Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have a very simple question for my colleague, who seemed to be quite worried about Bill C-51 that passed in the previous Parliament.

She talked about some serious concerns regarding the excessive powers given to this country's security agencies; at the time, however, her party did not share those concerns. Instead, it voted in favour of Bill C-51—enthusiastically, I might add.

How can she reconcile her comments today to the effect that serious concerns remain about excessive powers with the fact that her party voted in favour of Bill C-51 at the time?

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, on the contrary, I was elected in October 2015. I was not part of the former deliberations or government. I can assure the member opposite and all members of the House that Bill C-51 caused a grave amount of concern with respect to excessive use of powers that really belong to members of Parliament and Canadians. I am very pleased to support Bill C-22 today.

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22 , the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

I had the opportunity to comment on this legislation at second reading, and unfortunately, my concerns have not been addressed. As I noted earlier, this legislation prescribes a committee that would be a PMO working group rather than a parliamentary oversight committee.

Above all else, Parliament's role is to oversee the government and the executive. Unfortunately, Bill C-22 would make the reverse true. The government and the executive would oversee parliamentarians. The committee would report to the Prime Minister and not Parliament. The Prime Minister would have the power to censor the committee's reports. Parliamentarians on this committee would not be protected by parliamentary privilege as they undertake their work. This committee would not be able to provide parliamentary oversight of Canada's national security agencies, because it is not a committee of Parliament. It is not even close. Without support from more than the governing party, this committee would not have multi-partisan legitimacy and, therefore, have no discernible impact.

During the bill's review at committee, Conservative and NDP members presented amendments that would have made this committee of parliamentarians something that somewhat resembles a parliamentary committee by, amongst other things, giving the leader of each opposition party input into which opposition members sit on the committee. The response from the government side by voting against this amendment speaks volumes as to why this bill is meaningless.

I will quote the member for Eglinton—Lawrence:

...if this amendment were to be passed, the Prime Minister would no longer have full responsibility or accountability for recommending appointments to the committee. As this committee is an extension of the executive, which would report to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office, it would be contrary to the purpose of this bill.

The contention of the member for Eglinton—Lawrence is clear. The members of this committee would be chosen by the Prime Minister without consultation or input from the other party leaders. According to the member, giving someone other than the Prime Minister the right to nominate members to this committee would reduce the power of the executive, thus making it unacceptable to the government.

The purpose of this legislation is not to empower Parliament, but rather to empower the Prime Minister. The committee's membership is critical as the members would determine the committee's agenda, determine what witnesses they want to hear from and what questions should be asked. They would be reviewing the documents they request, and they would be writing the committee's reports. Additionally, and most importantly, the members would serve as a liaison between the committee and each caucus.

Nothing is more important to the success of a committee than its members and their ability to meaningfully participate in the committee's proceedings. The sum of their experiences and contributions to the committee's process would determine whether the committee is effective.

If the Prime Minister is unwilling to relinquish the responsibility of determining which members of Parliament sit on this committee, it is hard to consider this entire exercise of creating this committee as more than going through the motions to check off a box on his Liberal electoral platform.

Ms. Heather Sheehy from the Privy Council described what the committee would actually be:

This committee is a committee of parliamentarians, as distinct from a committee of Parliament. The subclause that limits parliamentary privilege is consistent with a committee of parliamentarians, as distinct from a committee of Parliament.

Quite frankly, a committee of parliamentarians can be just about anything. The Conservative Party caucus hockey team can be considered a committee of parliamentarians. It does not mean it is an oversight body for the agencies and departments that oversee the security of Canadians.

The committee being made up of parliamentarians is simply not enough. The parliamentarians sitting on that committee must be given more power than what is being provided for in this legislation in order to be effective. As has been stated, Canada does not need to further enshrine executive oversight over its national security agencies. The executive in Canada, cabinet, already has oversight responsibilities of Canada's security agencies. In Canada, the executive branch is the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office that supports it.

The Prime Minister does not need to have a new advisory group of parliamentarians to provide him with input on Canada's national security. The supposed problem as outlined by the Liberals that this legislation was intended to solve was that Parliament, and not the executive, did not have the tools required to properly oversee our security agencies. Alternatively, the executive already has the ability to summon any member of Canada's security agencies to ask questions and order changes to operations, if necessary. Parliament does not. Therefore, it makes no sense to create another committee that reports to the executive.

The Liberal platform was clear on what it intended to do, which is to “create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities”.

In order to fulfill this commitment, the leaders of the opposition parties should have the responsibility of naming their members to the committee, and Parliament must have the autonomy to oversee every government department and agency with national security responsibilities. If a committee is to be part of the decision-making process, then it should be allowed to impact policy. It should also be noted that when in opposition, the Liberals called for this very kind of parliamentary oversight. If, however, the PMO chooses to set up this committee purely for advisory purposes, then it will lose the true advantage of presenting a diversity of views to Canada's security agencies and the quality of advice that they receive will be compromised.

Furthermore, when it comes to changing Parliament's Standing Orders or the appointment of an officer of Parliament, the governing party typically goes to great lengths to ensure that it has the support of all parties. This is done to ensure that any change to the Standing Orders does not benefit the governing party or the opposition. It also ensures that each officer of Parliament begins work with the support of all parliamentarians behind them, thus giving them a real mandate for that work.

Unfortunately, the creation of this committee breaks all the rules that typically govern this place. This committee would not even have a mandatory quorum that is set by Parliament. It is almost laughable that the chair of the committee could be the only one present and be able to receive evidence.

As members of all parties would be serving on this committee, it only makes sense that a majority of members from all parties support its creation, its mandate, how it conducts its business, and how it would eventually report back to Parliament. Throughout the legislative process, all opposition parties have tried to make this committee more of an agent of Parliament, while the government has insisted that it must be an agent of the executive. Unfortunately, the government has voted down these practical amendments from the opposition.

In conclusion, I am disappointed by this legislation. I cannot shake the impression that this entire piece of legislation is simply a facade for the Prime Minister to say that he fulfilled a campaign commitment. If that is the case, he has failed to fulfill both the spirit and the letter of that very commitment. As long as this committee remains a working group of the Prime Minister, it will have no legitimacy or practical use.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member for Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek for acknowledging that this is a Liberal platform commitment that we are indeed fulfilling.

As the member knows, coming out of committee, Bill C-22 firmly enshrines in the legislation that government MPs cannot form a majority on this committee. Also, this committee would have powers to report to Parliament, including on obstruction by a minister, which the majority of the committee, which does not need to include the support of a single government member, have decided is undue. The member describes this as somehow giving the power of the committee to the Prime Minister, and speaks of it as “laughable”.

The government caucus contains no senators. If a future Conservative government wants to continue to appoint partisan senators, that is something the Conservatives can take up with the electorate.

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I am not sure I heard a question. I do not think there was one there.

However, what is important and what we are highlighting during this debate is the difference in what the Liberals called for when they were in opposition, what they committed to during the campaign, and what they have introduced in this place. I think that if Canadians are watching this debate, they will begin to understand the hypocrisy in this piece of legislation.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Mr. Speaker, could the member comment on the fact that although every member of this committee will have to have top secret clearance, will have to swear a permanent oath of secrecy, and will have to waive their immunity to prosecution based on any breach, but despite this, these members will not have the same access to the sensitive information that existing committees in Canada such as SIRC already have? Does this show some lack of trust that the government has in our elected representatives?

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, the short answer to that is “yes”. I believe that the committee will not be able to do real work. The lack of independence as described by the bill is really the problem and the lack of trust that it purports in the members who will be appointed to the committee.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am wondering if the member is aware that when the Speaker says “questions or comments”, one can ask a question or make a comment?

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I do appreciate that and I meant no offence in recognizing that there perhaps was no question in that comment.

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to be able to speak to this extraordinarily important piece of legislation. Before I reference parts of the bill, I would like to provide a bit of background as to where my perspective emanates from. I was a member of Toronto City Council on the Police Services Board, and in particular on the Police Services Board during the G20 summit when elected officials were presented with information that they could not share with their constituents, despite the fact that they were on the board precisely because they represented constituents. It was a very trying period to provide oversight to an important police body and an important security operation. They had no capacity to talk to those in charge of the operation because it was nestled in the Ontario Provincial Police at the time, not at the City of Toronto as many think it was. At the same time they could not relate back to their constituents the steps they were taking to protect their civil rights and make sure that their rights to political protest as well as access even to their homes were going to be guaranteed.

Therefore, civilian oversight is at the heart of any democracy and is at the heart of any responsible approach to public safety, let alone intelligence and security measures that we are now embarking upon, which when Parliament was conceived were not really perceived as being part of the responsibility of Parliament but rather the executive branch and others in society. As Parliament has evolved over the last few centuries, we have been evolving the practice of stronger and stronger civilian oversight, in particular around public accountability for the way in which our police and security agencies operate. We have also developed, expanded, and layered our security and our police bodies as we have taken on more and more complex matters. Society has changed and we have become more cognizant of the realities that we have to encounter. As a result, there is not a single police operation that Parliament oversees but rather close to 17, 18, or 19. We could even include border security now in that, which we need to explore as dynamics change in an ever-evolving world.

Into this mix, we have had over the last decade, even the last 20 years I would argue, significant powers invested into our security agencies. What has not kept pace is an oversight body that is as complex and as far reaching as those agencies now are. When the RCMP was originally looked at as a security force way back when, 100-plus years ago, there was no need to think of it as a spy agency dealing with foreign interventions coming into this country. It was a completely different colonial period of time when it was conceived.

CSIS flew straight out of the inadequacies both in the regulation and the oversight of the RCMP, when that was discovered in the 1970s. When CSIS was established, a whole new chapter of security agencies was brought to bear in terms of the way in which this country and this Parliament prosecuted public safety. However, the rules and regulations that were brought in for CSIS were not applied to other elements of the government. We get into electronic surveillance, intelligence sharing with our allies, and the complexities that technology has brought to this issue. It is clear that it is time for a revisit as to how we provide civilian oversight, as I said the corner of democracy, to make sure that we are protecting both people's public safety and their private safety as well as their civil liberties and society's civil liberties. That is the challenge that we are trying to address with the bill in front of us.

Over the last decade in particular, the powers invested in our security agencies have been strengthened, but the powers of oversight have not. What this Bill C-22 seeks to do is strengthen those oversights. One of the most important components of this bill is that the committee would be struck in a way that it would report directly to Parliament. I know the opposition has talked about it going through the executive branch because the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, in particular, have the ability to screen it to make sure that the reports that have been tabled in public do not compromise public safety. That is a prudent measure, it is not a political measure. It is a measure that has been put in place in particular to keep sensitive information away from public eyes, not to stop the work of the committee or the advice that the committee would give Parliament as it relates to public safety. That is a critical distinction to make. All redactions and all screenings would have to be justified in writing both to the committee and to Parliament and would have to be understood as such, as being filters that do not preclude activity or preclude areas of examination but rather make sure that the reporting of those activities is done in the safest way possible to protect our public safety environment.

The other thing that is critically important here is there has been criticism that it would not be a parliamentary committee but rather a committee of parliamentarians. The language there might sound very familiar, just a set of words reordered, but a committee of parliamentarians means that it would include the Senate.

Again, I think this is a critical piece of evolution. It would allow us to sit down with both chambers, both of which have carriage of public safety in this country, to make sure that real information and sensitive information are delivered in real time to both bodies, so that both bodies can make quick decisions when quick decisions are needed. What we know from the ever-evolving situation globally and internally in this country is that quick decisions are part of what of what we have to accommodate as we move through accountability practices in this country.

The other issue which I think is critically important is that the government would not have a majority on this committee. Let that be said again. It would be a committee of parliamentarians where government would not have a majority. This means that the activities, the advice, the description, and the publication of what is being done is constituted by a majority of parliamentarians who are outside of government, let alone outside of the executive branch. In other words, if the belief of some members of Parliaments is that civil liberties or public safety in the areas of inquiry are being frustrated by the government, they would have the ability, as a majority committee, to make a committee report to that effect and bring public pressure. That is the best form of accountability to bring to bear on the activities of this committee.

The other thing which I think is critically important to understand, as well, is that currently there are silos in which the different security agencies operate, and with the accountability officers for those different security agencies, all 17 to 19, depending on one's view of the configuration of the list, that is not shared in real time. The information among those organizations is shared in real time, but the accountability is not conducted in a coordinated, overreaching, and overarching method. What this committee would achieve is to bring that together under one accountability model. It would measure the relationships between these two organizations, or several different organizations, and make sure that the information that is being shared, the practices that are being pursued, the behaviour of these agencies, are consistent across all of government as we move to protect both civil liberties and the public's right to public safety.

These issues allow us to broaden the access of parliamentarians to security, and sensitive information and sensitive operations. Instead of just being housed inside the executive branch now, it is housed inside the Parliament of Canada. That, again, is a critically important development. It is one that fulfills our mandate and our promise to the electorate that sent us here to make sure that we strengthen, broaden, and engage all of Parliament as we try to make sure that public safety in this country is done with the most accurate, up-to-date, and effective civilian oversight possible. That is a principle that this party will not step back on.

I would like to also reference a couple of other components of the bill which I think are critically important. The notion that this is somehow not fulfilling our mandate, I think is just wrong. In fact, if we listen to the experts who were critical of the previous government's approaches to public safety, what we hear is that they are in accordance with us.

Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents. [It will be] a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. [It's] a good bill.” He gives it a high pass.

The criticism of Bill C-51 largely emanated from this individual, and now the support is coming from this individual. Clearly, we have moved the yardsticks.

I am going to leave members with one last thought. I think this is a critical thought, as well.

There is a notion somehow, and I certainly saw it in Bill C-51 when I was here in the previous term, that governments can land on public safety issues or civil rights issues perfectly, every time that they present legislation. That is a fallacy. In fact, I would say that is an arrogance.

Public safety and civil rights in particular are iterative processes. We move forward carefully. We move forward prudently. We expand rights. We protect rights simultaneously as best we can. However, we never get it right. Circumstances change. The behaviour of institutions changes. Individual officers within these organizations behave in particular ways.

It is a constant moving target that we are trying to deal with here, both the need to protect Canada's public safety and the need to protect charter rights. This process, as we establish this committee, I can guarantee members will evolve over time. It must evolve over time, because the circumstances we are dealing with are evolving over time. To do it in a way that is responsible is to do it in a way that is open and parliamentary and accountable to this body, and not to the executive branch.

That is exactly what this legislation would achieve. It would allow us to make significant steps forward at this time. I assure members that as long as I am sitting in this House, the conversation around good legislation, strong ideas, and intelligent criticism that emerges around how we balance the complexities of the security environment which we live in, how we make sure that civil liberties are protected as we protect public safety, needs to be sustained.

I take the ideas that frame that endeavour and that work of this Parliament very seriously. I think members have seen over the last couple of days that when strong ideas and intelligent criticism are presented on the floor of this Parliament, all parliamentarians have the ability to say, “That's a good idea. Let's support that, and let's move that into law and move that forward to protect Canadians or develop Canadians rights.”

That is what this bill would do. It is in the spirit of that kind of thinking, that kind of discipline around public safety and civil rights. That is the hallmark of the Liberal Party and this government. I am proud to support this bill because it continues that reputation.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I think what we saw in the last speech was a campaign to be on the committee. The member across the way was campaigning hard, on the record, that he has a great command of what this committee should and should not be. The hon. colleague perhaps wants to be on the committee, or maybe he already has a spot on it that has already been planned and he already knows about.

In the spirit of our hon. colleague's speech, which talked about the open and transparent ways of his government, I have one simple question. Why was not one recommendation from the Conservative opposition taken, heeded, and considered in the amendments of this bill?

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Spadina—Fort York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I apologize for not being able to answer that question more directly. I was not party to the committee debates or how the specific amendments that the member is speaking to were handled, as I have not seen them.

Let me stress that this is an ongoing process. This Parliament has carriage of many of these issues, and the Senate does as well. Therefore, good ideas, perhaps reframed, rethought, and reworded, may prevail when presented in a different light or with a different focus in terms of the specifics of the words.

I will quickly address the notion that I want to be on this committee. Having served for two years on the Toronto Police Services Board, let me assure the member that I have done my duty as someone providing civilian oversight. I am confident that there are members with better minds than mine in this House who could sit on this committee. If it requires being said in public, I will say now that I do not want to be on this committee. However, I thank him for the—

[The Deputy Speaker, Bruce Stanton]

Questions and comments, the hon. member for Sherbrooke.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his contribution to the debate.

Bill C-22 is meant to be a direct response to Bill C-51. In fact, when we were debating Bill C-51, my Liberal colleagues often brought up this issue. They said that we needed to ensure some kind of parliamentary oversight of Canada's intelligence organizations. However, they went ahead and supported Bill C-51 anyway, even though the Conservative bill included no such measures.

Why did the Liberals support that bill in the first place, and why did they trust the Conservatives or the next government to fix the part of the legislation that deals with parliamentary oversight?

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Spadina—Fort York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time that I have faced this line of questioning from the New Democrats, so I have a prepared answer for this.

First of all, Bill C-51 did a few things right. The modification to the no-fly list to prevent people from getting on airplanes, as opposed to simply stopping hijacking situations, was a very important transition that needed to be understood. We no longer had a no-fly list that dealt with what might happen on an airplane, but what might happen when the airplane landed and people deployed into other countries. We should not be exporting fighters into foreign wars where national interests and national security are quite clearly at stake. We need to manage that differently, and that is what some of the changes in Bill C-51 did.

There were a number of small changes like that. Expanding preventative detention by a number of days was prudent in light of the complexity of the way that attacks were materializing. It required a different thinking and approach to how we use preventative detention. That is not unlike the way in which some Criminal Code provisions in this country already operate. It simply was extended to areas of terrorism and national security. Those were some of the fine points that we found needed to be strengthened as we started to embark upon changes to Bill C-51. We thought they were quite clearly important.

This is the third time that this Parliament has tried to deal with civilian oversight of our security agencies. The NDP has never once supported civilian oversight when it has been on the floor for a vote.

My question to the NDP is this. How do you protect democracy without civilian oversight? Why has that party historically voted against every single proposition put forward by this party in this House when the opportunity has arisen? Why will the New Democrats not strengthen it incrementally? Why do they leave it in the hands of experts instead of the public, where it should be if we are to have true civilian oversight?