Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we have a system of oversight. Having a committee that is able to look at the day-to-day operations, the day-to-day bills that we are considering in Parliament is one thing, but having another style of committee, which is a committee of parliamentarians that also includes members from the other place, really adds some value to having another third party looking at matters of security that often are not allowed to be made public because of the true nature of being items of security but are overviewed by elected officials.

Right now, we do not have that ability. Elected officials are not included in the process of security oversight. That is precisely what this committee is being set up to do.

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, if openness and transparency were a currency, the government would be squandering it as fast as it is our taxpayers' hard-earned dollars.

By structuring the committee the way it has, the government has undermined the independence of it. I am wondering if the hon. member could speak to why the government has undermined the independence of this committee.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, as I am watching the discussion today, as well as the discussion that happened previously, it is fascinating to hear members of the Conservative Party talking about openness and transparency.

It is fascinating in terms of what we saw in the previous government. Actually, the former prime minister was found in contempt of Parliament for not respecting parliamentary discussions and for not respecting the oversight of committees.

In this case, we have a committee that is recommending a parliamentary committee to undo some of the lack of transparency that we had in the previous government.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, or, as I call it, another piece of bad legislation to cover for a campaign promise the Liberals made without really thinking it through.

There are some points I want to address in discussing this bill, as I mentioned: using bad legislation to cover for bad campaign promises, the problem with creating legislation that relies on putting blind trust in the government, a redundancy of some of the legislation, and what stakeholders are saying about the bill.

We start with a campaign talking point that turned out to be a poorly phrased policy platform: how to reconcile the Prime Minister's support of Bill C-51 when he was a third party leader and his current compulsion to oppose everything the previous government did. My colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka said it perfectly when he said, “the devil is not only in the details; the devil is in the fundamental misappropriation of the bill to promise something to the electorate and then not deliver.”

Today's legislation is just another in a string of poor attempts to cover up politically popular, but operationally difficult, campaign promises. This bill gives broad discretion over intelligence and national security discussions to the government, with “strong” oversight from the PMO, but not from Parliament. MPs are told to just trust the Liberals and they will figure it all out later. We know from their actions, though, they cannot be so easily trusted. They find ways to bend, break, and skirt the rules.

Therefore, we use the mechanisms within the House to hold the government to account and make sure that Canadians are aware of what the Liberal government is up to. Bill C-22 creates a committee with broad oversight, heavy Liberal influence, and public disclosure solely at the discretion of the PMO. It is a system designed to operate on blind trust in the government of the day, but we know that a strong and secure democratic system of government will ensure our security and liberty no matter who is in charge. Bill C-22, demanding that Canadians blindly trust the Liberals, does not accomplish this.

With their already lengthy track record of abuse of privileges, ethical lapses, and skirting responsibility for their mistakes, as well as their general contempt for the opposition when it opposes flawed legislation, I just cannot trust the government to act in the best interests of Canadians. Bill C-22 simply does not provide reasonable, meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary oversight.

Let us look at the track record of this bill. The special committee is appointed by, and reports to, the PMO. It should, instead, be appointed by, and report to, Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role for the PMO, but his actions do not follow his words. Similarly, the Prime Minister, independent of any discussion with the other parties, appointed the committee chair in January before the legislation was even created. He refused to consult with the opposition parties, despite the public willingness of my party and the NDP to discuss this important committee. We were at the table, willing and ready to talk, but they stood us up.

The purpose of this committee is not to encourage and ensure transparency for the security agencies that are already as transparent as they can be while still protecting Canada and Canada's interests, rather it is a knee-jerk policy decision to shore up public support the Liberals lost when they voted in favour of Bill C-51 previously. Bill C-22 is a roundabout way for the Prime Minister's Office to direct the way our national security agencies function, effectively politicizing institutions that should always operate at arm's length from political sources. If the bill achieved some balance between oversight for parliamentarians and effective oversight for the committee while enhancing our national security, perhaps Conservatives could support it, but the bill, as it is, is purposeless.

Oversight agencies, including the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the RCMP External Review Committee, National Defence and Canadian Forces ombudsman, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee are already mandated to provide oversight for each department or agency. This includes providing annual reports to Parliament.

Let us look at the membership process of the committee. Subclause 4(2) of the bill states:

The Committee is to consist of not more than two members who are members of the Senate and not more than seven members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than four Committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party.

There are two members of the Senate, seven members of this House, and not more than four government members, so we could easily be looking at four parliamentary secretaries from the government, notably members who are accountable first to their cabinet ministers, two so-called independent senators, and three members of the opposition.

I have heard government members state that they only get up to, but not necessarily, four members. Let us be honest here. No one expects the government to appoint a majority made up of opposition members and Conservative senators.

We have seen all too often that the Prime Minister and his office truly believe that their unilateral decisions are the best courses of action for Canadians. They dictate the issues of the day and the alleged solutions to those issues.

The government House leader has offered amendments so that subclause 4(2) would instead read: “The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party”.

Even with this, we could have five government members, three so-called independent senators, and three opposition members. We would still be faced with a Liberal majority on the committee that could unilaterally direct our intelligence and security agencies.

We always talk about how important it is to consult with the relevant stakeholders on legislation, so I will read what a couple of stakeholders are saying about Bill C-22. Here is a spoiler alert. It is not praise.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association said:

we are concerned by the government’s power to halt a Committee investigation, or refuse to provide information, when it is deemed “injurious to national security.” While we recognize that the utmost secrecy is sometimes required, this is particularly worrisome because these decisions are final, and are not subject to judicial review or any other dispute resolution process. Also concerning is the prime minister’s power to redact Committee reports (without any evidence that redactions were made), as well as the numerous categories of information the committee cannot access. Furthermore, it should be the Committee members themselves—not the prime minister—that chooses the Committee chair.

The Civil Liberties Association seems to broadly agree with our concerns, that Bill C-22 would leave most of the discretionary decisions and oversight resolution mechanisms to the Prime Minister.

I am really not sure how the government can genuinely argue that it is increasing oversight by increasing the discretionary power of the PMO to censor information that claims to be injurious to national security but may actually just be injurious to the Liberal government.

The government seems to hide things it does not like. Just two weeks ago, members of the House debated a motion calling on the government to release the finance department's redacted data on a federal carbon tax. The information was unfavourable to the government, so it refused to disclose the information and voted it down.

The government has muzzled more than 100 public servants for life on the purchase of the politically motivated, sole-sourced Super Hornet purchase. We have heard testimony in committee that the government did not even bother to make these muzzled public servants aware of their rights under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, but it sure went out of its way to muzzle them for life.

The Canadian Bar Association, which I understand might be versed on the impacts of laws, waded in on Bill C-22 by saying:

While we have made suggestions and expressed concerns about various aspects of the Bill, our concerns about section 16 of the Bill are greater by several orders of magnitude. That section would provide broad discretion for Ministers and departments to refuse to provide information on vague national security grounds and on the basis of the expansive definition of ‘special operational information’ in the Security of Information Act.

Just recently, in the government operations and estimates committee, we heard how the government is making extensive use of national security exemptions to skirt rules on the procurement of such items as jackets for Syrian refugees, under the guise of national security, yet we are supposed to trust that government ministers are not going to opt out of the disclosure regime under Bill C-22 when they see fit.

However, it is okay, just trust that the Liberal government will always act in everyone's best interest, and shame on us for again questioning its so-called commitment to act openly and honestly.

I do not like legislation that relies solely on trusting the government to act properly. We have seen too many examples of the government hiding from responsibility for political gain, and this legislation will only make that easier, without tangibly increasing Canada's national security oversight.

As such, I cannot in good conscience support the bill.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I find it a little rich hearing about muzzling, coming from the Conservatives, who muzzled every federal scientist in the country for an extended period of time. It is an odd comment to make.

I have been hearing the Conservatives talk today about not being able to oversee operations going on in the community, which is clearly not the case, if they read the bill. The bill says that the committee will have the power to oversee anything operational unless there is a rejection by the minister, with an explanation for that particular operation. Generally, the committee will have the power to do the job it needs to do at all times. If it is blocked at any point, it would have to be clearly and expressly explained by the minister.

I wonder if the member has any comments on that.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the bill is very clear that ministers can interfere and suppress information. We saw in our operations committee, just a couple of weeks ago, that the government uses national security exceptions to skirt rules on purchases of paperclips and photocopy paper, yet somehow he wants us to believe that ministers will not interfere in major issues that may embarrass the government.

I do not have faith in a government that would suppress information on paperclips to have full access to suppress other information.

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this is an extremely sensitive topic. Bill C-51 came up a lot during the election campaign. People talked about a great darkness, as my colleague opposite said. However, the Liberals supported Bill C-51, saying they would figure it all out later on, and that member was part of the team in charge in another capacity then.

Canadians have not forgotten. They remember. They remember that Bill C-51 was outrageous, regardless of what my colleagues over here think, and that the Liberals said they would figure it all out. The PMO has some nerve thinking it can appoint the committee chair.

Would my colleague care to comment on that? It makes no sense.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I agree with my colleague from the NDP. We often hear that committees in Parliament are their own masters, yet here we have a committee where the master was appointed by the PMO many months before this legislation even appeared. Basically it seemed to be a bone thrown to the committee chair as payment for past services, or perhaps as an apology for not getting a PS role or a cabinet role.

The Canadian Bar Association and many experts say that if we are to have this committee, the committee chair should be appointed by the actual committee members and not by the Prime Minister's Office.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I would just like to remind everyone that the bill says that any request to withhold information would have to be explained to the committee, and if the committee was not happy with the minister's decision, it would have the opportunity to report back to Parliament.

It would be a legitimate platform in public, in Parliament, before all Canadians. I would be interested in the hon. member's comments on how that is not transparent and accountable.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I want to read further from the Canadian Bar Association regarding clause 16, which would allow ministers to hide or muzzle:

Put simply, section 16 would gut the proposed law.... It would create a broad and largely standardless ‘out clause’ for Ministers to exempt themselves from the Committee’s disclosure regime. The rationale for such an exemption is difficult to discern. The exemption seems unnecessary and illogical

I think that answers the question very clearly.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the House with respect to the second reading of Bill C-22 establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Bill C-22 is about rebuilding trust with Canadians. It is about providing assurance that our national security and intelligence communities' activities are being conducted responsibly. Parliamentarians can and should play a major role in reviewing these activities. To that effect, our government made a commitment to an approach that protects our rights and freedoms and provides for the security of Canadians.

For many, Bill C-51 was cause for grave concern. Today, as our consultation analysis and improved legislation comes forward, it is a pleasure to demonstrate that we are being proactive and fair in our commitment to protecting Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Democracy and freedom should never be taken for granted. Upholding democracy and freedom requires constant vigilance. Bill C-22 is a significant step forward. It stands against excessive powers of the state, something that I and many in the House believe in strongly.

Bill C-22 would provide a well-designed and sensible framework for the government to share highly classified information with selected members of Parliament from various parties, as well as senators, so that national security and intelligence activities in Canada would be subject to their scrutiny.

It is my pleasure to continue debate on this important bill that would help to protect both Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms. The amendments proposed by the government would strengthen the bill. The bill and an amendment brought forward by the committee would enable the national security and intelligence committee to review any federal department or agency, and now, because of a recent amendment, any crown corporation that performs national security or intelligence activities. This could be the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have a government-wide mandate that would set it apart from other oversight bodies established to review a specific agency, such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

To ensure transparency, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would provide an annual report of its findings and recommendations to Parliament. It would also issue special reports at any time it considered it necessary. Because these reports would be available to the public, they would need to be submitted to the prime minister before tabling to ensure that they did not contain any classified information. However, I wish to emphasize the fact that the prime minister would not have any power to change the committee's findings and recommendations.

Bill C-22 would also enable the committee to provide classified reports to ministers at its own discretion. To ensure transparency about its reviews, the committee would be required to include a summary of these special reports in its annual report.

While it is vital to involve more parliamentarians in examining how federal agencies carry out their national security responsibilities, there must be some boundaries to ensure that ministers remain fully responsible and accountable for the activity of their departments.

Every department and agency of the security and intelligence community reports to a minister. That minister is ultimately responsible for the conduct of these departments and agencies. The minister is accountable to Parliament, and Canadians, for ensuring that the organization under her or his charge carries out its duties to keep Canadians safe while respecting our fundamental rights and freedoms. A minister may need to stop a review of a security or intelligence operation or may have to withhold sensitive operational information if the minister believes the review or the disclosure of the information could be harmful to national security.

I believe that such checks and balances are appropriate when we consider, for example, that the integrity of an active operation could be at stake. This is the reason our government has put forward amendments relating to access to information. Under the amendments proposed, ministers would not be able to use their power arbitrarily when it came to disclosing or not disclosing the information. Any request to withhold information would have to be explained to the committee, and if the committee was not happy with a minister's decision, it could report back to Parliament. The committee would have a legitimate platform to challenge a minister in public, in Parliament, before all Canadians.

Thanks to Bill C-22, the committee of parliamentarians would be able to hold the government to account. It would play a key role in ensuring that ministers took the necessary actions to address problems and fix deficiencies. It is clear that the bill would give the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians significant powers. It would also back it up with the necessary support through the creation of a secretariat.

It is also very important to stress the fact that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians' mandate and powers could only be changed through amendments to the legislation, that is to say, only through the will of Parliament. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation includes an obligation for a review of all of its provisions and operations after five years to make sure it is meeting its objective.

Bill C-22 demonstrates how the government is setting the bar higher when it comes to transparency and accountability concerning national security. Canadians can be confident that Parliament can and will hold the government to account.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the member's speech. I want to say that the committee did a lot of really good work. I wonder if the member could expand a bit more on the importance of having accepted some of the amendments that came forward from the opposition, ensuring that their committee work at the security committee here in Parliament will improve the overall process here.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as the member knows, this whole process is much more than a campaign commitment. This process is about engaging parliamentarians and the country in order to address what was broadly perceived as excessive use of power under Bill C-51. Bill C-22 takes a significant step forward by providing that kind of oversight. Our country was in the minority really, one of the only countries in the G20 not to provide this kind of oversight. I believe we will see a much more robust, engaged assessment as we move forward, because it is intended to say that we are open and transparent about providing and balancing our freedoms with our security and safety.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I was wondering if the parliamentary secretary could comment on the fact that the government is insisting that the chair of this committee not be elected by the members of the committee itself, as is done in other committees like this in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere. Why are we doing something different here in Canada?

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned in my remarks, the Prime Minister will be reviewing decisions by this committee, but has no power to change or alter recommendations. In that spirit, the Prime Minister will be acting in the best interests of Canadians to balance our freedoms, and our security and safety.