Mr. Speaker, I do think that it is worth reviewing in committee.
Gary Anandasangaree Liberal
Bill passed the House, now waiting to be considered in the Senate, as of June 18, 2026
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This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament has also written a full legislative summary of the bill.
Part 1 amends various Acts to modernize certain provisions respecting the timely gathering and production of data and information during an investigation. It, among other things,
(a) amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(i) facilitate access to basic information that will assist in the investigation of federal offences through confirmation of service demands given to telecommunications service providers or judicial production orders for the production of subscriber information,
(ii) expedite the response to production orders by shortening the review process and clarify the ability of peace officers and public officers to receive and act on certain information that is voluntarily provided to them and to obtain and act on information that is publicly available,
(iii) specify certain circumstances in which peace officers and public officers may obtain evidence, including subscriber information, in exigent circumstances,
(iv) allow a justice or judge to authorize, in a warrant, a peace officer or public officer to obtain tracking data or transmission data that relates to any thing that is similar to a thing in relation to which data is authorized to be obtained under the warrant and that is unknown at the time the warrant is issued,
(v) provide and clarify authorities by which computer data may be examined, and
(vi) allow a justice or judge to authorize a peace officer or public officer to make a request to a foreign entity that provides telecommunications services — or that provides services by a means of telecommunication — to the public to produce transmission data or subscriber information that is in its possession or control;
(b) makes a consequential amendment to the Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act ;
(c) amends the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow the Minister of Justice to authorize a competent authority to make arrangements for the enforcement of a decision made by an authority of a state or entity that is empowered to compel the production of transmission data or subscriber information that is in the possession or control of a person in Canada;
(d) amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to, among other things,
(i) facilitate access to basic information that will assist the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in the performance of its duties and functions under section 12 or 16 of that Act through confirmation of service demands given to telecommunications service providers and judicial orders against those providers, and
(ii) clarify the response time for production orders; and
(e) amends the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act to provide and clarify authorities by which computer data may be examined.
Part 2 enacts the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act . That Act establishes a framework for ensuring that electronic service providers can facilitate the exercise, by authorized persons, of authorities to access information conferred under the Criminal Code or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act . It also makes related and consequential amendments to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 3 provides for the parliamentary review of Parts 1 and 2.
All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.
Bill numbers are reused for different bills each new session. Perhaps you were looking for one of these other C-22s:
This is a computer-generated summary of the speeches below. Usually it’s accurate, but every now and then it’ll contain inaccuracies or total fabrications.
Bill C-22 seeks to modernize "lawful access" rules, equipping law enforcement with tools to investigate digital crimes. While proponents argue it closes crucial investigative gaps, the bill faces criticism regarding potential overreach, the threshold for accessing private data, and the scope of metadata retention requirements.
Liberal
Conservative
NDP
Bloc
Green
Kelly DeRidder Conservative Kitchener Centre, ON
Mr. Speaker, I do think that it is worth reviewing in committee.
Kelly McCauley Conservative Edmonton West, AB
Mr. Speaker, I used to live in my colleague from Kitchener Centre's riding. It is a wonderful area. I am very glad that she is representing it.
The member brought up the point of a lack of trust in the government and a fear of a lack of transparency and accountability. The government will argue not to worry because inside the bill is a mandated comprehensive review of the legislation in three years. However, we have the same thing for the Access to Information Act, which the government has blown off; the Environmental Protection Act, which the government has blown off; the Lobbying Act, which the government has not done a review on; the Conflict of Interest Act; the Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Act; the CSIS Act; the Anti-terrorism Act; and the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act. For all of these acts, the government has blown off the legislative review.
Does my colleague trust that the government is going to do the review as mandated, or will it be just another broken promise from the Liberal government?
Kelly DeRidder Conservative Kitchener Centre, ON
Mr. Speaker, truthfully, I do not trust the Liberal government right now to handle crime and what is happening in our communities. I will share a very personal reason why that is.
Homicide is up almost 51% in Ontario, and that is not just a statistic for me. A very close and dear friend of mine was murdered and was part of these numbers last year. She was murdered by someone who had committed repeat violent offences, including stabbing, and that is how my friend died. She was stabbed to death.
The revolving door that is our justice system is a piece that has been ignored. We have put opposition motions forward to try to reverse what is happening in this country. No, I do not have faith in this coming forward with the Liberal government, and I do not trust that it will keep its promise on this. We will continue to hold the government accountable, and we will do this right.
Lawful Access Act, 2026Government Orders
Vancouver Granville B.C.
Liberal
Taleeb Noormohamed LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation
Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for Hull—Aylmer.
I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act respecting lawful access.
I want to start by asking two questions that I think Canadians are rightly asking.
The first is this: Are we meeting the moment when it comes to investigating crimes in a digital world? The tools that criminals use today, including encrypted communications, cryptocurrency and transnational digital networks, did not exist five years ago the way that they do now and certainly not at the scale at which they exist now. The crimes have not changed. Child exploitation is real and still exists in our world. Organized crime has not changed, and fentanyl trafficking is still there. What has changed, however, is how these crimes are carried out and the degree to which our existing investigative tools simply cannot keep pace.
The second question is just as important: Are we doing this in a way that protects the privacy of Canadians? If the answer to the first question comes at the expense of the second, then we have not done our job.
Bill C-22 seeks to answer both questions.
I think it is important to walk through what the legislation would do because there has been a lot of confusion and misinformation about what is being proposed. Bill C-22 has two parts that would work together. Part 1 would modernize legal authorities that law enforcement and CSIS need to investigate crimes in a digital environment. Part 2, the supporting authorized access to information act, would establish the technical requirements for electronic service providers, companies like our major telcos, to be able to comply with existing court-authorized processes. I want to emphasize the word “existing”. The bill would not create new surveillance powers, new intercept authorities or back doors into any one system. It would make the court-authorized processes that we already have, warrants and production orders, which are tools that have always required judicial oversight, functional in a world that has moved online.
Right now, if a judge were to issue a production order for evidence held by a service provider, there is no regulatory framework in Canada that requires the provider to have the technical capability to comply. I would ask us all to think about that for a moment. A judge can authorize access to evidence, but the system to carry that out may not exist. That is the gap this bill seeks to close.
Folks may ask, “Why now?” The answer is simple: The gap between criminal capability and law enforcement capability is widening, not narrowing. Two Supreme Court decisions, R. v. Spencer and R. v. Bykovets, have brought important clarity to the legal landscape around digital investigations. In Spencer, the court confirmed that police need a warrant to obtain basic subscriber information. In Bykovets, the court extended that principle to IP addresses. These rulings affirmed something important: Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital lives. This bill would respect that.
Those decisions also made clear how outdated our existing legislative framework really is. The law as it stands was not built to function in a world where, rightly, judicial authorization is required at these stages. Without the proper tools to operate within that reality efficiently, investigations are slowing at precisely the moments when timeliness matters the most.
Here is a practical reality. When police are investigating a serious crime, such as a child exploitation case, an extortion ring or an active threat, and have a court-authorized production order in hand, they still need to know which service provider holds the relevant data. Under the current framework, they cannot even ask that question. They cannot confirm whether a provider services a particular IP address, not the subscriber's identity, just whether the provider has any connection to that address at all. If they serve the order on the wrong provider, they have to start all over again. Meanwhile, evidence degrades, trails go cold and, in some cases, kids remain at risk.
That is the gap I am talking about. It is not hypothetical; it is playing out in investigations across the country, and it is costing us time that we simply do not have.
We are the only Five Eyes country and the only G7 member without a modernized lawful access framework. What that means practically is that Canadian law enforcement has had to rely on international partners to do what we should have been able to do ourselves. That is simply not a sustainable position for a country that takes both public safety and sovereignty seriously.
We also need to have the conversation about whatever concerns exist about privacy.
I would ask members to look carefully at how this bill is structured, because I think that when we do, we see something that should give Canadians confidence. The principle at the heart of this bill is proportionality. The level of oversight is calibrated to the level of intrusion. The more information one is seeking and the more it touches the privacy of an individual, the higher the bar that has to be cleared. Most Canadians, I believe, would agree with that instinct.
Let us walk through what that might look like in practice. At the most basic level, there is confirmation of service demand, which is a threshold question. It asks, does this particular provider service this IP address or phone number, yes or no? There are no subscriber details, no content, no further information. This simply tells investigators whether they are knocking on the door of the right service provider. Because it reveals so little, it does not require a warrant. We are not learning anything about a person. We are learning whether a company has a connection to an identifier.
The next step is the subscriber information production order. Now we are asking for something that starts to identify a person, such as a name, an address, a phone number or an email address. This is more intrusive, so, appropriately, it requires the consent or the authorization of a justice or a judge. However, it is still narrower than a general production order, because we are not seeking content or communications, just the basic identifiers that allow an investigation to proceed. Then, when an investigator needs access to the content of communication or more detailed data, the full weight of the existing production order and warrant process applies, such as judicial authorization and full oversight. These are the same protections that have always existed under Canadian law.
Each step up in what the police ask for comes with a corresponding step up in the scrutiny that is applied. The oversight is proportionate to the invasiveness. I would suggest that this is not just good policy. It is in line with what the courts have told us about privacy and privacy interests in a digital context. The courts have said that these things engage privacy. This bill seeks to address the instructions of the court. It builds a system where the protections match the intrusions.
I want to speak briefly to the safeguards, because they reflect something important about how this bill came together. Earlier proposals around lawful access raised legitimate questions. The government's members heard those concerns. We went back and refined our approach. The definition of subscriber information was narrowed to basic identifiers. Ministerial orders under part 2 are now subject to approval by the intelligence commissioner. Data retention requirements are limited to metadata only and for a maximum of one year, and the bill explicitly excludes content, web browsing history and social media activity.
These are not small refinements. They are the product of careful work to get the balance right. The bill also includes mandatory public reporting in a parliamentary review three years after royal assent. I think we have an obligation to build that kind of transparency into any legislation that touches on investigative power, and this bill does exactly that.
I would like to end with what matters to me as a dad, what should matter to all of us, because what matters is at stake. The crimes that depend most heavily on digital infrastructure, such as child exploitation, extortion, human trafficking and money laundering, are precisely the crimes where law enforcement currently lack the tools to investigate effectively.
The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has called for the modernization of our lawful access regime. The Canadian Centre for Child Protection has supported the advancement of this bill. The National Police Federation has recognized that this legislation is a long-overdue modernization that protects the rights of Canadians while keeping them safe. When law enforcement and child protection organizations are telling us the same thing, we have a responsibility to act, not recklessly, but deliberately, and with the kind of care that this bill reflects. Responsible governance means modernizing our tools while respecting the rights of Canadians, not one at the expense of the other, but both together.
Bill C-22 gives law enforcement the investigative tools that they need to combat serious crimes, while ensuring that the privacy of Canadians is protected through judicial oversight, proportioned authorities and robust accountability. It is built within the charter. It responds to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and it closes a gap that has left Canada behind every one of its Five Eyes allies and G7 partners. This is how we keep Canadians safe, not by standing still while the world moves forward, but by keeping pace with the threats and the values that define us.
I urge all members to support this bill.
Frank Caputo Conservative Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC
Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to rise on behalf of the people from Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola. When it comes to getting it right, there is no doubt that we need to address loopholes when it comes to access and when it comes to ensuring that information is available. The question is, how do we get it right? I am approaching this debate with that lens. We have ministerial orders that will not necessarily be transparent under this legislation. They will be in secret.
Does my hon. colleague have a position on that, namely whether they should all be in secret, or whether some should be in secret in order to protect vulnerabilities?
Taleeb Noormohamed Liberal Vancouver Granville, BC
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for the work he has put in, and for his advocacy on behalf of his citizens and, of course, all Canadians when it comes to matters of public safety.
The reality is that this bill works precisely within the limitations of the law. It works within the instructions of the court and ensures that the rights of Canadians are protected. That includes their privacy rights. It includes ensuring that the appropriate information is or is not disclosed within the bounds of what is acceptable in this country.
I would argue that one of the challenges we will always have in dealing with legislation like this is the question of whether seeking perfection is preventing us from getting done what is necessary and right in this moment. I believe this bill addresses those concerns and the concerns of my friend across. He should feel confident, as should Canadians, in this response from the government.
Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC
Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleague a very simple question. Upon reading the bill, some lawyers who specialize in privacy protection said that they had a bit of a problem with the definition of essential service providers, who may be subject to injunctions relating to technical capabilities for lawful access. That would be done through regulation, which is a major problem.
Does my colleague agree that we need to carefully review the definition of essential service providers?
Taleeb Noormohamed Liberal Vancouver Granville, BC
Mr. Speaker, the law is clear in that regard. We need to create an environment where service providers must work with and help law enforcement in a way that respects the law.
As the member opposite knows, it is important to make sure these definitions are clear and correct. This bill does that. It makes sure that the folks who are in the positions to provide that information, the service providers, know exactly what their responsibilities are and, within the constructs, are able to do the work and have the capacity to do what is required to address the needs of local police.
Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC
Mr. Speaker, this bill represents progress. First, Bill C-2 was introduced. Then, in light of the feedback we received from members, we went back to the drawing board to redraft the proposed legislation, seeking as much consensus as possible. Consultations were then held with all political parties in an effort to reach that consensus.
Does my colleague believe that Bill C-22 accurately reflects the discussions that we had with all parliamentarians?
Taleeb Noormohamed Liberal Vancouver Granville, BC
Mr. Speaker, as I said in my speech, this bill represents exactly that. It reflects the changing reality that we are currently facing. This bill is designed to protect rights while providing responsible support to law enforcement in a digital environment that has become very complex. It reflects both the desire and the need to take significant yet responsible action for Canadians.
Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC
Mr. Speaker, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to this bill, which is very important for the safety of Canadians and for Canada's role on the international stage.
Usually, when I give a speech, I like to speak off the cuff, relying on only a few notes. However, I will not do that today for two reasons. First, as a member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, I have several obligations, including the obligation not to disclose certain information that I am made aware of in the course of my work. Second, this issue is very relevant to the work of the committee of parliamentarians, which is made up of parliamentarians from all political parties in the House and the Senate. I am therefore going to be very focused and read my speech just to make sure that I do say anything that I should not.
The world around us is becoming increasingly digital and networked, and much of our day-to-day business, means of communication and overall lives relies on the Internet. I do not have to tell my colleagues about all of our different devices, which I will not use as a prop, such as smart phones, emails and the like, and instant messaging applications. All these things easily and instantly transcend provincial, national and international borders.
Unfortunately, this equally means that malicious actors like organized crime groups and violent extremists can explore this borderless nature of cyberspace for their own benefit. Canada's law enforcement agencies and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service need modern tools to help keep communities and Canadians safe. Therefore, we must close the capability gap in current legislation that prevents law enforcement's and CSIS's lawful access to data and ensure they can properly execute their mandates and protect Canadians.
Canada maintains an international reputation as a safe and peaceful country. To sustain this reputation, we must ensure that our legislation keeps pace with modern threats and technologies used in criminal and malicious activities.
“Lawful access” is a term we will hear a lot in association with this bill, and let us be very clear about what it means. Lawful access includes the tools and authorities to legally obtain certain information, data or communication during investigations. This information is often essential to generating leads on serious criminal activities and national security threats, as well as identifying and prosecuting those involved.
For decades, law enforcement and CSIS have had to operate without a legal framework requiring electronic service providers, or, as I will refer to them, ESPs, to develop and maintain lawful access capabilities. The current legal framework has not kept up with rapid advances in technology. Frankly, our laws are very much like me: They are analog in a digital world. This is the reason we have developed Bill C-22, which aims to facilitate law enforcement's and CSIS's timely access to basic subscriber information. I would like to make sure we understand it would be basic information. This is important because law enforcement and intelligence investigators need basic subscriber information, like a legal name or an address, to identify or exclude suspects, particularly during the preliminary stages of an investigation.
Bill C-22 would also establish a general legal framework to require electronic service providers to have the capability to respond to legally authorized requests, like a warrant or a production order, while respecting and protecting privacy interests and fundamental rights that all Canadians expect.
Bill C-22 would introduce provisions to support law enforcement agencies as they crack down on crime in an increasingly complex technological landscape, where the vast majority of evidence is online and in an electronic format. Law enforcement groups have sounded the alarm on the obstacles they encounter during investigations. They have sounded this alarm for years. Currently, law enforcement faces many challenges in obtaining the information it needs. Often, law enforcement does not know which service provider holds the customer account associated with the subscriber information, which also means it does not know who to serve with a production order. This challenge presently stalls and delays real-world investigations.
In many cases, law enforcement is required to seek multiple judicial authorizations to seek very basic information from different service providers, solely to confirm which provider services a phone number or an IP address. The current framework causes significant, unnecessary and harmful delays. Timely access to this basic information is crucial in all stages of an investigation and can spell the difference between securing key evidence and allowing criminals to slip through our fingers.
As another example, police could be aware that a provider holds certain information, but the company is unable to provide it because its systems do not possess the capability to do so and there is no legal requirement to carry such capabilities. We have heard many stories of law enforcement tracking a missing child or attempting to stop a terrorist attack, knowing which ESP to obtain the information from but being stonewalled by the provider's lack of lawful access capabilities. We cannot hope to fully protect Canadians and our communities if law enforcement and CSIS are unable to do their jobs. What is more, Canada may not be able to contribute meaningfully to joint investigations with its international partners or fully benefit from the support that our international partners provide to us. My colleague the parliamentary secretary spoke at length about this.
For this reason, Bill C-22 introduces new legislation to close this gap, whereby certain electronic service providers would need to develop and maintain the technological capabilities to respond to production orders. To be clear, this aspect of the legislation intentionally and explicitly would not allow for a so-called back door or any direct access for law enforcement or CSIS into electronic service providers' systems, and the legal authority to access that information would still always be required.
Bill C-22 proposes two ways by which an ESP could be asked to develop and maintain lawful access capabilities. First, those designated as core providers, such as traditional telecommunications companies, would have to abide by specific requirements set out in the regulations. Second, the Minister of Public Safety could issue a ministerial order to develop specific capabilities based on operational needs as new technologies develop.
We have heard the concerns from parliamentarians and stakeholders around privacy and oversight, and I want to reassure Canadians. I am actually very proud of the fact that the government took back this bill, listened carefully and amended it in ways to address the concerns that were raised. Bill C-22 now includes safeguards so that ESPs would not have to abide by any demands that would introduce systemic vulnerabilities in electronic protections, such as encryption breaking or what I called a “back door”. The bill would also require that the Minister of Public Safety obtain the approval of the intelligence commissioner before a ministerial order is valid, and it could be subject to further review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA.
Bill C-22 is about removing harmful barriers that impede active investigations, delay justice and put Canadians in harm's way. This is about bringing our legislation up to date, finally, with modern technologies and with that of our closest allies. This is about ensuring that extortionists, child predators, cybercriminals, hostile state actors and organized criminal networks would have nowhere to hide.
This is a responsible bill that would make the necessary changes, and I hope all members can see their way to support it.
Kelly McCauley Conservative Edmonton West, AB
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the intent of the bill and what the government is trying to accomplish, but there are a lot of concerns from Canadians about, perhaps, overreach by the government and about privacy.
I brought this up previously. There is a provision in the bill for parliamentary review after three years. We have an Order Paper question that just came back a couple of months ago that shows the government is behind on 106 legislative reviews. I have mentioned some of them. It appears the government is not actually performing the legislative reviews.
I am wondering if my colleague opposite can advise the House and Canadians on what would be done to ensure that this review would be done within the three years, as would be mandated.
Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC
Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member from the Edmonton area for raising this issue. It is a very important issue and one that I fully support, and I understand what he is bringing up.
I know, for example, that the NSICOP Act is behind in its five-year review. I can assure the hon. member that I would be happy to work in partnership with him and others to ensure that this review does happen. I will also commit to working with the member on these issues. This is not easily arrived at, in terms of Bill C-22. To ensure that Canadians have confidence in it, we do have to make sure that it has those reviews in that time. I would be happy to work with the member, and he has my full commitment to do so.
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
Mr. Speaker, since my colleague serves on the national security committee, can he tell me why the government is granting our law enforcement and intelligence agencies more power in this bill while also cutting the budget of the agency responsible for overseeing them?
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency's budget was slashed by 15% in the name of cost-cutting measures that can only be described as penny-pinching, when this is a very important issue.
Can my colleague from Hull—Aylmer explain that?
Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from Shefford for her very relevant question. We introduced this bill to give our national security and intelligence agencies new tools, modern tools, they could use to conduct investigations and protect Canadians.
That does not mean that we are going to be spending money the same way as before. We can take advantage of these new tools. Rather than using paper and sorting through paper files, we can use modern tools to do the work, making it much more efficient and effective.
I think that is one way of making sure that we are protecting Canadians.