Bill S-8

An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

This enactment amends the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) reorganize existing inadmissibility provisions relating to sanctions to establish a distinct ground of inadmissibility based on sanctions;
(b) expand the scope of inadmissibility based on sanctions to include not only sanctions imposed on a country but also those imposed on an entity or a person; and
(c) expand the scope of inadmissibility based on sanctions to include all orders and regulations made under section 4 of the Special Economic Measures Act .
It also makes consequential amendments to the Citizenship Act and the Emergencies Act .
Finally, it amends the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations to, among other things, provide that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, instead of the Immigration Division, will have the authority to issue a removal order on grounds of inadmissibility based on sanctions under new paragraph 35.1(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act .

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our witnesses for having been here, for their testimony, and for answering all the questions posed by the members.

Thank you, Mr. Bellissimo, Mr. Kolga, Ms. Middlemiss, Mr. Michalchyshyn, Mr. Zakydalsky and Mr. Daoud.

We're very grateful indeed.

Is it the will of the committee to adjourn?

(Motion agreed to)

I will just remind everyone that Tuesday is clause-by-clause for Bill S-8.

Thank you.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Thank you.

I'm going to cede the rest of my time to my colleague, Mr. Hoback.

Before I do, I'm going to make a statement that I'm wrestling in terms of the balancing of security and safety concerns with some of the legitimate concerns that we've heard today.

We heard in the testimony from the senator this morning that speed and urgency were behind pushing forward Bill S-8, and that's why it was introduced in the Senate. However, I have to ask myself why, given it's been a year since that process started, we are now faced with it. I feel a sense of urgency for the situation in Ukraine, but I will acknowledge some of the concerns that I've heard from other parties.

Go ahead, Mr. Hoback.

[Lisa Middlemiss]

The sanctions could be included. Bill S‑8 covers all types of sanctions against a country, even economic sanctions.

[Marcus Kolga]

Yes, I believe the government could engage more closely with human rights organizations and civil society groups that are tracking human rights violations around the world, and work internationally to harmonize our sanctions with our allies, some of whom have close relationships with those civil society organizations. These people know best who should be targeted by those sanctions, so, again, closer coordination would be greatly welcomed.

I think that specific amendments.... This point doesn't speak necessarily to BillS-8 but to our broader sanctions regime...but ensuring some form of transparency and accountability....

In the United States, for example, the U.S. sanctions legislation, their Global Magnitsky Act, requires the U.S. government, the executive, to produce an annual report to demonstrate how U.S. sanctions have been used, who they've been targeting and why they've been targeting specific individuals and entities.

I think this is something that would be extremely useful in Canada as well, to help guide our sanctions and to make them more efficient in the long run.

[Abdulla Daoud]

As far as expediting how we put people on the sanctions list, I don't think that's really the purpose of this bill.

In terms of how it's being done now, if you refer to Mr. Bellissimo's brief, he pointed out from security experts that Canada has a pretty big lag when it comes to our sanctions regime. For example, we've kept countries longer on the sanctions list when our partners and our allies had taken them off. The examples were Liberia and Eritrea. If, for example, we were to pass this and cast this big, wide net in terms of economic sanctions, individuals from those countries, who have had some sort of financial connection to those countries because of the way they operate, would have been deemed inadmissible.

Basing our entire Bill S-8 legislation on a sanctions regime that is not quick to act and, from your own recommendations of 2017, needs a lot of improvement, is a dangerous road to go down.

I would refer back to our recommendations. They are very minor fixes that would still achieve and ensure what my colleagues here are also worried about in terms of individuals who are moving around assets, who should be labelled and targeted. We work in collaboration with our international partners, so those individuals would probably be identified more by our allies than by us first, given how we operate. We would still be able to use those lists, because we work in concert, which is in the legislation currently under IRPA with our international partners. Even if this is the case, we would still be able to target these individuals.

Lastly, I believe that, in the Senate debates we saw when this was being discussed, the CBSA said that 25 individuals they've identified have applied to come to Canada. There were 25 who have tried, and all 25 were rejected. There is a case here that our current inadmissibility process would cover them.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

You said earlier that some of our allies are imposing sanctions on individuals who don't face sanctions in Canada.

Would Bill S‑8 change that? Does Canada have to follow in the footsteps of allies when it comes to sanctions imposed on certain individuals, or should we retain the independent analysis process we currently have?

My question is for Mr. Daoud and Ms. Middlemiss.

[Lisa Middlemiss]

We're trying to define the word “sanction” so that we can understand exactly what we're talking about. With respect to the Special Economic Measures Act, Bill S‑8 proposes to expand the notion of sanctions to four types of sanctions: economic sanctions, sanctions for international peace or human rights violations, and sanctions against corruption. Those who are already subject to sanctions for human rights violations are inadmissible to Canada.

It's important that the types of sanctions be defined. I agree with my colleagues Mr. Daoud and Mr. Bellissimo that sanctions need to be kept in the context of human rights violations. You have to understand that there are different types of sanctions. Economic sanctions are sometimes intended to force a country to change its behaviour. It could also be an innocent person in Canada who is opposed to the regime. They may have had their refugee claim accepted, but their name remains on a list of individuals subject to sanctions. In that case, their application for permanent residence can't be processed.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of the witnesses for their testimony.

I'm going to begin with the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.

You've heard the testimony from all the witnesses. As heard from the previous panel, Bill S-8 went through the legislative process in the Senate almost a year ago. I'm going to ask you to comment on the speed, the urgency and the concerns that have been raised in the testimony from witnesses you've heard, and I assume also at the Senate. The Senate made its decision. That is also now what this committee is weighing.

Can you comment on the urgency of this situation? A driver here was the illegal invasion of Russia into Ukraine. The goals of this legislation are something that we all support around the table. Can you help us with our deliberations?

[Abdulla Daoud, Executive Director, The Refugee Centre]

Good afternoon, everyone.

I am Abdulla Daoud, executive director of the Refugee Centre, which is based in Montreal.

Our organization is rooted in the newcomer community, providing a variety of services, including the only full-service refugee legal clinic in Montreal. So far this year, we have assisted over 9,000 refugees and refugee claimants. I would like to thank this committee for giving us the opportunity to address this critical issue today.

First, we applaud the government's effort to restrict bad actors, such as Russian oligarchs, from entering the country, as we have witnessed first-hand accounts at The Refugee Centre from Ukrainian refugees of the brutality of the Russian regime. It is crucial for the government to maintain a balance between protecting national security and upholding our democracy, including the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals impacted by legislation such as Bill S-8. This bill goes beyond Russian oligarchs and introduces potential dangers and adverse consequences to unintended individuals or families. We believe changes to the bill must be made.

One of the most concerning aspects of Bill S-8 is that it currently decouples the term “sanctions” from violations of human or international rights, thus creating a high level of ambiguity in relation to how sanctions would be applied in regard to admissibility.

Bill S-8 further connects sanctions to the entire section 4 of SEMA, such as economic measures imposed against foreign states. This effectively places the burden of economic sanctions solely on individual applicants due to the actions of a foreign government. For example, a Venezuelan foreign national who has invested their money into the state, which is typical of state enterprises such as Venezuela, could be held to account or deemed inadmissible in Canada. This is why the most important solution we are proposing is to properly define the word “sanctions”, specifically in regard to Bill S-8's amendments in proposed new subsection 35.1(1) of IRPA.

We believe it should be worded as “a foreign national is inadmissible for sanctions on grounds of violating human or international rights”. This rejoins the terms with violating human or international rights, avoiding any misuse or ambiguity in relation to broad economic sanctions that individuals cannot be held accountable for.

Another issue is that Bill S-8's current language places a disproportionate burden on already vulnerable groups. In order to remove themselves from a sanctions list, protected persons would need to seek out and endure a convoluted and complex legal procedure through Global Affairs Canada. This list has a historical precedent of infrequent updates and is often misaligned with the actions of our international partners. Without specific provisions tailored to address the unique circumstances of these individuals, legislation may inadvertently jeopardize their safety and well-being. Therefore, we propose to amend Bill S-8 to indicate that any refugee claimant who has been found to be a protected person within Canada be immediately delisted from the sanctions list.

Another concern arises from the potential misuse of power granted to the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the CBSA under Bill S-8. There is a substantial risk of enforcement officials exceeding their authority and making arbitrary determinations related to inadmissibility with little to no accountability. This is due to the lack of a well-defined decision-making framework and removes access to appeals through the immigration division and ministerial relief.

There is no proper history of training in relation to removals based on sanctions within the CBSA, as the existing immigration and security infrastructure already addresses such concerns effectively within the immigration division. This is further reiterated by the director general of the CBSA's own testimony. When asked about the CBSA's experiences with sanctions, he stated, “However, with respect to sanctions inadmissibility cases to date, there have been no actual removals because the system has been quite effective in terms of stopping people from arriving in the first place.”

Our solution is to amend Bill S-8 in regard to the CBSA. In cases in which an individual is deemed inadmissible on the grounds of sanctions as defined by violating human or international rights, the CBSA should not have the unilateral authority to refuse entry or initiate removal proceedings against an individual without referring the case to the immigration division of the IRB.

Last, the proposed amendments in Bill S-8 may invite challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The denial of access to certain immigration processes and the removal of the ability to appeal or seek ministerial relief may infringe upon the rights of affected individuals, opening the door to lengthy and costly court battles for procedural fairness.

In conclusion, by carefully considering the recommendations provided in our brief, we can achieve the dual goals of protecting national security and upholding the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals affected by our immigration laws.

Thank you.

[Lisa Middlemiss, Chair, Immigration Law Section, The Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Members of the committee, my name is Lisa Middlemiss, and I am the current chair of the immigration law section of the Canadian Bar Association. The Canadian Bar Association is a national association of 37,000 members, including lawyers, judges, notaries, academics and law students, with a 120-year-old mandate to seek improvements in the law and the administration of justice.

Thank you for inviting the CBA to comment on Bill S-8.

Our section believes that the following loopholes should be addressed to avoid innocent people being caught by the broader language of Bill S-8.

The bill states that a foreign national is inadmissible for international sanctions imposed not only on a country but also on an entity or person. Broadening the scope of inadmissibility for international sanctions poses a risk by obscuring the delisting process.

There are disturbing examples of cases where individuals say they were wrongly sanctioned. Dr. Andrea Charron, a sanctions expert and director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, gave the example of a differently spelled first or last name, even if it's only one letter off, which can lead to another person being sanctioned.

The consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List contains over 3,500 names of individuals or entities sanctioned under the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Leaders Act (also known as Sergei Magnitsky's Law), in addition to those sanctioned under the United Nations Act.

Take the recently reported case of a businessman who is listed on the Canadian consultant sanctions list for collaborating with the Putin regime, although he left Russia over 20 years ago and claims that he has no ties to Russia. His wife was working in another country and claims no ties to Russia either.

Given that the delisting application process is complex and lengthy, those who contend they are mistakenly sanctioned have little recourse. When Bill S-8 expands the scope of inadmissibility for sanctions, this is of particular concern.

Speaking of the lack of definitions for sanctions, it is essential to define the word “sanctions”, which the bill references in lieu of sanctions for human and international rights violations as presently referenced in subsection 35(1) of the IRPA.

Bill S-8 expands inadmissibility based on sanctions to include all orders and regulations made under section 4 of the SEMA. Section 4 references the Governor in Council making sanctions for a wide variety of circumstances, which in some cases—see subsection 4(1.1) of SEMA—may be premised merely on a decision, recommendation or resolution. Given the potential breadth for inadmissibility based on sanctions, it is really important to adopt definitions within the IRPA and the IRPR.

With respect to the missing definition of the term “entity”, Bill S‑8 determines sanctions-based inadmissibility for an entity, person or country; and yet, the term “entity” is not defined in it. The Special Economic Measures Act, for example, defines “entity” broadly in section 2 as “a body corporate, trust, partnership, fund, an unincorporated association or organization or a foreign state”.

It's hard to imagine what this concept of entity might not include. We recommend that Bill S‑8 implement a regulatory framework to ensure that the term “entity” is clearly defined in the context of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In addition, the degree of ownership and participation in such an entity should be clarified to avoid unintended consequences on individuals seeking admission into Canada or wishing to stay in the country.

There is the gravity of consequences for inadmissible individuals. Delisting processes vary across international organizations. This complexifies and obscures the process.

We believe it's critical that individuals facing inadmissibility based on the ground of sanctions are independently and impartially assessed.

Finally, we would note that inland refugee claimants remain eligible to pursue their claims pursuant to Bill S-8. This is an exception that we endorse. However, we would recommend amending Bill S-8 to ensure that a finding inland or overseas that a person is a convention refugee or a person in need of protection results in immediate delisting. Otherwise, refugees' opportunities to apply for permanent residence and to integrate in this society will be jeopardized.

[Orest Zakydalsky, Senior Policy Advisor, Ukrainian Canadian Congress]

Thank you.

The first issue we see with Canada's sanctions regime is the methodology by which our government decides whether or not to sanction someone. We've never really understood or received an explanation for why, for example, someone is sanctioned in other jurisdictions but not in Canada, or how the decision is made to not sanction someone here if they've been sanctioned by our allies.

For example, on April 6, 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Viatcheslav Kantor, the largest shareholder of fertilizer company Acron, with, as the United Kingdom stated, “vital strategic significance for the Russian government”. On April 8, 2022, he was sanctioned by the European Union. He has not been sanctioned by Canada, and we don't know why.

The second problem we see is enforcement of existing sanctions. According to the RCMP, in June 2022, $123,031,000 had been frozen in Canada under Russia SEMA regulations. In December 2022, which is the most recent data I could locate, the RCMP reported $122,245,000 in frozen assets.

In the intervening seven months, between June and December 2022, Global Affairs Canada announced sanctions against 302 Russian individuals and 83 entities. Either none of those individuals or entities hold any assets in Canada, or we were simply unable to locate any of those assets.

At any rate, $122,000,000 is a comparative pittance compared to what are the likely actual Russian holdings in Canada. In fact, in just one known case, the Russian oligarch Igor Makarov moved out some $121,000,000 in assets just days before being sanctioned by Canada, in April 2022. The amount a single Russian oligarch was able to move out is essentially equal to the sum total of Russian assets that Canada has been able to freeze.

Makarov had been sanctioned by the U.S. treasury in 2018. The reason our government took no action against him until after he moved his assets out is unknown to us.

We understand that this committee intends to conduct a wider study of Canadian sanctions policy, which we welcome and for which we'd be honoured to provide more recommendations. In the meantime, the UCC reiterates its strong support for Bill S-8 and our strong support for ensuring that those sanctioned by Canada are not able to travel here. Human rights abusers and corrupt officials have no place in Canada.

Thank you.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I wish we didn't have to be here so often, but today is day 441 of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, so it is good to speak with you today.

With regard to this bill, Bill S-8, and the amendments on individuals sanctioned by Canada and by SEMA, we strongly support this legislation as drafted by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. We believe that with the freezing of assets held in Canada, and hopefully soon the seizure of those assets, the inadmissibility of individuals listed under SEMA will be a key part of Canada's strong sanctions regime against foreign officials whose regimes, as we know and have heard, are engaged in gross human rights violations and in significant corruption activities against individuals who financially and politically support those regimes.

We believe that the proposed amendments to IRPA are a step, as you heard, in closing the statutory gaps in our legislation to harmonize SEMA with the immigration act and to assist in making Canadian sanctions more effective.

We call on the committee to adopt the bill quickly. For our community, it is part of the ongoing effort to significantly strengthen Canada's sanctions regime.

I will turn it over to my colleague to talk about two specific issues we believe can be addressed.

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and esteemed members of this committee, for inviting me to testify today on Bill S-8 and Canada's sanctions regime.

I had the privilege of leading the Canadian civil society campaign for Magnitsky legislation, during which time I had the honour of working with Senator Andreychuk, former justice minister Irwin Cotler, MP James Bezan and many of you here today.

That work also included co-operation with many of the leading post Cold War-era Russian human rights activists, such as Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Kara-Murza, both of whom came to Ottawa to advocate for Magnitsky legislation. Boris Nemtsov was, of course, assassinated in February 2015 for his leadership and advocacy. Vladimir Kara-Murza was poisoned twice to within a hair of his life. Two weeks ago, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his criticism of the Putin regime and its barbaric invasion of Ukraine.

My activism and advocacy for Magnitsky sanctions have also attracted the attention of the Russian government and its morally corrupt enablers here in Canada. I’d like to take this moment to note the intimidation the member for Wellington—Halton Hills has endured for his leadership and advocacy against foreign authoritarians. His experience has finally forced a national spotlight onto the threat of transnational repression and the efforts of authoritarian regimes to silence Canadian advocates of human rights and democracy. For those of us who have long endured threats of violence, organized campaigns to discredit us and dehumanizing marginalization based on our ethnic backgrounds, we shudder and share the anxiety of our fellow Canadians who are victimized by foreign intimidation.

The application of sanctions is a painful consequence for the corrupt officials and oligarchs whose stolen assets are used to fund lavish lifestyles and pay for the protection of totalitarian leaders like Vladimir Putin. Their threats and intimidation against those who advocate for them are a good measure of their effectiveness. Over the past 15 months, since Russia invaded Ukraine, we've witnessed a rapid and welcome intensification of our application of sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the Putin regime. All Canadian parliamentarians deserve credit for their unanimous support of sanctions, which has made Canada a leader in holding the Putin regime to account. Sanctions have been imposed on leading Putin-aligned oligarchs who have assets in Canada, like Roman Abramovich. Mr. Abramovich’s Evraz owns five major steel processing plants in western Canada, worth billions of dollars.

Kremlin-controlled propaganda outlets that pollute our information environment and provide platforms for domestic far-left and far-right extremists, such as RT, Sputnik and Channel One, have been sanctioned and removed from our public airwaves.

However, some gaps remain. Bill S-8 helps address one of them: ensuring those on our sanctions lists are also denied entry into Canada. This is a very welcome amendment to IRPA and our overall sanctioning regime.

Another significant gap is one that pertains to Russian state media and its continued availability to Canada’s Russian diaspora community. Despite our sanctions on Russian state media, streaming devices and services, like those offered by Amazon and Google, are sold in Canada by Canadian companies and provide access to multiple Russian channels specifically sanctioned and banned by our government. These channels are Russia-1, Channel One, NTV, Russia-24 and the many other channels controlled by the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, which is also on our sanctions list. Canadian far-left and far-right extremists continue to appear on the sanctioned Russian state media channel RT, where they legitimize Russian state narratives. If they receive any benefit, this may also represent a violation of Canadian sanctions laws.

Finally, the acquisition of services related to tourism in temporarily occupied Crimea contravenes Canadian sanctions legislation. A Canadian far-left, pro-Kremlin extremist recently boasted on social media that he met with Russian foreign ministry officials in Moscow and later travelled to Crimea on a tourist visa. While Canadians are free to travel as they wish, it does not mean they are free from the consequences of contravening our sanctions.

In conclusion, I strongly support the harmonization of IRPA with the Canadian Magnitsky law and SEMA.

Thank you so much, again, for inviting me to appear here today. I look forward to your questions.

[Mario Bellissimo, Lawyer, Certified Specialist, Bellissimo Law Group Professional Corporation, As an Individual]

Good morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation.

In our brief submitted before the Senate last year, we made five recommendations, which we repeat here. We endorse the concerns highlighted by the CBA and The Refugee Centre. Why the recommendations? Context is always important.

The current law is potent. As the committee knows, the authority to render individuals inadmissible under IRPA for international and human rights sanctions has been in place for over 20 years. Of the thousands of people currently on the sanctions list, we cannot identify anyone who would currently be inadmissible under Canadian immigration law.

What's the harm in adding more sanctions? The bad actors should have no access to Canada. We agree. Yet it is much more complicated. IRPA's jurisdictional integrity, for one, is at stake. Why? Aligning all of subsection 4(1.1) of SEMA with IRPA introduces, to list just a few things, economic sanctions; where recommendations to sanction result in automatic inadmissibility; and where investigations into sanctions could be grounds for detention without legal context and without relief from third party adjudicators like the immigration division. That will now be repealed.

In short, the new law, make no mistake, is too broad. It can impact citizens, permanent residents and foreign nationals guilty of no wrongdoing. This is striking. Applicants and their spouses and children would have few options, if any, left under the IRPA. It would have a generational impact.

Recommendation one is the requirement for legislative clarity. We've heard a lot about it. The word “sanction” remains undefined, but it's also been divorced from “grounds of violating human or international rights”—it's now a stand-alone, undefined ground for inadmissibility—that currently exists in IRPA. Why? Is this not the harm we are targeting—bad actors in violation of human rights or international rights? Proposed section 35.1 must be connected to human or international rights violators. Key terms like “sanction” and “entity” must be defined in IRPA.

This is all very important, because such subject matter experts in the sanctions regime as Dr. Andrea Charron, and a prior Senate study, raised several acute issues. There are too many to recite here, but I'll mention a few about sanctions. These are the need for parliamentary oversight, better coherence and compliance, timely and independent redress avenues, accountability, transparency and other practical challenges.

For example, Canada continued to leave sanctions in place against foreign states like Liberia and Sierra Leone long after the United Nations lifted them, a legal purgatory under Bill S-8. This committee should address that regime—I understand that it's going to study it—before the passage of Bill S-8.

Put plainly, individuals' lives could be significantly altered by a law that potentially should not apply to them. Equally troubling is that it may not exclude some of the bad actors, because the law becomes immersed in legislative ambiguity and applicatory limitations, resulting in procedural and fairness concerns possibly rising to the level of constitutional issues.

Recommendation two is that legislative clarity is also required for the Citizenship Act and the Emergencies Act. That has not been discussed thus far. Canadians should not be at risk of losing their Canadian citizenship on a precarious legal foundation.

It's the same for recommendation three with respect to independence. IRPA cannot lose its jurisdictional integrity by being restricted in providing relief where justified in the confines of its own act. Ironically, in the sanctions regime there are legislated exemptions, but really, none remain for those involved in navigating IRPA.

Recommendation four underscores the need for overbreadth and excluding those with no personal wrongdoing or any connection to transgressions.

For recommendation five, we rely on David Matas's brief before the Senate. The granting of refugee status should result in immediate delisting. Access to refugee status should be uniform in and outside of Canada.

We propose calling David Matas and Dr. Charron to testify. It is critical that we maintain the jurisdictional independence of the IRPA and its harmonious intersection with other domestic and international legislation for the objects of the act and the clear intention of Parliament to be realized. To get there, Bill S-8 needs further study and amending.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call the meeting back to order.

It is now my great pleasure to welcome to this committee various witnesses who are here in relation to the consideration of Bill S-8.

As individuals online, we have Mr. Mario Bellissimo, a lawyer and certified specialist with Bellissimo Law Group Professional Corporation, and Mr. Marcus Kolga, senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. From the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, we have Mr. Ihor Michalchyshyn, chief executive officer, and Mr. Orest Zakydalsky, senior policy adviser. From the Canadian Bar Association, we have Ms. Lisa Middlemiss, chair of the immigration law section. From The Refugee Centre, we have Mr. Abdulla Daoud, the executive director.

I will now open it up to opening remarks from the various witnesses. Each witness will be provided five minutes. When you're very close and I want to indicate that you should be wrapping up your comments, I will hold this up. That applies not only to your opening remarks, when you get your five minutes, but also to when the members are asking you questions.

All that having been explained, I will now go to Mr. Bellissimo, who is joining us virtually.

Mr. Bellissimo, the floor is yours. You have five minutes.