Evidence of meeting #6 for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was afghanistan.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

David Sproule  Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Arif Lalani  Director General, Policy Planning Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Excellency Ron Hoffmann  Ambassador, Embassy of Canada to the Kingdom of Thailand

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, colleagues. This is meeting number 6 of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, on Wednesday, April 21, 2010.

Again I will remind everyone that we are televised, so you may want to adjust your cellphone and your BlackBerry so they aren't ringing in the middle of today's testimony.

Towards the end of today's meeting we are going to have time for committee business; the first portion will be public and we may consider having two minutes of in camera after that. But for certain the first portion of the meeting will be public.

We're going to continue our study on the transfer of Afghan detainees. We have a panel of witnesses this afternoon.

I'm pleased to welcome, from the Embassy of Canada, Ron Hoffmann, Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand.

Welcome to our committee.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, we have Arif Lalani, director general, policy planning bureau, and David Sproule, deputy legal adviser and director general of the department's legal affairs bureau.

Welcome.

I understand that each of you will have a few comments to make. Then we'll go into a couple of rounds of questioning. We thank you for being here today.

I believe Mr. Sproule is going to start this afternoon.

We look forward to your comments.

3:30 p.m.

David Sproule Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Thank you, Chairman.

My name is David Sproule. I am the deputy legal adviser and director general of the legal affairs bureau in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I served as Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from October 6, 2005, until April 17, 2007. Immediately prior to this assignment, I was Canadian High Commissioner to Bangladesh.

Let me begin by noting that an overriding consideration for Canada and the more than 60 partner countries present in Afghanistan is to ensure that the impact of our assistance endures. We do this by helping develop strong and democratic institutions, thus equipping Afghanistan to assume full responsibility for its own long-term governance and security needs.

When I began my assignment in Afghanistan in 2005, our diplomatic personnel at the embassy consisted of five staff--me, one political officer, and three development officers--and three administrative staff, 10 security staff, and Glyn Berry at our PRT in Kandahar. Our objective was to transform our tiny operation into a full-fledged embassy and PRT, with the necessary personnel, infrastructure, communication systems, financial controls, and security protections to operate effectively in an austere and dangerous environment.

Our embassy and the PRT staff focused on diplomatic and development work designed to support our armed forces security operations.

We reported on our meetings and program work with President Karzai and key cabinet ministers; officials in government ministries and agencies; the Kandahar provincial administration; assembly and development councils; the Afghan army, police, and judiciary, a large number of UN and international organizations; other embassies; human rights organizations; and NGOs.

We also organized visits for numerous Canadian ministers, members of Parliament, government officials, the Prime Minister, the Governor General, and private sector experts from Canada.

A number of issues dominated our work, including: making the case for more NATO soldiers and Afghan army and police to assist Canadian Forces in Kandahar; enhancing training programs for the Afghan army and police; developing a bilateral aid program to meet Afghanistan's long-term development needs, such as education, micro-credit for women, and health, as well as some of the immediate requirements in Kandahar, including roads, wells, and police stations; strengthening Afghan institutions such as Parliament and the judiciary; addressing the problems of corruption and narcotics trafficking; negotiating formal and informal arrangements with the Afghanistan government; protecting our civilian personnel; preparing human rights reports; and supporting the detainee file.

A number of factors informed our efforts during this period with regard to the detainee issue, the key ones being: our presence in Afghanistan is based on relevant UN Security Council resolutions and a recognition that we are there at the invitation of the Afghan government and in support of its sovereignty; the need to facilitate the detention of enemy personnel to prevent them from returning to the battlefield and again threatening the lives of Canadian soldiers and diplomats; and, the importance of ensuring that persons captured by Canadian Forces are afforded proper standards of treatment and humane living conditions.

In this regard, let me add that we have never been under any illusion about the human rights situation in Afghanistan; it is part of the reason we are there.

To ensure appropriate treatment of detainees transferred to Afghan authorities, we needed to be satisfied that they were going to treat them in accordance with the international legal standards to which Afghanistan was committed. We obtained assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government through the December 2005 arrangement. We made sure there was a firm understanding by Afghan authorities of both the importance Canada attached to this issue and the essential role we were playing in their country.

In order to further strengthen Afghan assurances, the 2005 arrangement recalled the existing entitlement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, to oversee detainees and the explicit recognition of the constitutional role and responsibility of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the AIHRC, in monitoring the treatment of detainees. We then began to make significant investments in Afghan institutions to build their capacity in the judicial system, policing, and corrections fields.

The first detainee issue that arose during my tenure was the operational delays in notifying the ICRC of those turned over to Afghan authorities by our forces and the insufficient detail provided to allow individuals to be properly tracked within the Afghan detention system by the ICRC. We sought to address these issues in mid-2006 by providing more detail on each individual turned over and putting in place a system to facilitate the direct notification of ICRC offices in Geneva and Kabul.

We also focused on the poor conditions in Afghan detention facilities and the inadequate training of prison personnel. We responded by mounting a Corrections Canada assessment visit to detention facilities in Kandahar to determine how facilities could be improved and the training of prison staff upgraded, and we funded initiatives in both these areas. Two CSC personnel and additional RCMP officers were assigned to our PRT in Kandahar to establish training and mentoring programs in prisons and for police. Visits were conducted by Corrections officials to Sarposa prison and to the NDS facility in the province.

Let me emphasize that while we were under no illusion about the possibility of mistreatment within Afghan detention facilities, we made crystal clear to the most senior Afghan government officials the importance Canada attaches to the proper treatment of detainees that we turned over to their authorities. We had received strong assurances that the Government of Afghanistan took its human rights obligations seriously.

Nevertheless, to further enhance protections against the potential for abuse or mistreatment in Afghan detention facilities, we improved the access and funding for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission staff. We began developing a diplomatic contingency plan outlining steps to take vis-à-vis the Afghan authorities in the event allegations of abuse were brought to our attention. In conjunction with this, we refined our standing operating procedures on the handling of detainees.

The initiation of these measures coincided with the decision to significantly increase the number of diplomatic personnel in Kabul and Kandahar to facilitate support and programming along these lines of effort, including on detainee issues. Full implementation of these plans took place during the tenure of my successor, Arif Lalani, who will now describe these measures in more detail.

Thank you.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you very much, Mr. Sproule.

Mr. Lalani.

3:40 p.m.

Arif Lalani Director General, Policy Planning Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon.

My name is Arif Lalani. I am currently the director general for policy planning at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

I served as the Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2007 to August 2008. Immediately prior to that, I was ambassador to Jordan and to Iraq.

You have heard from my colleague David Sproule and from others about the complexities of the mission—civilian and military—in Afghanistan, over the entire period of Canada's approximately 10-year engagement there.

I would like to speak to you today briefly about the objectives during my time in Afghanistan, and specifically about the detainee transfer file. My predecessor, and officers from the embassy and headquarters, had been developing a number of aspects of the file. David has outlined those to you.

I arrived in Kabul on April 27, 2007. The detainee file was a priority from day one. On my first day in the embassy, on April 28, instructions were sent by headquarters to negotiate a supplemental arrangement to the 2005 detainee transfer agreement using guidelines that had been drafted between the post and headquarters over a period of months. The embassy completed negotiations within six days--by May 3. The conclusion of the supplemental arrangement and other actions Canada took allowed us to address some key aspects of the file.

The detainee transfer arrangements up to that point had three main challenges: notification to the ICRC and other authorities, despite improvements, remained convoluted; we did not have in place a monitoring regime by Canadian personnel for detainees transferred by Canadian Forces; and, record-keeping, by all concerned, needed to improve.

In the month following the arrangement, Canada had begun to implement an increasingly robust monitoring regime, with Canadian civilian personnel, to augment the work of others, such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the ICRC. We had changed our notification process to the ICRC so that officials in Kandahar notified the Kandahar ICRC office immediately, in addition to the notifications to Kabul and Geneva. We had developed and began to implement standard operating procedures for the transfer of detainees and for their monitoring. And we had dispatched a technical assistance mission of Canadian experts to examine further options for training, and the provision of equipment to assist Afghans with the management of detainees in Afghan facilities.

Over the course of the year, Canada focused on implementing the transfer regime, including identifying key people accountable for the file, and the creation of a database of detainees transferred by the Canadian Forces.

We had other urgent work at the embassy and in the country, of course.

There were two strategic objectives.

First of all, we were trying to help develop and implement a whole-of-government engagement in Afghanistan, one that saw our military and civilian effort managed in a coherent fashion, and in the midst of a counter-insurgency campaign.

We needed to ensure that a civilian engagement could occupy the space secured by the military so that we could concentrate on the governance, development, and stabilization efforts that were required.

That's why we doubled the civilian presence in Kandahar and Kabul, including officers to monitor detainees.

Second, we needed to have influence commensurate with our investment. Canada was one of the top donors to Afghanistan. On any given file--education, police reform, micro-finance loans for women--Canada was among the top three donors. It was my job, on a daily basis, to ensure that we had voice on these issues, that we were developing policy with headquarters and in Kandahar that would have an impact in a way that would help Afghans build governance institutions, strengthen economic development, and provide for their own security.

Ron Hoffmann joined the embassy in August 2007 as deputy head of mission. His position was created so that we could operate at a fundamentally different level--as a major actor across a number of priority files--with the deputy helping to run the embassy and its operations, including the Kandahar civilian component, and the head of mission focused on influencing the outcome of the files in which we were so heavily invested.

To summarize my time there, Mr. Chairman, Canada was in the process of strengthening its civilian presence in Kabul and Kandahar in order to achieve our national objectives. The detainee transfer file was an important component of a highly charged and important set of issues that the embassy team and I managed.

With regard to detainees, by the time I arrived at the embassy, the reporting had done its job. The issues had been acknowledged. Decisions had been made. Within a week, there was a formalized agreement in place.

Then came the work of ensuring that everyone involved--both the Afghan authorities and all Canadian personnel--fully understood the new system and were working together towards the goal of the agreement. That work was carried out in an outstanding manner by my successor, Ron Hoffmann, and all of the dedicated Canadians who risked their lives to serve in Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you very much, Mr. Lalani.

Ambassador Hoffmann, please.

3:45 p.m.

His Excellency Ron Hoffmann Ambassador, Embassy of Canada to the Kingdom of Thailand

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Ron Hoffmann. As I have already explained it, I am currently Canada's Ambassador to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and I am Canada's Ambassador designate to Myanmar (Burma).

I arrived in Kabul in early August 2007 to establish the new position of deputy head of mission. I was later appointed ambassador, ultimately serving two years in Kabul. As Arif already explained, my arrival coincided with a significant transformation of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.

In the deputy role, I was considered head of chancery, responsible for infrastructure, staffing, services, health and safety, security policy, quality of life, and oversight of mission administration generally. This was in the context in a dramatic growth in civilian resources. One of my key functions was to help foster mission cohesion, to ensure an effective whole-of-government approach, but also to effect stronger integration and coordination of our Kabul and Kandahar operations.

I was also asked to contribute to our detainee management strategy. My role was to ensure that we had the right people doing the right things in monitoring; that we were analyzing and communicating issues clearly and thoroughly; that we were reacting effectively and appropriately to new issues and developments as they arose; that our military and civilians were working in concert; that our support and investments in Afghan institutions were appropriate to their needs; and that our engagement with other parties, including--and perhaps especially--the Afghan government, was active and effective.

When I arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 2007, the security situation was an increasing concern, in Kabul and elsewhere.

Our duty of care obligations to our personnel were taken seriously and overseeing stepped-up mission security in the capital became a major preoccupation.

Given the influx of additional personnel, we also worked to address seemingly mundane but critical issues like embassy overcrowding, the need to upgrade the chancery and staff quarters, and the strengthening of internal operations and accountabilities.

I was appointed ambassador on the departure of Arif in the summer of 2008. This assured continuity of leadership in the programming we were delivering. It also meant familiarity with key issues we were contending with, and it enabled us to capitalize on the high-level relationships that we already had in place.

I travelled to Kandahar more than 20 times, many of them with Afghan ministers or heads of agencies to support the leadership role of the country's own government. In my last six months alone, I travelled with ministers of defence, interior, education, transport, and health, and the head of the NDS respectively.

We witnessed tangible successes, but it was nevertheless a difficult and a costly time. The security situation remained dire in parts of the country and was worsening in some areas.

There were daily reminders that we were in a country at war, a country fighting for its survival and for its future. For instance, as ambassador, I led Canada's in-country efforts to secure the safe release of CBC journalist Mellissa Fung, kidnapped in the early fall of 2008. I worked closely with senior Afghan authorities, with whom I engaged in person or by phone about 20 times during the final frenetic week of Mellissa's captivity, before she was freed by the Afghan government.

And, during my time in theatre, it was with great sadness that I bid farewell to a Canadian man or woman in uniform at an average rate of one every 12 days. We lost Canadian civilian humanitarian workers in this period too.

We were fully aware, Mr. Chairman, that the Afghan state and Afghan society in general suffered from the profound consequences of two generations of war. This reality touched every aspect of life in Afghanistan. While conditions were improving and the state was modernizing and gaining in capacity, progress was slow and it was uneven.

We were well aware that the justice and security institutions suffered from deep systemic challenges. The Government of Afghanistan had a clear official policy prohibiting torture and abuse of prisoners, but we were also aware, Mr. Chairman, of gaps in human capacity, insufficient training, poor infrastructure, and some very crude conditions. I was personally confident, however, that the measures Canada had in place during my time in Afghanistan meant that the risk of mistreatment faced by detainees the Canadian Forces transferred to Afghan authorities was minimized.

Like my predecessors before me, as ambassador and as a deputy closely involved with the issues, I was frequently in discussion with Afghan authorities at multiple levels across government, including ministers and, regularly, the Afghan president, to reaffirm Canada's expectations and to discuss Afghanistan's detainee management obligations. They understood the importance we attached to the issue and they understood their commitments in this regard.

Our monitoring system and our steadfast demands for humane treatment of detainees were respected and applauded by allies, by independent groups, and by Afghan senior level authorities. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission articulated this view to me, as did NATO ISAF, the UN, and key international organizations.

In addition to our robust system of monitoring and our ongoing advocacy and senior level engagement, Canada invested in improvements in Afghan prison capacity and infrastructure. We provided training, equipment,and improvements in physical conditions in facilities both in Kandahar and in Kabul.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that Canadians had and have much to be proud of. It wasn't easy in Afghanistan, and we weren't perfect. We learned lessons continually and we regularly adjusted. But Canada's military, our diplomats, development workers, and police and corrections staff worked increasingly in unison, and they did their best to fulfill their mandates and their responsibilities.

I look forward to trying to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Mr. Hoffmann.

We'll proceed with the first round of questioning.

We'll start with Mr. Rae.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Thank you very much.

Ambassadors, welcome. It's good to hear from you, and if I may so, it's good to see all of you. I've had the opportunity of working with you and with your staffs in Kabul and in Canada, I very much appreciate your being here.

I don't want to be unfair, and I don't want to put words in anyone's mouth, but it seems to me that sort of the thrust of your testimony is that there was a policy decision.

Ambassador Sproule, you referred to it in the second paragraph of your statement, I think, where you talk about the fact that the building up of the capacity of the Afghan government and Afghan institutions was a pre-eminent goal, and therefore, the decision was made that the transfers would take place, and every step would be taken--and successive steps were taken--on the basis of hard experience to deal with the problems that happened as a result of the initial decision to make transfer the policy. Is that a fair summary?

3:55 p.m.

Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

David Sproule

Yes. I think it's fair to say that we continually were developing our policies to enhance our ability on the detainees issue and confront changes and challenges that we met along the way.

3:55 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Again, I'm not trying to be difficult. I'm just trying to understand the dilemmas of public policy here.

The implication of that decision was that there would be a risk of mistreatment of people who were being transferred.

3:55 p.m.

Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

David Sproule

We were confident that the risk was minimal, particularly given the mandate that the ICRC had in terms of access to detention facilities, as well as the recognition of the role of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

3:55 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

But you yourself, Ambassador Sproule, used the phrase in your comments: “...we have never been under any illusion about the human rights situation in Afghanistan...”. What exactly do you mean by that?

3:55 p.m.

Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

David Sproule

Well, we were aware of systemic deficiencies, lack of training, and the need for Canada to assist in this regard so that they could upgrade their abilities to oversee detainees, provide proper care facilities, and to do that long after we left Afghanistan.

3:55 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

But, Ambassador Lalani, what you describe in your report is that the experience.... I mean, when you arrived, the collective experience appeared to be...because there were number of reports. There were the UN reports, and presumably a number of other reports, not all of which we've seen, as well as your own internal reports; Mr. Colvin, who has testified, and others who were on the ground, who have testified to the effect that torture was widespread in the system. The state department's reports every year state that torture is a widespread phenomenon in Afghan institutions.

The words “Geneva Convention” don't appear in anyone's paper here. I understand the need to build up Afghan institutions, but if the consequence of that policy decision is that people are sent to a risk of torture or mistreatment or abuse, isn't that a problem in terms of how we've lived up to our international obligations?

3:55 p.m.

Director General, Policy Planning Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Arif Lalani

Sure. Let me answer since you referred to me. Everything that we have described, and, I think, everything that we have done, that Canada has done, over our entire engagement there--as I think you were quite right to point out--has been to make sure that we were in compliance with our Geneva Convention and other obligations.

Part of that, as every other country has noted in the arrangements they have signed with the Afghan authorities, is also a responsibility Afghanistan has under its constitution and under its international obligations. But if you look at what everyone has been trying to do, it is to say that of course there are shortcomings. As David pointed out, and as others have pointed out, that's why we're there. We wouldn't be there if there weren't problems across the board. And you know that. You've been there yourself.

What I think the regime on monitoring has been trying to do is to say, can we monitor, with frequency, and can we get the process in a way that allows people to have confidence when we transfer detainees? I think the system that we have put in place, that has been referred to by others, frankly, as one of the most rigorous systems that is in place at the moment, provided that confidence. I think we have seen that work over the course of the past few years.

4 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

But just to complete the trio, Ambassador Hoffmann, despite the rigour of the reviews, the rigour of the visitations, and the rigour of the attempts to improve the capacity of the Afghan prisons, we continue to have stories. We can all argue about how compelling they are or how true they are, but we continue to hear serious allegations--I'll put it that way--about mistreatment, some of them so serious that the army itself says, “We can't transfer, we're going to halt transfers.” There has been a series of times when we've halted transfers--

4 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you.

4 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Just to complete the sentence, if I may Mr. Chairman--

4 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Go ahead.

4 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

--doesn't that show that, throughout the piece, this risk of abuse has been an underlying reality of public policy as it relates to us and other allies in Afghanistan?

4 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Mr. Rae.

Please answer very quickly, Mr. Ambassador.

4 p.m.

Ambassador, Embassy of Canada to the Kingdom of Thailand

His Excellency Ron Hoffmann

Mr. Rae, I'd say that some of this information on these developments came to light not in spite of our program, but because of our program, and there are a number of lessons from our experience.

As we geared up this new system of monitoring, which was a robust one and a complex one and required enormous resources from and risk to Canadian personnel to implement, we thought that risk was worth it, because it was important to deliver those obligations; they didn't cover a range of allegations over the course of us stepping up that program. As that monitoring program matured, was refined, and became more and more robust, the number of allegations actually declined. In 2008 we had none, and I think that was a demonstration of the positive outcome of what we were doing.

For the allegations that there were, we took every allegation seriously. Some people complained about the food, about the air conditioning, about the toilet paper, and then the range was much more serious. There was one very compelling allegation of all that we have had--the 10 or 12 over the entire time of our experience with 200 or so visits. There was one that we felt was materially much more significant than the rest, and we took the actions that we think are appropriate to that. That did involve a lengthy stop to the transfer of detainees while we implemented the program and the action plan that we had pre-established, which was to work with the AIHRC, the ICRC, and the Afghan government across the board to ensure that the measures that we expected were needed were actually implemented. And there were no transfers until we were fully satisfied.

4 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you very much, Ambassador.

We'll move to the Bloc Québécois.

Madame Lalonde, vous avez sept minutes.

4 p.m.

Bloc

Francine Lalonde Bloc La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC

Thank you, gentlemen.

I would like to first address Mr. Sproule. Mr. Sproule, thank you for your testimony.

You said that you started after the 2005 arrangement was signed. In your words, as written on page 4: “We have never been under any illusion about the human rights situation in Afghanistan.“ We can also read in the middle of the paragraph: “We obtained assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government through the December 2005 arrangement.” Had you read the arrangement carefully? Were you aware of any shortcomings for Canada, such as the inability to make visits at any given time? What assurances did you obtain from the highest levels of government for the detainees? I want to point out, by the way, that you were required to identify the detainees, to monitor them and to be able to visit them at all times.

4 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

Mr. Sproule, you have the floor.