Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-13 as the Bloc Québécois critic for international trade.
As members know, the bill enables the U.K.'s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Let me end the suspense and say that we are voting in favour of the principle of this bill. Although it changes a lot for the U.K., it does not change much for us. However, I will be voting no in committee during clause-by-clause review. I will be voting against the legal provisions that implement investor-state dispute settlement. I will come back to that later. Our final vote will depend on what happens there.
The question of process is an important one to return to. As the saying goes, the medium is the message, and very often, the process is the agreement. The process itself perfectly illustrates the need for the Bloc Québécois's Bill C‑228 dealing with transparency around treaties. When we debated our bill last week, I found it ironic that the Liberals said there was no need to pass it because a policy was already put in place back in 2008 and it is working. Under that policy, there has to be a 21-day period between the announcement of an agreement and the tabling of a bill for its implementation. At the very moment this argument was being served up, the Liberal government had violated this same policy only a few days earlier when it tabled Bill C‑13 15 days after announcing the agreement. If my math is correct, 15 days is less than 21 days. The government violated its own policy, which it held up as absolute. This is proof that a mere policy is not enough and legislation is required.
With Bill C‑13, as with all agreements before it, what we debate, study and vote on is not the agreement itself, but rather an implementation bill. We can therefore amend only a handful of clauses in a bill that is only a few pages long, and not the underlying provisions that in some cases run to thousands of pages. In the end, Parliament's function is simply to rubber-stamp it. We have been reduced to that in a very short time.
In that regard, last week I listened to Conservative members tell us that they were opposed to the Bloc Québécois's bill because it was too long and too complicated. However, it was the Conservatives' proposed amendments to the agreement with Ukraine that were all rejected and ruled out of order. If we had undertaken a clause-by-clause study of an actual agreement rather than a bill, the Conservatives would have been able to put forward their proposed amendments. Personally, I disagreed with all of their proposals. I voted against all of them, but I voted with the Conservatives to challenge the chair's decision to rule them out of order, because to me, that is democracy. The Conservatives should at least have the right to put their proposals forward. We are democratically elected representatives with a mandate to administer communities and public assets. That includes what we want to see in international agreements.
I would remind the House that Bill C‑228 provides for the systematic tabling of treaties in the House of Commons, a requirement to wait 21 days after tabling before taking any action to ratify a treaty, the publication of treaties in the Canada Gazette and on the Department of Foreign Affairs' website, the obligation to obtain the advice of the House before ratifying an important treaty, and consultation with civil society by a parliamentary committee before Parliament votes on the treaty.
Let us review some facts. In the United States, Congress assigns negotiating mandates, and this makes it harder for negotiating teams to reach unsatisfactory agreements. In Canada, the executive branch acts unilaterally without any parliamentary guidelines. In most industrialized countries, treaties are adopted by parliaments, and this forces the executive branch to maintain an ongoing dialogue in order to keep elected officials on board during negotiations, even if it means having to change directions at the negotiating table. In Canada, Parliament simply changes its domestic laws and has no ability to intervene in the treaty itself. Elected officials can only vote for or against it, and that is it. They no longer have a say in the matter.
By the same token, while provinces are responsible for implementing the parts of the treaty that pertain to their jurisdictions, they are not involved in the negotiations, as opposed to what is done in Europe, for instance, where member states play an integral part, even if the treaty is with the European Union. We often invite senior federal officials to committee hearings, and they tell us that they talk with the provinces. However, do they really seek their opinion?
The practice in Quebec for mandatory publication and parliamentary approval is modelled on the practice in the majority of European countries. The practice is already in force in Quebec. It is a practice, but it is not anchored in legislation. In 2016, Belgium almost refused to sign on to the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, even though it supported it. Under the Belgian constitution, the country cannot ratify an agreement without the consent of all its regions. Well, Wallonia was not in agreement and so even though Belgium had agreed to the treaty, it found itself in a bind and was forced to concede that its constitution prevented it from ratifying the agreement.
In the United States, negotiating mandates are vested in Congress. Congress is kept abreast of discussions and must approve the text prior to ratification. In Europe, the European Commission requires authorization from the European Parliament and a mandate from member states represented in the European Council before initiating trade negotiations. In many countries, parliamentary ratification of treaties is considered so vital that it has been embedded in their constitutions. This the case in France, Germany, Denmark, Italy and the United States, which have a constitutional requirement to seek legislative approval for some categories of international agreements prior to ratification.
Let us talk about the agreement itself. As I said earlier, the agreement will not change much. Canada is already party to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United Kingdom is also a party, because most of the partner countries have also agreed to its accession. In this case, we also agree, as long as this does not result in new breaches in supply management and cultural exemption is confirmed, but we do not agree with investor-state dispute settlement.
The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement made this concept more mainstream. Although it existed before, NAFTA popularized this system that allows a foreign company to sue a state. I use the adjective “foreign” loosely, because all a company has to do is incorporate in a state where it is considered to be foreign, even if, in fact, it is inside the country it wishes to sue. A foreign company can sue a state that has democratically adopted public policies in favour of, for example, more social justice, a higher minimum wage, a tax on soft drinks, as we saw in Mexico, environmental measures such as cancelling projects that could be harmful to the environment, or even the introduction of plain cigarette packaging that does not include a company's logo, as was the case in Australia. These are real examples. In defence of their right to make a profit, foreign investors have sued states for measures that were democratically adopted.
That makes it increasingly difficult for a state to legislate on issues related to social justice, the environment, labour conditions or public health if a transnational company believes that its right to profit has been violated. Some will say that those companies are unlikely to win. However, according to a 2013 report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, or UNCTD, states won those lawsuits 42% of the time, compared with 31% for corporations. The remaining disputes were settled out of court. That means that plaintiffs were able to override the political will of the states, either in whole or in part, in 60% of cases. However, that is a quantitative figure that overlooks the fact that, beyond the lawsuit itself, states proactively self-censor. Before adopting a policy or making a decision, they say to themselves that they could be sued and end up in court. A company that does not like a government's decisions could cause it to lose millions of dollars. States are under constant pressure as a result.
In 2014, a report by the European Union's Directorate-General for External Policies stated that this mechanism had a deterrent effect on public policy choices. It should also be noted that these disputes are very lucrative and involve lengthy processes. According to a document published by the non-governmental organizations Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute, it is well known that large law firms specializing in commercial law have an interest in getting involved in this area and are lining their pockets with such provisions.
The Bloc Québécois has always opposed such provisions and its position has not changed. We actually put it on the agenda for the convention. I take pride in the fact that it was my personal proposal; it came from my riding. At the Bloc Québécois convention in 2023, we included in the party's platform our rejection of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. I said it before: I will vote against those provisions when we proceed to a clause-by-clause review. After that, we will see what we do with the bill as a whole.
CUSMA, the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, eliminated that possibility when it replaced NAFTA, which made this mechanism mainstream. CUSMA eliminated this possibility for litigation between Canada and the United States, but the mechanism is still in force with respect to Mexico. We do not want to reopen that. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP, featured a version of the mechanism that was maybe not quite so bad, but in 2021 when the time came to vote for the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement, there was no mechanism that allowed that. It was part of the agreement, but if it was not in force in the European Union, it did not apply. Here, unfortunately, it will apply with the United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP. This is legally a bit complicated. While the mechanism that was in our agreement with the United Kingdom did not apply, it will now apply. This is a major sticking point for us. We will vote against these provisions. That is our promise to this House.
Now, there is something I find interesting in the agreement. By supporting the United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP, which is a first, Ottawa is reinforcing the argument in favour of Quebec's independence. We know that in a few years' time, the government will begin fearmongering again, but it will be in a bind because it will have proven the opposite point.
The United Kingdom is the first country to join the CPTPP since it was established. It is the first country to join even though it is not part of the Pacific Rim. Bill C‑13 seeking to ratify the UK's accession to the CPTPP, which we are debating today and will soon be voting on, is somewhat a continuation of Brexit when the British people voted for independence from the European Union. The European Union is a customs union that provides for the free movement of goods and services within the European Union and for uniform rules in external trade. It is like Canada. External trade is what the European Union refers to as a “Community power”, meaning that trade falls under Europe as a whole rather than with member states. Trade agreements are therefore signed with Europe and not with each individual member state. Agreements are not made with France, Belgium, Germany, and so forth.
In this regard, with respect to trade issues, Great Britain's experience with Brexit offers a glimpse of what Quebec will experience when it becomes independent. When Quebec exits Canada, which is a customs union like the European Union, with a central authority responsible for trade, the province will no longer be party to the trade agreements that bind us as a province of Canada.
During the 1995 stolen referendum, which is about to have an anniversary in two days, the “no” side amply highlighted this uncertainty by arguing that Quebec would lose its guaranteed access to export markets. People warned that Quebec would not automatically be a party to agreements negotiated and signed by Canada, which naturally included NAFTA. At the time, Jean Charest, the Conservative-Liberal-Conservative—no one can say for sure—said that we were entering a black hole. He used that term. He said that we were about to enter a period when businesses, perhaps only temporarily, would be denied their guaranteed access to other markets because Quebec would be excluded from agreements until it renegotiated them.
At the time, the “yes” side said that this assumption was illogical, that all of Quebec's partners would want to preserve their business ties with Quebec and that money talks. Back then, the uncertainty was pervasive.
When the Bélanger-Campeau studies were updated, constitutional expert Daniel Turp pointed out that, where treaties are concerned, countries apply a presumption of continuity if the newly minted country expresses an intention to remain bound by the treaty. An assumption is made that the country is going to remain a party to the treaty. However, Mr. Turp's demonstration dealt with UN treaties only. The trade agreement issue remained unresolved. The only trade treaty precedent at that time dated back to 1973, when Bangladesh separated from Pakistan to become independent.
Pakistan was part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, the forerunner of the World Trade Organization, and Bangladesh automatically became a member, so there was no period of limbo. However, GATT was a multilateral treaty that did not need to be renegotiated to admit a new member. It could be said that history had yet to be rewritten.
Brexit set the first precedent for a territory leaving a customs union to which it previously belonged and through which it was a signatory to a series of trade agreements. That issue was first resolved with the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement, a temporary trade continuity agreement. That allowed us to see what happens when a trading nation acquires or regains its trade sovereignty. In reality, it works very well.
After the Brexit referendum, all the countries that had an agreement with Europe rushed to approach the United Kingdom to propose agreements that would ensure that nothing changed in terms of trade relations. The Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement maintained the status quo and ensured stability until the agreements could be permanently renegotiated. That prevented any gap in trade relations during the transition period.
As we speak, Canada has not renegotiated its permanent agreement with the United Kingdom, but it still has its temporary agreement, so free trade continues and trade relations continue. The U.K. concluded such an agreement with all the partners that had concluded an agreement with Europe. It even concluded an agreement with Japan, which did not have an agreement with Europe. There is no change in the access to global markets that British products enjoyed.
In the next few years, when the time comes to actively discuss choosing independence for Quebeckers, the federal scarecrows will return, but they will all have been deflated by the federal government itself. In real life, there is no vacuum in the aftermath of independence. Furthermore, by joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership while the European Union is not a member, the United Kingdom is even demonstrating an interest in regaining the freedom to choose its trading partners. By supporting it today, Ottawa is reinforcing the argument in favour of Quebec independence.
