inadvertently or advertently collected. However, the timing of my bill was very interesting, because the final discussion and vote took place one week after the attack on Parliament, which had been preceded by two deadly attacks on Canadian soldiers. At that time, there was a great deal of concern about the security of Canadians, due to radicalization and potential terrorism.

In the remarks following the attack on Parliament, it was remarkable that all party leaders confirmed their commitment to protect the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of Canadians, even as security measures were to be analyzed and strengthened. Indeed, Canadians expect these fundamental aspects of their very democracy being guarded to be respected. That kind of attention to security measures and privacy is the underlying intention of Bill C-22.

At the time, in 2014, I invited members of all parties to support sending my bill to committee for further examination and to signal the authenticity of their commitment to protecting privacy at the same time as strengthening security in Canada. Unfortunately, instead, the previous prime minister instructed his Conservative members to vote against Bill C-622, even though all members of the Liberal Party and all other parties in the House, including one brave Conservative member, voted for it. The bill failed. It was not passed.

However, I am now happy to see the government following through on the spirit of my bill, Bill C-622. I was proud to campaign on the promise of delivering stronger national security oversight by parliamentarians, and Bill C-22 delivers on that promise.

It is regrettable that it has taken so long, but we can be proud as the members of Parliament who will, I am confident, finally bring this essential parliamentary body into being. After all, as the federal and provincial privacy commissioners stated in the fall 2014 communiqué, “Canadians both expect and are entitled to equal protection for their privacy and access rights and for their security. We must uphold these fundamental rights that lie at the heart of Canada’s democracy.”

I followed with interest as the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studied this piece of legislation, proposed and debated amendments, and amended the bill, frequently with the support of several parties.

I want to emphasize what a pleasant change this is from working under the previous government, whose members viewed government bills as sacrosanct.

That was especially the case with laws concerning security measures. As we know, Bill C-51 followed shortly after the tragedies of the attacks on soldiers and on Parliament and was pushed through, essentially with no amendments, despite the deep concerns of Canadians.

I feel that many of the committee's amendments improve the bill and the new committee it will establish.

For example, the committee amended clause 8 to expand the scope of the committee's mandate. When it comes to examining activities carried out by national security or intelligence agencies, the power of a minister to determine that the examination would be injurious to national security would now be time limited to the period during which the activity was actually happening. Once it was no longer ongoing, the minister would be required to inform the committee and the committee could then undertake its examination. I support this change.

I also support the amendment that gives the committee chair a vote only in the case of a tie as well as the NDP's addition of a clause requiring the committee to inform the appropriate minister of the discovery of any activity that may not be in compliance with the law.

I also support some of the changes to the exemptions that were in clause 14 initially, the information to which committee members were not entitled.

I agree with the public safety committee that the new committee of parliamentarians should be able to receive information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations. I support that it should have access to information considered privileged under the Investment Canada Act and that it should have access to information collected by FINTRAC, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

There were certain changes made by the committee that were not accepted by the government, for a variety of reasons. For example, there is the amendment currently before the House to reintroduce clause 16, which would allow a minister to prevent the release of information that constitutes special operating information under the Security of Information Act, when disclosing it could be injurious to national security. This kind of authority exists in the case of other equivalent committees in similar parliamentary systems around the world. Moreover, Bill C-22 would still require the minister to give written reasons for preventing the release of information, and Parliament would be informed of each occasion on which this authority was used.

This legislation is a major leap forward for Canadian national security accountability. The new committee of parliamentarians would not only provide Canadians with the assurance that their elected representatives, the MPs in Parliament, were on watch to strengthen the protection of their essential civil rights but would also help identify opportunities to improve on current mechanisms for defending their security. In fact, effective protection of individual privacy and effective delivery of national security measures are not a balance, a dichotomy, or a trade-off. They are complementary, and both are necessary.

The United States Department of Homeland Security, for example, considers safeguarding civil rights and liberties to be critical to its work to protect its nation from the many threats it faces. This third-largest department of the U.S. government now explicitly embeds and enforces privacy protections and transparency in all the department's systems, programs, and activities.

In 2014, deputy secretary Mayorkas confirmed in a Department of Homeland Security speech that not only is this an integral part of the DHS mission and crucial to maintaining the public's trust but it has resulted in Homeland Security becoming a stronger and more effective department.

The original version of Bill C-22, as presented by the government at first reading, was already lauded by experts, and it has only become stronger with the amendments accepted from the public safety committee. Crucially, the bill requires that the act be reviewed by Parliament five years after coming into force, so all of the discussions we are having here in Parliament can be reviewed and the bill can be changed as appropriate.

I am proud to have contributed to the conversation leading to Bill C-22. I am pleased that our government has taken this essential step forward in protecting fundamental Canadian security and freedoms. Ultimately, the bill before us today would make Canadians safer and help ensure that our rights and freedoms are better protected. It has been a long time coming. I invite all hon. members to join me in making it happen.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:15 a.m.

NDP

Ruth Ellen Brosseau NDP Berthier—Maskinongé, QC

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for her speech.

In 2014, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and nine other ministers voted for Bill C-622, a bill that would have established an oversight committee with unfettered access and subpoena powers.

Is the member disappointed? Why is the government trying to take tools away from the committee that Bill C-22 would establish?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:15 a.m.

Liberal

Joyce Murray Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I thank the NDP member for her question.

I want to point out that today is a historic day. A bill like this one to create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee, improve, scrutinize, and analyze the activities and operations of over a dozen security intelligence agencies is unprecedented in Canada.

These kinds of activities were carried out in the dark. We had to have faith, without any oversight as parliamentarians, and that must stop. I think this is worth celebrating, and I hope the member will join me.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:15 a.m.

NDP

Anne Minh-Thu Quach NDP Salaberry—Suroît, QC

Mr. Speaker, despite my colleague's speech, I think that Canadians expect Parliament to have a truly effective watchdog that has some real teeth.

If we want to strengthen the confidence of Canadians in our public security and intelligence agencies, we need to ensure real oversight. We need to give this oversight committee the tools and autonomy needed to be effective.

In 2004, an all-party committee looked at the issue of an oversight committee. After visiting some allied countries, members of that committee concluded that, without full access to classified information, the oversight committee would not be able to complete its task.

However, the bill before us today places a number of limitations on the rights of MPs, even though MPs would have security clearance and would be bound to secrecy.

Does the parliamentary secretary not have sufficient confidence in the members to grant them full access to as much information as possible, rather than trying to restrict that information?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:15 a.m.

Liberal

Joyce Murray Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the first part of the NDP member's question. We want an oversight committee that is as effective as possible. That is what Bill C-22 promises and I am proud of that.

I am also very pleased that we have a government that accepts amendments proposed by opposition party members. We are making history because for 10 years, hon. members were unable to contribute to improving government bills. Now, committees operate in such a way that members of all parties can contribute to creating a more effective framework. That is what the committee did and the government accepted several proposed amendments.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:20 a.m.

Conservative

Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON

Mr. Speaker, one of the most important duties of any national government is the safety and security of its citizens. That is what people look to the government for, that is what they trust their government will do, and that is indeed one of our most important obligations here in this House, but more importantly for any government in Canada.

I come to this debate as a former public safety minister. While aware of the national security threats that we face as a country and how we work to deal with those threats, it also means that I understand full well that there are very good reasons that one might not want to have a committee such as this. Those arguments have been articulated in the past.

On the one hand, for example, one could argue that our national security agencies conduct themselves with the utmost professionalism and that the existing oversight mechanisms we have are adequate and do a fine job in providing oversight of those mechanisms to protect the public interest. I think all of us would agree that is indeed largely the case here in Canada today, and I think it is clear that the Liberal government has concluded the same, based on the approach it is taking to the bill.

The second argument that we hear from time to time is that we cannot really trust politicians, especially those with a partisan interest, with this kind of sensitive security information. If they see a partisan gain to be had, they will find some way to use that information to their advantage, even if it would hurt national security.

The Liberals have clearly concluded that they believe both of these two perspectives. However, they are stuck with a problem. The problem is that notwithstanding their conclusions on this front, they have this promise from the last election to establish an all-party national oversight committee. They feel they must somehow fulfill that promise. They noted when they were out campaigning that Canada is “the sole nation among our Five Eyes allies whose elected officials cannot scrutinize security operations”. Therefore, they come to us with a bill today that ensures that parliamentarians will not be able to scrutinize national security operations, i.e., their solution does not address what they say was their problem.

The Liberals' solution indicates that they do not believe we can trust politicians, which is one of those arguments for not having such a body in the first place. What we are dealing with here is a fascinating shell game. We are establishing something that has the name, national security committee of parliamentarians, but it is not a parliamentary committee; it is a committee of parliamentarians. It seems to belong to the Prime Minister as his personal group, but it is not a parliamentary committee. It has none of those privileges. It is simply an empty shell, with none of the powers we would think such a committee would have.

While we are going through a tremendous charade to pretend we are carrying through on a commitment to do something from the election, we are creating it in name but not in substance.

That is the problem we have in the Conservative Party. I believe it is legitimate to have a perspective where we make those arguments and say we will not have a parliamentary oversight committee because of those reasons, because our existing system works well: “We think our bodies do well. We are concerned about trusting politicians.” We could say that, or we could say that those statements are not true: “We really do need to have parliamentary oversight.” Then, we can actually create it. The bill does not create it. It is consistent. In fact, one of the ironies is that the underlying premise of the argument that we cannot trust politicians is proven by this bill. The Liberals went out there and told Canadians they would do something, and they are not. They are doing something very different. They are proving that very argument by their actions in this case.

This committee, as I said, is not a parliamentary committee. It has none of the associated powers and privileges of a parliamentary committee, and, by its structure, is isolated and cut off entirely from this parliamentary process. Members will see that it does not have the ability to appeal to the rights that one has as parliamentarians by virtue of our long-standing traditions in this House of Commons, and which for centuries of the Westminster system has worked.

The body is not a parliamentary committee; it is a committee merely of parliamentarians. The bill before us ensures that the body cannot scrutinize ongoing operations, and it says that when the operations are complete then of course it can reflect upon them. However, in this day and age, there is no such thing.

As a former public safety minister, I can say that no investigation is ever complete. The principal threat that we face, as the public safety department and the government assess in their national security priorities documents on the terrorism front, is the threat of Islamic extremist terrorism. Every time we have had such an incident, though, even when the incident is over and the perpetrator may be killed, the fact is that investigations continue with the people they have dealt with, in the context they have had, and the networks they have, and these investigations continue on and on. By their very nature, they do not come to a conclusion.

By the definitions of the exclusions that have been created for this committee, they are effectively, de facto, excluded from ever dealing with anything of substance that is actually happening on the national security front. Then, ironically, most of all, the authority that it would be given to seek information, to ask for documents, the mandate it would be given and the realms in which it can investigate, are more limited than the existing oversight bodies that are doing their work. They are duplicative, but more narrow. They are not even in other areas. They are in the exact same areas, but they are more narrow.

Therefore, it is a paper shell that is being proposed by the government. It is a meaningless shell. It certainly underlines those two principal arguments that I made in the first case about why the government probably has come to the conclusion that it would not, if it had its preferences and had not made such a rash promise in the last election, be proceeding with this committee.

Let us deal with the first of those arguments, whether our existing national security organizations do their jobs well and have adequate oversight. I can say, I think without compromising any oaths or laws, that our Canadian Security Intelligence Service is highly professional. We are very fortunate to have it working for us. I believe the men and women in that organization are second to none. They provide a service to Canadians that has kept us safe countless times.

They resist any temptation to put themselves in the spotlight, to tell success stories of their work, but there is a myriad of success stories of their work. The threats that they have shut down, which we have never ever heard about, that they have neutralized, prevented from happening, have identified, and appropriately tracked to protect us are numerous. We can be very proud of the work of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It is indeed highly professional.

I have heard occasional criticisms of individuals on the Security Intelligence Review Committee. After all, a lot of them are politicians and people like to criticize politicians. However, I have never heard any substantive criticisms of the work they have done being inadequate. We can conclude that both the organization and the oversight have worked very well.

Another one of the three organizations that we are dealing with, the Communications Security Establishment, is outstanding. It is a second-to-none, world-class operation, and we can commend its work. Fortunately, most of us do not know the work that it does, which is the way it is supposed to be, but I can assure everyone that it does outstanding work. I have never ever heard a single credible criticism of the quality of work done by the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment. Again, it is high quality.

The RCMP is a bit of a different body. One of the difficulties is that we ask our police to spread themselves across an incredibly large mandate, everything from local and municipal policing to counterterrorism investigations, to dealing with money laundering, to dealing with very sophisticated financial transactions. It is a mandate that is truly broad, so their work is not always perfect. However, that being said, the work of Ian McPhail and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission has been excellent. I have not heard any credible complaints. They are providing very high-quality reviews.

When I look at these, I can see that the government has concluded there is not a problem. However, Liberals have talked about it in opposition, whipping up a frenzy of concerns. They do not really share that. They do not really believe that. At the end of day, they honestly do not believe politicians should have oversight. That is why they have created this limited scope, this inability. In fact, as I said, this body would become a pale duplication. It is a duplication of the existing oversight, but it is a pale duplication. The committee of parliamentarians will have less power than those existing oversight bodies that we talked about that are doing their work.

Not only will it have less scope, but the government almost implicitly in this bill acknowledges embarrassment that it is creating a body that is merely a duplication with fewer powers. It does that with an entire clause, clause 9 of the bill, that requires the review bodies and this new committee to “avoid any unnecessary duplication of work.” The government has actually acknowledged it is asking this committee to do the exact same thing. Just a little slice of it is all the government is going to let the committee do and please, no duplication.

At one point in time when this was proposed, I thought that as a former public safety minister, it would be great for me to be on this committee. Now I look at this committee as it is being proposed by the government, and it is such a meaningless shell. I can assure every member in this House who is interested in serving on it that they are going to find it a very frustrating and empty experience, because they are not going to see too much and they are not going to have much power to actually do anything. Certainly, it is a far cry from a substantive committee such as we see, for example, south of the border.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

March 10th, 2017 / 10:30 a.m.

Liberal

Francis Drouin Liberal Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON

Mr. Speaker, one of the issues that will be addressed with this committee is if there are issues that arise in the RCMP or CSIS, that particular committee will be able to follow the evidence from the RCMP to CSIS, or from CSIS to the RCMP. Right now the review bodies cannot do that.

Would the member not agree that this is a big improvement with regard to that particular committee? It can follow the evidence from the RCMP to CSIS. Right now that cannot be done.