Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Could you fill us in on how Bill C-22 responds to the recommendations that Justice Dennis O'Connor made in the Arar report?

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Waterloo, ON]

Perhaps to build off what Mr. Goodale said, the mandate I've received as government House leader is actually the commitment of putting in place a different style of government and actually empowering parliamentarians to take leadership roles. As Mr. Goodale said so eloquently, each parliamentarian has something to offer, and Bill C-22 is just an important step in the right direction.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to both ministers for being here today and also for your leadership in bringing this bill to us. We were on the road, as you mentioned. Although we weren't studying Bill C-22, oversight came up repeatedly in our meetings. It's something that the public has been asking for, so we're very pleased to see this before us now. Certainly this is only one piece in the puzzle of oversight.

I'll let either one of you answer these questions. I'll put it out to whoever thinks is best suited. Can you let us know how you envision the committee working with the current oversight bodies—the RCMP's civilian review and complaints commission, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

It's a pleasure to be back with you once again, accompanied this time by the government House leader; my deputy minister, Malcolm Brown; and also, from the Privy Council Office, Ian McCowan and Heather Sheehy.

The topic today, of course, is Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

The establishment of a rigorous parliamentary oversight mechanism of national security and intelligence activities was one of the crucial points of our election platform in the last campaign. It's a significant component of the steps we are taking to ensure the safety of Canadians while protecting our rights and freedoms. As I have clearly indicated on many occasions, Bill C-22 is the cornerstone of our approach, but it is definitely not the only measure we are taking.

Our multi-faceted approach to national security includes creating an office of community outreach and counter-radicalization with funds that were committed in the last budget; improving the no-fly system, particularly with respect to redress and appeal mechanisms; ensuring full compliance in all respects with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; protecting the right to advocate and protest; providing greater clarity regarding warrants; better defining terrorist propaganda; mandating a full review of anti-terror legislation after three years; and consulting Canadians, including parliamentarians, subject matter experts, and members of the public about what else should be done to achieve the dual objectives of protecting both our security and our rights.

It was in the context of these consultations that I appeared before you a few weeks ago. I know that this committee has since travelled the country to hear Canadians on this broad topic of national security. I very much appreciate your engagement, and I look forward to receiving the report that you will file, which will be an important contribution to this unprecedented national conversation about Canada's national security framework.

I'll turn specifically now to this one element of that framework that we have before us today, specifically Bill C-22. It will create, as you know, a committee of parliamentarians with extraordinary access to classified information so they can examine the security and intelligence operations of all departments and agencies of the Government of Canada.

This is something that most of our allies have had for many years, or at least some variation thereof. It's an initiative for which many in this country have been advocating for many, many years, including this very committee back in 2009; other parliamentary committees, including those in the other place; the Auditor General; and at least two judicial inquiries.

Bills quite similar to Bill C-22 were introduced by the Martin government back in 2005 and by several MPs and senators over the past decade. Unfortunately, none of them were adopted. Canada has, therefore, remained an anomaly among our allies when it comes to national security accountability. At long last, this legislation will fix that gap.

For just a few moments, I'd like to look more closely at how our proposed committee—that is, the Canadian committee—compares to those of our allies who have Westminster-style parliaments.

First, the scope of the Canadian committee's mandate would be distinctly broader than is the case in most other countries. Bill C-22 mandates the committee to review “the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence” as well as “any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence”.

In other words, the committee would be empowered to examine activities across the entire federal government, including operational matters, and to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

It's estimated that some 20 departments or agencies would be covered. That list, I emphasize, is open-ended. It's wherever the evidence leads.

This is in contrast, for example, to the British committee, which requires a memorandum of understanding between the committee and the U.K. Prime Minister in order to examine anything beyond the work of three specific agencies: MI5, MI6, and GCHQ. If the British committee wants to go beyond those three agencies, it actually has to negotiate a memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister.

Similarly, the Australian committee is limited to conducting statutory reviews of legislation and the administration and expenditures of particular agencies. In fact, in Australia a parliamentary resolution or ministerial referral is required for the committee to even look at additional issues related to those same agencies. You can see that the language in the federal law here in Canada is substantially broader.

With respect to our Canadian committee's access to information, a matter that several members raised during the second reading debate, again I think it's useful to examine the way that these committees work in other countries.

In the U.K., a minister may prevent information from being disclosed to the committee on the grounds that it is sensitive information that in the interest of national security should not be disclosed. That's the British rule.

In New Zealand, a witness may decline to provide information to the committee on the grounds that it is sensitive and that it would not be in the national interest to disclose it. It is up to the Prime Minister to overrule if he or she determines that disclosure is desirable in the public interest.

In Australia, ministers can issue certificates preventing witnesses from giving evidence to the committee in order to prevent disclosure of “operationally sensitive information”.

Our allies have lists of types of information that cannot be disclosed, such as in Australia, for example, information that would or might prejudice national security or the conduct of foreign relations; in New Zealand, information likely to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences; and in the U.K., information that might provide details of “operational methods”.

Clearly, our allies recognize the need for some discretion to ensure that committee investigations do not jeopardize security, and we agree with that principle. That's why, for example, Bill C-22 allows the minister to step in if he or she determines that a review would be injurious to national security. However, because of the extensive scope of the Canadian committee's mandate, and because Bill C-22 deliberately does not bar the committee from examining operational matters, our Canadian version will have investigative authority that generally exceeds that of its equivalents elsewhere.

It might also be noted that if there is a controversy between the committee of parliamentarians and the government, the fact that there is a dispute about some activity or some information is something that the committee is perfectly at liberty to report upon. If the committee, consisting of seven members of Parliament and two senators, reports an accumulation of incidents where the committee does not appear to be getting the co-operation of the government, that in itself will become a very serious discipline on the government. The controversy will not go away until the committee gives the all-clear signal.

Finally, another matter that was frequently discussed at second reading was the committee's annual report and additional special reports. The House leader has made reference to this. I simply want to underscore the importance of it. As is the case in the United Kingdom, the committee—that is, the Canadian committee—will send its reports to the Prime Minister before those reports go to Parliament. And as in the case in the U.K., the Prime Minister may have certain elements redacted on the grounds of security.

I don't think any of us would agree that this is unreasonable. When we're dealing with classified material, classified material needs to remain classified, but that is the only purpose for referring the report to the Prime Minister. He is not in a position to otherwise edit, alter, add to, or change the committee's report. It is simply for the purpose of protecting classified information. I suspect that this power in the Prime Minister would be used pretty infrequently in any event, because the committee itself would not want to publish classified information. I think we all have a common interest in making sure that such information is protected. Otherwise, the committee can say anything it wants to say, and at any time.

The suggestion was to indicate in the public report the parts that have been redacted, and I'm open to that possibility. I'm actually open to any good-faith proposals that might help us to achieve our dual objective of ensuring that Canada's national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe while protecting our rights and freedoms.

As you study the bill, I encourage you to keep in mind also the international context in which this committee will exist and in which our Canadian arrangements need to be seen as credible. Those who have gone before us in other countries in developing this kind of review and oversight have all recommended to us that we start prudently and that we learn by experience.

The MPs on this committee will need to become familiar with the unique and extraordinary role and responsibilities they will have. The committee will need to earn the trust and the confidence of the public, and equally the trust and the confidence of the agencies they oversee, along with the other review bodies that already exist in the federal system.

On this point, I would quote former Senator Hugh Segal, who had this to say about how to get this committee started on the right foot:

The model suggested in Bill C-22, namely a committee of parliamentarians, chosen by order in council, as opposed to a parliamentary committee elected by the various parties in the House and the Senate, is the right choice and mirrors the initial form of oversight chosen by the United Kingdom....Moving to where the U.K. committee of parliamentarians is now, after decades of operation and a proven track record on trust and discretion, would be a...mistake....

You might remember that when this bill was introduced in June, one of Canada's foremost experts in national security law, University of Ottawa Professor Craig Forcese, said that the committee created by Bill C-22 will be a stronger body than its U.K. and Australian equivalents. I agree with that. He also said that it will be a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. I agree with that too.

Bill C-22 will finally give Canada the necessary parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence matters that we have lacked for far too long. Then, down the road a bit, after five years of working experience, we will have the opportunity to review the legislation and amend it at that time if we believe it is then necessary.

Mr. Chairman, may I just close with the observation that I notice that the makeup of this committee has changed since my last visit here. May I welcome Mr. Clement as the critic for the official opposition. I wish him well in his new responsibilities.

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Colleagues and all present, I am pleased to be here with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to discuss Bill C-22. The bill would establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Within Canada's Westminster system, Parliament is the primary forum for democratic accountability. By its very nature, parliamentary business is by default open and accessible to Canadians. However, this presents a challenge with respect to the review of classified information regarding national security and intelligence activities.

The purpose of Bill C-22 is to provide for a structured and responsible framework to securely share highly classified information with parliamentarians. When our government took office, we committed to doing things differently. One of my key priorities as government House leader is to make Parliament more relevant by empowering parliamentarians and strengthening our parliamentary institutions.

Bill C-22 is an important step forward in that regard. It will allow for a more meaningful engagement with parliamentarians in reviewing classified national security matters in a way that has never been done before. It will provide assurance to Canadians that government agencies are exercising their powers appropriately and are subject to appropriate oversight. I have no doubt that we can all agree with this objective.

Bill C-22 is designed to provide the committee with a broad, government-wide review mandate. This includes the power to review any national security matter, including an ongoing operation, carried out by any department or agency of the federal government.

I would note that this is unique to Canada, and no other Westminster model we examined, namely the U.K., Australia and New Zealand, provides for such a broad scope. We believe that this government-wide perspective is essential to enable the committee to perform reviews of our national security system as a whole, and to advise whether it is functioning effectively and efficiently while also respecting Canadians' rights and freedoms.

The bill establishes the mandate and powers of the committee of parliamentarians. This ensures the committee will act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review, and in reporting its findings and recommendations to Parliament.

As is the case in other Westminster countries that have established similar committees, such as the U.K., the bill provides for certain safeguards on the most classified information and to ensure that the committee's work does not disrupt or interfere with government operations.

I would like to discuss some recent criticism of these measures. The Prime Minister's review of the committee's report prior to tabling has been characterized as muzzling the committee. This is an inaccurate characterization. I would like to note that other Westminster countries that have well-established national security committees also provide for similar reviews of committee reports prior to public release. This review would be done in consultation with the chair of the committee and for the sole purpose of ensuring that the reports do not contain classified information. The Prime Minister will not have the authority to alter or redact the findings of the committee on the grounds that they are critical or embarrassing to the government.

Rather, it is the committee that has sole authority to determine the direction and conclusions of its public reports, including how to redact any classified information. How any redactions are done is decided by the committee itself and not the Prime Minister. If the committee wants to use blacked-out lines, as in an access to information request, the committee can do so. If the committee wants to denote a redaction with an asterisk, as the U.K. committee does now, they will be able to do that. It's up to the committee.

Some have commented that the committee lacks independence because of certain restrictions on accessing and reviewing some operational information and activities.

Mr. Chair, members of this committee will be examining each of these provisions in detail and we look forward to hearing their views. However, I would like to highlight that other international models either prevent their committees from reviewing operational matters, or limit such reviews to past operations only. We have taken a significantly different approach, where the committee's mandate and powers allow it to examine any matter it chooses.

The restrictions in the bill are intended to help prevent the committee's review from inadvertently interfering in or disrupting an active operation. This will ensure that ministers remain fully accountable to Parliament for government activities and for taking corrective actions when needed. This is a fundamental principle of our system of responsible government.

Bill C-22 fulfills the government's commitment to establish a committee of parliamentarians. It provides parliamentarians with access to classified information so that they can directly assess government activities, thus strengthening the democratic accountability of those activities.

I don't think that was 10 minutes, but that's good for now, Mr. Chair. Merci.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Welcome to the 40th meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Let me welcome the ministers.

Welcome to all our committee members.

We are continuing our discussion around a national security framework. However, we are particularly dealing with Bill C-22 today, which has been introduced in the House and has received approval at second reading to come to this committee for consideration.

We're delighted to have both Minister Chagger and Minister Goodale with us today to present remarks.

They each have up to 10 minutes. I understand they may not take all the 10 minutes.

We will begin with Minister Chagger.

Budget Implementation Act, 2016, No. 2

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to take the floor on the budget implementation bill, since it gives me the opportunity to speak to the shortcomings or errors that the government has made in its budget. There are many of them, and I would like to talk about those that are related to the issues I represent for the NDP, namely public safety and infrastructure. Naturally, I will also be talking about the repercussions of the Liberal government’s decisions on the lives of the people in our communities and in my riding.

First of all, I would like to talk about Bill C-51. This is not a budgetary measure in itself, but it grants budgets to the various committees that oversee the national security agencies. I am referring in particular to the SIRC, which reviews the activities of CSIS and, in certain circumstances, of the RCMP. But it primarily monitors those of CSIS, which has always experienced difficulties with its operating budget.

In the 2015-2016 budget, before the Liberals came to power and while the Conservatives were still in power, the budget of the committee that monitors the activities of CSIS was increased, after the population had expressed its opposition to the passage of Bill C-51.

However, in the last budget tabled by the Liberals, last spring, there was a decrease of $2.5 million per year in this budget, spread over the years ahead. Coming from a party that said it wanted to address the shortcomings in Bill C-51 and increase transparency and oversight, this is totally unacceptable.

Considering the size of the budget of a country such as Canada, that $2.5 million may not look like much, but I am going to demonstrate the consequences of this change for the committee that provides oversight of CSIS. It is the equivalent of 11 full-time positions that will be lost. And those are not receptionists or people who fetch coffee: they are high-level analysts who look into CSIS activities.

If the government really wanted to increase transparency and oversight, it would not confine itself to half measures, and it would not reverse course and cut the budget of a group of experts that already exists to provide oversight of those agencies.

Moreover, it is important to note that these budget cuts are taking place in a context where CSIS is using the powers it was granted by Bill C-51. Therefore, on one hand, those powers are being used, which is very worrisome—our colleagues are well aware of our position on that bill—and on the other hand, cuts are being made to the budget of the only committee that currently exists to oversee CSIS’s activities, pending the establishment of a committee of parliamentarians.

I am sure I can anticipate the government’s response on this issue. It is the response that the minister gave me in committee. He told us not to worry, because they were going to strike a committee of parliamentarians. That is fine, and that is why we supported the bill at second reading. We also plan to propose some amendments to address a few of its serious deficiencies.

However, let’s be clear: all the experts we heard in committee as part of our study on national security and the study of Bill C-22 that begins today have told us that the committee of parliamentarians could not exist in a vacuum.

Independent experts are needed to provide oversight and review in partnership with the committee of parliamentarians. However, the government is in the process of slashing the budget of an existing independent oversight agency. That is completely unacceptable.

Since we are talking about public safety, we also need to raise the issue of the ability of the police to do their job. For us, at the federal level, that means the RCMP. By focusing all of our efforts on preventing terrorism, we are ignoring a number of other areas.

In the last Parliament, budget cuts were made to the Eclipse squad, and we saw the impact that had on cities such as Montréal, with the proliferation of street gangs and the radicalization of youth. We have to be honest: radicalization is not just about religion. The aim is not to profile a single community. Radicalization takes many forms. It involves young people, sometimes street gangs, and sometimes extreme right-wing groups. We are well aware that our police services lack resources, and we are not taking these other factors seriously when we focus on a single threat. It is not me saying this, it is the RCMP commissioner.

In committee, we asked the RCMP commissioner whether we were neglecting other types of threats by focusing on the terrorist threat. He replied that that was quite true. For example, the RCMP no longer pays enough attention to organized crime. That is not the fault of the men and women who work for the RCMP; it is due to the lack of resources. It is a negative trend that started under the previous government and is continuing under the Liberal government.

I also want to talk about infrastructure, another topic that has raised some very serious concerns over the past few weeks. We are seeing this government's true colours when it comes to investing in infrastructure.

During the election campaign, the Liberals promised that they would take a progressive approach to infrastructure. They said that they would work with the provinces and municipalities by investing, spending, and running a deficit. That is nice, but we are starting to realize that the government is planning to privatize.

The most glaring example of that is the involvement of Crédit Suisse in the discussions with the Minister of Finance. We know that Crédit Suisse specializes in privatizing airports. I would therefore ask the government to explain to me how it fails to see a conflict in interest when a private company that earns a living privatizing airports is working in close collaboration with the Minister of Finance. We are told not to worry, that there will be no privatization.

As my colleague from Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques put it so well yesterday, this is letting a fox into the henhouse. This is troubling. We saw this tendency with CHUM in Montreal and with Highway 407 in Ontario. These seem to have inspired this government in the development of its infrastructure plan. It is completely unacceptable. We need to stand up and oppose this privatization. This problem is not just about foreign investment and the loss of control over our own infrastructure, which are public at this time, nor about the fact that taxpayers will then be accountable and assume all the risk while private corporations rake in all the profits. It is also about the user-pay principle. We will set up the toll booths, but the profits will go to private companies.

With regard to the Champlain Bridge, my former colleague from Brossard—La Prairie, Hoang Mai, the former members for Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert and Saint-Lambert, as well as my current colleague from Longueuil—Saint-Hubert and I all took a stand against the previous government. It is to the current government's credit that it respected that commitment. There will be no tolls on the Champlain Bridge.

However, if the government decides to sell the bridge to a private company tomorrow, and the company wants to introduce a toll system, that system will benefit only that private company, not Canadian taxpayers. It is completely unacceptable.

The clock is ticking, so I will wrap up with some comments on the local issues I mentioned. The most important issue for the City of Chambly is the dispute between the federal government and the municipalities over payments in lieu of taxes, an issue that has been festering for a very long time. As promised during the last election campaign, I introduced a bill about that as soon as possible after the election. Every year, the City of Chambly has to absorb a $500,000 shortfall because the Liberal government is not honouring its commitment to the municipality to pay its fair share of costs related to the Fort Chambly site. The timing is good because the Liberal candidate set herself up as the great champion of this issue, which I have been fighting for since I was elected in 2011. Of course, that is another broken promise because there is nothing in the budget for it.

That is another battle we still need to fight, and we could go on at length about it, but I see that my time is up, so I will take this opportunity to answer my colleagues' questions.

National Defence

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Mr. Speaker, since my colleague was also a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence in the previous Parliament, he will understand what I am talking about. We had access to some secret defence documents, under certain conditions to prevent information from being leaked, of course. That helped us to better understand the issue.

Does the government intend to make detailed information, such as the statement of operational requirements, the analysis of the various aircraft, and everything that has been done by cabinet, available to the people who will sit on the committee that Bill C-22 proposes to create?

Will the opposition critics on this file have access to that information so that they can determine whether the best decision was made for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces?

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good evening.

Welcome to the 38th meeting of the Standing Committee of Public Safety and National Security of the 42nd Parliament.

I want to welcome members of the public here, acknowledging that it's a Friday evening. I am glad that you are here with us.

I want to begin with a couple of remarks about what we are doing this week in the context of our study on the national security framework, and then I will have the members of the committee introduce themselves to you.

My name is Rob Oliphant and I am the chair of this committee. This past week, our committee has been undertaking a study of the national security framework that exists in Canada, which we began the week before in Ottawa. As you know, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, was the culmination of a set of different acts over the last number of years that had restructured the national security framework.

It was felt that when this government was elected they wanted to make some changes, so we felt, as a parliamentary committee, that we should do a study on this security framework, both to advise the government of what Canadians were thinking, and as well to respond to what the government was doing in terms of study or legislation.

There are two consultations going on right now. They are simultaneous. The first consultation is being done by the government, through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. He has issued a green paper, a shorter version and a longer background document, that is engaged now in public consultation. You can respond to it online. We can show you how afterwards, if anybody doesn't know.

Parallel to that is a parliamentary review. In this committee we represent Parliament, not part of government. Some of us are on the government caucus and others are not. However, we have not come here with an opinion. In some cities we have had large gatherings where people have wanted to know our opinion on issues, and we're not at an opinion stage. We are consulting with the public to find out what you think about the parameters of the national security framework.

We were in Vancouver for two meetings on Monday, in Calgary for two meetings on Tuesday, and in Toronto for two meetings on Wednesday. Yesterday in Montreal we had three meetings, and we're here in Halifax today. Our afternoon meetings are with experts in the field who may be academics or practitioners, and various civil society groups that come and give us their expertise. We have a chance to question them. Our evening meetings are your opportunity to tell us what your concerns or thoughts are.

The end of this study isn't quite clear yet. The goal is to report back to Parliament, and thus to have the government read our report and respond to it as well. Normally, when a parliamentary committee issues a report, they request a government response to that report. This study will also be fuelling all the legislation that the government is going to be bringing forward in the area of public safety. There's one bill that has already been tabled that comes under this umbrella. It's Bill C-22, and it establishes a committee of parliamentarians to do oversight of national security agencies. We are looking at oversight, but we will be studying that bill in depth beginning next week.

Tonight is your turn. I'm going to turn it over to the committee to introduce themselves. I let them tell you where they're from, and then we're going to turn on the microphone.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Absolutely. We'd be delighted to have any of your research work.

If any of you have anything you'd like to submit in writing to the committee, it would be very helpful. It would be helpful for this study, as well as for Bill C-22, so if you have something, that would be very interesting for us.

We're actually not bad for time with our extension.

Thank you for your help with our study. I'll remind those of you in the gallery today that we'll be reconvening at 5:30 p.m. That's an opportunity for anyone from the public who would like to speak to the committee to do so.

Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thanks for that answer.

Mr. Fraser, I don't want to spend too much time on Bill C-22 because we are going to study it, but inevitably it comes back again and again as part of this study because it is an important component.

My colleague Murray Rankin and I are working on what we think are some appropriate amendments to the bill, and some of that involves points that were raised about the fact that at the end the committee is answerable to the Prime Minister and cabinet, who have the final say over the content of the report. I believe you alluded to that in your comments.

The other question is in relation to public trust. For example, there are things like the election of the chair, as opposed to the chair being selected by the Prime Minister, in order to ensure more independence on behalf of the committee. Perhaps you'll share your thoughts on that and anything else you might want to add.

[David Fraser, Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much to this honourable committee for inviting me to provide my thoughts on this very broad consultation that the committee is undertaking, one that has obviously been influenced and affected by the green paper issued by the Department of Public Safety.

Though I have previously appeared before this committee on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, particularly its national privacy and access law section, I am here today as an individual. I will not be speaking on behalf of my firm, any associations of which I'm a member, or any of my clients.

For some background, I am a lawyer in private practice with the firm McInnes Cooper, based in Atlantic Canada. I'm also a part-time instructor at Dalhousie law school, where I teach Internet and media law, and law and policy for e-commerce. I've also taught privacy law.

As you might be able to guess, my practice is exclusively devoted to privacy law and Internet law. In that capacity, I regularly provide advice to public sector and private sector clients from across Canada, and actually around the world, on their obligations under Canadian laws. That includes companies that are exclusively in the technology sector, the telecommunications sector, and other sectors. This means I'm often providing advice to my clients on interactions with law enforcement and national security agencies in Canada, where the police and national security authorities are seeking access to my client's customer information and information about others of their stakeholders. I have seen many things that inform the testimony I am about to give.

In my personal capacity, I am a strong proponent of a free and democratic Canada that is founded on the rule of law and rooted in our constitutional traditions. I am not associated with any political party, and I feel free to speak my mind on matters such as these from my heart, and hopefully informed by some serious, informed reflection.

I have some mixed feelings about where we are today. The current government campaigned and was elected on a platform that advanced scaling back Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act. I would have hoped we'd be discussing a piece of legislation that would be doing that rather than continuing the long-standing discussion that I expect will extend into the next year.

The information-sharing and disruption powers that the act contains have now become the status quo. We've heard testimony from others, and you've certainly heard it reported in the media, that these powers are being used. We are told they are working, but since we're dealing with the RCMP, CSIS, and CSE, we're not being given any real information about how they are being used. We're being kept in the dark, as usual.

That brings me to my first point. Our national security apparatus in Canada needs effective, accountable oversight. I think Bill C-22 is critical. Our system of government is a parliamentary one, in which Parliament makes the laws that set the limits under which the national security agencies operate. Parliament cannot do this job if it has blinkers on or if it's only given access to unclassified information, and in that case even information that only those agencies deem to be appropriate for Parliament to see. A committee of parliamentarians should have unfettered access to all information it deems relevant to carry out this critical job.

I would, however, suggest that we may need an officer of Parliament to oversee all the national security agencies, something in the model of the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, or the Auditor General, who reports to Parliament directly. It may look like a super-SIRC, Security Intelligence Review Committee, that would have oversight over all of the agencies, because the line between CSIS, the RCMP, CSE, and others only depends upon who signs your paycheque, perhaps, or what's written at the top of your paycheque. They collaborate hand in hand. This oversight agency needs to be fully independent of the agencies and has to have unfettered access to everything. It should have the power to report to Parliament on its own initiative and to take any questions before any of the designated justices of the Federal Court on any question about lawful activities.

Our national security agencies by necessity operate largely in the shadows. The only way that we as Canadians can have confidence that they're doing their jobs appropriately is if we have confidence in the organizations that oversee them. I'm not sure we yet have that.

We saw recently a case in which CSIS, with the approval of the Department of Justice, knowingly lied under oath to a Federal Court judge in order to get a warrant. We cannot allow that to happen. We saw a situation in which our federal police department was found to have created terrorists through entrapment. This can't be allowed to happen. Dozens of police officers every year are disciplined for inappropriate and unlawful access to CPIC, the Canadian police database. That shouldn't be allowed to happen. We need to be able to assume the good faith of the individuals who act on our behalf in our police departments and our national security authorities, but it's only through effective oversight and accountability that this can actually be done.

I read with great interest the green paper, and I read with great interest its backgrounder. I could tell who the author was. It was drawn directly from the wish lists of public safety bureaucrats, folks like Commissioner Paulson and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

It advocates, in a one-sided manner, a whole bunch of police powers that have been debated back and forth over the years and ultimately have been dismissed.

You'll recall that Canadians roundly denounced the lawful-access provisions, the interception capabilities, and other things that were embedded in the Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act that was tabled by Vic Toews and ultimately left to die on the order paper.

I found that the green paper and its backgrounder on advocacy was disguised as consultation, and it's clear that somebody was looking to revive these lawful-access powers, notwithstanding that the Spencer decision was pretty clear about access to basic subscriber information and rights of privacy that individuals enjoy on the Internet. We're still hearing advocates of this sort of thing talking about phone book information—and I'm happy to talk about metadata as well—which was thoroughly debunked by the Supreme Court in that case. The fact that this discussion is taking place in terms that fly in the face of what in fact is the last word on the supreme law of the land from the Spencer decision further reinforces to me that strong oversight is required.

I'm happy to talk about the topic of warrantless access to subscriber information, a topic that I've done a lot of research into, as well as the topic of going dark through encryption.

Ultimately, to allow additional time for questions to make sure that everything the committee wants to hear is heard, we need to be careful that this wish list doesn't come at the expense of our rights. We need to be very cautious, and this committee has a very important job. The threat of terrorism is a threat to our democracy, but we cannot create a self-inflicted wound by marching towards a police state or undermining our democratic values.

I very much look forward to the discussion we're going to have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

We're going to reconvene.

Thank you to the witnesses who are here for our second panel. I don't think you were in the room when we started, so this is just to put this into context.

We are doing a study on the national security framework of Canada, and that is a large study. It's being done at the same time as the government is doing a study. They've issued a green paper on national security and how we reframe it. Our study is related to that, but not part of it, so we're not here as government. The green paper informs our study, but it does not encompass our study. Our study can be broader. It can be more foundational.

We're already having the first piece of legislation to deal with, and that's Bill C-22, around oversight. We're anticipating more pieces of legislation, and as a result of this study we may be recommending legislative changes to the government. However, we are not doing their consultation. This is our consultation.

The members of the committee have been travelling. As I've said, we've been in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, and Montreal this week, and we are delighted to be in Atlantic Canada.

There was some miscommunication, but we'd like to give each panellist would 10 minutes, so I'd like to go to about 4:10 or 4:15, if that's okay with the committee, so that we can have enough time for questioning as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you.

Thank you for your testimony.

I'm going to give advance notice to the committee that I have an idea in my head, which is always dangerous. We're beginning to get some different models of oversight presented to us at different meetings. I think maybe we need to host them to come together.

I think it was not quite fair to say Mr. Segal wanted to get rid of the oversight, he wanted a very beefed-up bureaucracy underneath the parliamentary oversight committee, the committee of parliamentarians. It could be like a super-SIRC that has experts, and there are all kinds of models. I think we're probably going to end up with three or four different models of oversight that we're going to have to test Bill C-22 against. I think a different format of meeting could be quite interesting where we have a panel of people who engage in a different way than we're normally doing. We're getting some fascinating expert opinions, and we as non-experts are going to have to make recommendations. You've inspired us today and we thank you for your work, not only today but always, in the pursuit of justice.

Thank you.

We're going to adjourn this meeting and we're going to reconvene at 5:30.

You are cordially invited to attend the public consultation meeting this evening.

Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Can I stop you there, because I think that's a separate conversation. I think we can study that more when we're looking at Bill C-22 specifically.

Having served as commission counsel on the Arar inquiry, I'm curious to know how you think Justice O'Connor...and you envisioned co-operation between a committee of parliamentarians and whether it's just SIRC or SIRC and existing independent bodies working. Again, just focus on the overlap in reviewing activities. In my view, the committee doesn't have a lot of help at this stage to map that out by way of a recommendation to the minister.