Mr. Speaker, I fear I may disappoint my colleagues, because I will not be talking about the carbon tax.
It is often said that the desire to appear clever stops us from actually becoming clever. That is what I will try to show today. I want to comment on Bill C‑57, which seeks to review the free trade agreement between Canada and Ukraine, but I will talk about it in a different way.
For centuries, people around the globe have heard Hamlet asking one of the big questions: “To be, or not to be, that is the question.” That is the way he put it, but I will rephrase the question: “To be, or to appear to be, that is the question”. In other words, is it better to be or to appear to be?
When it comes to free trade, Canada seems to have made up its mind. It has chosen to appear to be. When I think of “appearing to be”, the word that comes to mind is “minimum”, meaning the very least, the bare minimum. The agreement does not say that this is the minimum that we want. It says it is the minimum that we are going to agree on.
Last weekend, an article in La Presse caught my attention. The headline read: “Is Canada doing the minimum for Ukraine?” The article quoted authors Justin Massie and Nicolas‑François Perron, who argued that Canada's primary objective is to be perceived as a “reliable ally”. That is a quality it shares with golden retrievers. I am just throwing that in for those in the know.
The authors also proved that Canada was doing the bare minimum, favouring actions that look good over those that actually work. In their chapter of a book that is soon to be published—in French, I should mention—by the Presses de l'Université Laval, they scrutinize the help Canada has offered to Kyiv. The authors argue that, far from being a leader in the pro-NATO camp, Ottawa is content to echo the positions of its allies and offer “very modest” military support to Ukraine. They write that “Canada's desired objective has more to do with being perceived as a reliable ally than any other consideration, including Ukrainian victory against Russian aggression”. We need to be clear on that. We are debating the free trade agreement, but it seems like much ado about nothing.
The authors also say that Canada's policy is to project a certain image—surprise, surprise—and that waving the maple leaf flag is its main objective. That reminds us that Canada's foreign policy is a bit half-baked. In terms of total aid provided to Ukraine as a share of GDP, Canada is basically a big Portugal. Well ahead of Canada are Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Finland, Czechia, Croatia, Slovenia and Portugal. So much for impressing others.
Canada has provided significant financial aid in the form of loans. However, if we consider overall aid, including financial, humanitarian and military aid, as a share of GDP, Canada ranks 31st out of 39 countries. Quite honestly, we are currently debating the smallest of details right now. As I was saying, Canada is basically a big Portugal, but we need to be careful. According to those experts, Ottawa is doing just enough in Ukraine to be perceived as a “reliable ally”. They say that this level of action will result in very few political consequences. Basically, that is all that is expected from Canada in its current state. This is not a government priority. One of the experts believes that the government is “more interested in provincial jurisdictions than its own”. That is a subject that the Bloc Québécois cares about. That expert also said that Canada does not have a very good track record.
There is nothing new so far. Since 2015, Canada's foreign affairs policy seems to have been vague and opportunistic at best. All the same, there are a few things in the bill worth noting. Of the 30 chapters, 11 are new and were not in the 2017 agreement. I should point out that it was the Bloc Québécois that managed to get the only amendments to the bill adopted, thanks to my colleague, the member for Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot. The agreement is supposed to help people try to curb corruption. They know a thing or two about that. It is no secret that, before Russia invaded, Ukraine ranked pretty poorly on that score.
In any case, the agreement aims to create voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulation so that people can set guidelines for themselves. Frankly, this is a pipe dream. It is not going to happen. The agreement says that it is inviting the countries to work together towards respecting each other's laws. Once again, this is the bare minimum, and no one is reinventing the wheel. Basically, this is the goal in the areas of labour, the environment, gender equality, human rights and corruption. Right now, labour, the environment and human rights are not the main concerns in Ukraine. Nevertheless, that is where we are at, and it comes off as a bit of a lecture.
Despite its statement of principle, there is no plan for Canada to meet its commitments, which is problematic, or at the very least unimpressive. It is important to understand that Ukraine is a marginal trading partner for Canada. We are talking about 0.2% of $760 billion. In other words, we are talking a lot about very little in terms of trade. In reality, the revised agreement will have little impact on Canada and Quebec.
As I said at the start, everything I have just laid out over the past few minutes shows that we are still in the land of appearances. To appear is to be on show. Speaking of being on show, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made an appearance in Ukraine last weekend to talk about issues that matter to her. To be on show is the bare minimum of taking action. Nevertheless, the Bloc Québécois will support the bill. The risk is low. We are going to try to avoid pointless debates on the carbon tax, which our colleagues are so obsessed with, and focus on offering our assistance to the extent that the bill allows. However, I want to make it clear that, while we may be a reliable ally, reliability is the bare minimum required to be an ally.
