Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Speaker's Ruling

[The Speaker, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

There are seven motions in amendment standing on the Notice Paper for the report stage of Bill C-22.

The Chair has received a letter from the government House leader arguing that Motion No. 6 could not have been presented in committee, as the changes it proposes arose out of a decision of the Supreme Court rendered very shortly before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security began clause-by-clause consideration of the bill. A similar argument was made in relation to part (b) of Motion No. 3. The court decision in question was rendered on Friday, November 25, 2016, and clause-by-clause consideration began on Tuesday, November 29, 2016. The government House leader contended in her letter that there was not sufficient time to analyze the consequences of the decision and prepare amendments accordingly. For that reason, she has asked that they be selected at report stage.

The hon. member for Victoria has also sent a letter to the Chair arguing that these amendments should not be selected, as he believes they should have been presented in committee. He also argues that there are cases in the past where the Chair has refused to select motions presented by the government.

As members know, consistent with the note to Standing Order 76.1(5), the Chair would not normally select motions that could have been presented or were defeated in committee.

However, there have been exceptions. On September 22, 2014, the Speaker was faced with a similar case in relation to a motion at the report stage of Bill C-13, an act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. The hon. member for Charlottetown submitted a motion arising out of a court decision rendered after clause-by-clause and, in that case, the motion was selected.

The circumstances in the present case, although not identical, are sufficiently analogous to satisfy the Chair that the motions in question should be selected for consideration at report stage.

The Chair has examined the remaining motions submitted and is satisfied they meet the criteria spelled out in Standing Order 76.1(5). Motion No. 1 could not have been presented in committee, as it requires a royal recommendation. Part (a) of Motion No. 3 and Motion No. 4 further amend changes made by the committee. Motion No. 5 restores a clause deleted by the committee. Motions Nos. 2 and 7 propose to delete clauses. These motions will all be selected.

Motions numbered 1 to 7 will be grouped for debate and voted upon according to the voting pattern available at the table.

I shall now propose Motions Nos. 1 to 7 to the House.

The House proceeded to the consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendments) from the committee.

Freedom of the Press

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, again, let us be very clear. This is not happening at the federal level. This has been stated unequivocally by not only the directors of CSIS and the RCMP, but by the Prime Minister and the minister.

Let me go one step further. Not only is this government relying on the fact that it has not happened, not only are we relying on the vigorous and strong mechanisms to protect freedom of the press, we are going further, both in Bill C-22, which will be before the House and which allows for political oversight of our security and intelligence framework, and in the review we are doing. In fact, very soon the committee will be tabling its recommendations on the security and intelligence framework to ensure there is vigorous oversight of all departments, so that not only are the powers in place but also the oversight mechanisms to ensure oversight is effective and is as strong as it can be.

Let me state unequivocally our support for freedom of the press, and to ensure that it is guarded in all forms with the utmost protection.

Preclearance Act, 2016

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Drummond raises an excellent point. Let us go through the examples.

We can look at the clear recommendation that was made by the committee on electoral reform. We can look at the clear recommendation that was made by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on Bill C-201. We can look at the clear recommendations that were made by the public safety committee with respect to Bill C-22. In each one of those instances, the committee did its due diligence, listened to the experts, and presented its recommendations to the House, only to have the government completely ignore the evidence and recommendations and proceed along a predetermined path.

Therefore, my friend raises a valid concern. In every instance, the Liberals tell us to trust in the committee process. I have trust in it, but I have no trust in the government following the recommendations and hard work that those committees do on behalf of the House.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will make a quick response to the comment that was just made about the work of committees. A lot of experts came before committee with respect to Bill S-201 and Bill C-22 and made recommendations that were unanimously adopted by that committee, only to have the government completely ignore and refute those recommendations.

In asking us to put faith in the committee process and in the government respecting that process, I am sorry to say that my patience with that line of argument is wearing very thin at the moment.

My question to the member is about the part of the bill that gives authorization to U.S. customs officials to carry firearms on Canadian soil. I have yet to hear a convincing argument from the Liberal benches as to why this is necessary. Why, when we have a perfectly capable police force in Canada, would we cede this kind of sovereignty to U.S. agents on Canadian soil?

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, before the House standing committee did its work with respect to Bill C-22, the University of Ottawa expert in this field Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the U.K. and Australian equivalents, and a dramatic change for Canadian national-security accountability.” That was before the committee amendments. The committee made some changes, some of those can be accepted and others cannot, but the net result is the bill is even stronger now than when Mr. Forcese made those comments.

Bill C-23—Time Allocation Motion

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman is rather overstating his point.

The committee work on Bill C-22 was very important, and has shaped a number of revisions and changes in that legislation to narrow the scope of the exemptions and exclusions, and that will represent a very substantial improvement in the legislation.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I found it interesting to hear the minister say earlier that not a single question was asked. The reason for that, first of all, was that the bill was introduced just a few days before the summer recess, just before we returned to our ridings, so, of course, we did not really have an opportunity to ask any questions last spring.

When we returned in the fall, we were asking questions about Bill C-51 and we introduced a bill to repeal it. We were dealing with the consultations that the minister launched in order to take attention away from the issue. There is also Bill C-22. The government is trying to tell us that it is no big deal, and that, if we have concerns about Bill C-23, we will work on it in committee and everyone will have a chance to be heard.

I will use the example of Bill C-22. It is ironic to be talking about this on the very day that we arrived in the House to find that all of the amendments that were adopted by the committee and supported by experts have been rejected by the government.

I would therefore like the minister to explain to me why he has a problem with questions from the opposition. Why should we trust the committee process for a bill so vital to Canadians' rights and privacy? The last time, the government decided to backpedal and not listen to the witnesses or the committee members, even though we were dealing with an issue that should have been non-partisan.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, this afternoon the House will resume consideration of the opposition motion.

Tomorrow, we will continue second reading debate of Bill C-23 on pre-clearance.

Monday, March 6, and Thursday, March 9, shall be allotted days. In terms of legislation for that week, we will be focusing on report stage of Bill C-22, concerning the national security committee of parliamentarians.

I wish all members a good week in their constituencies.

[Peter Edelmann]

They would be able to look into it once they're up and running, presumably, if the scope of their mandate is broad enough to encompass.... Right now, the scope that is set out in Bill C-22 is a third definition of national security. In other words, it doesn't refer to either the CSIS Act or the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act's definition of national security, and that was one of our criticisms of Bill C-22. We need a coherent definition of what it is we're talking about when we talk about national security. Right now, we don't have one. We used to have one that was referred to in general by legislation, which was the definition in the CSIS Act. Now we have this other definition and potentially a third one. How they play together is unclear and, in our submission, not helpful.

[Peter Edelmann, Executive Member, Immigration Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.

The discussion focuses on many appropriate aspects of national security, including a number that have been raised in the government's Green Paper.

Three aspects are of specific concern to us.

The first, the most basic of the three, is the effective examination of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. Like the Arar and Air India inquiries, the CBA agrees with the need to create specialized review bodies and to provide them with the resources and the mandate they need to examine all activities in the realm of national security.

As the CBA has set out in various submissions over the years, including our recent submission on the green paper and on Bill C-22, rigorous, independent oversight plays a crucial role in maintaining confidence in the national security apparatus.

I will emphasize three aspects of review that are of particular importance. First, each national security agency must have rigorous, independent review of its core activities. Some agencies like CSIS and the RCMP have these review mechanisms in place. Although there are criticisms of the functioning of these mechanisms in certain circumstances, at least the means for review exist. Other agencies, in particular the Canada Border Services Agency, have no review mechanism whatsoever outside of the agency and the minister in charge. This must be remedied and addressed.

Second, there must be effective review of the national security apparatus as a whole. This is all the more crucial as we see greater levels of information sharing and co-operation between the agencies. The reviewing agencies, if there are any at all, are siloed and not able to follow their investigations all the way through to where the information or the investigation is heading.

Of this aspect, there are two parts. One has to do with the proposal for a national security committee of parliamentarians. We expressed our support for this and made some suggestions for changes in the way this has been set out. We discussed these with you before in respect of Bill C-22. That's one aspect of it.

The second aspect would be the creation of what's being colloquially referred to a “super SIRC”, or an organization more independent of Parliament. Such an organization would be able to develop not only the required resources but also the institutional memory and the ability to engage in investigations beyond the scope and ability of parliamentarians, who have a lot of other responsibilities. Both of these mechanisms are important, particularly as investigations become more integrated within the national security apparatus.

The next issue raised in the green paper that I would like to address is information sharing. We raised a number of concerns during the hearings and review of Bill C-51 with respect to the information-sharing regime. This was significantly expanded by the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

As we pointed out at the time of the passage of Bill C-51, this expansion raised a number of concerns. First, there were concerns around the scope—in particular, the definition given of “national security” within the act. It is different from the definition in the CSIS Act and from the way things are framed in Bill C-22.

We are concerned about having different definitions of national security for different purposes. This needs to be remedied. It would be beneficial to have one definition for oversight, information sharing, and activities of national security agencies. The oversight and review ought to be of the same expanse as the activities and information sharing themselves. Currently that is not the case.

The second issue is information sharing with foreign entities and the ability to review these activities. This issue is becoming of particular concern in light of recent developments on the global stage with respect to the partners with whom we share information. It was at the core of the concerns raised in the Arar commission and with regard to what happened to Mr. Arar. This is an ongoing issue in terms of what kind of information sharing happens, who the information is shared with, and it's a growing concern with respect to expanding information sharing within Canadian agencies.

This has a domino effect in the sense that if you have further, and broader unrestricted and unreviewed information sharing within Canadian agencies, and those agencies are then co-operating in an unreviewable or unreviewed way with foreign agencies, the problems that faced Mr. Arar are likely to arise again in the future. This needs to be addressed in the information-sharing regime that we have.

Finally, the green paper raises once again the issue of lawful access, which was discussed in great detail under the previous government. At that time, it was framed by the previous government in the context of child pornography. I believe it was Minister Toews at the time who made comments in Parliament to the effect that you're either with us or with the child pornographers in regard to how the debate ought to happen with respect to lawful access. That's been reframed in the green paper in terms of terrorism. These are not helpful ways to engage in what are complex public policy discussions in balancing liberties against the interests of national security, or other interests of the community.

These are important issues that need to be addressed coherently and consistently across the board, and ought to be addressed in a way that's consistent, whether it's within the national security framework or outside of it.

We are happy to engage further in those discussions. I see that my time is up. I'm happy to address any questions. Thank you very much.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Yes, thank you.

I invite you to take a look at my study on Bill C-22, in which I compare several countries. This study will be published in a few weeks and will provide a precise answer to that question, and explain why the bill in its current form has not reached its objective.

[Béatrice Vaugrante]

I will let my colleague Alex Neve complete my comments, because he will probably be able to provide more references in this regard. For my part, I know that other countries such as Great Britain have created such parliamentary committees. We all understand that Bill C-22 refers to a parliamentary committee on national security, but that kind of mechanism often reaches its limits.

National security agencies sometimes have trouble working together, and we have unfortunately seen that in the past. Organizations all have their own particular culture. That is why other countries, and even Canada, have trouble putting in place an organization that will be able to oversee all of it. There has to be a way to get beyond those cultural differences and that past in order to be able to do so.

Perhaps my colleague could provide a better answer to your question.

[Béatrice Vaugrante]

Thank you very much, and my apologies to the interpreters.

All Canadian national security laws should include a provision requiring legislation to be interpreted and applied consistent with the Charter of Rights, the Canadian Human Rights Act, and binding international human rights standards.

Additionally, there should be specific and binding reference to the rights most frequently at stake: the right to life; the ban on torture and ill-treatment; the prohibition of discrimination; safeguards against unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and unfair trials; freedoms of expression, association and assembly; freedom of religion; privacy rights; and the protection against refoulement.

Next, a clear lesson highlighted in the Maher Arar inquiry was the inadequacy of national security review and oversight bodies and processes in Canada. Commissioner Dennis O'Connor proposed a comprehensive new model of integrated review that would subject all agencies to robust review, by bodies that possess the necessary powers and operate in an integrated manner. Unfortunately, ten years later, that recommendation has not been taken up.

Bill C-22 would establish a national security committee of parliamentarians, but that proposal is not enough.

This leads to our second safeguard. Building on Bill C-22, Canada's model of national security review and oversights must be reformed to ensure all agencies are subject to robust, real-time review by expert and independent bodies which are able to cooperate with each other in an integrated manner.

Third, national security measures that encroach on rights should be exceptional and not permanent. However, national security measures adopted by governments are rarely temporary. Most national security provisions are part of Canadian law, including some that violate or undermine human rights provisions. Regular review helps safeguard against that possibility.

As the third safeguard therefore, Parliament should ensure regular reviews of national security laws, at least every three years.

Our final proposed safeguard is accounting for national security-related human rights violations from the past. The compensation and official apology provided to Maher Arar and Benamar Benatta are rare instances of redress being provided to individuals who have experienced serious violations.

Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abou-Elmaati and Mr. Nureddin have not been compensated for human rights violations documented in a 2008 judicial inquiry report from former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci. Omar Khadr has had no redress for charter violations upheld in unanimous 2008 and 2010 Supreme Court of Canada judgments. Other cases remain similarly unresolved.

Our fourth guarantee is therefore to appoint a judge or other independent expert to quickly review and resolve, consistent with international human rights principles, all pending legal cases involving claims for redress related to human rights violations arising in the context of national security operations.

My colleague Alex Neve will conclude our remarks.

Thank you.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I think that's still to be determined. However, I do believe that it would be very important for this to be reported back to Parliament. If Bill C-22 passes, that committee would certainly be monitoring and have access to this information. That committee would have purview over anything that deals with security intelligence or the CSE, so it would be. However, again I think it is important to highlight and to stress that the information collected would not be information from political parties. It's about providing political parties information to protect themselves. We need to make that distinction really clear—