I think this is the fundamental issue.
When we had just Task Force Kandahar—only Canadians, and even before the arrival of the first U.S. battalion—we were in a very small, concentrated area. Many of you visited some of the various camps. Camp Wilson, just west of Kandahar, used to have about 250 soldiers. There are in excess of 3,000 soldiers in that camp right now, and they are patrolling throughout the whole western area of Kandahar down to Zhari District. They are not only removing the Taliban from the area but they are staying. That has obviously increased the number of statistics in terms of IEDs found, IED hits, and IEDs cleared.
This is a fundamental issue: you need to have sufficient troop density in order to hold ground. What we've seen now is that the addition of the 12,000 U.S. forces, but really significantly the additional ten Kandaks or ten battalions of Afghan army, plus the advent of more capable Afghan police, is having a dramatic effect upon what's happening on the ground.
In the short term it will be manifested through increases in violence rates. I still remember a visit earlier in the year, when I brought this up to the attention of other ambassadors. Their comment was: “When the troops hit the Normandy beaches, violence went up in France.” The fact is that when you put in that number of soldiers you are going to have a significant level of kinetic activity on the ground and at the same time, as seen through open sources that I know you're all reading, a number of Taliban fighters who have been removed from the battlefield and very significantly Taliban leaders who have been removed form the battlefield not only by the troop density but also by all the other essential intelligence and surveillance enablers that are allowing the soldiers to be smart, to be precise, to be surgical. From our standpoint, if we can do a mission without firing a shot, that's success. The reality is, that is having a significant effect on the ground.
I would look to Dand District. I know we've testified here before on Dand District, just south of Kandahar; we talked about a model village a year and half ago. We had to fight to move into Dand District, but working with a very capable district leader and funnelling development aid through our DFAIT and CIDA colleagues and through that district leader, enabling him to demonstrate leadership, Dand District is now advanced far beyond many other districts in the area. That's where the minister mentioned 26 schools. Two years ago there were no schools; this year, there are 26 schools. That's because they have the density of forces.
Panjwai is the same way now. It's because of the density of forces on the ground. That's why we saw a significant change of context.