Bill C-22

Lawful Access Act, 2026

An Act respecting lawful access

Part 1 amends various Acts to modernize certain provisions respecting the timely gathering and production of data and information during an investigation. It, among other things,
(a) amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(i) facilitate access to basic information that will assist in the investigation of federal offences through confirmation of service demands given to telecommunications service providers or judicial production orders for the production of subscriber information,
(ii) expedite the response to production orders by shortening the review process and clarify the ability of peace officers and public officers to receive and act on certain information that is voluntarily provided to them and to obtain and act on information that is publicly available,
(iii) specify certain circumstances in which peace officers and public officers may obtain evidence, including subscriber information, in exigent circumstances,
(iv) allow a justice or judge to authorize, in a warrant, a peace officer or public officer to obtain tracking data or transmission data that relates to any thing that is similar to a thing in relation to which data is authorized to be obtained under the warrant and that is unknown at the time the warrant is issued,
(v) provide and clarify authorities by which computer data may be examined, and
(vi) allow a justice or judge to authorize a peace officer or public officer to make a request to a foreign entity that provides telecommunications services — or that provides services by a means of telecommunication — to the public to produce transmission data or subscriber information that is in its possession or control;
(b) makes a consequential amendment to the Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act ;
(c) amends the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow the Minister of Justice to authorize a competent authority to make arrangements for the enforcement of a decision made by an authority of a state or entity that is empowered to compel the production of transmission data or subscriber information that is in the possession or control of a person in Canada;
(d) amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to, among other things,
(i) facilitate access to basic information that will assist the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in the performance of its duties and functions under section 12 or 16 of that Act through confirmation of service demands given to telecommunications service providers and judicial orders against those providers, and
(ii) clarify the response time for production orders; and
(e) amends the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act to provide and clarify authorities by which computer data may be examined.
Part 2 enacts the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act . That Act establishes a framework for ensuring that electronic service providers can facilitate the exercise, by authorized persons, of authorities to access information conferred under the Criminal Code or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act . It also makes related and consequential amendments to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 3 provides for the parliamentary review of Parts 1 and 2.

Lawful Access Act, 2026

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his very important intervention. I will get back to the substance of Bill C-22.

The different parties came together on what is essential for law enforcement to protect Canadians, and there are three major parts to the bill. I want to frame where the first one comes from. Twenty-five years ago, there were phone books that every household had. Bell Canada would deliver phone books to virtually every household. In that phone book, we could look up somebody's name and actually find a phone number. Similarly, there is a book that was a reverse lookup. We could essentially go to that phone book and, if we had a phone number, we could seek even the address of the individual whose address is attached to that phone number.

Technology has evolved extensively in the last three decades, and right now, we are at a point where that type of information is not readily available. Part 1 of the bill would essentially enable law enforcement to have basic, timely access to data and information. It would essentially be a confirmation-of-service demand, which means that law enforcement could go to an electronic service provider and ask it if an individual phone number is associated with the company. It would be a simple answer of yes or no. There is nothing beyond it. There are no other aspects. It is a very simple yes-or-no question.

For example, in a case of extortion, where there may be a number of telephone numbers attached to an extortion threat, very simply, the individual law enforcement agency could canvass a multitude of service providers to seek confirmation of service. It is a demand that would enable law enforcement to know which company is a service provider for that particular phone number or, in this case, ISP.

The second element is about taking subscriber information, which is also part of part 1. This would enable, again, law enforcement to get basic information about the individual. This would be email addresses, an address, perhaps, or a name that corresponds to the individual phone number or ISP, the Internet service, that would allow law enforcement to further the investigation.

Right now, what happens is that, from the time the phone number is received to the time there is the required production order to get the information, it could sometimes be eight, 10 or 12 months before that information is obtained. This is essentially handcuffing the work of law enforcement.

From there, law enforcement would be able to access additional information as the bill seeks for the ESP, for example, to have the technical capability to offer information on the subscribers' use. This is a critical component of it that is essentially part of the supporting authorized access to information act or SAAIA. It would ensure that ESPs and telecommunication companies can comply with requests to produce certain types of information, data and communications that law enforcement may seek.

From there, for law enforcement to get additional information on a particular case, situation or a set of circumstances, it would require warrants. Warrants are judicially authorized, judicially reviewed and subject to preparation by law enforcement agencies.

The third major component of this bill is a review process, because we know that the pace of progress and the pace of technology is moving at a speed that really is beyond what humans expect. With AI, we know there are enormous challenges and changes about to come forward. As a result, we have a review provision that would enable Parliament to do a statutory review of the legislation and be able to make necessary amendments as required.

Let me highlight some very important components of the support we have. First and foremost, NSICOP, which has members from the House as well as from the Senate, had a unanimous report to have a lawful access regime embedded in Canadian law.

I will quote the former police officer and investigator, the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner. It is rare for me to quote him, but I am super impressed with his depth of knowledge on this subject. He said, “Our current legislation means police face barriers around seizure authorities, causing investigative delays, sometimes with no way to get access to the information they need.”

This is an important piece of legislation, one that law enforcement demands and one that Canadians need for their safety and security. I would ask all parties to support this bill.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to rise on behalf of the people of Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola.

There are a lot of issues in this bill that I look forward to addressing at committee. One of the questions I have is about the role of ministerial orders. I am mindful of the fact that ministerial orders require approval from the intelligence commissioner, but then they then go into what I call a “vacuum” because they are kept confidential. I understand why they may need to be confidential.

Would the minister be open to discussing amendments that would require or enable some sort of transparency, whether it be that it is reviewed by a committee or somebody else, so it is not put into this vacuum that lacks transparency when these orders are made in confidence?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will say, at the outset, that we have consulted the intelligence commissioner and the provisions in this bill reflect what is required, in our opinion, for that transparency and accountability to take place. Of course, as I have always said, we look forward to this bill proceeding to committee and a more robust conversation taking place at the committee stage.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Speaker, yes, we agree with the minister that this bill is important.

My question is rather simple. Bill C-22 is much better than Bill C-2, and it includes more protections. That proves one thing: Bill C-2 was hastily thrown together without consultation. It is a good thing the government only had a minority. That meant that we did not have to pass that bill and that we are now able to debate Bill C-22, which is much better.

Is the minister willing to agree to amendments to further improve Bill C-22?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the answer is yes.

[Guillaume Deschênes-Thériault, Liberal, Madawaska—Restigouche, NB]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I want to commend the minister for his leadership in preparing this bill, which is another example of how our government is taking Canadians' safety seriously and acting accordingly.

As members know, law enforcement has long been asking us to modernize Canada's lawful access capabilities and powers. Bill C‑22 has been very well received by a number of organizations that represent law enforcement. I am thinking in particular of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, which is encouraging all members to work together to pass the bill quickly.

My question for the minister is, how were the various organizations representing law enforcement consulted in the drafting of Bill C‑22?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his question and for his work.

We did extensive consultations, on an individual basis, with the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime, the Minister of Justice, me and other colleagues. For example, we were in Halton, where we met with the regional police. I want to thank the member of Parliament for Oakville West for her advocacy.

We have gone across Canada and consulted with law enforcement agencies. This is a critical tool that they have asked to be made part of Canadian law.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I know the telecom sector is very concerned about the costs of complying with this legislation. I wonder what sort of compensation schemes, if any, the government anticipates putting into place to ensure this legislation can be complied with.

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we expect compliance from telecommunication companies and other service providers. We are not contemplating compensation. This is part of the CRTC's licensing. As members are aware, these are licences that are provided to the public, and in the public interest, it is important there is compliance from those service providers, which are essentially governed by Canadian law.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Secretary of State (Combatting Crime)]

Mr. Speaker, in an increasingly and rapidly evolving digital world, law enforcement services are having to mitigate new challenges in the face of a rising tide of criminal activity using technology. Let me give some examples that we have been hearing. Cases of extortion are on the rise, including with arson and with shootings. Pedophiles are exploiting children online, which often leads to sextortion or human trafficking. Just in 2024, we lost over $600 million to fraud and cybercrime, and often the victims of these crimes are our most vulnerable seniors.

This bill, in fact, would help law enforcement to be able to tackle these challenges. These new challenges have created a gap in ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. This gap is between what our investigators know and what our legal framework allows them to do about it. I am pleased to say that Bill C-22 would close the gap that currently exists.

When an investigator receives a tip, a phone number linked to an extortion ring or a child exploitation case, or information about a human trafficking network, they have the grounds to investigate. They are ready to move, but before they can seek a production order from a judge, they need the answer to one foundational question: Which telecom company services the number? Under our current law, there is no clear legal tool to get that answer. Police must rely on voluntary co-operation, which may come in days or weeks, or not at all. Investigators may have to spend considerable time and resources pursuing a provider, only to learn that the phone number was never that of the suspect, and then they have to start all over again. In some cases, this completely stalls the investigation, not because the officers failed, but because the law did.

Peel Regional Police has described cases where quick confirmation from a telecom company, a simple yes-or-no answer about whether a phone number is theirs, was the centre point of an entire investigation. That confirmation allowed them to seek a production order, identify a suspect and locate the victim quickly, but that outcome depended entirely on the provider choosing to co-operate voluntarily, as there was no legal framework requiring it. The victim was found because of goodwill, not because of the law, and goodwill does not always come. Goodwill is not what the justice system should rely on.

What does Bill C-22 actually do? Let me describe the following tools that would aid law enforcement officials.

The first tool is the confirmation of service demand. Police can ask a telecom or an Internet service provider one question: “Do you service this number or IP address?” It is a yes or no only. That is all: no content, no personal information, no communications. This question alone does not require a warrant, because the Supreme Court has recognized that a yes-or-no confirmation does not carry the same privacy weight as subscriber details or content.

The second tool is a new, faster, narrower production order specifically for subscriber information, which means name, address and account details. This would require a judge and require reasonable grounds. This process would be court-supervised at every step. It would provide a more direct path to that basic identifying information so that investigators can act quickly at the start of a case without waiting on a process designed for other, far more sensitive data.

The third tool requires core electronic service providers to actually have the technical capability to respond to lawful orders. Right now, and this is the part that is almost impossible to believe, a provider may receive a court order and be genuinely unable to comply, not unwilling but unable, because they have never built the infrastructure to respond. Investigations have stalled and in some cases gone cold for this reason alone.

Canada is currently the only Five Eyes G7 country without a lawful access regime. The United Kingdom has one. The United States has one. Australia and New Zealand also have them. We are not proposing something radical. We are proposing something long overdue.

The OPP commissioner and president of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Thomas Carrique, told reporters that he and many of Canada's police leaders have been sounding the alarm about the need for lawful access for the last 30 years, before smart phones and before the modern Internet.

I want to now speak directly to those who have raised concerns about this legislation, those who believe, as I do, that protecting the privacy of Canadians is a fundamental function of government. They are not wrong to ask the hard questions. They are not wrong to be skeptical. That is what democracy is all about. This is why I want to tell them how we are balancing bringing investigative capacity into the modern era while at the same time protecting the privacy rights of Canadians.

Every ministerial order requiring a provider to build lawful access capabilities must be reviewed and approved by the independent federal intelligence commissioner before it takes effect. Annual public reports would be required under this bill. The new subscriber production order would cover basic subscriber information and nothing more: no browsing history, no content and no communications without a separate and higher judicial threshold.

This bill was shaped directly by feedback from numerous consultations with law enforcement, civil liberties groups, telecoms and Internet service providers. It is also shaped by Supreme Court rulings that tell us precisely where the constitutional lines are. We drew those lines, built in oversight and narrowed the scope from what was proposed before, because we understand that we cannot afford to get this wrong. Technology continues to evolve, and this is the moment. We must act now. Victims and investigators cannot wait any longer for action.

This is what I need everyone in the House to understand: The alternative to this bill is not privacy. The alternative is impunity. A legal framework where investigators cannot confirm which telecom or Internet service provider to approach, and where the first step of an investigation depends on voluntary goodwill, is not a framework that protects rights. It is a framework that currently protects criminals.

Canada was built on a promise. We are not a country that chooses between safety and freedom. We built the charter because we believe we can have both. We built our courts because we believe oversight is strength and not weakness. That is exactly what this bill reflects: not surveillance, but accountability; not a back door, but a courthouse door, one that finally works in the digital world.

Every day we delay is another day an investigator hits a wall at the very first step of a case. Every day we delay, another victim waits, while police chase down voluntary confirmations that may never come. Every day the police have to wait, victims multiply. Every day we delay, there are families somewhere in the country waiting for answers that exist but that we choose not to allow investigators to reach.

I have heard it said that we cannot let security compromise freedom. I agree completely, and that is precisely why I am standing here today. Freedom without justice is not freedom. It is a promise we made and did not keep. The law, not the gaps in it, not the limitations of outdated legislation and not the absence of a framework that our allies have had for years, is the supreme authority of this country. It is time we made that mean something in the digital age.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to rise on behalf of the people from Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola.

One question I really hope the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime can answer right here and right now is a very clear question that relates to encrypted communications: Would this bill be going after encrypted communications, yes or no?

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the bill as it is right now does not provide for encrypted communications. I know that after the bill passes, there is a regulatory framework that is going to take place, but that, too, does not envision receiving the content of encrypted, detailed messages. What it does is connect who is sending those messages, and that is what is really important to law enforcement, so that they can catch those who are involved in criminal activity.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we have been told that all police services across Canada want this. They are demanding it. We understand them. This is a tool they need, but questions have been raised. For instance, lawyers who specialize in privacy protection want to know why the government set such a low threshold for collecting information.

Perhaps the secretary of state can explain to me why the government feels that reasonable grounds to suspect a crime will be committed—rather than reasonable grounds to believe that a crime will be committed—is sufficient to make a demand for information.

In law, there is a big difference between those two thresholds for demanding information.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, reasonable grounds to suspect have been used in other places in the Criminal Code. I think that is completely appropriate in this case, since these are the initial steps in an investigation.

Confirmation and subscriber information provide the police the ability to eliminate or narrow down suspects, so these are the first, initial steps of an investigation. At that point, having reasonable grounds to believe would be too high of a burden and would hinder investigations and us getting to the bottom of catching criminals.