An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Dominic LeBlanc  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill.

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

April 4, 2017 Passed That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass.
April 4, 2017 Failed That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following: “Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities”.
March 20, 2017 Passed That Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, {as amended}, be concurred in at report stage [with a further amendment/with further amendments] .
March 20, 2017 Passed 16 (1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security. (2) If the appropriate Minister refuses to provide information under subsection (1), he or she must inform the Committee of his or her decision and the reasons for the decision. (3) If the appropriate Minister makes the decision in respect of any of the following information, he or she must provide the decision and reasons to, (a) in the case of information under the control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (b) in the case of information under the control of the Communications Security Establishment, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment; and (c) in the case of information under the control of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
March 20, 2017 Passed 14 The Committee is not entitled to have access to any of the following information: (a) a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, as defined in subsection 39(2) of the Canada Evidence Act; (b) information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; (c) the identity of a person who was, is or is intended to be, has been approached to be, or has offered or agreed to be, a confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada, or the government of a province or of any state allied with Canada, or information from which the person’s identity could be inferred; (d) information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution.
March 20, 2017 Passed to sections 14 and 16, the Committee is entitled to have access to ed by litigation privilege or by solicitor-client privilege or the professional
March 20, 2017 Failed That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).
March 20, 2017 Passed and up to ten other members, each of whom must be a (2) The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five Committee members who
March 20, 2017 Passed That, in relation to Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, not more than one further sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at report stage of the Bill and one sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill; and That, 15 minutes before the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders on the day allotted to the consideration at report stage and on the day allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if required for the purpose of this Order, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the Bill then under consideration shall be put forthwith and successively without further debate or amendment.
Oct. 4, 2016 Passed That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Madam Speaker, I would just say this is not a parliamentary committee, and maybe they should call it an all-party committee for the Prime Minister on national security intelligence issues. That would probably be the best way. They will definitely go through the process of making it look like it is a parliamentary committee, but we know for a fact that Parliament would not approve this committee, that Parliament would have no say in what the committee does, and that Parliament would not see the reports coming from the committee until after they have been vetted and rewritten by the Prime Minister's Office.

Until that point in time when the government realizes the folly of Bill C-22, we unfortunately will not have a committee that provides the oversight that Canadians want and were led to believe in the last federal election they would have.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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Liberal

James Maloney Liberal Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON

Madam Speaker, this strikes me, frankly, as an opportunity to vent against the Prime Minister's Office, something that my friend and his colleagues have not been able to do for 10 years. I hope you are enjoying your newly found freedom.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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The Assistant Deputy Speaker Carol Hughes

I remind the members to put their questions to the Chair.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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Liberal

James Maloney Liberal Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON

Madam Speaker, my question is quite simple. I am not sure if the member is opposed to parliamentary oversight. If he is not, why did my friend's government not pass legislation it preferred, rather than waiting until now to criticize us when the opportunity has been put before the House?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Madam Speaker, the member for Etobicoke—Lakeshore knows full well that the committee proposed in Bill C-22 would not provide parliamentary oversight. All it would be is an all-party caucus. It would not have the tools to provide true oversight and report back to us here in Parliament. We want to have parliamentary oversight and want it to work in a responsible manner. Those are some of the apprehensions that we had as a government. I can see, based on this bill, that those apprehensions continue with the PMO today, because it would control the committee.

If those apprehensions exist, the Liberals should not have promised in the last election campaign that they would provide parliamentary oversight, because they are not doing that. What they would do is provide more vetting and control by the PMO over anything this committee would do and over a number of parliamentarians who, in this process, would give up the immunity and privilege guaranteed to them by the House if it were done as a parliamentary committee.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:05 p.m.


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Conservative

Marilyn Gladu Conservative Sarnia—Lambton, ON

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his excellent speech.

One of the concerns I have is the loopholes in this bill preventing the committee from having the oversight powers it needs. For example, I am thinking about paragraph 8(b), wherein if a minister's department were under investigation, the minister could claim that it was an issue of national security and the committee would then not be able to look into it. Certainly with parliamentarians, we have a degree of integrity and confidentiality. That is one of the exemptions that I see. Could the member talk about some of the other exemptions?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:10 p.m.


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Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Madam Speaker, my colleague from Sarnia—Lambton makes a great point. Why would we call it the “national security and intelligence committee” when any minister could determine that a review would be injurious to national security and that we could not therefore look at it? The hypocrisy in this legislation is beyond the pale.

The seven exemptions that would go beyond that include the committee's not being entitled to information that has confidence of the Queen's Privy Council, because no one on the committee would be sworn in as a member of the Privy Council. The committee members are just going to take an oath under the Security of Information Act. They would not be able to get information respecting ongoing defence intelligence gathering for national security. The list goes on. There are seven exemptions in total, and the Prime Minister or ministers could always hide under the veil of national security, and the members would not be entitled to see those matters even though they were the national security and intelligence committee.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:10 p.m.


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The Assistant Deputy Speaker Carol Hughes

Order. It is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 38 to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Nanaimo—Ladysmith, Status of Women; the hon. member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie, Child Care; the hon. member for Vancouver East, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:10 p.m.


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Regina—Wascana Saskatchewan

Liberal

Ralph Goodale LiberalMinister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Madam Speaker, although Bill C-22 falls under the purview of the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, who is responsible for the machinery of government, I am pleased to have the opportunity to take part in this debate.

Might I just, for the information of the hon. gentleman from Selkirk who has just spoken, inform him that the description of the appropriate committee he put on the record in the last half hour or so bears very little resemblance to the advice given by his own critic in a letter sent to me on March 1, 2016. The member for Durham recommended a committee under a majority controlled by the government, nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by Governor in Council. That was the advice the critic offered, so the description the hon. gentleman just put on the record in the House seems to be at odds with that of his own critic.

In the last election we laid out a clear agenda with respect to Canada's national security framework. It included these specific elements: first, stronger scrutiny of security and intelligence activity through a new committee consisting of parliamentarians; second, a new initiative on community outreach and counter-radicalization; third, faithful compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; fourth, full protection for the right to protest; fifth, clarity with respect to warrants; sixth, conscientious treatment of appeals about no-fly lists; seventh, a more precise definition of the term “propaganda”; eighth, a full review of all terrorism-related legislation after three years; and finally, genuine consultation with Canadians to help identify any other steps that should be taken to achieve two simultaneous objectives, ensuring that all security agencies and police forces are being effective at keeping Canadians safe and, at the same time, safeguarding our rights and freedoms and the open, inclusive, democratic character of our country—in other words, the qualities that make Canada Canada.

Bill C-22 is the cornerstone of that agenda. It fulfills our single most important commitment to Canadians. The legislation will establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, and it will give those parliamentarians from all official parties extraordinary access to classified information so they can scrutinize all the security and intelligence operations of the Government of Canada.

As distinguished Professor Wesley Wark has said, the creation of this committee and the passage of this legislation is long overdue. Virtually every other country in the western world, including all of our Five Eyes allies—the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand—have had a body of this kind for a good many years. Canada, therefore, has been the anomaly.

Over a decade ago, in 2003, the Auditor General identified significant shortcomings in Parliament's ability to scrutinize the activities of Canada's security and intelligence agencies. The following year, a joint House-Senate committee recommended the creation of a parliamentary body to fill that gap.

In 2005, the then Minister of Public Safety, the Hon. Anne McLellan, sought to address the problem by introducing a bill that is very similar to the one we are debating today. Unfortunately, when a different government was elected in 2006, the proposal was dropped.

Since that time, private members' bills to institute parliamentary scrutiny of national security and intelligence agencies have been repeatedly introduced, including by the former member for Scarborough—Rouge River, Derek Lee, and the current members for Malpeque and Vancouver Quadra. Former Senators Hugh Segal and Roméo Dallaire also brought forward legislation to this effect in the other place.

That is all in addition to a report by the House public safety committee in 2009, calling again for the adoption of Anne McLellan's bill or something very similar to it, as well as inquiries by Justices Frank Iacobucci and Dennis O'Connor, both of which highlighted the need for greater accountability of our national security and intelligence agencies.

In the wake of the terrorism tragedies in October 2014 at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and here in Ottawa, there came another opportunity to correct this major deficiency in Canada's national security framework. The whole country shared the grief of those sorry days. We were leaning on each other, on all sides, in this House. There was a clear sense that our security, intelligence, and anti-terrorism laws needed to be revisited and strengthened, and there was a palpable will, on all sides, to work together to get it right, because these are difficult questions. Getting it right would include strengthening scrutiny, review, and oversight of the process.

In the words of a large group of eminent Canadians, including four former prime ministers, who wrote in an open letter at that time, “Canada needs independent oversight and effective review...more than ever”. However, the government of that day resisted that argument, and the opportunity for collaboration and co-operation across the floor quickly evaporated.

That is why a central commitment in our platform last year was to deliver stronger national security oversight, which included the creation of an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities.

With Bill C-22, we are keeping that promise.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be made up of nine members, including the chair. Two of the members would be senators. The other seven would be members of Parliament. No more than four would be from the government caucus. Ministers and parliamentary secretaries would not be eligible to sit on the committee. The law would require consultation with the Senate before senators were named, and consultation with the leaders of opposition parties before the appointment of opposition MPs.

The committee would have a broad mandate to examine the legislative, regulatory, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence as well as any activity related to national security and intelligence carried out anywhere within the federal government.

There are nearly 20 departments and agencies within the Government of Canada that have some kind of security function, from the RCMP and CSIS to the Canada Border Services Agency, National Defence, Transport, Foreign Affairs, and many others. This committee would be able to look at all of them.

On its own initiative, the committee would be empowered to follow its investigations wherever they led, which means that it would get a full picture of what the government was doing in national security and intelligence matters. This would be in contrast to several of the Canadian committee's counterparts elsewhere in the world, where mandates are strictly limited to reviewing the activities of a particular agency or agencies or to examining general structures but not particular operations.

In fact, because of the wide-ranging scope of the committee's mandate, one of Canada's foremost experts in national security law, Professor Craig Forcese, has declared that this committee of parliamentarians in Canada would be a stronger body than its equivalents in either the U.K. or Australia.

Indeed, Bill C-22 would transform Canada from being a laggard to being a leader when it comes to parliamentary scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities.

To make certain that the nine parliamentarians on the committee could be as effective as possible, the legislation would also establish a secretariat to help them fulfill their mandate. The secretariat, made up of capable and knowledgeable individuals, would handle the research and administrative tasks necessary to ensure that the committee's work and the work products of the committee were of the highest possible quality and that the committee had the resources and the expertise it needed to get the job done.

The committee might also draw upon the help and expertise of existing review bodies, such as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and others, and seek information from them, as appropriate.

The bill directs the committee and existing review bodies to work in close collaboration. I expect that by design and through experience, they would relate to each other in a way that would complement each other's efforts and ultimately produce for Canadians significant value-added and greater confidence in the activities of the respective agencies.

The committee would be required to prepare at least one annual report. There could be others. It could also prepare special reports as it saw fit. In other words, it would be able to report on whatever it wanted and whenever it wanted. Obviously, because of the nature of information related to national security and intelligence, not everything the committee looked into could be made public.

However, on this point, I would like to take a moment to discuss the recourse available to committee members should they uncover something they find truly problematic but that their oath of confidentiality prohibits them from disclosing.

Classified information must remain classified. However, without getting into specifics, committee members would command a great deal of attention and put a great deal of pressure on the government of the day if they were to tell Parliament and the public that there was something going on within the realm of security and intelligence activities that they believed was improper. The committee would be able to outline the problem in detail in its report to the prime minister, and the prime minister would be accountable to Canadians. Subsequently, the committee would be able to tell Canadians whether the problem had been adequately addressed, and the pressure would not go away until the committee gave the all-clear. That public pressure would be a powerful tool, and only a committee of parliamentarians could bring it to bear.

Finally, all of these aspects of the committee's operations would be reassessed five years after Bill C-22 came into force. The bill would require Parliament to conduct a review at that time to ensure that the committee was functioning effectively and to make recommendations about how to further advance its work.

We have included this statutory review in the legislation, because there will undoubtedly be lessons learned in the first years of the committee's existence, and we want to guarantee that there will be an opportunity for those lessons to be seriously considered and for any appropriate changes to be made as a result.

The goal is for Canada to have a national security framework that makes us a world leader in both effectiveness and accountability. The legislation before us today is an important step in that direction.

In our consultations with other countries that have had practical experience over the last many years with this concept, like the United Kingdom, for example, we heard repeatedly that it would be wise and prudent to move at this new initiative in a deliberate and measured manner, learning as we go, and to be prepared to accommodate further changes over time.

It is critical to earn trust on all sides: from the public, and after all, the public interest is what this committee would be designed to protect; and from the security and intelligence agencies that would be scrutinized.

Let me emphasize once again our two core objectives for national security for this new committee and indeed for all of our other initiatives in this domain. Number one, we need to ensure that all of our agencies are being effective in keeping Canadians safe. Number two, in lockstep with that, we need to equally ensure that Canadian rights and freedoms are safeguarded along with equality and the character of our democratic way of life.

Building that trust with the agencies and the public, all around, is crucial. That is why we are proposing a mandate for the committee that is not siloed to a few named agencies, as other countries do, but rather is a mandate that reaches across the full scope of government. Unlike other review bodies and other countries, this Canadian committee of parliamentarians would be able to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

In addition to looking at events and activities retroactively, this committee would also be able to examine ongoing activities, a unique power, subject only to basic, reasonable safeguards for classified information.

Again, please recall the full context of our national security agenda. The anchor piece would be the committee of parliamentarians that would be providing a brand new type and level of scrutiny and review, plus a new initiative, funded in the last budget, for community outreach and counter-radicalization, plus full compliance with the Charter of Rights, plus full protection of the basic right to civil protest, plus clarity about warrants, plus action to remedy issues with no-fly lists, plus a more precise definition of “propaganda”, plus a full review of terrorism legislation after three years, plus the first ever inclusive consultations with Canadians, parliamentarians, subject-matter experts, and the general public about other measures they deem appropriate, beyond the ones I have mentioned, and necessary to keep Canadians safe and to safeguard our rights and freedoms.

Already in the consultations we have undertaken we have received more than 7,000 submissions online, which indicates a considerable appetite to be involved and engaged.

In light of a report issued just today by the Privacy Commissioner, let me make one point about our national security consultations very clear: This is not a narrow exercise. All Canadians, including the Privacy Commissioner, can raise and pursue any issue they want to pursue under the rubric of national security and intelligence operations. The discussion paper we published a few weeks ago is not a statement of government policy. It is intended to provoke discussion and debate to get Canadians involved and engaged, and it is doing exactly that.

After we hear from Canadians, we will be able to put forward the appropriate changes in law or procedure that reflect the recommendations we have received.

I will look forward to hearing the full scope of what the Privacy Commissioner has to say about any and all dimensions of our national security architecture. Indeed, I understand that he may be appearing before the House security committee on this topic just next week to present his views on the national security framework. His ongoing input, advice, and oversight are important to me and to the government, just as we want to hear from all Canadians, an opportunity they have never had before.

Parliament has rightly been called the grand inquest of the nation. For too long, however, Canada's Parliament has been prevented from fulfilling that particular role in matters of national security and intelligence. Yet these are matters that concern the fundamental freedoms of Canadians, and they are quite literally matters of life and death. Parliamentarians, the people's chosen representatives, must be at the heart of our system of national security accountability, and at long last, Bill C-22 will make it so.

Before I close, allow me to pause for just a moment to recognize the tremendous work done by the brave women and men of our law enforcement and national security agencies, which they demonstrate on a regular basis. That was the case, in particular, in Strathroy, Ontario, this summer. They were exemplary professionals. The security agency plus at least four different police forces worked seamlessly and effectively, and they prevented a much larger tragedy. I know that we are all exceedingly proud of them and are grateful for their service.

I trust that hon. members in all parties understand the gravity of the issues we are dealing with and will approach not only the committee itself but the upcoming legislative process to establish it with the seriousness this topic warrants. I will be looking forward to good, useful, practical advice.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:30 p.m.


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Conservative

Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON

Madam Speaker, we all have pride in our security agencies but I am a little disappointed in the minister responsible for them today, first for not introducing debate on the bill, and second, for having the gall to reference my letter to him in debate, my letter which was the first of two written in collaboration with the NDP to talk about this. The minister refused all meetings. He also refused meetings with some of the leading experts he quoted in his speech to get this right. My letter said a Privy Council appointment and the oaths ascribed to that should be part of this committee if the committee was going to see real information.

The government has so many exceptions to Bill C-22 that this committee would just be window dressing. We want to see amendments, as does the NDP, so that we can make this work from a political basis and for our practical security needs.

I would remind the minister that when he was involved as House leader in the Milliken decision with respect to Afghan detainee documents, he demanded such disclosure of information to members of Parliament. Now he is denying that same disclosure. Which member is it? Is it the member for Regina—Wascana now or the member for Wascana in 2010 whose words in this place should ring true? I would like the member to square that circle.

I would also like the minister to say why he voted Motion No. 431 for the election of chairs and now refuses to allow a chair to be elected? Why does he now not seem to respect the privilege outlined in the Speaker Milliken decision? He is talking about earning trust, yet he denied the ability to work with the opposition to get this right.

We hope this debate is an opportunity for the minister to listen and make the amendments needed.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:30 p.m.


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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

Madam Speaker, on the member's first point about the sponsorship of the legislation, I am sure he will recognize that the legislation, because it would create a committee that will fit within the machinery of government, is the prerogative of the government House leader. On the very front page of the bill, it indicates that the government House leader is the sponsor of the bill. Under the rules of the House, it is only that minister who can give the introductory speech and if that minister does not give the introductory speech, he or she is not in a position to cede their position to anybody else. It is appropriate parliamentary procedure for the sponsor of a bill responsible for the machinery of government to give the opening speech, not that it matters a heck of a lot because I have the opportunity to participate in this debate, as all members of Parliament do.

I was glad to receive the honourable gentleman's letter in March. He now seems to be aggrieved that I have accepted a number of his recommendations. He cannot have it both ways. He offered a number of suggestions and many of them are reflected in Bill C-22.

I look forward to the committee work on the legislation, which will drill down into the details of various sections. If members of the opposition parties wish to provide further advice, we will be anxious to hear it. We will also be anxious to hear from subject matter experts and from Canadians who also need to have their input paid attention to.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:35 p.m.


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NDP

Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC

Madam Speaker, I was quite surprised to hear the minister describe the centrepiece of Liberal national security policy as this piece of legislation. Canadians are under the impression that the centrepiece of the Liberal national security policy would be fixing Bill C-51, which they promised to do in the campaign. It is important to have oversight and review but what the Liberals made front and centre during the campaign was to fix the problematic elements of Bill C-51.

My specific question deals with the Privacy Commissioner's report. With all due respect, the minister has mis-characterized his concerns about the consultation process. The Privacy Commissioner did not say it is impossible to raise concerns about privacy. He said he was disappointed that the government did not make privacy issues a part of the consultation process.

I would like to know what the minister intends to do now to correct that oversight in the consultation process, because Bill C-51 raises serious concerns about our privacy rights in Canada. How was that not included in the consultation he is doing?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:35 p.m.


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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

Madam Speaker, it is included. The entire national security architecture and framework for the Government of Canada is the subject matter of this consultation. All Canadians are invited to make whatever representations they may wish to make about any dimension or aspect of the national security framework. Nothing is excluded.

The Privacy Commissioner has mentioned the subject matter that he wishes to drill down into in great detail and we will be anxious to hear what he has to say. Other Canadians have said they want to talk in detail about the whole process of peace bonds because that obviously is an issue that gained some prominence during the course of the summer, particularly in the wake of the tragic events in Strathroy. That is a subject that other Canadians will want to debate as well.

Other Canadians have said the committee of parliamentarians is a good idea, but we also need to fill some other gaps in the architecture such as, for example, the ability to have some supervision and oversight specifically with respect to CBSA. That is another topic that Canadians are raising.

The discussion paper opens the general subject matter and begins the debate, but other Canadians will have a great many other things they want to raise and that is perfectly and completely and legitimately a part of the process. We are very anxious to hear what Canadians are going to say. Over 7,000 have already participated.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:35 p.m.


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Scarborough—Guildwood Ontario

Liberal

John McKay LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence

Madam Speaker, the subject matters that the committee will be studying are by definition notoriously secret. Indeed some witnesses may come before the committee who feel compelled either by convention or the oaths that they have sworn that they cannot disclose to the committee material that the committee deems to be appropriate.

What will be the powers of the committee to compel a witness to speak before the committee? Further, when the committee feels that it has not received a full version of the truth, what will be the powers of the committee to sanction that particular witness?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 4:35 p.m.


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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

Madam Speaker, the mandate of the committee laid out particularly in section 8, makes it very clear that the committee members can pursue any activity carried out by a department and look at any matter relating to national security. It is a very broad power. If they are not getting the co-operation from officials or representatives that they think they need to have, then the committee will make that determination and the chair of the committee should approach either the responsible minister or the Prime Minister to demand the satisfaction that the chair and members of the committee would deem to be appropriate.

This is a process that is going to depend on very vigorous participation by the committee members. The task that they are taking on is extraordinary and certainly unique in Canadian experience. They will have powers that no other group of parliamentarians has ever had before. The responsibility is onerous. I fully expect they will pursue their duties in a very vigorous, aggressive way, and if they are not receiving the co-operation that they think they deserve, then they should tell the Prime Minister and he will be accountable for making sure they get the co-operation.